Service Law – Drug Inspector / Drug Control Officer – Qualifications for Appointment – Central vs State Rule-making Power – Doctrine of Occupied Field – Rule 49, Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 – State Rules prescribing experience as essential qualification – Invalid – Parliament under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 has expressly conferred exclusive power on the Central Government to prescribe qualifications of Inspectors – Rule 49 prescribes educational qualifications for appointment and experience only for authorisation to inspect manufacture of Schedule C drugs – State Governments lack competence to elevate such experience into a mandatory eligibility condition for initial appointment – Field fully occupied by Central legislation – State Rules framed under proviso to Article 309 or under State service statutes cannot override or supplement Rule 49 – Held: State-prescribed experience requirement ultra vires the D&C Act and Drug Rules [Paras 23–56].

Statutory Interpretation – Proviso to Rule 49, Drugs Rules – Nature and Scope – Experience not a condition of eligibility for appointment – Proviso merely carves out a class of Inspectors authorised to inspect manufacture of Schedule C substances – Experience contemplated post-appointment and for limited functional authorisation – Cannot be read as minimum or essential qualification for recruitment – Any such reading would amount to rewriting statutory rules – Affirmed views of Allahabad High Court (Kuldeep Singh) and Delhi High Court (Nidhi Pandey) [Paras 31–41, 53–55].

Constitutional Law – Article 309 – Limits of Executive Rule-making – Central Statute occupying field – Rule-making under proviso to Article 309 is subject to existing legislation – Once Parliament enacts a law and delegates rule-making power, executive power under Article 309 stands displaced – Doctrine of occupied field applies – Rules framed by Governor or State under Article 309 cannot supersede rules framed under Central statute – Relied on A.B. Krishna v. State of Karnataka [Paras 42–45].

Concurrent List – Drugs and Poisons (Entry 19, List III) – Pre-Constitution legislation – Article 372 – Drugs and Cosmetics Act enacted under Section 103, Government of India Act, 1935 with provincial consent – Continued in force post-Constitution under Article 372 – In absence of State amendment to the Act, States cannot legislate indirectly by service rules on matters expressly governed by Central law – Central Rules prevail [Paras 24–30, 46].

Distinction from S. Satyapal Reddy v. Govt. of A.P. – Motor Vehicles Act empowered Centre to prescribe only “minimum qualifications” leaving scope for States to prescribe higher qualifications – Drugs and Cosmetics Act contains no such latitude – Central Government alone empowered to prescribe qualifications of Inspectors – Judgment held inapplicable [Paras 47–49].

Haryana and Karnataka Recruitment Processes – Consequences – Advertisements prescribing experience as essential qualification quashed – Selection processes based on such criteria unsustainable – Directions issued for re-drawing merit lists strictly in accordance with Rule 49 of Drug Rules – Experience to be ignored for eligibility [Paras 57–69].

Relief and Directions – Moulding of Relief – Article 142 – Conditional appointees in Haryana protected subject to placement in revised merit list – If falling within merit, to continue with consequential benefits – If not, State may continue them on supernumerary posts without affecting advertised vacancies – Karnataka PSC directed to redo selection list and appointments accordingly – Timelines fixed for compliance [Paras 70–71].

Decision: Appeals by State of Haryana and State of Karnataka dismissed – Appeal by Parveen Kumar (Diary No. 1909/2024) allowed – State-prescribed experience as essential qualification for appointment of Drug Inspector / Drug Control Officer declared ultra vires – Public Service Commissions directed to redraw merit lists strictly as per Rule 49 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 – Appointments to follow accordingly.

Hindu Law – Maintenance of Dependants – Widowed Daughter-in-Law – Section 21(vii), Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 – Respondent became widow after the death of her father-in-law – Family Court dismissed maintenance petition as not maintainable – High Court reversed and held petition maintainable – Supreme Court affirmed – Held: Expression “any widow of his son” includes every widow of a son irrespective of the time when widowhood occurs – Timing of son’s death is immaterial [Paras 7, 10–16, 22, 29].

Statutory Interpretation – Literal Rule – Clear and unambiguous language – Courts cannot add or subtract words from statute – Legislature deliberately used words “any widow of his son” and not “widow of predeceased son” – Judicial re-writing of statute impermissible even if hardship alleged [Paras 16–22].

Maintenance – Liability of Heirs – Section 22, Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 – Obligation of all heirs inheriting estate of deceased Hindu to maintain dependants – Dependant who does not inherit any share entitled to maintenance from those taking the estate [Paras 12–13].

Constitution of India – Article 14 – Arbitrary Classification – Distinction between widowed daughters-in-law based on whether husband died before or after father-in-law held unreasonable – Such classification has no nexus with object of the Act and violates equality before law [Para 23].

Right to Life – Article 21 – Maintenance as component of right to live with dignity – Denial of maintenance to widowed daughter-in-law would lead to destitution and social marginalisation – Provisions of Act must be interpreted in harmony with constitutional values and social justice [Para 24].

Hindu Law Principles – Moral and Legal Obligation – Duty to maintain female dependants – Reference to Manu Smriti – Pious obligation of family head to support widowed daughter-in-law reaffirmed – Codified law does not negate fundamental Hindu law principles consistent with statute [Paras 25–26].

Sections 19 and 22 – Distinction – Section 19 governs maintenance during lifetime of father-in-law – Section 22 applies after death of father-in-law and enables claim against his estate – Widowed daughter-in-law entitled to maintenance as dependant after death of father-in-law [Paras 27–28].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – Judgment of High Court upheld – Maintenance petition held maintainable – Family Court directed to decide claim on merits – No order as to costs.

Arbitration Law - Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 34 – Withdrawal of petitions – Revival by Supreme Court – Land owners whose lands were acquired under the National Highways Act, 1956 had withdrawn their Section 34 petitions following High Court judgment declaring Sections 3G and 3J unconstitutional – Supreme Court subsequently stayed the High Court judgment – Fresh petitions barred by limitation under Section 34(3) – Held: To avoid grave injustice and remedilessness, Supreme Court invoked Article 142 and set aside the withdrawal order – Section 34 petitions restored to their original stage [Paras 1–4].

Constitution of India – Article 142 – Complete justice – Exercise of plenary powers – Supreme Court found that withdrawal of arbitral challenges occurred due to an intervening High Court judgment later stayed by Supreme Court – Applicants would otherwise suffer irreparable prejudice – Held: Article 142 power rightly invoked to revive proceedings and restore status quo ante [Paras 2–4].

National Highways Act, 1956 – Sections 3G and 3J – Arbitral mechanism – Competent authority and notified arbitrators – Court noted that arbitration under Section 3G(5) is conducted by executive officers such as Collectors/Commissioners lacking judicial training and adequate time – Such mechanism raises concerns in adjudication of complex compensation issues [Paras 5–6].

Land Acquisition – Compensation – Comparative statutory regimes – Supreme Court contrasted remedies available under the National Highways Act, 1956 with those under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – Held: Land owners under the 1956 Act form a disadvantaged class without intelligible differentia, leading to apparent inequality in violation of Article 300-A [Paras 7–9].

Legislative Policy – Infrastructure development versus property rights – While acknowledging the need for expeditious highway development, Supreme Court observed that parity in compensation determination mechanisms can coexist with speedy acquisition – Court urged reconsideration of the statutory framework to ensure fairness without undermining national infrastructure goals [Paras 10–12].

Judicial Restraint – Legislative domain – Supreme Court refrained from striking down provisions at this stage and left the matter to legislative wisdom – Attorney General requested to examine the issue – Registry directed to forward order to Attorney General and Solicitor General – Interim orders continued [Paras 12–16].

Decision: Interlocutory Applications allowed – Order dated 25.04.2025 of the Additional District Judge, Bhiwani set aside – All Section 34 petitions revived and to proceed from the stage of withdrawal – Matters posted for further consideration on 21.04.2026 – Interim orders to continue.

Constitutional Law – Validity of Legislation – Section 17A, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Upheld (with interpretation) – The Court examined the constitutional validity of Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, which mandates prior approval for inquiry or investigation into offences committed by public servants in discharge of official functions or duties – The provision aims to protect honest public servants from frivolous complaints and policy paralysis – The Court noted that Section 17A, unlike its predecessors (Single Directive 4.7(3) and Section 6A of DSPE Act), applies across the board to all public servants and includes time limits for approval decisions – It was contended that Section 17A is a salutary provision with checks and balances to prevent harassment of honest public servants – The Court held that the object behind Section 17A to provide previous approval for inquiry/investigation into offences relatable to recommendations or decisions taken by public servants in discharge of official duties cannot be faulted – The Court emphasized the need to balance protecting public servants from mala fide prosecution and upholding probity in public life – The Court also referred to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, which advocates for an appropriate balance between immunities for public officials and effective investigation – The Court concluded that Section 17A is constitutionally valid, subject to the condition that the grant or refusal of approval by the competent authority will depend on the recommendation of the Lokpal/Lokayukta – This interpretation ensures an independent screening mechanism, aligning Section 17A with the principles laid down in Vineet Narain and Subramanian Swamy – This mechanism addresses concerns about potential abuse and lack of objectivity if the government itself were the sole screening authority – The Court rejected the argument that judicial review alone is sufficient to check misuse of power, as judicial review primarily focuses on the decision-making process, not the merits of the decision itself – The Court also rejected the analogy with the judiciary's screening mechanism as not tenable due to the distinct nature of judicial functioning – The Court disposed of the writ petition with directions to ensure the involvement of Lokpal/Lokayukta in the approval process [Paras 45, 53, 58, 59, 81, 87, 88, 89, 96, 99, 100, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 111, 115, 116, 119, 120, 122, 124].

Constitutional Law – Interpretation of Statutes – Reading Down – Section 17A, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Applied – The Court applied the principle of "reading down" to Section 17A to save it from being rendered unconstitutional – The Court noted that where there are two possible interpretations, one invalidating the law and the other upholding it, the latter should be adopted – This approach aims to salvage legislation to achieve its objective without infringing the Constitution – The Court held that Section 17A can be aligned with the pronouncements in Vineet Narain and Subramanian Swamy by ensuring a screening mechanism by an independent agency before the grant or refusal of approval by the government, and that the recommendations of this independent agency are binding on the government – This ensures the salutary provision in preventing frivolous complaints against honest public servants is not set at naught – The Court emphasized that this interpretation does not amount to "substitution" or "judicial legislation" but rather ensures safeguards for its implementation and attracts talent to public service [Paras 97, 98, 99, 100, 111, 114, 122, 123, 124].

Criminal Law – Corruption – Investigation – Prior Approval – Role of Lokpal/Lokayukta – The Court directed that the Union of India or State Governments and the authorities competent to remove public servants, upon receiving information under Section 17A, shall immediately forward it to the Lokpal/Lokayukta (in case of States) – The Lokpal/Lokayukta shall then conduct an inquiry on the information in accordance with their respective statutes and forward a recommendation to the appropriate authority – This authority shall be bound by and act in accordance with the Lokpal/Lokayukta's recommendation regarding the grant or refusal of permission under Section 17A – For bodies/organizations/public servants not covered under the Lokpal's jurisdiction, the competent authority to remove the public servant shall commission an appropriate independent investigative agency to screen the information and act on its recommendation – The time-limit stipulated in the proviso to Section 17A (three months, extendable by one month) shall apply, and all authorities must adhere to it – The Lokpal/Lokayukta must provide reasons for their recommendations [Paras 124(i), 124(ii), 124(iii), 124(iv), 124(v)].

Dissenting Opinion – Constitutional Validity of Section 17A, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Unconstitutional – Justice B.V. Nagarathna, in a separate opinion, held that Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, is unconstitutional and ought to be struck down – The dissenting opinion argued that Section 17A is contrary to the objects of the Act and is an attempt to reintroduce provisions (Single Directive 4.7(3) and Section 6A of DSPE Act) previously struck down by the Supreme Court in Vineet Narain and Subramanian Swamy – It was contended that the requirement of prior approval forestalls inquiry and protects the corrupt, rather than the honest – The dissenting opinion found the substitution of "Government" with "Lokpal" or "Lokayukta" impermissible by way of interpretation, as it amounts to judicial legislation – It highlighted that the provision is arbitrary due to "policy bias," potential conflict of interest within government departments, and the difficulty in identifying a single public servant responsible for decisions – The dissenting opinion emphasized that the classification of public servants based on their decision-making duties, effectively protecting higher-level officers, violates Article 14 of the Constitution – It concluded that Section 17A, in substance, is a resurrection of Section 6A and continues to suffer from the infirmities identified in Subramanian Swamy, including impeding independent investigation and forewarning potential culprits – The dissenting opinion stressed that the overarching object of the Act is to prevent corruption, and Section 17A undermines this purpose by creating a shield for dishonest public servants [Paras (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), 19.1, 20.1, 20.3, 20.5, 20.6, 20.7, 20.8, 20.9, 20.10, 20.11, 20.12, 20.13, 20.14, 20.15, 21, 21.1, 21.2, 21.3, 21.4, 22(i), 22(ii), 22(iii), 22(iv), 22(v), 22(vi)].

Decision: Appeal allowed – The writ petition is disposed of with directions to ensure the involvement of Lokpal/Lokayukta in the approval process under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The matter is referred to the Chief Justice of India for constituting an appropriate Bench to consider the issues afresh due to divergent opinions.

Criminal Law - Preventive Detention – Detenue Already in Judicial Custody – Governing Principles – A person already in custody may be preventively detained only if three conditions are satisfied: (i) awareness of custody, (ii) cogent material showing real likelihood of release on bail in near future, and (iii) likelihood of indulging in prejudicial activities upon release – These conditions are cumulative and mandatory [Paras 7, 18].

Likelihood of Release on Bail – Requirement of Cogent Material – Detenue’s bail application already dismissed and no fresh bail application pending on date of detention – No co-accused in same case granted bail – Detaining authority relied solely on bail granted to an accused in an unrelated case – Held: Such reliance amounts to mere ipse dixit and does not constitute cogent material to infer likelihood of release on bail [Paras 8, 12–15, 19–20].

Bail Granted in Unrelated or Similar Case – Insufficiency – Bail granted to an accused in another case, not being a co-accused and not similarly situated, cannot form the basis for subjective satisfaction regarding likelihood of release of detenue – Similarity must be real, specific, and disclosed in grounds of detention [Paras 15–16, 19].

Subjective Satisfaction – Vitiation – Satisfaction of detaining authority stood vitiated as it was based on conjecture and absence of relevant material – Preventive detention order rendered illegal ab initio [Paras 19–21].

Preventive Detention – Strict Scrutiny – Preventive detention being an exceptional measure, safeguards under Articles 21 and 22 must be strictly complied with – Any casual or mechanical approach in recording satisfaction renders detention unsustainable [Paras 18–21].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgment of the Madurai Bench of Madras High Court dismissing Habeas Corpus Petition set aside – Detention Order No. T.K. Aa. No. 08/2025 dated 22.02.2025 quashed – Detenue directed to be released forthwith unless required in any other case.

Service Law - Public Employment – Persons with Disabilities – Denial of Appointment – Appellant applied under Visually Handicapped category pursuant to 2019 recruitment by Coal India Limited – Declared medically unfit on ground of multiple disabilities – Single Judge quashed medical unfitness and granted relief for subsequent recruitment – Division Bench reversed on ground of expiry of panel – Supreme Court set aside Division Bench order – Held: Expiry of panel cannot defeat substantive rights where initial denial was illegal and not attributable to candidate [Paras 1–3, 8].

Disability Law – Benchmark Disability – Medical Assessment by Expert Body – AIIMS Medical Board constituted pursuant to Supreme Court directions – Board assessed appellant at 57% disability, exceeding benchmark of 40% – Appellant held eligible for appointment under reserved quota for persons with disabilities [Paras 4–7, 9, 12].

Reasonable Accommodation – Concept and Scope – Reasonable accommodation recognised as a fundamental right and gateway right – Rooted in RPwD Act and Articles 14, 21 and 41 of the Constitution – Not limited to assistive devices but includes flexible, purposive interpretation of rules and conditions of employment – Denial amounts to discrimination and violates substantive equality [Paras 13–17].

Employment Rights – Right to Work – Constitutional Perspective – Right to livelihood integral to right to life with dignity – Directive Principles under Articles 39(a) and 41 to inform interpretation of fundamental rights – Public sector undertakings obligated to respect and promote disability rights [Paras 18–22].

Intersectionality – Disability and Gender – Appellant a single woman facing compounded discrimination – Technical objections such as expiry of panel cannot override need to do complete justice – Substantive equality requires recognition of multiple and intersecting axes of disadvantage [Paras 23–24].

Corporate Social Responsibility – Disability Inclusion – Public sector employer’s obligation to respect human rights of persons with disabilities – Disability inclusion integral to ESG framework and CSR obligations – Equality at workplace requires proactive accommodation and inclusion [Paras 25–28].

Relief – Creation of Supernumerary Post – Supreme Court directed creation of supernumerary post for appellant – Direction to provide suitable desk job with universal design accommodations – Posting directed at North Eastern Coalfields, Assam – Relief granted in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution [Paras 30–34].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Order of Division Bench of Calcutta High Court set aside – Appellant directed to be appointed by creation of supernumerary post with reasonable accommodation – Appeal disposed of accordingly.

Service Law – Army Pension – Dismissal by Court Martial – Forfeiture of Pension – Distinction between Commissioned Officers and JCOs – Respondent, a Junior Commissioned Officer (JCO), dismissed from service in 1967 pursuant to General Court Martial – No specific order passed at the time of dismissal regarding forfeiture of pensionary benefits – Armed Forces Tribunal allowed claim for pension relying on Major G.S. Sodhi v. Union of India – Held: Regulation 113(a) of Pension Regulations, 1961 applies to JCOs and provides for automatic forfeiture of pension and gratuity on dismissal – No separate or specific order of forfeiture required – AFT erred in applying Regulation 16(a), which governs Commissioned Officers only [Paras 4, 6, 9–11, 14].

Pension Regulations – Regulation 16(a) vs Regulation 113(a) – Applicability – Regulation 16(a) falling under Chapter II applies exclusively to Commissioned Officers – Regulation 113(a) applies to JCOs, other ranks and enrolled non-combatants – As per Regulation 113(a), dismissal under the Army Act ipso facto renders the individual ineligible for pension or gratuity, subject only to discretionary power of the President in exceptional cases – Clarified and reaffirmed in Union of India v. Subedar Ram Narain [Paras 9–11, 15].

Armed Forces Tribunal – Error of Law – Reliance on Inapplicable Precedent – Tribunal relied on Major G.S. Sodhi, which dealt with a Commissioned Officer governed by Regulation 16(a) – Said precedent held inapplicable to JCOs – Tribunal’s direction granting pensionary benefits to dismissed JCO held legally unsustainable [Paras 6, 15–16].

Equitable Relief – Recovery of Amount Already Paid – Delay in Appeal – Death of Respondent – Appeal filed with considerable delay and during pendency, arrears of pension paid to respondent pursuant to AFT’s order – Respondent died during pendency of appeal – Though Tribunal’s order set aside on merits, Supreme Court directed that amounts already paid shall not be recovered, balancing equities and avoiding undue hardship to legal heirs [Paras 12, 17].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Orders dated 30.04.2012 and 13.06.2014 passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal set aside – Direction issued that amounts already paid to the respondent pursuant to Tribunal’s orders shall not be recovered – Pending applications disposed of.

Right to Education – Section 12(1)(c), RTE Act, 2009 – Admission of children from weaker sections and disadvantaged groups – Neighbourhood schools under statutory obligation to admit at least 25% of entry-level class strength – Provision held to be transformative and central to achieving constitutional equality of status – Effective implementation declared a national mission [Paras 1, 7–10].

Fundamental Right – Article 21A – Nature and Scope – Right to free and compulsory elementary education recognised as a positive fundamental right – Identification of five duty bearers: appropriate government, local authority, neighbourhood school, parents/guardians and teachers – Co-relative duties essential for realisation of constitutional mandate [Paras 5–6.5].

Judicial Review – Denial of Admission – High Court dismissed writ petition blaming parent for failure to follow online procedure – Supreme Court held such approach unsustainable in face of administrative directions, RTI disclosures of vacant seats and poverty of petitioner – Courts duty-bound to provide effective relief in cases of denial of fundamental right to education [Paras 2–3].

Access to Justice – Procedural Barriers – Digital illiteracy, language barriers, lack of transparency, absence of help-desks and grievance redressal mechanisms found to obstruct access to Section 12 benefit – Online-only admission processes held exclusionary for vulnerable groups [Paras 3–4].

Constitutional Values – Equality, Dignity and Fraternity – Section 12(1)(c) designed to integrate children from diverse socio-economic backgrounds in common neighbourhood schools – Provision furthers substantive equality, social integration and fraternity – Common School System endorsed as constitutional strategy to dismantle class and caste segregation [Paras 7–12].

Duties of State and Local Authorities – Monitoring and Enforcement – Obligations under Sections 6 to 9 and Section 31 of RTE Act emphasised – National and State Commissions for Protection of Child Rights entrusted with monitoring, grievance redressal and enforcement of children’s right to education [Paras 6.1–6.3, 11–12].

Standard Operating Procedure – NCPCR – Non-binding Nature – SOPs and guidelines found insufficient in absence of enforceable statutory rules – Lack of uniformity across States and UTs undermining effective implementation of Section 12(1)(c) [Paras 12–15].

Subordinate Legislation – Necessity – Supreme Court held formulation of rules under Section 38 of RTE Act imperative – Without enforceable rules, mandate of Article 21A and Section 12(1)(c) would remain illusory – Directions issued to frame rules in consultation with NCPCR, SCPCRs and Advisory Councils [Paras 15–16].

Directions – Compliance and Monitoring – NCPCR directed to be impleaded as party respondent – Directed to collate information regarding framing of rules by States and UTs and file affidavit before Supreme Court – Matter kept pending for further monitoring [Paras 16–16.3].

Decision: Special Leave Petition retained for precedent and policy directions – Appropriate Governments directed to frame enforceable rules for implementation of Section 12(1)(c) – NCPCR tasked with monitoring compliance – Matter listed for further hearing.

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 52 (Lis Pendens) – Applicability to Transferees Pendente Lite – Upheld – The doctrine of lis pendens, enshrined in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, applies with full force to transfers made during the pendency of a suit – Such transfers are not void ab initio but remain subservient to the decree that may be passed by the court – The Explanation to Section 52 clarifies that pendency commences from the date of plaint presentation and continues until final decree or satisfaction – The Maharashtra amendment requiring registration of lis pendens notice is for the benefit of third parties to prevent undue hardship, but its absence does not render the doctrine inapplicable or grant absolute title to subsequent purchasers who bought during pendency – Appellants, as transferees pendente lite, were bound by the decree for specific performance, and their rights were subservient to the decree holder – The High Court's finding that Section 52 TPA was applicable to the pendente lite transfers was affirmed [Paras 39-45, 65-66].

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 19(b) (Relief against subsequent transferees) – Interaction with Section 52 TPA – Distinguished – Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which provides for specific performance against subsequent transferees for value without notice, operates at a stage prior to the institution of a suit or proceeding – Once a suit is instituted and the property is transferred during its pendency, Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, takes precedence – A transferee pendente lite cannot claim protection as a bona fide purchaser without notice under Section 19(b) because the doctrine of lis pendens binds them to the outcome of the litigation irrespective of their knowledge – The interpretation of Section 19(b) must align with Section 52 TPA to avoid incongruous situations [Paras 46-50].

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXI Rules 97, 98, 101 (Execution, Resistance, Adjudication) – Powers of Executing Court – Affirmed – The Executing Court has wide powers under Order XXI Rules 97 to 103 CPC to adjudicate all questions, including those relating to right, title, and interest, arising between the parties to the proceeding or their representatives, when a decree holder seeks possession and is resisted or obstructed – Transferees pendente lite have no independent right or locus standi to obstruct the execution of a decree for possession as they step into the shoes of the judgment debtor and their title is extinguished under Section 52 TPA – The Bombay Amendment to Rule 98(2) CPC further empowers the Executing Court to order civil imprisonment and compensation for obstruction – The Executing Court's decision to allow the decree holder's application for removal of obstruction and reject the obstructionists' objections was upheld [Paras 51-60, 64.5, 65].

Limitation Act, 1963 – Articles 129, 134 (Execution of Decree) – Rejection of Limitation Plea – Upheld – A plea of limitation raised by the appellants at a belated stage, not having been pleaded before the High Court or framed as a substantial question of law, was rejected – The decree holder had sought execution within one year of the trial court's judgment and decree – The application for removal of obstruction was filed within 30 days of the resistance, as prescribed by Article 129 of the Limitation Act, 1963 – Article 134 was held not to be attracted to the facts of the present case – The High Court's view on this aspect was affirmed [Paras 69-71].

Constitution of India – Article 142 (Extraordinary Powers) – Directions to Prevent Frivolous Litigation – Issued – Considering the peculiar facts of the case, where the decree holder had to suffer multiple rounds of litigation for over three decades despite the decree attaining finality, the Supreme Court invoked its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India – Directions were issued to ensure that no further application(s) or petition(s) by the appellants, the judgment debtor, or any other person claiming rights qua the suit property through them, shall be entertained by any court, to prevent further harassment and ensure the ends of justice [Paras 74].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Appellants directed to hand over actual physical possession of the suit property to respondent No. 1 (decree holder) on or before 15.02.2026 – No cost – No further application(s) or petition(s) by appellants, judgment debtor, or any person claiming through them regarding the suit property shall be entertained by any court [Paras 72, 73, 75].