Criminal Law – Bail – Section 436-A CrPC – Applicability to Heinous Offences – High Court granted bail relying on Section 436-A – Held: Section 436-A explicitly excludes offences for which the punishment of death has been specified – The accused are charged under Section 302 IPC and Section 16 UAPA, which carry the death penalty – High Court erred in applying Section 436-A – Paras [7-11].

Constitutional Law – Article 21 vs. National Security – Bail in Terror Cases – Jnaneshwari Express Derailment – Held: While Article 21 guarantees speedy trial, individual liberty is not absolute and is subject to national interest and security – In cases of mass casualties and attacks on sovereignty, the Court must balance rights with societal security – High Court erred in granting bail solely on the ground of delay without adequately weighing the gravity of the offence (148 deaths) – Paras [15-16, 21.1, 22].

Bail – Cancellation/Interference by Supreme Court – Factors – Accused were released on bail in 2022/2023 – Held: Despite the High Court's error, bail is not cancelled at this stage because the accused have been on bail for over 3 years without misusing liberty, and the trial is proceeding at a "glacial pace" (28 witnesses remaining after 15 years) – Sending them back to custody now would not serve a fruitful purpose – Paras [21.2-21.3, 22].

Directions – Speedy Trial – UAPA Cases – Directions issued in personam for day-to-day trial of the present case – Directions issued in rem to all High Courts to assess pending UAPA cases, designate special courts, and ensure sufficient staffing to prevent delay in trials involving reverse burden of proof – Paras [24].

Decision: Appeals allowed to the extent of setting aside the reasoning on Section 436-A, but interference with liberty declined due to passage of time – Directions issued for speedy trial – Para [23].

Criminal Law – Section 8(c), 20(b)(ii)(C), 25, 29(1), 50, 52-A, 57 NDPS Act – Independent Witnesses – Non-examination – Held: Absence of independent witnesses is not fatal to the prosecution if the testimony of official witnesses is consistent and credible – In the present case, official witnesses deposed in unison that no independent persons were available at the time of seizure – No material contradiction found – Paras [20-22].

Criminal Law – NDPS Act – Section 52-A – Sampling Procedure – Appellant contended that drawing samples at the spot instead of before a Magistrate vitiates trial – Held: Relying on Bharat Aambale, mere non-compliance or delayed compliance with Section 52-A is not fatal unless it affects the integrity of the seized substance – Here, samples were drawn at the spot, sealed, produced before the Magistrate, and certified – Chain of custody was intact and integrity of samples preserved – Paras [23-27].

Criminal Law – Evidence – Discrepancy in Weight of Sample – Reduction in sample weight from "about 50g" to 40.6g – Held: Minor variation due to loss of moisture over time (40 days) does not undermine the prosecution case – Forensic report confirmed the sample contained dry broken fragments – Paras [29-30].

Sentencing – Mitigating Circumstances vs. Statutory Minimum – Appellant pleaded for reduction of sentence citing youth and minor child – Held: Court has no discretion to reduce sentence below the statutory minimum prescribed under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the NDPS Act – Humanitarian grounds are relevant for executive remission but cannot override statutory mandates – Para [32].

Decision: Appeal dismissed - Conviction and sentence of 10 years upheld - Para [34-35].

Criminal Law – Bail – Economic Offences – Prolonged Incarceration – Appellants accused of defrauding consortium of 17 banks through shell companies – Prosecution invoked serious charges under IPC and PC Act – Appellants in custody for over 5.5 years, over 2.5 years in the present case – Chargesheet over 4 lakh pages and 736 witnesses – Charges not yet framed – Held: Bail cannot be denied solely on gravity of charges where co-accused are on bail and trial is unlikely to conclude in near future [Paras 6, 7, 24, 25].

Constitutional Law – Article 21 – Right to Speedy Trial – Inordinate delay in trial constitutes violation of fundamental rights – Court emphasized that bail must be considered where prolonged custody without trial results in punitive effect – Prosecution’s delay in allowing inspection of unrelied documents worsened the prejudice to accused [Paras 5, 11–14, 25].

Bail Jurisprudence – Presumption of Innocence – Seriousness Not Sole Ground – Court reiterated that “bail is the rule and jail is the exception” – Courts cannot allow pre-trial incarceration to become punishment – Accused presumed innocent until proven guilty – Co-accused granted bail in similar matters; hence, parity principle applies [Paras 11, 14, 17, 18, 25].

Statutory Interpretation – Section 479 BNSS – Not a Bar to Bail in Grave Offences – Court rejected State’s interpretation that accused in grave offences should be denied bail under Section 479 BNSS – Held: Provision must be construed in line with personal liberty – Delay in trial cannot be a ground to indefinitely detain undertrial prisoners [Paras 20–23].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Appellants granted bail with stringent conditions including surrender of passports, restriction on travel, and mandatory appearance before trial court – No opinion expressed on merits of the case.

Rent Control and Eviction Laws – Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 vs. State Rent Control Acts – Overriding Effect – Conflict between Suhas H. Pophale v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (2014) and Ashoka Marketing Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank (1990) – Held: Suhas H. Pophale laid down incorrect law by holding that the PP Act 1971 is prospective and does not apply to tenants inducted prior to 16.09.1958 or prior to the premises becoming public premises – The Constitution Bench in Ashoka Marketing conclusively held that the PP Act is a special statute enacted later in time and overrides the Rent Control Acts (also special statutes) based on the purpose and policy of the legislation – Paras [6-9, 12].

Judicial Discipline – Doctrine of Precedent – Stare Decisis – Two-Judge Bench in Suhas H. Pophale failed to follow the binding ratio of the five-Judge Bench in Ashoka Marketing and three-Judge Bench in M/s. Jain Ink – A smaller bench cannot distinguish a larger bench judgment on the ground that a specific argument was not canvassed – Suhas H. Pophale overruled – Paras [9-10, 13(xi)].

Statutory Interpretation – Retrospectivity – Public Premises Act, 1971 – The Act applies to all "public premises" as defined in Section 2(e) regardless of when the tenancy was created – The definition of "unauthorised occupation" in Section 2(g) includes continuance in occupation after authority has expired or been determined – Termination of tenancy by notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act renders occupation unauthorised, irrespective of whether tenancy was created before or after the PP Act came into force – Paras [13(vii)-(x)].

Decision: Reference answered – Suhas H. Pophale overruled – PP Act 1971 overrides State Rent Control Acts for all public premises – Matters to be decided accordingly – Para [14].

Insurance Law – Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Package (PMGKY) – Meaning of "Requisitioning" of Services – Appellant’s husband was a private doctor who died of COVID-19 – Claim rejected on ground that his services were not specifically requisitioned – High Court upheld rejection stating the municipal notice only directed keeping clinics open and was not a requisition – Held: The notice dated 31.03.2020 issued by NMMC invoking the Epidemic Diseases Act and threatening action under Section 188 IPC for closing clinics constituted a "requisition" of services – The context of the pandemic and the mandatory nature of the order to keep dispensaries open for the public amounts to drafting/requisitioning of services – A narrow view cannot be taken given the compelling circumstances – Paras [21-24, 26, 30].

Administrative Law – Executive Orders during Pandemic – Interpretation – Notices issued under the Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897 and COVID-19 Regulations must be interpreted in the context of the emergency – A direction to private practitioners to keep clinics open under threat of criminal prosecution is an exercise of power to requisition services for containment measures – The distinction between "directing to keep open" and "requisitioning" is artificial in such circumstances – Paras [23-24].

Decision: Appeal allowed - The finding of the High Court that there was no requisition is set aside - Matter remanded for verification of factual evidence regarding cause of death and eligibility - Paras [30-31].

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 9 – Operational Creditor vs Corporate Debtor – Pre-existing Dispute – Moonshine Defence – The NCLAT set aside the NCLT's admission order on the ground of pre-existing disputes regarding short supply and faulty cables raised in 2018-2019 – The Appellant (Operational Creditor) relied on the Corporate Debtor's own email from 2021 confirming the ledger balance and subsequent payments made even after the demand notice – Held: The defence of pre-existing dispute was mere moonshine and had no credible basis – The minor issues raised by the Corporate Debtor did not stop further supplies or payments, as evidenced by the ledger account – The NCLAT failed to attach requisite importance to the Corporate Debtor's admission of liability and the payments made after the alleged dispute – Order of admission restored - [Paras 19-21]

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 9 – Adjudicating Authority’s Duty – The Adjudicating Authority must determine if the dispute truly exists in fact and is not spurious, hypothetical, or illusory – Where the Corporate Debtor continued to make payments and confirmed the debt balance in writing after the alleged correspondence regarding faulty goods, the dispute cannot be termed as a genuine pre-existing dispute warranting dismissal of the Section 9 application - [Paras 15, 20]

Decision: Appeal allowed - Judgment of NCLAT set aside - Order of admission by NCLT restored.

Criminal Law - Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Section 12 – Apology – Power to Remit Sentence – Appellant issued a circular criticizing the judiciary ("Dog mafia", "Judges don't want to see") regarding stray dog orders – High Court convicted her for criminal contempt and rejected her unconditional apology as perfunctory – Held: The power to punish carries the concomitant power to forgive – The Appellant tendered an unconditional apology at the earliest opportunity and demonstrated genuine remorse – The High Court erred in rejecting the apology based on distinguishable precedents where apologies were either not offered or withdrawn – Sentence remitted and appeal allowed - [Paras 1, 9.4-9.6, 10]

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Section 12 Explanation & Proviso – Bona Fide Apology – An apology should not be rejected merely because it is qualified if made bona fide – However, where the apology is unconditional and sincere, the Court must exercise its discretion under the proviso to Section 12 to discharge the contemnor or remit the punishment – The power of contempt is not a sword to silence criticism but requires fortitude to accept contrition - [Paras 8.3-8.4]

Judicial Precedent – Ratio Decidendi – High Court relied on Rajendra Sail and D.C. Saxena to convict – Held: Reliance misplaced as factual matrices were distinct (e.g., allegations of bribery against judges or lack of apology in those cases) – Ratio of a decision must be understood in the context of its specific facts - [Paras 9.1-9.3]

Decision: Appeal allowed - Impugned judgment set aside to the extent of the sentence - Sentence remitted.

Arbitration Law – Expiry of Arbitrator’s Mandate – Substitution of Arbitrator – Section 29A(6) – Arbitrator became functus officio upon expiry of statutory period under Section 29A – Despite failure to make award within prescribed time, High Court erroneously extended mandate – Held: Mandate of sole arbitrator had already terminated by operation of law under Section 29A(4) – Court is obligated to substitute arbitrator in such cases – New arbitrator to continue from existing stage [Paras 11–14].

Statutory Interpretation – Independent Remedies under Arbitration Act – Sections 14, 15 vs. 29A – Rejection of petitions under Sections 14 and 15 does not preclude substitution under Section 29A(6) – Section 29A operates independently to address delay and ensure time-bound arbitration – Mandate can be terminated and fresh arbitrator appointed even if prior termination petitions have failed [Paras 12–13].

Arbitration – Delay in Proceedings – Effect of COVID-19 on Limitation – Delay period between 15.03.2020 and 28.02.2022 excluded due to pandemic – On calculation, arbitrator was bound to render award by 28.02.2023 – Failure to do so without extension rendered arbitrator’s mandate terminated – Held: Continuation of arbitrator after expiry of mandate without valid extension is impermissible [Paras 11–12].

Judicial Power – Court’s Role under Section 29A(6) – Scope – Section 29A(6) grants discretion to substitute arbitrator once mandate ceases – High Court erred in merely extending time without addressing termination – Substitution necessary to uphold intent of time-bound arbitration regime – Appellate Court appoints former High Court judge as substituted arbitrator [Paras 13–14].

Decision: Appeals allowed – High Court order dated 22.04.2025 set aside – Mandate of arbitrator Mr. Anjum Javed stands terminated – Justice Najmi Waziri (Retd.), Former Judge of Delhi High Court appointed as substituted sole arbitrator – Proceedings to continue from prior stage and conclude within six months [Paras 14–15].

POSH Act – Inter-departmental Complaint – Jurisdiction of ICC – Phrase “where the respondent is an employee” in Section 11 is procedural and not jurisdictional – ICC at aggrieved woman’s workplace competent to inquire into complaint even if respondent is from another department – No requirement under POSH Act for respondent and complainant to belong to the same department – Wide and inclusive definitions of “employee”, “workplace”, and “respondent” support such interpretation – Appeal dismissed [Paras 30-46, 72].

Sexual Harassment – Statutory Interpretation – Social Welfare Legislation – Narrow reading of Section 11 would defeat purpose of POSH Act – Requirement for aggrieved woman to complain only to ICC at respondent’s department would create procedural and psychological barriers – Interpretation must advance the object of enabling redressal at the complainant’s own workplace – Expansive scope of "workplace" under Section 2(o)(v) includes inter-departmental scenarios [Paras 47-57, 72].

Service Law – Role of ICC – Two-stage Inquiry – ICC has dual role: preliminary fact-finding under POSH Act and formal inquiry under CCS (CCA) Rules if disciplinary action is warranted – ICC at aggrieved woman’s department conducts fact-finding; ICC at respondent’s department acts as inquiry authority during disciplinary proceedings – Such bifurcation aligns with DoPT OM dated 16.07.2015 – No violation of respondent’s rights or prejudice caused [Paras 58-68, 70-71, 72].

Employer’s Duty – Departmental Coordination – ICC’s fact-finding report to be sent to respondent’s employer for action – Employer of respondent bound to cooperate and act under Section 19(f) of POSH Act – Inter-departmental cooperation necessary for effective implementation – Held: No procedural error or jurisdictional defect – Recommendations of ICC to be acted upon by disciplinary authority of respondent [Paras 66-68, 73].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – ICC at aggrieved woman’s workplace held competent to conduct inquiry – Report to be transmitted to respondent’s employer for necessary action – ICC at respondent’s department to conduct further disciplinary inquiry if initiated – No jurisdictional infirmity in proceedings [Paras 72-73].