Facts:

Raj Kumar, a permanent driver in a public school, was retrenched by the Managing Committee of the school, citing his surplus status. The case involved the appellant challenging the retrenchment under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the Delhi School Education Act, 1973.

Issues:

Compliance with the retrenchment procedure under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act.

Validity of retrenchment under Section 8(2) of the Delhi School Education Act.

Interpretation of Section 25F(c) as a mandatory condition.

Held:

The court determined that a driver employed by a school, being a skilled person, is a workman under the Industrial Disputes Act, making its provisions applicable.( Para 20)

The court held that notice under Section 25F(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act had not been served on the State Government, and the previous decision treating it as directory was outdated. The court clarified that Section 25F(c) is a mandatory condition, and non-compliance renders the retrenchment invalid.( Para 24-27)

The court rejected the argument that compliance with Section 8(2) of the Delhi School Education Act was unnecessary. Section 8(2) was deemed a procedural safeguard to prevent arbitrary or unreasonable termination, and the striking down of the provision in a previous case was found to be incorrect.( Para 30-33)

Section 8(2) was valid at the time of the appellant's retrenchment, and its non-compliance rendered the termination order bad in law. The rights and liabilities of the parties were to be considered based on the law at the date of the institution of the suit.( Para 34-35)

The termination was held invalid for non-compliance with mandatory provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act and Section 8(2) of the Delhi School Education Act. Back wages and other consequential benefits were awarded to the appellant.( Para 36)

The court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment and declaring the retrenchment and termination order as bad in law.( Para 37)

Facts:

The suit was filed for a declaration that a Municipality survey Khatiyan entered in favor of defendant No.1 was wrong and not binding on the plaintiff.

The trial court dismissed the suit on the grounds of Res Judicata and lack of cause of action.

The plaintiff filed a revision before the High Court, contending that no appeal was maintainable as the suit was dismissed without framing an issue.

Issues:

Whether the order dismissing the suit on the ground of Res Judicata, without framing an issue, is appealable or revisable under the Civil Procedure Code.

Held:

The impugned order dismissing the suit on the ground of Res Judicata does not cease to be a decree on account of a procedural irregularity of non-framing an issue. The court ought to treat the decree as if the same has been passed after framing the issue and on adjudication thereof, in such circumstances.

What is to be seen is the effect and not the process. Even if there is a procedural irregularity in the process of passing such order, if the order passed is a decree under law, no revision lies under Section 115 of the Code in view of the specific bar under sub-Section (2) thereof. It is only appealable under Section 96 read with Order 41 of the Code.

The appeal is hence allowed. The impugned order is set aside. However, the respondent/plaintiff is granted liberty to file an appeal against the order dated 03.08.2010 passed by the High Court. In case such an appeal is filed within six weeks from today, the same shall be treated to have been filed within time, in view of the facts and circumstances of this case.

Facts:

After the Coimbatore serial blasts, a conspiracy was alleged involving two groups (A1 to A6 and A8 to A13) to murder Dr. Sridhar, a BJP Town Secretary in Trichy. The daughter of the deceased (PW1) witnessed the murder, and charges were filed against the accused under various sections, including Sections 148, 302, 201, and 120B of IPC.

Issues:

The reliability of eyewitness testimony, the validity of the Test Identification Parade, the alignment of medical evidence with the eyewitness account, and the proof of conspiracy.

Held:

The Court discussed the testimony of PW1 and PW65, emphasizing the complementary nature of their statements. The reliability of PW1's account, despite her absence from the inquest report, was affirmed.( Paragraph 11)

The Court addressed the validity of the Test Identification Parades, rejecting claims of delay and asserting that a joint TIP involving two accused persons was acceptable. The Court highlighted the corroborative nature of TIP as opposed to substantive evidence.( Paragraph 16)

Regarding the conspiracy, the Court referred to statements from witnesses PW23, PW36, and PW37. The difficulty in proving a conspiracy was acknowledged, and the Court emphasized the importance of circumstantial evidence.( Paragraph 18)

The Court set aside the conviction of A7, reasoning that his presence and connection to the common object were doubtful. The acquittal was based on the lack of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.( Paragraph 24)

Facts:

T. Kocha, the appellant, claims to be a member of the Thandan Community.

Dispute arises regarding the Thandan Community's status as Scheduled Caste, leading to litigation.

Amendments to the Scheduled Castes Order and subsequent orders from the State Government create confusion regarding the inclusion of Ezhavas/Thiyyas known as Thandans.

Issues:

Whether the appellant belongs to the Thandan Community and is entitled to the benefits of Scheduled Caste status.

The validity of the State Government's orders determining the appellant's caste identity.

Held:

The Court held that, as per the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order 1950 and subsequent amendments, Thandans, including Ezhavas/Thiyyas known as Thandans, were entitled to the benefit of being treated as Scheduled Castes until 29.08.2007. The 2007 Amendment Act, while excluding Ezhavas and Thiyyas known as Thandans from Scheduled Castes, was prospective and did not affect those who had already been conferred the benefit. The interim orders allowing the appellants to continue in service were upheld, treating them as validly appointed members of the Scheduled Caste category.

Facts:

The case involves the murder of a woman, with the First Information Report (FIR) filed by the deceased's husband accusing appellant no. 2 and another person. Witnesses during the investigation later implicated the husband in the murder. Harassment of witnesses and subsequent threats by the husband led to further legal actions.

Issues:

The quashing of the cognizance order by the High Court. Additionally, the court considered the harassment of witnesses, the threat against appellant no. 1, and statements made under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in quashing the cognizance order. It emphasized that the CJM had taken cognizance after careful consideration of the case diary, charge sheet, and relevant material, finding a prima facie case against the accused. The High Court's failure to consider threats against appellant no. 1 and statements indicating the husband's involvement in the murder was noted. The seriousness of the murder charge was highlighted, suggesting that interference with criminal proceedings should be approached with caution.

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal, stating that the High Court failed to appreciate the material and exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Facts:

Original lessee granted a 20-year lease with an option for a further 20 years.

Lessee sought lease renewal, but breaches occurred, leading to DDA's termination notice in 1968.

Four years later, the lease was terminated.

Original lessee filed a suit for perpetual injunction against DDA.

During the second appeal, the property was sold to the respondent through a compromise decree.

Issues:

Validity of the termination notice issued by DDA.

Legal consequences of the sale of the property to the respondent during the appeal.

Whether DDA's acceptance of rent amounted to a renewal of the lease.

Held:

The courts below erroneously declared the termination notice as illegal, arbitrary, and without jurisdiction. This conclusion is contrary to the lease deed and relevant sections of the Delhi Development Act, 1957, and the Delhi Development Authority (Disposal of Developed Nazul Land) Rules, 1981. (Para 24)

The Transfer of Property Act, 1882, is not applicable to public premises. The property is classified as public premises under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. Automatic lease renewal is rejected, and acceptance of rent does not constitute renewal. (Para 25)

In the absence of a lease renewal, the original lessee becomes an unauthorized occupant under the 1971 Act. The lessee failed to remedy breaches, leading to the termination notice in 1972. (Para 27)

The status of the original lessee as an unauthorized occupant is affirmed under Section 2(g) of the 1971 Act. Pleadings about estoppel and acceptance of rent after lease expiry are deemed irrelevant. (Para 28)

The High Court's order substituting the respondent is declared unlawful. The sale of the property by the original lessee to the respondent is void, as the original lessee had no right, title, or interest in the property. (Para 32)

Without lease renewal, the original lessee becomes an unauthorized occupant. The respondent's payment of conversion charges does not confer rights. The concept of converting leasehold rights to freehold is inapplicable. (Para 33)

The original lessee and the respondent are liable for damages due to unauthorized occupation. The DDA is entitled to claim damages under Section 7 of the 1971 Act. (Para 34)

The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. The DDA is permitted to take immediate possession without eviction proceedings. Damages are recoverable from the original lessee, his heirs, and the respondent. Costs of Rs. 1 lakh are awarded to the DDA. (Para 35)

Facts:

A sample of Kesar Pista ice cream taken by the Food Inspector was declared adulterated by the Public Analyst.

One co-accused exercised the right under Section 13(2) of the PFA Act, leading to the request for re-analysis by the Central Food Laboratory (CFL).

CFL reported the received sample as deteriorated and not fit for analysis.

High Court rejected the appellant's plea to quash the case, citing the deteriorated second sample and delayed availability of the third sample.

Issues:

Whether the right under Section 13(2) exercised by one accused should benefit all co-accused?

The impact of the CFL's report superseding the Public Analyst's report under Section 13(3).

The validity of the High Court's reasoning in rejecting the appellant's plea.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that once the right under Section 13(2) is exercised by any accused, it results in the supersession of the Public Analyst's report, benefiting all co-accused.

Section 13(3) was interpreted to mean that the certificate from the CFL supersedes the Public Analyst's report.

The Court disagreed with the High Court's reasoning, stating that individual prayers for separate re-analysis may not be practical in cases with more than three accused.

The impugned order was set aside, and the appellant's plea for quashing the criminal complaint was allowed.

FACTS:

The appeals arise from a common judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Patna.

The appellant, Kedar Mishra, claimed the right of pre-emption under Section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act.

The High Court dismissed the writ petitions on the grounds of non-compliance with Rule 19 and Form L.C. 13, affirming the order of the Additional Member, Board of Revenue.

ISSUES:

Whether there was sufficient compliance with Rule 19 and Form L.C. 13 in the pre-emption applications.

The correctness of the High Court's pedantic approach in viewing the treasury challan.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not justified in finding insufficient compliance with Rule 19 and Form L.C. 13. The appellant had deposited ten percent of the purchase money, and a technical mistake in mentioning the correct head in the treasury challan should not be a ground for dismissal. The Court criticized the pedantic approach, emphasizing that the appellant, being a raiyat, may not be expected to know the correct head. The Court remitted the matter back to the Board of Revenue for reconsideration on merits.

Facts:

The appellant filed a suit for eviction against respondent no. 1 due to the expiration of a license agreement in 1994.

The competent authority ordered the respondent to hand over possession and pay compensation from November 1, 1994.

Despite possession being handed over in 2001, the compensation was not paid, and the respondent allegedly transferred the property to respondent no. 2.

Issues:

Whether the transfer of the property to respondent no. 2 was a legitimate transaction or an attempt to frustrate the execution of the compensation order.

Held:

The High Court's order setting aside the attachment was challenged in the Supreme Court. The Court held that the MOU and unregistered agreement were collusive and created to obstruct the execution of the compensation order. The MOU's indication that the mother would remain in possession even after the daughter's marriage raised doubts about the legitimacy of the documents. The appeal is allowed.