Insolvency Law – Professional Fees – Jurisdiction of NCLT – The appellant, a registered valuer, was appointed during the CIRP of the corporate debtor, which was subsequently set aside by the NCLAT. The appellant's claim for professional fees was dismissed by the NCLT, which held it was functus officio. The Supreme Court held that the NCLT has the jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c) of the IBC to determine the fees payable to professionals engaged during the CIRP, emphasizing the need for a forum to address such claims within the insolvency framework [Paras 1-21].

IBC – Section 60(5)(c) – Scope and Application – The Supreme Court clarified that Section 60(5)(c) of the IBC grants the NCLT jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes arising out of or related to the insolvency resolution process. This includes determining the claims of professionals like registered valuers whose services were utilized during the CIRP [Para 18].

Costs and Expenses – CIRP – The court highlighted the definitions and provisions under Regulations 31 and 34 of the IRP Regulations, which encompass fees for professionals as part of the insolvency resolution process costs. The NCLT is thus empowered to assess and adjudicate the professional charges claimed by the appellant [Paras 12-15, 19].

Redressal Mechanism under IBC – Jurisdiction of NCLT and IBBI – The Supreme Court distinguished between the grievance redressal mechanism available under the IBC for addressing misconduct by resolution professionals and the jurisdiction of the NCLT to determine professional fees as part of CIRP costs. It stated that the NCLT's jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c) is not ousted by the availability of other grievance mechanisms [Para 20].

Decision: Appeal allowed – The impugned judgment of the NCLAT was set aside, and the matter was remitted back to the NCLT to determine the appellant's claim for professional fees afresh. The earlier order of the NCLT was also set aside to facilitate this determination [Para 21].

Criminal Law – Fabrication of False Evidence – Applicability of Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC – The Supreme Court examined whether the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC applies to prosecution by the investigating agency for offenses under Section 193 IPC committed during the investigation stage. It held that Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC does not bar such prosecution, provided the complaint is lodged before the commencement of proceedings and production of evidence before the trial court [Paras 1-24].

Interpretation of Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC – The Court clarified that the term "in relation to any proceeding in any Court" should not be construed to include offenses committed during the investigative stage that do not have a direct nexus with the court proceedings. The bar under Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC is intended to prevent private parties from initiating frivolous or vexatious prosecutions [Paras 6-24].

Judicial Proceeding – Investigation Stage – The Court noted that while an investigation is deemed to be a stage of a judicial proceeding under Explanation 2 to Section 193 IPC, it does not equate to a proceeding in any court for the purpose of Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC. The investigating agency is best positioned to verify and act upon fabricated evidence detected during the investigation [Paras 20-23].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – The Court upheld the convictions and sentences imposed by the Trial Court and the High Court, emphasizing the gravity of the offenses and rejecting the application of Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC as a bar to prosecution by the investigating agency [Para 24].

Prevention of Food Adulteration Act – Nomination of Responsible Person – Section 17 – The appellant contested the criminal proceedings initiated against him, asserting that he was not the nominated person responsible for the company, as per Section 17 of the Act. The Supreme Court held that the nomination in Form VIII, duly submitted to the Local Health Authority and received, could not be rejected on technical grounds such as it being sent on the company's letterhead. The complaint's averments indicated that Devendra Singh Bhadauria was the nominated person, not the appellant [Paras 1-11].

Cognizance of Offense – Validity of Nomination – The Court found that the lower courts erred in taking cognizance of the offense against the appellant, as there were no specific allegations against him apart from being incorrectly impleaded as the nominee. The valid nomination of Devendra Singh Bhadauria was substantiated by the documents submitted, negating the claims against the appellant [Paras 7-11].

Decision: Appeal allowed – The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the High Court and the Special Judge taking cognizance against the appellant. The appellant was found not responsible under Sections 7 and 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, due to the valid nomination of another individual [Paras 11-12].

Limitation Act – Period of Limitation – Article 137 – The Supreme Court clarified that the period of limitation for filing an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, would be governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The period of limitation will begin to run from the date when there is a failure to appoint the arbitrator. The court emphasized the need for Parliament to consider amending Section 11 to prescribe a specific period of limitation to align with the objective of expeditious arbitration proceedings [Paras 1-40].

Arbitration and Conciliation Act – Appointment of Arbitrator – Section 11 – The Court held that Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act mandates the appointment of an arbitrator by the court upon failure of the parties to appoint one within the stipulated period. However, in rare and exceptional cases where the claims are ex facie time-barred and there is no subsisting dispute, the court may refuse to make the reference [Paras 40-41].

Judicial Intervention – Commercial Disputes – Expeditious Disposal – The judgment highlights that the Arbitration Act, amended in 2015 and 2019, aims to minimize judicial intervention and promote the expeditious resolution of disputes. The court's role at the pre-reference stage should be limited to examining the existence of an arbitration agreement, leaving other issues to the arbitral tribunal [Paras 17-31, 40-41].

Decision: Appeals allowed – The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the High Court and dismissed the application filed under Section 11 by the respondent. The court reiterated that the period of limitation for filing an application under Section 11 is three years from the date of failure to appoint the arbitrator, as governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 [Paras 40-41].

Criminal Law – Quashing of Proceedings – Section 482 CrPC – The appellants challenged the High Court's order quashing the criminal proceedings against the second respondent for offenses under Sections 420, 406, and 34 IPC. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its decision, as the allegations in the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet disclosed the commission of offenses. The ingredients of the offenses under Sections 406 and 420 IPC were present, and whether the allegations were correct was a matter to be decided during the trial [Paras 1-24].

Inherent Jurisdiction – Exercise with Care and Circumspection – The Supreme Court reiterated that the exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC is an extraordinary power to be exercised with great care and circumspection. The High Court should not quash criminal proceedings at the inception unless it is a rarest of rare case. The Court emphasized that the High Court must prima facie consider the complaint, charge-sheet, and witness statements to decide if a cognizable offense is made out [Paras 12-13, 28].

Civil and Criminal Proceedings – Coexistence – The Court observed that the existence of a civil remedy or arbitration proceedings does not preclude the initiation of criminal proceedings if the ingredients of the alleged offense are present. The High Court's view that civil disputes should not be converted into criminal cases was incorrect, as many offenses, including cheating, often occur in the course of commercial transactions [Paras 32-33].

Decision: Appeal allowed – The High Court's order quashing the criminal proceedings was set aside. The trial Court was directed to proceed with the trial expeditiously without being influenced by the observations made in this judgment [Paras 38-39].

Customs Law – Recovery Proceedings – Proper Officer under Section 28(4) – The Supreme Court examined whether the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) had the authority to issue a show cause notice under Section 28(4) of the Customs Act, 1962, for recovery of duties not paid. The Court held that the power of recovery under Section 28(4) must be exercised by "the proper officer" who initially assessed and cleared the goods or his successor, not by any other officer. The Additional Director General of DRI was not "the proper officer" to exercise the power under Section 28(4) in the present case. The initiation of recovery proceedings by the DRI was thus without jurisdiction and liable to be set aside [Paras 1-23].

Statutory Interpretation – Use of Definite Article "The" – The Court emphasized that the definite article "the" before "proper officer" in Section 28(4) signifies a specific officer who initially assessed the goods. The term does not refer to any officer of the same rank but to the specific officer or his successor within the same office [Paras 10-13].

Entrustment of Functions – Validity of Notification – The Court noted that the notification conferring functions under Section 28 on officers of the DRI was invalid as it was issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs, which had no such power under Section 2(34) of the Customs Act. The proper entrustment should have been done under Section 6 of the Customs Act by the Central Government [Paras 16-21].

Limitation for Recovery Proceedings – Extended Period – The Court also addressed the limitation for issuing a show cause notice under Section 28(4). It held that the extended period of five years for recovery due to suppression of facts was not applicable in this case, as the importer had disclosed all relevant information to the Customs officers at the time of assessment and clearance [Paras 24-29].

Decision: Appeals allowed – The Supreme Court set aside the common order dated 19.12.2017 passed by the CESTAT and the ensuing demands. The Additional Director General of DRI was not authorized to issue the show cause notices under Section 28(4) of the Customs Act [Paras 23, 31].

Contempt of Court – Non-Compliance with Court Orders – Refund of Lease Rent – The petitioners alleged that NOIDA did not comply with the Supreme Court's directions to refund the lease rent for the remainder period after the plot is sold. The Supreme Court held that the one-time lease rent paid by the petitioners represents the entirety of the lease period, and thus, the component representing the remainder period after the plot is sold should be refunded without interest [Paras 1-20].

Lease Agreement – Terms and Conditions – Execution of Supplementary Lease Deed – The Supreme Court directed NOIDA to execute a supplementary lease deed upon payment of all dues by the petitioners. In case of default, the plots should be auctioned, and the proceeds used to refund the petitioners with an interest rate of 7% per annum on the amounts deposited towards premium [Paras 22-25].

Auction of Plots – Refund and Interest Calculation – The Court provided a detailed mechanism for calculating refunds and interest based on the auction price of the plots, ensuring NOIDA receives a minimum base rate. The petitioners were given options to either pay dues and continue with the lease or opt for auction and refund [Paras 19-28].

Decision: Contempt petitions disposed of – The Court modified its previous directions to ensure both parties' interests are addressed. NOIDA is directed to auction the plots if the petitioners choose not to continue with the lease, refunding the amounts with interest calculated up to April 30, 2021. If petitioners opt to continue, they must clear dues by the stipulated time [Paras 20-29].

Criminal Procedure – Place of Inquiry and Trial – Section 117 CrPC – The Supreme Court considered the place of inquiry and trial under Section 117 of CrPC, which states that every offense shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. The cause of action as per the FIR arose in New Delhi where the matrimonial home of the petitioner is situated. Hence, the trial should ordinarily be held in New Delhi [Paras 14-15].

Transfer of Criminal Case – Convenience of Parties and Witnesses – Sections 117 and 406 CrPC – The petitioners sought the transfer of the case to Allahabad, arguing financial burden and inconvenience. However, the Court noted that most of the prosecution witnesses, including 12 official witnesses, are based in New Delhi. Transferring the case to Allahabad would cause significant inconvenience to these witnesses and hinder their official duties. The apprehension of the petitioners did not constitute exceptional circumstances for transferring the criminal case [Paras 16-17].

Judicial Precedents – Transfer of Criminal Cases – The Court referred to several precedents emphasizing that a criminal case should be inquired into and tried where the cause of action arose unless exceptional circumstances justify otherwise. Convenience for transfer means the convenience of the prosecution, other accused, the witnesses, and the larger interest of society [Para 17].

Decision: Transfer petition dismissed – The proceedings arising out of FIR No. 39 of 2016, which were transferred to the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate at Allahabad (Prayagraj), Uttar Pradesh, were directed to be transferred back to the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, Rohini Courts, New Delhi. The petitioners were given the liberty to seek interim relief from the appropriate court in New Delhi [Paras 18-20].

Negotiable Instruments Act – Dishonour of Cheque – Presumption under Section 139 – The appellant challenged the High Court's judgment convicting her under Section 138 of the Act. The Supreme Court emphasized that the appellant failed to rebut the presumption under Section 139 that the cheques were issued for consideration. The complainant provided sufficient evidence that the cheques were issued in discharge of a debt, which the appellant could not disprove [Paras 1-24].

Quasi-Criminal Nature of Proceedings – Burden of Proof – The Court reiterated that proceedings under Section 138 of the Act are quasi-criminal and the principles of preponderance of probabilities apply. The burden of proof shifts to the accused to rebut the presumption, which can be done by bringing forward compelling evidence or circumstances [Paras 13-17].

Issuance and Dishonour of Cheques – Legal Notice and Complaint – The complainant established that the appellant issued cheques which were dishonoured due to insufficient funds. Legal notices were sent to the appellant, who failed to respond or make payment. The trial court's acquittal was overturned by the High Court on reappraisal of evidence, leading to the appellant's conviction [Paras 18-22].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's judgment convicting the appellant under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The appellant's failure to rebut the presumption and the evidence provided by the complainant justified the conviction. The bail bonds were cancelled, and the appellant was directed to pay the fine or serve the sentence [Paras 24-26].