Arbitration – Prohibitory/Excepted Clauses – Contractual bar on idle labour, machinery, overheads, business loss – Arbitral Tribunal allowed claims 3, 4 and 6 despite explicit contractual prohibition – Civil Court set aside award under Section 34 – High Court restored award solely relying on Bharat Drilling – Held: High Court erred in not examining contractual clauses; autonomy of parties and contractual limitations must guide arbitral jurisdiction [Paras 4–9].

Interpretation of Contract – Party Autonomy – Court reiterates that party autonomy is the “brooding and guiding spirit” of arbitration – Arbitral Tribunal is bound by procedures and substantive restrictions agreed by parties – Award granting prohibited claims contrary to contract is unsustainable [Paras 8–9].

Scope of Bharat Drilling & Foundation Treatment Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand, (2009) 16 SCC 705 – Not an authority for proposition that contractual prohibitory clauses bind only the employer and not the Arbitral Tribunal – Decision did not examine contractual clauses and relied on precedent relating to interest under Section 31(7), which stands on a different legal footing – Ratio doubtful and inconsistent with later decisions (CORE, Cox and Kings, Interplay Reference) – Matter requires reconsideration by larger Bench [Paras 7–12].

Interest under Section 31(7) – Distinct from Prohibited Claims – Court clarifies that principles governing grant of interest under Section 31(7) cannot be applied to interpret contractual clauses restricting substantive claims – Prohibitory clauses founded purely on freedom to contract and must be strictly enforced [Paras 10–11].

Direction – Judgment in Bharat Drilling referred to Larger Bench for authoritative adjudication to ensure certainty and clarity of law – Registry directed to place matter before Hon’ble Chief Justice for constitution of larger Bench [Para 12].

Administrative Law – Illegality – Irrelevant Considerations – Memo requiring Assistant Registrar’s recommendation before granting stamp duty exemption under Section 9A – Held: Requirement is unnecessary, superfluous and disruptive of ease of transaction – Executive action based on irrelevant considerations is illegal and liable to be set aside [Paras 2–2.2, 9–12, 15].

Stamp Duty Exemption – Section 9A, Indian Stamp (Bihar Amendment) Act, 1988 – Right of Cooperative Societies – Certificate of registration under Section 5(7) of the Jharkhand Self-Supporting Cooperative Societies Act is conclusive proof of existence – No further verification needed – Additional recommendation adds no value and violates statutory mandate [Paras 2.2, 11–14].

Cooperative Societies – Legal Status – Once registered, society becomes a body corporate under Sections 5–7 of the 1996 Act – Certificate from Registrar is binding on State authorities – Recommendation from Assistant Registrar unnecessary; authorities must accept certificate as conclusive evidence [Paras 13–14].

Judicial Review – Administrative Directions – Courts may strike down actions mandating excessive, redundant requirements as illegal – Memo imposes an unwarranted extra tier unsupported by statute – Violates principles of good governance and simplicity in public transactions [Paras 2, 2.1, 9].

Registration Process – Powers under Registration Act, 1908 – Registering authority may verify execution and stamping but cannot question validity of cooperative society registration – Memo imposing additional verification beyond statutory framework is ultra vires [Para 6].

Decision – Memo dated 20.02.2009 issued by Principal Secretary set aside – Appeal allowed; High Court’s refusal to interfere reversed [Paras 15–16].

Criminal Law – Summoning Additional Accused – Section 319 CrPC – Strong and Cogent Evidence – Courts below erred in refusing to summon husband’s relatives despite clear inculpatory evidence – PW-1’s deposition attributing harassment, sex-determination pressure and instigation, PW-2’s detailed eyewitness account, and deceased’s own statements cumulatively disclose prima facie involvement – High standard under Section 319 satisfied [Paras 7–12, 17].

Eyewitness Testimony – Minor Witness – Credibility at 319 Stage – PW-2 (daughter aged 9) narrated specific overt acts: instigation by grandmother, uncle and brother-in-law; handing of pistol; exhortation to kill – Her cross-examination indicating she heard gunshots cannot be used to discard ocular version at 319 stage – High Court committed error by conducting a ‘mini-trial’ [Paras 11–12].

Statements under Section 161 CrPC – Dying Declaration – Admissibility – Deceased’s statements dated 25.03.2021 and 18.04.2021 fall within Section 32(1) Evidence Act – Absence of Magistrate, lack of medical fitness certificate, or time gap before death (approx. 2 months) does not render them inadmissible – Once declarant dies, Section 161 statements relating to cause of death assume character of dying declarations [Paras 14–16].

FIR – Omissions Not Fatal – FIR not an encyclopaedia – Non-mention of instigation by husband’s family in FIR does not weaken PW-1’s later testimony, which is consistent with his detailed representation dated 20.05.2021 – Courts below erred in treating it as embellishment [Paras 9–10].

Section 319 CrPC – Principles Reiterated – Power extraordinary and discretionary; to be invoked sparingly – Degree of satisfaction higher than framing of charge but short of conviction – Evidence appearing during trial must indicate person ‘could be tried’ – Statements under Section 161 can corroborate trial evidence – Real perpetrators must not escape [Paras 6–7, 7.1–7.4].

Decision – Sufficient prima facie evidence exists to summon Respondent Nos. 2–4 (mother-in-law, brother-in-law, and sister-in-law’s husband) – Orders of Trial Court and High Court set aside – Respondents directed to appear before Trial Court on 08.01.2026; trial to be expedited [Paras 17–19].

Arbitration Law – Section 31(7)(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Power to Award Interest – Party Autonomy – Held: The phrase "Unless otherwise agreed by the parties" at the beginning of Section 31(7)(a) qualifies the entire provision. Where the parties have agreed to a specific rate of interest in the contract, the Arbitral Tribunal ceases to have any discretion to award a different rate or "reasonable" interest. The Tribunal is bound by the terms of the agreement. The discretion to deem a rate reasonable arises only in the absence of an agreement between the parties. [Paras 53-65, 140(iv), 140(vii)]

Contract Law – Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 – Penalty vs. Liquidated Damages – Test for Commercial Contracts – Adoption of Cavendish Principle – Context: The contract provided for a concessional interest rate of 22.5% p.a., which would be withdrawn in case of default, reverting to a normal rate of 36% p.a. with monthly rests. Appellant argued this was a penalty. – Held: The Court adopted the test propounded by the UK Supreme Court in Cavendish Square Holding BV v. Talal El Makdessi, moving beyond the strict "genuine pre-estimate of loss" test from Dunlop. The true test is whether the impugned provision is a secondary obligation imposing a detriment on the contract-breaker out of all proportion to any legitimate interest of the innocent party. In commercial contracts between parties of equal bargaining power, a clause withdrawing a concession and reverting to a higher agreed rate upon default is commercially justifiable to ensure punctual payment and is not penal. The 36% compound interest was upheld as it protected the legitimate commercial interest of the lender in a high-risk, unsecured bill discounting facility. [Paras 74-91, 102-104, 140(ii), 140(viii)]

Commercial Law – Bill Discounting Facility vs. Loan – Usurious Loans Act, 1918 – Held: A bill discounting facility is distinct from a traditional loan; it is a short-term financing option where a business sells unpaid invoices for immediate liquidity. Given the higher risk profile and unsecured nature, higher interest rates are a trade-off for immediate liquidity. The transaction was purely commercial, and the Usurious Loans Act, 1918 (as amended by Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act) does not apply to such bill discounting facilities. [Paras 47-50, 140(i)]

Interpretation of Statutes – Maxim Verba Chartarum Fortius Accipiuntur Contra Proferentem – Applicability to Commercial Contracts – Held: The rule of contra proferentem (interpreting ambiguity against the drafter) applies primarily to standard form contracts like insurance where bargaining power is unequal. It has no application to bilateral commercial contracts negotiated between parties of equal bargaining power. Where the contract terms regarding interest are clear and unambiguous, they must be enforced as written. [Paras 116-127, 140(v)]

Public Policy – Unconscionability of Interest Rates – Held: In voluntary commercial agreements between sophisticated corporate entities, a high rate of interest (36% with monthly rests) cannot be termed unconscionable or opposed to public policy if the borrower knowingly accepted the terms. A party cannot invoke the doctrine of unconscionable contract to frustrate recovery after enjoying the financial facilities. [Paras 107-108, 140(ii)]

Decision: Appeals dismissed. The Arbitral Award and the High Court's orders upholding the interest rate of 36% p.a. with monthly rests are affirmed. [Para 141]

Contempt of Court – Non-compliance of Court Directions – Land Acquisition – Original writ petition sought mandamus for return of land and compensation – High Court in 2003 recorded government’s assurance to hand over possession of unutilized land and pay compensation – Contempt petition filed due to non-compliance – High Court dismissed contempt petition stating the earlier order was ambiguous and open to dual interpretation – Held: Order dated 17.01.2003 contained clear and categorical directions for handing over land and payment of compensation – High Court erred in not examining whether compliance had in fact occurred – Matter remanded for fresh consideration [Paras 2-10].

Civil Procedure – Contempt Jurisdiction – Interpretation of Court Orders – Where specific grievance is made regarding non-compliance of directions recorded in a judicial order, it is incumbent on the court to assess the veracity of the claim based on available records – Statement recorded in judgment binds the parties and cannot be brushed aside as ambiguous in the face of specific allegations and rejoinders by the petitioner – Held: Contempt petition warranted examination on merits and could not be dismissed summarily [Paras 8-10].

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court’s dismissal of Contempt Petition No. 315 of 2003 set aside – Contempt proceedings restored and remanded to the High Court for fresh adjudication in light of this judgment – No opinion expressed on merits of the contempt allegations [Para 11].

Taxation Law - GST – Exemption – Renting of Residential Dwelling – Entry 13 of Notification No. 9/2017 – Hostel accommodation – Held: Residential building leased to a company, which sub-leases rooms to students/working professionals for long-term stay (3–12 months), qualifies as ‘residential dwelling’ and is ‘used as residence’ – Exemption applies for period prior to 18.07.2022 – Lessee need not personally reside; ultimate use for residence is sufficient [Paras 47–54, 61–63].

Residential Dwelling – Meaning – Term not defined in GST laws – Interpreted using trade parlance and earlier service-tax Education Guide – Any residential accommodation not akin to hotel/guest house/lodging – Hostels providing long-term stay constitute residential dwelling – Supported by precedents: Bandu Ravji Nikam, VL Kashyap, Uratemp Ventures – Premises with 42 rooms and long-term occupancy remains residential [Paras 36, 40–47].

Lessee’s Use – Whether Mandatory – No requirement in Entry 13 that lessee must himself reside – ‘Use as residence’ satisfied where property is ultimately used residentially by sub-lessees (students/working professionals) – Rejecting revenue’s contention that exemption depends exclusively on the first transaction – Sub-lease is effectively continuation of residential use [Paras 49–53].

Purposive Interpretation – Beneficial Exemption – Court applies purposive construction to avoid defeating legislative intent of exempting residential use – Narrow interpretation would burden end-users (students, working women) with 18% GST – Reliance on Mother Superior Adoration Convent, Wood Papers, Parle Exports – Once exemption conditions are met, notification must be liberally construed [Paras 54–57, 58–63].

Amendments – Prospective Effect – Entry 13 amended w.e.f. 18.07.2022 to exclude renting to registered persons – Explanation (01.01.2023) clarifies exemption where proprietor rents home for personal residence – Revenue cannot apply 2022 amendment retrospectively to deny earlier exemption [Paras 65–68].

Decision – High Court correctly allowed exemption; no error in finding that all three conditions under Entry 13 were satisfied – Appeals by Revenue dismissed [Paras 69–70].

Civil Law - Contempt of Court – Compliance of Judicial Directions – High Court dismissed contempt petition on the ground that the order dated 17.01.2003 was ambiguous and open to two interpretations – Supreme Court held that the operative portion of the High Court’s 2003 order clearly directed the authorities to hand over possession of land and pay compensation to petitioners – Direction for attending the office of Special Land Acquisition Officer on 22.01.2003 and delivery of possession was categorical – Held: High Court erred in holding the order was ambiguous and in not examining the specific grievance of the petitioner regarding non-compliance – Matter remanded for fresh consideration [Paras 7-11]

Land Acquisition – Possession and Compensation – Land in Gat No.78 claimed to be unutilized and not handed over despite court directions – MIDC and State claimed that land had been acquired via award dated 07.10.1970 and possession transferred – However, award not produced before Court – Held: Petitioner’s contention of non-receipt of possession needed to be judicially examined – High Court failed to consider relevant record despite specific direction to produce it – Non-production of award record undermined defence of respondents [Paras 4-6, 10]

Remand – Fresh Consideration Required – Supreme Court sets aside dismissal of Contempt Petition No. 315 of 2003 – Matter restored to High Court for fresh consideration in light of judicial directions issued in W.P. No. 3412/1992 – No opinion expressed on merits of rival contentions – All issues left open [Para 11]

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment dated 26.02.2022 set aside – Contempt Petition No. 315 of 2003 restored to High Court for fresh consideration – No opinion on merits expressed – All rights and contentions reserved.

Service Law – Pay Revision – Revised Pay Rules, 2017 – Employees in Service on Cut-off Date – Appellants attained age of superannuation in March 2016 – By virtue of FR 56(a), date of retirement extended to 31.03.2016 – Rules of 2017 applicable to employees in service on 31.03.2016 – Held: Appellants were in service on the cut-off date and entitled to revised pay scales – Division Bench judgment denying benefit set aside [Paras 2–3, 15–16, 18].

Service Jurisprudence – Superannuation – Fundamental Rule 56(a) – Date of Retirement – FR 56(a) mandates retirement on the afternoon of the last day of the month in which employee attains age of superannuation – No concept of deemed severance on date of attaining age of 60 years – Continuance till last day of the month is full continuation in service and not merely for pay and allowances [Paras 10–11, 16].

Pension – Last Working Day – Rule 5(2), CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 – Day of retirement treated as last working day – Employees retiring on superannuation deemed to be in service on that day – Appellants therefore in service on 31.03.2016 and entitled to pay revision applicable on that date [Paras 14–16].

Precedent – Coordinate Bench Decision – K. J. George v. BSNL – Limited Applicability – Observation that extension under FR 56(a) is only for pay and allowances not accepted – Court declined reference to Larger Bench as Three-Judge Bench decision in S. Banerjee v. Union of India supports entitlement of benefits accruing on date of retirement [Paras 10, 12–13].

Distinction of Earlier Cases – K. J. George v. BSNL and Union of India v. G.C. Yadav – In both cases employees retired prior to date of pay revision – Present case distinguishable as appellants retired on the very date on which revision applied – Hence precedents not applicable [Paras 8–9, 13].

Interpretation of Pay Revision Rules – Rule relating to Pensioners – Provisions revising pension of those retired on or before 31.03.2016 intended as minimum safeguard – Cannot curtail right of employees who were in service on 31.03.2016 to revised pay – Rules of 2017 clear and unambiguous in granting benefit to those in service on cut-off date [Paras 15–17].

Relief – Pay and Pension Refixation – Appellants entitled to revised pay for March 2016 – Revised pay to be reckoned for pension computation – Arrears of pay and pension directed to be paid within six months – Interest at 6% payable in case of delay – Revised pension to commence from February 2026 [Para 18].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Judgment of Division Bench set aside – Judgment of learned Single Judge restored – Appellants held entitled to pay revision as on 31.03.2016 with consequential pensionary benefits.

Criminal Law – Withdrawal of Prosecution – Permission from High Court Mandatory – Appellant, a former MLA, challenged criminal proceedings arising from FIRs under Arms Act and IPC – State had issued orders to withdraw cases citing public interest, and Public Prosecutor filed withdrawal application before trial court – Held: As per Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India, no prosecution against sitting/former MP/MLA can be withdrawn without leave of the High Court – In present case, no such permission was obtained – Hence, trial court and High Court rightly declined to quash the proceedings [Paras 2–5, 10].

Section 321 CrPC – Judicial Function of Granting Consent – Court reaffirmed that even though withdrawal is initiated by Public Prosecutor, the court must ensure that such application is not to thwart justice – Public Prosecutor must form an independent opinion – Consent must subserve public interest and not be tainted by mala fides or extraneous purposes – Cited principles from State of Kerala v. K. Ajith and Ram Naresh Pandey – Emphasised High Court’s duty to judicially scrutinise such withdrawal applications concerning MPs/MLAs [Paras 6–9].

Public Prosecutor’s Role – Duty to Assist with Reasons – Held: Prosecutor must disclose all reasons for withdrawal to court – Mere good faith is insufficient – Courts must ensure the application is not an abuse of process – Reasons are essential to both administrative and judicial decision-making [Paras 9, 13].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – High Court’s rejection of petitions under Section 482 CrPC upheld – No permission having been obtained from High Court as required – Proceedings to continue as per law – Observations on merits expressly kept open for trial/discharge stage [Para 10].