Facts:

A sample of Kesar Pista ice cream taken by the Food Inspector was declared adulterated by the Public Analyst.

One co-accused exercised the right under Section 13(2) of the PFA Act, leading to the request for re-analysis by the Central Food Laboratory (CFL).

CFL reported the received sample as deteriorated and not fit for analysis.

High Court rejected the appellant's plea to quash the case, citing the deteriorated second sample and delayed availability of the third sample.

Issues:

Whether the right under Section 13(2) exercised by one accused should benefit all co-accused?

The impact of the CFL's report superseding the Public Analyst's report under Section 13(3).

The validity of the High Court's reasoning in rejecting the appellant's plea.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that once the right under Section 13(2) is exercised by any accused, it results in the supersession of the Public Analyst's report, benefiting all co-accused.

Section 13(3) was interpreted to mean that the certificate from the CFL supersedes the Public Analyst's report.

The Court disagreed with the High Court's reasoning, stating that individual prayers for separate re-analysis may not be practical in cases with more than three accused.

The impugned order was set aside, and the appellant's plea for quashing the criminal complaint was allowed.

FACTS:

The appeals arise from a common judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Patna.

The appellant, Kedar Mishra, claimed the right of pre-emption under Section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act.

The High Court dismissed the writ petitions on the grounds of non-compliance with Rule 19 and Form L.C. 13, affirming the order of the Additional Member, Board of Revenue.

ISSUES:

Whether there was sufficient compliance with Rule 19 and Form L.C. 13 in the pre-emption applications.

The correctness of the High Court's pedantic approach in viewing the treasury challan.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not justified in finding insufficient compliance with Rule 19 and Form L.C. 13. The appellant had deposited ten percent of the purchase money, and a technical mistake in mentioning the correct head in the treasury challan should not be a ground for dismissal. The Court criticized the pedantic approach, emphasizing that the appellant, being a raiyat, may not be expected to know the correct head. The Court remitted the matter back to the Board of Revenue for reconsideration on merits.

Facts:

The appellant filed a suit for eviction against respondent no. 1 due to the expiration of a license agreement in 1994.

The competent authority ordered the respondent to hand over possession and pay compensation from November 1, 1994.

Despite possession being handed over in 2001, the compensation was not paid, and the respondent allegedly transferred the property to respondent no. 2.

Issues:

Whether the transfer of the property to respondent no. 2 was a legitimate transaction or an attempt to frustrate the execution of the compensation order.

Held:

The High Court's order setting aside the attachment was challenged in the Supreme Court. The Court held that the MOU and unregistered agreement were collusive and created to obstruct the execution of the compensation order. The MOU's indication that the mother would remain in possession even after the daughter's marriage raised doubts about the legitimacy of the documents. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

Complainant, N. Ramakrishnappa, accused the appellant, V. Sejappa, of demanding a bribe of Rs. 5,000 for processing pension papers and other retiral benefits.

A trap was laid by the Lokayukta police, resulting in the appellant's arrest with tainted currency notes.

The trial court acquitted the appellant, citing reasons such as absence of proof of demand, doubts about document submissions, and inconsistencies in witness testimonies.

The High Court reversed the acquittal, holding that a valid sanction was obtained and the prosecution proved demand and acceptance.

Issues:

Validity of sanction order.

Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification.

Held:

The Supreme Court, upon careful consideration, found the trial court's acquittal to be reasonable. Key observations and holdings include:

Sanction Order: The trial court found the sanction order invalid, but the High Court disagreed. The Supreme Court concurred with the High Court's view, emphasizing the validity of the sanction obtained from the competent authority.

Demand and Acceptance: The prosecution failed to establish the essential element of demand on 09.12.1997. Witness testimonies, including that of PW-2, raised doubts about the purpose of the payment, suggesting it was for a legitimate transaction (purchase of diesel).

Burden of Proof: The Court reiterated that for an offense under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, proof of demand is essential. Mere recovery of money is not enough; there must be evidence of voluntary acceptance as a bribe.

Appellate Court's Discretion: The Court stressed that if the trial court's findings are reasonable and plausible, the appellate court should refrain from interference. The reluctance to disturb the trial court's conclusions is justified unless there is manifest error or injustice.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring the trial court's acquittal.

Facts:

The appellant, K.S. Joseph, appealed against the rejection of his plea to quash the order of cognizance and issuance of summons in a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The case involved bounced cheques and issues related to delay, jurisdiction, and compliance with procedural requirements.

Issues:

The delay in filing the complaint, non-compliance with Section 200 of the CrPC, and the absence of a mandatory inquiry under Section 202 of the CrPC due to the appellant residing outside the jurisdiction of the Magistrate.

Held:

The judgment rejected the plea based on Section 200 of the CrPC, citing Section 145 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, which allows the complainant's evidence to be given on affidavit. The court found substance in the plea regarding the delay of 62 days in filing the complaint. The Magistrate's orders did not show any application of mind to the issue of delay or to the requirement of Section 202 of the CrPC. The court set aside the orders of the High Court and the Magistrate, directing the Magistrate to reconsider the relevant facts, including the issue of delay and the requirement of an inquiry under Section 202 of the CrPC. The appeals were allowed.

Facts:

Review petitions filed against the judgment of the Supreme Court dated 18th July 2013.

Initially placed before a Three-Judge Bench but later ordered to be heard by a Five-Judge Bench.

Notice served through substituted service, and matters heard after necessary publication.

Various judgments on the scope of review considered.

Issues:

Whether the judgment in Christian Medical College case needs reconsideration.

Whether the majority view in the original judgment failed to consider binding precedents.

Whether there was a lack of discussion among the members of the Bench before pronouncing the judgment.

Held:

The Court, after thoughtful consideration, decided that the judgment in Christian Medical College case needs reconsideration.

The Court did not provide detailed reasons at this stage to avoid prejudicing the re-hearing of the matters.

Referring to the Constitution Bench judgment in Sheonandan Paswan, the Court noted that a review bench might not be faulted for not giving detailed reasons to avoid pre-judgment.

The majority view in the original judgment was criticized for not considering some binding precedents, and it was noted that there was no discussion among the members of the Bench before pronouncing the judgment.

The Court allowed the review petitions, recalled the judgment dated 18th July 2013, and directed that the matters be heard afresh.

Facts:

The case involves the migration of EWA spectrum to UL, allowing existing BWA spectrum to transition to UL. TRAI initiated the process in 2012, leading to the issuance of the National Telecom Policy-2012 by the Government of India. The Department of Telecommunications (DoT) made a policy decision allowing migration to UL from UASL and ISP to UL regime.

Issues:

The validity of the migration decision, potential undue benefit to a specific respondent, the fixation of additional fees, spectrum usage charges, and the scope of judicial review in matters of government policy.

Held:

The court upheld the validity of the government's decision to permit migration to the UL regime, considering it a lawful and well-considered policy decision.

The migration decision applied uniformly to all holders of BWA spectrum, and any benefit to a specific respondent was deemed a consequence of the policy rather than favoritism.

The fixation of an additional fee of Rs. 1,658 crores for migration was found justifiable, given the government's discretion to ensure a level playing field among different license classes.

The court affirmed the validity of fixing Spectrum Usage Charges (SUC) at 1% of Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR), citing TRAI's recommendation and government scrutiny.

Judicial review was deemed to have a limited scope, with minimal interference in government policies, especially those formulated by experts.

Decision: The writ petition was dismissed, confirming the legality and validity of the government's decisions and policies in the telecommunications sector.

Facts:

The State Government initially stayed further action on granting mining leases for non-scheduled minerals, citing the need for a detailed environmental impact study. Subsequently, the State informed the lessee-company of its intention not to grant leases for mineral sand to private parties. Revision applications were filed, and the Central Government directed the State Government to reconsider the case.

Issues:

The ownership of mineral deposits, the power of the State Government to reserve areas for mining operations, and the compliance with legal procedures outlined in Section 17A of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957.

Held:

The Parliament has exclusive authority over the regulation and development of mines and minerals. The State Government owns mineral deposits but must comply with the procedures outlined in Section 17A for valid reservations. The absence of Central Government approval renders the State Government's claim of reservation untenable.

Section 17A(2) empowers the State Government to reserve areas, subject to Central Government approval. The State's failure to follow the prescribed procedure makes its claim invalid. The State can make a valid reservation by adhering to the legal process.

While the dismissal of the appeals does not prevent the State from invoking its right under Section 17(A)(2) by issuing a notification, adherence to the legal procedure is essential.

State Governments own mines and minerals within their territories, and the MMDR Act does not diminish this ownership. The State has discretion in granting mining leases. Section 17A(2) allows the State Government, with Central Government approval, to reserve areas for mining operations by government companies.

The State's policy decision aligns with the MMDR Act and the National Mineral Policy. The State's duty to balance developmental needs and environmental protection is consistent with Section 18 of the MMDR Act. The High Court was correct in upholding the State Government's policy decision. The appeals fail and are hereby dismissed.

Facts:

The case involves a complaint filed under sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, against a company and its executive director and directors. The High Court, using its power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, quashed the summons issued in the case.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and whether the accused company's directors can be held criminally liable for the offense under Section 138.

Held:

Upon a perusal of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the Court emphasizes that the section creates constructive liability on persons responsible for the conduct of the business of the accused company. In this case, accused Nos. 4 and 5, who were whole-time Directors of the company, were alleged to be in charge of day-to-day business activities. The High Court erred in concluding that there were no specific averments in the complaint against them.

Decision: The Court allows the appeals and directs the Magistrate to proceed with the complaint, stating that the summons were wrongly set aside by the High Court.