Facts:

T. Kocha, the appellant, claims to be a member of the Thandan Community.

Dispute arises regarding the Thandan Community's status as Scheduled Caste, leading to litigation.

Amendments to the Scheduled Castes Order and subsequent orders from the State Government create confusion regarding the inclusion of Ezhavas/Thiyyas known as Thandans.

Issues:

Whether the appellant belongs to the Thandan Community and is entitled to the benefits of Scheduled Caste status.

The validity of the State Government's orders determining the appellant's caste identity.

Held:

The Court held that, as per the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order 1950 and subsequent amendments, Thandans, including Ezhavas/Thiyyas known as Thandans, were entitled to the benefit of being treated as Scheduled Castes until 29.08.2007. The 2007 Amendment Act, while excluding Ezhavas and Thiyyas known as Thandans from Scheduled Castes, was prospective and did not affect those who had already been conferred the benefit. The interim orders allowing the appellants to continue in service were upheld, treating them as validly appointed members of the Scheduled Caste category.

Facts:

The case involves the murder of a woman, with the First Information Report (FIR) filed by the deceased's husband accusing appellant no. 2 and another person. Witnesses during the investigation later implicated the husband in the murder. Harassment of witnesses and subsequent threats by the husband led to further legal actions.

Issues:

The quashing of the cognizance order by the High Court. Additionally, the court considered the harassment of witnesses, the threat against appellant no. 1, and statements made under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in quashing the cognizance order. It emphasized that the CJM had taken cognizance after careful consideration of the case diary, charge sheet, and relevant material, finding a prima facie case against the accused. The High Court's failure to consider threats against appellant no. 1 and statements indicating the husband's involvement in the murder was noted. The seriousness of the murder charge was highlighted, suggesting that interference with criminal proceedings should be approached with caution.

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal, stating that the High Court failed to appreciate the material and exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Facts:

Original lessee granted a 20-year lease with an option for a further 20 years.

Lessee sought lease renewal, but breaches occurred, leading to DDA's termination notice in 1968.

Four years later, the lease was terminated.

Original lessee filed a suit for perpetual injunction against DDA.

During the second appeal, the property was sold to the respondent through a compromise decree.

Issues:

Validity of the termination notice issued by DDA.

Legal consequences of the sale of the property to the respondent during the appeal.

Whether DDA's acceptance of rent amounted to a renewal of the lease.

Held:

The courts below erroneously declared the termination notice as illegal, arbitrary, and without jurisdiction. This conclusion is contrary to the lease deed and relevant sections of the Delhi Development Act, 1957, and the Delhi Development Authority (Disposal of Developed Nazul Land) Rules, 1981. (Para 24)

The Transfer of Property Act, 1882, is not applicable to public premises. The property is classified as public premises under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. Automatic lease renewal is rejected, and acceptance of rent does not constitute renewal. (Para 25)

In the absence of a lease renewal, the original lessee becomes an unauthorized occupant under the 1971 Act. The lessee failed to remedy breaches, leading to the termination notice in 1972. (Para 27)

The status of the original lessee as an unauthorized occupant is affirmed under Section 2(g) of the 1971 Act. Pleadings about estoppel and acceptance of rent after lease expiry are deemed irrelevant. (Para 28)

The High Court's order substituting the respondent is declared unlawful. The sale of the property by the original lessee to the respondent is void, as the original lessee had no right, title, or interest in the property. (Para 32)

Without lease renewal, the original lessee becomes an unauthorized occupant. The respondent's payment of conversion charges does not confer rights. The concept of converting leasehold rights to freehold is inapplicable. (Para 33)

The original lessee and the respondent are liable for damages due to unauthorized occupation. The DDA is entitled to claim damages under Section 7 of the 1971 Act. (Para 34)

The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. The DDA is permitted to take immediate possession without eviction proceedings. Damages are recoverable from the original lessee, his heirs, and the respondent. Costs of Rs. 1 lakh are awarded to the DDA. (Para 35)

Facts:

A sample of Kesar Pista ice cream taken by the Food Inspector was declared adulterated by the Public Analyst.

One co-accused exercised the right under Section 13(2) of the PFA Act, leading to the request for re-analysis by the Central Food Laboratory (CFL).

CFL reported the received sample as deteriorated and not fit for analysis.

High Court rejected the appellant's plea to quash the case, citing the deteriorated second sample and delayed availability of the third sample.

Issues:

Whether the right under Section 13(2) exercised by one accused should benefit all co-accused?

The impact of the CFL's report superseding the Public Analyst's report under Section 13(3).

The validity of the High Court's reasoning in rejecting the appellant's plea.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that once the right under Section 13(2) is exercised by any accused, it results in the supersession of the Public Analyst's report, benefiting all co-accused.

Section 13(3) was interpreted to mean that the certificate from the CFL supersedes the Public Analyst's report.

The Court disagreed with the High Court's reasoning, stating that individual prayers for separate re-analysis may not be practical in cases with more than three accused.

The impugned order was set aside, and the appellant's plea for quashing the criminal complaint was allowed.

FACTS:

The appeals arise from a common judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Patna.

The appellant, Kedar Mishra, claimed the right of pre-emption under Section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act.

The High Court dismissed the writ petitions on the grounds of non-compliance with Rule 19 and Form L.C. 13, affirming the order of the Additional Member, Board of Revenue.

ISSUES:

Whether there was sufficient compliance with Rule 19 and Form L.C. 13 in the pre-emption applications.

The correctness of the High Court's pedantic approach in viewing the treasury challan.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not justified in finding insufficient compliance with Rule 19 and Form L.C. 13. The appellant had deposited ten percent of the purchase money, and a technical mistake in mentioning the correct head in the treasury challan should not be a ground for dismissal. The Court criticized the pedantic approach, emphasizing that the appellant, being a raiyat, may not be expected to know the correct head. The Court remitted the matter back to the Board of Revenue for reconsideration on merits.

Facts:

The appellant filed a suit for eviction against respondent no. 1 due to the expiration of a license agreement in 1994.

The competent authority ordered the respondent to hand over possession and pay compensation from November 1, 1994.

Despite possession being handed over in 2001, the compensation was not paid, and the respondent allegedly transferred the property to respondent no. 2.

Issues:

Whether the transfer of the property to respondent no. 2 was a legitimate transaction or an attempt to frustrate the execution of the compensation order.

Held:

The High Court's order setting aside the attachment was challenged in the Supreme Court. The Court held that the MOU and unregistered agreement were collusive and created to obstruct the execution of the compensation order. The MOU's indication that the mother would remain in possession even after the daughter's marriage raised doubts about the legitimacy of the documents. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

Complainant, N. Ramakrishnappa, accused the appellant, V. Sejappa, of demanding a bribe of Rs. 5,000 for processing pension papers and other retiral benefits.

A trap was laid by the Lokayukta police, resulting in the appellant's arrest with tainted currency notes.

The trial court acquitted the appellant, citing reasons such as absence of proof of demand, doubts about document submissions, and inconsistencies in witness testimonies.

The High Court reversed the acquittal, holding that a valid sanction was obtained and the prosecution proved demand and acceptance.

Issues:

Validity of sanction order.

Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification.

Held:

The Supreme Court, upon careful consideration, found the trial court's acquittal to be reasonable. Key observations and holdings include:

Sanction Order: The trial court found the sanction order invalid, but the High Court disagreed. The Supreme Court concurred with the High Court's view, emphasizing the validity of the sanction obtained from the competent authority.

Demand and Acceptance: The prosecution failed to establish the essential element of demand on 09.12.1997. Witness testimonies, including that of PW-2, raised doubts about the purpose of the payment, suggesting it was for a legitimate transaction (purchase of diesel).

Burden of Proof: The Court reiterated that for an offense under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, proof of demand is essential. Mere recovery of money is not enough; there must be evidence of voluntary acceptance as a bribe.

Appellate Court's Discretion: The Court stressed that if the trial court's findings are reasonable and plausible, the appellate court should refrain from interference. The reluctance to disturb the trial court's conclusions is justified unless there is manifest error or injustice.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring the trial court's acquittal.

Facts:

The appellant, K.S. Joseph, appealed against the rejection of his plea to quash the order of cognizance and issuance of summons in a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The case involved bounced cheques and issues related to delay, jurisdiction, and compliance with procedural requirements.

Issues:

The delay in filing the complaint, non-compliance with Section 200 of the CrPC, and the absence of a mandatory inquiry under Section 202 of the CrPC due to the appellant residing outside the jurisdiction of the Magistrate.

Held:

The judgment rejected the plea based on Section 200 of the CrPC, citing Section 145 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, which allows the complainant's evidence to be given on affidavit. The court found substance in the plea regarding the delay of 62 days in filing the complaint. The Magistrate's orders did not show any application of mind to the issue of delay or to the requirement of Section 202 of the CrPC. The court set aside the orders of the High Court and the Magistrate, directing the Magistrate to reconsider the relevant facts, including the issue of delay and the requirement of an inquiry under Section 202 of the CrPC. The appeals were allowed.

Facts:

Review petitions filed against the judgment of the Supreme Court dated 18th July 2013.

Initially placed before a Three-Judge Bench but later ordered to be heard by a Five-Judge Bench.

Notice served through substituted service, and matters heard after necessary publication.

Various judgments on the scope of review considered.

Issues:

Whether the judgment in Christian Medical College case needs reconsideration.

Whether the majority view in the original judgment failed to consider binding precedents.

Whether there was a lack of discussion among the members of the Bench before pronouncing the judgment.

Held:

The Court, after thoughtful consideration, decided that the judgment in Christian Medical College case needs reconsideration.

The Court did not provide detailed reasons at this stage to avoid prejudicing the re-hearing of the matters.

Referring to the Constitution Bench judgment in Sheonandan Paswan, the Court noted that a review bench might not be faulted for not giving detailed reasons to avoid pre-judgment.

The majority view in the original judgment was criticized for not considering some binding precedents, and it was noted that there was no discussion among the members of the Bench before pronouncing the judgment.

The Court allowed the review petitions, recalled the judgment dated 18th July 2013, and directed that the matters be heard afresh.