Facts:

CBI filed a charge sheet against 14 accused persons, including the respondent, under various sections of the IPC and the Prevention of Corruption Act.

The Trial Court deferred taking cognizance initially, believing that a sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act was required.

The Trial Court later, upon clarification from the Investigation Officer, took cognizance. The respondent challenged this as a review.

Issues:

Whether the Trial Court's subsequent decision to take cognizance amounted to a review, and if the Special Judge had the power to do so.

Whether prior sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act was required.

Held:

The High Court held that the Trial Court's action amounted to a review, setting aside its order. The Supreme Court disagreed, citing Section 362 of the CrPC, stating that the Trial Court had not passed a final order disposing of the case when it deferred cognizance initially. The Court set aside the High Court's order and remanded the case back to consider the issue of whether prior sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act was necessary.

Facts:

The case involves the prosecution of police officials for alleged deaths in fake encounters and torture. The accused assert that the incidents occurred in the discharge of their official duties, while the prosecution contends that they were criminal activities.

Issues:

The requirement of sanction before prosecuting police officials under Section 6 of the Punjab Disturbed Areas Act, 1983, and Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The court needs to determine the necessity of obtaining sanction from both the State and Central Governments.

Held:

The court dismisses the notion that it is bound by the stand of the CBI regarding the referral of cases for sanction to the Central Government. Interim orders passed earlier do not decide the legality or correctness of the impugned orders.

The protection offered by sanction before prosecution is discussed, emphasizing that it assures honest officers but cannot be used to camouflage criminal activities.

The court states that Section 197 must be construed narrowly, and a public servant is not entitled to engage in criminal activities.

Emphasizing the need for a reasonable nexus between the act and official duty, the court suggests that the trial court should proceed on the basis of the prosecution's version but allows the accused to present evidence indicating that the incident was in discharge of their official duties.

The court asserts that the trial court can re-examine the question of sanction at various stages based on the evidence presented during the trial.

Accordingly, we dispose of the appeals.

Facts:

Hakim Singh Rawat filed a complaint against Rajveer Singh for offenses under Section 307/34 IPC.

The High Court quashed the FIR based on a compromise between Rajveer Singh and the complainant.

Issues:

Whether the quashing of the FIR, based on a compromise in a serious case involving Section 307/34 IPC, is justified.

Held:

The High Court erred in quashing the FIR as serious counter-allegations were made against the complainant.

The Court emphasized that the case involved a cognizable offense, and compromise in such serious matters goes against public policy and the administration of justice.

Referring to previous judgments (Shiji @ Pappu Vs. Radhika, 2012 Cr.L.R. (SC) 69; State of Rajasthan Vs. Shambhu Kewat, 2013 (14) SCALE 235), the Court stated that crimes against society should not be wiped off through compromises.

The appeal was allowed, and the High Court order was set aside.

The Court directed an investigation to be conducted in accordance with the law and taken to its logical conclusion at the earliest.

FACTS:

VTU, a university constituted under the VTU Act, filed returns for the Assessment Years 2004-2005 to 2009-2010 claiming exemption under Section 10(23C)(iiiab).

The Assessing Officer denied the claim, and this decision was upheld by various authorities and the High Court.

ISSUES:

Whether VTU exists solely for educational purposes and not for profit.

Whether VTU is wholly or substantially financed by the government.

HELD:

The court establishes that the surplus generated by VTU, though significant, has been ploughed back for educational purposes. Following established principles, it is held that VTU satisfies the requirement of existing "solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit."( Paragraph 8)

The court examines whether VTU is wholly or substantially financed by the government. It rejects the argument that fees collected under statutory provisions should be considered government financing, emphasizing the need for direct grants or contributions. The court distinguishes between different sections and concludes that fees collected cannot be equated with government financing.( Paragraph 10)

The court determines that even if the value of the land allotted to VTU is taken into account, the total funding by the government would be around 4%-5% of its total receipt. VTU is found neither directly nor substantially financed by the government, rendering it ineligible for the exemption.( Paragraph 14)

REFERRED CASES:

Aditanar Educational Institution Vs. CIT, (1997) 3 SCC 346

American Hotel & Lodging Assn. Educational Institute Vs. CBDT, (2008) 10 SCC 509

CIT Vs. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers' Assn., (1980) 2 SCC 31

Commissioner of Income-tax, Bangalore Vs. Indian Institute of Management, (2014) 49 Taxmann.com 136 (Karnataka)

Islamic Academy of Education Vs. State of Karnataka, (2003) 6 SCC 697

Mother Diary Fruit & Vegetable Private Limited Vs. Hatim Ali, (2015) 217 DLT 470

Queen's Educational Society Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, (2015) 8 SCC 47

Facts:

First respondent filed Securitisation Application No. 152 of 2010 before the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) challenging actions by the secured creditor (appellant).

Interim relief was granted initially but later vacated by DRT.

First respondent moved the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT) under Section 18 of SARFAESI Act.

During pendency, Securitisation Application was disposed of by DRT, rendering the appeal infructuous.

First respondent sought to withdraw the appeal and refund the deposit of Rs. 50 lakhs made before DRAT.

High Court allowed withdrawal unconditionally, setting aside the condition tying it to the appeal result.

Appellant (Axis Bank) challenged the High Court order in the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the first respondent is entitled to a refund of the deposit made before the DRAT under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act?

Does the bank have a right to set off the deposit against the borrower's dues?

Whether the bank has a lien on the deposit under Section 171 of The Indian Contract Act, 1872?

Held:

The court held that the deposit made under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act is not a secured asset or debt, and on disposal of the appeal, the deposit must be returned to the appellant unless there are specific circumstances such as appropriation or attachment. The court rejected the argument that the bank has a lien on the deposit under Section 171 of The Indian Contract Act, 1872, as the deposit is not a bailment with the bank.

The appeal was dismissed without prejudice to the appellant's right to take appropriate steps under Section 13(10) of the SARFAESI Act read with Rule 11 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002.

Facts:

License Agreement between the appellant and respondent dated 22.2.1993.

Termination notice by the respondent on 12.3.2007.

Arbitration proceedings initiated; Partial Final Award (PFA) issued on 23.12.2011.

PFA directed the transfer of certain Indian Patents from respondent to appellant.

Correspondence and discussions between parties regarding the draft deed of transfer.

Final transfer deed executed by the appellant on 4.4.2012 based on the redrafted version forwarded by the respondent.

Respondent raised issues with the draft and final deed, leading to legal proceedings.

Issues:

Whether the appellant fulfilled its obligation as per the PFA?

Validity of changes in the draft deed executed by the appellant.

Enforceability of the PFA and subsequent orders.

Held:

The Court found that the appellant fulfilled its obligation as per the PFA by executing the transfer deed dated 4.4.2012.

The impugned order, directing the appellant to execute the transfer deed as per the original draft, was set aside.

The Court held that the respondent's failure to act on the final transfer deed was not the fault of the appellant.

The impugned order was deemed to be based on a patent illegality and was, therefore, set aside.

The appeals were allowed.

Facts:

Appellant (Prakash Nagardas Dubal-Shaha) and respondent no. 1 (Sou. Meena Prakash Dubal Shah) were married.

Respondents initiated proceedings under the Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005, claiming maintenance for the wife and children.

The appellant and his wife had initiated divorce proceedings by mutual consent, which got dismissed due to the appellant's alleged failure to pay agreed alimony.

Issues:

Whether the unsuccessful divorce proceedings adversely affect the maintainability of the application under the Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

Whether the wife is entitled to maintenance under the Act despite the dismissal of the divorce proceedings.

Held:

Having given anxious consideration to the relevant facts and materials and on careful perusal of orders passed by learned Magistrate, Sessions Court, and the High Court, and appreciating those orders in the light of the submissions advanced before us, we have no hesitation in affirming the views of the High Court. The unsuccessful divorce proceedings cannot adversely affect the maintainability of the application filed by the contesting respondents under the Act. Even on merits of other issues, the views taken by the learned Magistrate are cogent and supported by relevant materials. Hence, the High Court rightly interfered with the order of the Sessions Court and confirmed that of the learned Magistrate. We, therefore, find no good reasons to interfere. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

Facts:

The case involves an appeal by Ramesh Kumar @ Babla against his conviction under Section 307 IPC by the Additional Sessions Judge, Adhoc, Patiala.

The appellant argued for a lesser offense and punishment.

The incident included a clash between two groups resulting in injuries to both parties.

Issues:

Whether the appellant should be convicted under a lesser offense, such as Section 324 or 326 of the IPC.

The severity of the injuries and the appropriateness of the original conviction under Section 307 IPC.

Held:

The Supreme Court examined the evidence and injuries, concluding that only two out of seven injuries were caused by a sharp weapon.

The Court held that the appellant should be convicted under Section 324 IPC instead of Section 307 IPC.

Considering the circumstances, including the appellant's age and settlement in life, the Court modified the sentence.

The appellant was released on executing an appropriate bond before the trial court, with directions to appear and receive a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year when called upon.

The appellant was instructed to keep the peace and be of good behavior.

The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

A contract was in place for the purchase of RLNG at a fixed price.

The Central Government made a policy decision to pool RLNG prices, leading to a unilateral increase in gas prices.

Communication from RLNG sellers to the appellant informed them of the price revision based on the government policy.

Issues:

Validity of the policy decision and its impact on the RLNG contract.

Constitutionality of the policy decision in light of Articles 14, 73, and Schedule VII, List I, Entry 53.

Held:

The power of price fixing, though a legislative function, can be delegated and executed through executive orders. RLNG, being an essential commodity, falls under the ambit of the Essential Commodities Act, and the Executive has the authority to fix prices as necessary .

By virtue of Article 73 and Entry 53 of List I, the Union has the legislative and policy-making authority regarding mineral oil resources and inflammable substances, including RLNG. The policy decision in question was taken after due deliberation and in the interest of the public .

The impugned policy decision aimed to unify RLNG prices on a non-discriminatory basis, treating consumers through long-term contracts as a distinct class. The decision was applied uniformly within this class and was not found to be discriminatory, arbitrary, or illegal .

The Supreme Court, in its jurisdiction under Article 136, does not have the competence to judge the viability of government policy decisions. Judicial review should be exercised cautiously, only intervening if the policy is enacted arbitrarily, unreasonably, or with malafide intent or if it violates constitutional provisions ‘

Decision: The appeals were dismissed as there was no demonstrated reason to interfere with the impugned policy decision .