Royalty – Controlled Release of Water – The expression 'Royalty' is compensation for rights and privileges enjoyed by the grantee, typically derived from agreements between the grantor and the grantee. Unlike a tax imposed statutorily without reference to special benefits, royalty is based on the benefits conferred through an agreement. Controlled release of water for INDSIL and CUMI's electricity generation is considered a benefit or privilege under such agreements, justifying the charges [Paras 1-24].

Contractual Agreements – Legality and Interpretation – Agreements between the State and private entities for hydel projects included terms for controlled release of water, recognized as a benefit necessitating payment. Disputes arose over the imposition and calculation of these charges. The Supreme Court held that the agreements’ terms were binding, and the controlled release benefited the companies, thereby justifying the imposed charges [Paras 25-44].

Discrimination and Classification – CPPs vs. IPPs – The classification between Captive Power Producers (CPPs) and Independent Power Producers (IPPs) was challenged as discriminatory. The court found valid grounds for different treatment based on the end-use of generated power and contractual terms. The distinction was deemed rational and non-arbitrary, dismissing claims of discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution [Paras 22.1-28].

Decision – Appeals dismissed – The charges for controlled release of water were upheld, based on the agreements and the benefits derived from the controlled water supply. The terms were not unconscionable or arbitrary, and both CPPs and IPPs were correctly classified based on their operational and contractual contexts [Para 44].

Disciplinary Enquiry – Delay and Prejudice – Allegations against the respondent, a police officer, included the unauthorized operation of a "Gunda Squad" leading to a custodial death. The Tribunal quashed the charge-sheet due to a two-year delay, deemed prejudicial to the respondent’s career prospects. The Supreme Court held that delay alone does not invalidate proceedings unless demonstrable prejudice is shown. The Tribunal’s decision was reversed as the delay did not substantiate prejudice affecting the respondent’s ability to defend himself [Paras 1-14].

Charge-Sheet Specificity – Vagueness of Charges – The charge-sheet was found to be specific and detailed, contrary to the Tribunal’s finding of ambiguity. The Supreme Court emphasized the requirement for clarity in allegations to ensure fair disciplinary proceedings [Paras 10-13].

Judicial Review – Role of High Courts and Tribunals – The Supreme Court criticized the High Court for merely affirming the Tribunal’s judgment without proper scrutiny. Emphasized the importance of reasoned decisions in upholding procedural justice in disciplinary actions [Paras 13-14].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Tribunal and High Court orders set aside – Disciplinary enquiry to proceed expeditiously with specific directives for timely conclusion and consideration of the respondent’s retiral dues [Para 14].

Contract Law – Payment Disputes – Jurisdiction of Writ Court – The Supreme Court held that the Gauhati High Court erred in directing payment to the respondent based on the Joint Survey Report for road construction without considering the disputed facts about the authenticity of the report and the quantum of work done. The Court emphasized that such disputed questions of fact should be resolved through arbitration, as stipulated in the contract, rather than through a writ petition. The High Court does not have the expertise to assess measurements or construction works, and the matter is better suited for the agreed arbitration forum [Paras 17, 24]​​.

Arbitration – Dispute Resolution – The Court reiterated that when a contract specifies arbitration as the mode of dispute resolution, parties should be directed to that forum. The presence of serious disputes about the facts, such as the validity of the Joint Survey Report and the quantum of work completed, necessitates arbitration. The High Court's jurisdiction should be sparingly exercised in pure contractual matters, especially when alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are available [Paras 18, 24]​​.

Decision - Appeal allowed – The Supreme Court quashed the Gauhati High Court's order and dismissed the writ petition filed by the respondent. The Court directed that any payment disputes be resolved through arbitration as per the contract terms [Paras 26]​​.

Alternative Remedy – Writ Jurisdiction – The Supreme Court emphasized that while the existence of an alternative remedy under the statute is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, a writ petition should be entertained only in exceptional circumstances where there is a breach of fundamental rights, a violation of the principles of natural justice, an excess of jurisdiction, or a challenge to the vires of the statute or delegated legislation. In this case, none of these exceptions were established, and the High Court should not have entertained the writ petition​​.

Assessment of Facts – The High Court set aside the tax and penalty imposed on the respondent on the basis of surmises without a proper assessment of facts. The Supreme Court noted that such an assessment should be carried out by the appellate authority under the statutory framework of the CGST Act, specifically Section 107, which provides for an appeal process​​.

Natural Justice – Compliance – The Supreme Court found that there was no violation of the principles of natural justice as a notice was served on the person in charge of the conveyance at the time of detention of goods. This procedural compliance undermined the respondent's argument for invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court​​.

Decision – Appeal allowed – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, dismissed the writ petition filed by the respondent, and directed the respondent to pursue the available statutory remedies under Section 107 of the CGST Act for resolving their grievances regarding the tax and penalty imposed by the State​​.

Abetment of Suicide – Presumption under Section 113-A Evidence Act – The case involved the suicide of the wife within eight months of marriage due to alleged cruelty by the husband and mother-in-law. Section 113-A of the Evidence Act provides for a presumption of abetment if a married woman commits suicide within seven years of marriage and is subjected to cruelty by her husband or his relatives. The three conditions for this presumption are: (i) the woman committed suicide, (ii) the suicide occurred within seven years of marriage, and (iii) she was subjected to cruelty. The court found that all three conditions were met in this case, justifying the presumption of abetment of suicide​​.

Cruelty – Definition and Evidence – The definition of "cruelty" under Section 498-A IPC includes any willful conduct likely to drive a woman to commit suicide or cause grave injury, as well as harassment for dowry demands. The evidence showed that the husband demanded Rs. 25,000 from the deceased’s father for purchasing buffaloes and subjected her to physical and mental cruelty when the demand was not met. The mother-in-law also harassed the deceased, leading her to commit suicide by consuming poison. The court confirmed the cruelty and harassment, fulfilling the requirements under Section 498-A IPC​​.

Interested Witnesses – Reliability – The court addressed the argument that only relatives of the deceased were examined as witnesses, noting that offences of domestic cruelty often occur within the home, limiting the availability of independent witnesses. The testimonies of relatives, if consistent and reliable, are valid and cannot be rejected merely because they are interested witnesses. The court found the relatives' evidence in this case credible and supported by the facts​​.

Decision – Appeals dismissed – The Supreme Court upheld the conviction and sentences of the appellants under Sections 306 and 498-A IPC, confirming the Trial Court and High Court's findings that the deceased was subjected to cruelty and the presumption under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act applied. The sentences of one-year rigorous imprisonment and two years rigorous imprisonment, along with fines, were maintained​​.

Terms and Conditions of Employment – Dominance of Employer – The submissions made by the University's counsel that the teachers accepted the terms and conditions in their appointment letters were rejected. It was noted that employees in public employment cannot choose the terms of employment, as the employer is in a dominant position. Employees are often left with no option but to accept the dictated terms. The court acknowledged that questioning employment terms can risk the employee's job. Therefore, employees can challenge such conditions if they do not conform to statutory requirements and are not estopped from doing so when aggrieved [Paras 42-44].

Substantive Appointment – Regular Selection Process – The appellants were appointed through a regular selection process under the Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act, 1973, which signifies substantive appointments. These appointments were made following the statutory procedure, implying they were not ad hoc or temporary. The appellants are entitled to claim substantive capacity against permanent sanctioned posts and to be recognized as members of the teaching faculty of the Central University under the Central Universities Act, 2009 [Paras 48-51].

Central University Transition – Protection of Employee Rights – Upon conversion of the University to a Central University, the rights and interests of existing employees are protected under Section 4(d) of the Central Universities Act, 2009. The University must ensure compliance with the statutory requirements and recognize the substantive nature of appointments made under the previous State University regime [Paras 38-39].

Decision – Appeals allowed – The Supreme Court quashed the High Court's judgment and recognized the appellants as substantively appointed teachers of the Central University. The appellants are entitled to pay scales and notional benefits equivalent to regularly appointed teachers under the Central Universities Act, 2009 [Paras 52-54].

Lease Agreements – Government Property – The leased land, belonging to the government and located in a reserve forest, was subject to strict conditions. The lessee, M/s. Joseph & Company, breached the lease agreement by subletting and selling portions of the leased land without prior permission from the government, justifying lease termination. The Supreme Court held that the lessee’s actions constituted a clear breach of Clause 14 of the lease deed, and the State's right to terminate the lease was upheld [Paras 1-29].

Waiver of Forfeiture – The court addressed whether the acceptance of rent by the lessor constituted a waiver of forfeiture under Section 112 of the Transfer of Property Act. The court determined that mere acceptance of rent does not automatically signify waiver, especially when the lessor is a government entity and the breach involves unauthorized transfer of leasehold rights. Waiver requires clear intention and knowledge, which was not established in this case [Paras 17-20].

Equity Principles – The court emphasized that equitable principles, such as the maxim "he who seeks equity must do equity," do not support the lessee’s breach of contractual terms, particularly when public property and interests are involved. Strict adherence to lease terms is necessary to prevent misuse and unauthorized exploitation of government property [Paras 30-31].

Decision – Appeals allowed in part – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision and restored the Single Judge’s order upholding the termination of the lease. The court maintained the interim status quo regarding the leased property pending final resolution of related writ petitions [Para 32].

Retrenchment Compensation – Violation of Section 25F – The appellant, a daily wager, worked for 240 days and his service was terminated without complying with Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, which mandates retrenchment compensation. The Labour Court found non-compliance and ordered reinstatement with 25% back wages. However, the High Court modified this to a lump sum compensation of Rs. 25,000. The Supreme Court, noting the appellant's status as a daily wager and the lack of evidence of unfair trade practices, ruled that reinstatement is not automatic and compensation is a suitable remedy in such cases​​.

Reinstatement vs. Compensation – The Supreme Court referred to precedents, including BSNL v. Bhurumal and State of Karnataka v. Umadevi, highlighting that reinstatement with back wages is not automatic for daily wagers whose termination is due to procedural defects under Section 25F. Instead, monetary compensation is often more appropriate, unless there is evidence of unfair labor practices or violation of principles like "last come, first go." The court decided that suitable compensation, rather than reinstatement, would best serve justice​​.

Decision – Appeal partly allowed – The Supreme Court modified the High Court's order, directing that in addition to the Rs. 25,000 already paid, the appellant should be awarded an additional compensation of Rs. 3.25 lakhs. This amount is to be paid within eight weeks and constitutes full and final settlement of all claims by the appellant​​.

Motion of No-Confidence – Democratic Principles – Section 28 of the Uttar Pradesh Kshettra Panchayat and Zila Panchayats Act, 1961, ensures that an elected representative can only stay in power as long as they enjoy the support of the majority of the elected members. Once such a person loses the majority's confidence, they become unwanted. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, emphasizing that in a democratic setup, the will of the majority must prevail​​.

Procedure for Removal of Party Leader – The appellant contended that her removal was not in accordance with the rules submitted to the District Collector, which provided for a five-year term. However, the court found that the appellant’s initial appointment and the subsequent removal procedure were both presided over by the District President of the INC Party. The same process used for the appellant’s appointment was followed for her removal, making the removal valid​​.

Anti-Defection and Horse-Trading – The court rejected the appellant's argument regarding horse-trading, noting that the appellant herself acted contrary to the party’s wishes by contesting the Chairman's election with the support of a rival group. The court highlighted that the provisions of the Act and Rules aim to prevent horse-trading and maintain political purity, but they cannot be interpreted to allow a minority to impose their leadership on the majority​​.

Decision – Appeal dismissed – The Supreme Court found no reason to interfere with the High Court's decision. The appeal was dismissed, and the court upheld the decision of the District Collector approving the new Party Leader's selection. The court emphasized the democratic principle that the majority's will must prevail in political party leadership​​.