Dowry Death – Conviction Reversed – Appellants, father-in-law and mother-in-law of the deceased, were convicted under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC by the Trial Court and sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment – The High Court, while reducing the sentence to 7 years, upheld the conviction – The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that there was no direct evidence of dowry demand from the appellants – Alleged dowry demand appeared to be unrelated to the marriage, instead linked to the naming ceremony of the deceased's child – Prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment soon before her death in connection with dowry – Held: Conviction under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC set aside [Paras 16-18].

Presumption under Section 113-B Evidence Act – Not Applicable – Presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act arises only when all essential ingredients of dowry death are proved – In this case, the evidence of cruelty or harassment soon before death in connection with dowry was found lacking – Consequently, the presumption under Section 113-B could not be invoked against the appellants – Held: Prosecution failed to prove dowry harassment beyond reasonable doubt, negating the application of presumption under Section 113-B [Paras 13, 18].

Contradictions in Prosecution Case – Lack of Independent Witnesses – Testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2, parents of the deceased, were inconsistent with the allegations in the FIR regarding dowry demand – No independent witnesses from the locality were examined to support the prosecution’s case – The Court found these contradictions to be crucial in doubting the truthfulness of the prosecution’s case – Held: Testimonies of key witnesses lacked credibility, and failure to produce independent witnesses further weakened the prosecution’s case [Paras 17-18].

Suicide due to Personal Reasons – No Proof of Murder – The defense argued that the deceased committed suicide due to personal issues, including her inability to live with her husband and the discovery of a photograph with a male stranger – The Court noted that no other injuries were found on the deceased besides burn injuries, and the presence of the accused at the time of the incident was not established – Held: The death was likely a suicide, but the prosecution failed to prove dowry harassment, so the conviction was not sustainable [Paras 18, 13].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Conviction and sentence under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC set aside – Appellants acquitted – Their bail bonds stand discharged [Paras 19-20].

Criminal Conspiracy – Discharge of Accused – Section 120B of IPC – Sections 7, 12, 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act – Alleged Corruption – Discharge Upheld – The prosecution alleged that the Respondent No. 1, as Managing Director of the company, conspired with co-accused to pay illegal gratification to customs officials for clearing refunds – The High Court discharged the respondent based on lack of prima facie evidence of his involvement in the conspiracy – Held: There was insufficient material to link the respondent to the alleged payments or conspiracy, and the reference to "DM" in key entries was admitted to be referring to a different individual (Dushyant Mulani) – The High Court's decision to discharge the respondent was upheld [Paras 9-15].

Material Evidence – Diary Entries and Witness Statements – Inadequate to Implicate Respondent – The prosecution relied on diary entries made by co-accused, mentioning “DM” in connection with illegal payments – The prosecution admitted that "DM" referred to another co-accused (Dushyant Mulani) and not the respondent – No direct telephonic conversations or statements implicated the respondent – Held: The material on record, including diary entries, was insufficient to establish a prima facie case against the respondent [Paras 11-14].

Prima Facie Case – High Court's Role in Assessing Evidence at Discharge Stage – Legal Threshold – At the stage of framing charges, the court should only ascertain whether a prima facie case exists based on the charge sheet – The High Court carefully assessed the charge sheet, witness statements, and documentary evidence, concluding that there was no prima facie case against the respondent – Held: No error in the High Court's finding of discharge – Appeal dismissed [Paras 7, 13, 15].

Decision: The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's order discharging the respondent, finding that the material presented in the charge sheet did not establish a prima facie case of involvement in the alleged conspiracy or bribery – Appeal dismissed [Para 16].

Land Acquisition – Payment of Compensation – The appellant (M/s Ultra-Tech Cement Ltd.) challenged the High Court’s direction to pay compensation under the Supplementary Award dated 02.05.2022 – High Court had ruled that the appellant should pay the compensation first and recover the amount from Jaiprakash Associates Limited (JAL) later – The Supreme Court held that the High Court's reliance on Clause 7.1 of the Scheme of Arrangement between the appellant and JAL was erroneous – The acquisition proceedings commenced before the Scheme's "Effective Date," and liabilities associated with the land remained with JAL – Held: JAL is liable for the compensation determined under the Supplementary Award [Paras 16, 20, 27, 32, 56].

Land Ownership – Liability of Payment – The subject land was acquired for a safety zone under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for JAL's cement project – The land was not transferred to Ultra-Tech Cement under the Scheme of Arrangement – Supreme Court clarified that ownership of the land and liabilities relating to the land acquisition, including compensation, remained with JAL – Hence, the appellant could not be directed to pay the compensation amount for land not transferred to it – Held: Compensation liability remains with JAL, not Ultra-Tech Cement [Paras 27, 29, 32].

Return of Acquired Land – Unutilized Land under Section 101 of the 2013 Act – JAL contended that the subject land had remained unutilized and should be returned to the original landowners – The Court rejected this contention, holding that the land was acquired as a safety zone and was being utilized for that purpose – The argument that the land was unutilized did not hold since the purpose of acquisition was being fulfilled – Held: The return of land under Section 101 is not applicable in this case [Paras 33, 36-38].

State's Role – Article 300-A of the Constitution – The Court emphasized the constitutional duty of the State to ensure fair compensation for landowners – The Himachal Pradesh government failed in ensuring timely payment of compensation, contrary to the welfare State principles under Article 300-A – The Court held that the State should have facilitated payment to the landowners rather than leaving them to seek compensation from corporate entities – Held: The State must compensate landowners and recover the amount from JAL [Paras 43-52].

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court order set aside – Respondent Nos. 7 (State of Himachal Pradesh) and 10 (Land Acquisition Collector) directed to pay compensation to the landowners and recover it from JAL – Compensation to be paid within 15 days with interest at 9% from the date of the Supplementary Award [Paras 56-58].

Eviction Suit – Judgment on Admission – Order XII Rule 6 of CPC – Admission Must be Clear and Unambiguous – Judgment Set Aside - The appellants challenged the eviction decree based on the alleged admission in a different case regarding the succession of tenancy rights. The Court emphasized that a judgment under Order XII Rule 6 requires an unequivocal and unconditional admission. The alleged admission in this case did not meet that standard, as it was mixed with questions of law and fact. The decree passed by the Single Judge and upheld by the Division Bench was set aside [Paras 2-4, 8-9, 14].

Tenancy Succession – Interpretation of Section 2(g) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 – Retrospective Application Not Intended - The Court held that the 1997 Act did not retrospectively extinguish tenancy rights accrued under the 1956 Act. The phrase "whichever is later" in Section 2(g) of the 1997 Act was deemed superfluous, and the appellants’ tenancy rights, inherited under the 1956 Act, could not be nullified by the 1997 Act [Paras 19-21, 48-50].

Retrospective Legislation – Presumption Against Retrospective Operation of Statutes - The Court reiterated that unless expressly stated, statutes are presumed to operate prospectively. The rights vested in the appellants under the 1956 Act were protected, and the 1997 Act could not retrospectively divest those rights [Paras 25, 28-30].

Decision – Appellants’ Tenancy Rights Affirmed – Eviction Order Set Aside - The Court concluded that the appellants’ tenancy rights did not expire with the introduction of the 1997 Act. The eviction order passed by the Single Judge and upheld by the Division Bench was set aside, and the appeals were allowed [Paras 48-50].

Arbitration Agreement – Non-Signatory to Arbitration Agreement – Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Referral of Non-Signatory to Arbitration Upheld – The petitioners sought appointment of a Sole Arbitrator to resolve disputes arising under a Family Arrangement Agreement (FAA), including the involvement of the SRG Group which was not a signatory to the FAA – Held: Even though the SRG Group was not a signatory to the FAA, their conduct and involvement in the performance of the FAA raised a prima facie case for them being bound by the arbitration clause – The referral court is required to conduct only a prima facie inquiry into the existence of an arbitration agreement, with the arbitral tribunal left to determine whether the non-signatory (SRG Group) is bound by the arbitration agreement – The involvement of the SRG Group in implementing the FAA provisions, such as share transfers in Millenium and Deegee companies, prima facie indicates their role in the FAA, warranting referral to arbitration [Paras 52-80].

Prima Facie Determination – Section 11(6A) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Scope of Referral Court’s Jurisdiction Limited – Under Section 11(6A), the referral court's inquiry is confined to a prima facie examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement – Held: The referral court must avoid conducting a detailed inquiry into the facts and instead limit its examination to the prima facie existence of the arbitration agreement – Any further detailed examination, including whether a non-signatory can be bound by the arbitration agreement, must be left to the arbitral tribunal – Referral of SRG Group to arbitration was prima facie justified based on their involvement in the execution of the FAA [Paras 60-63, 80].

Non-Signatory Bound by Arbitration Agreement – Consent and Conduct – Factors for Determining Non-Signatory’s Intent – A non-signatory may be bound by an arbitration agreement if there is evidence of consent, conduct, or involvement in the underlying contract – Held: In this case, email exchanges, involvement in performance, and negotiations involving the SRG Group raised questions about their intent to be bound by the FAA – The issue of whether the SRG Group is a veritable party to the arbitration agreement should be decided by the arbitral tribunal after evaluating the evidence [Paras 68-79].

Decision:

The Supreme Court allowed the petition, appointing Justice Akil Kureshi (Retd.) as the sole arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes under the FAA – The arbitral tribunal is empowered to decide the involvement of the SRG Group as a veritable party to the arbitration agreement based on the evidence – All contentions of the parties were left open for adjudication by the tribunal [Paras 81-84].

Public Employment – Reservation Policy – Recruitment for Primary Teachers – Notification for 1423 posts of Primary Teachers was issued on 12.09.2006 – OBC reservation was introduced on 27.12.2006 after the recruitment process had commenced – High Court ruled that OBC reservation could not be applied retrospectively – Held: High Court’s judgment upheld, and a revised select list excluding OBC candidates directed to be prepared [Paras 9-11].

Constitutional Law – Equal Opportunity in Public Employment – Article 16 – OBC candidates were included in the final selection list despite no mention of OBC reservation in the recruitment notification – High Court held that such inclusion violated the principles of equal opportunity under Article 16 of the Constitution – Held: The failure to notify OBC reservation before the recruitment process led to arbitrary and illegal selection, and the process was quashed from the stage where the error occurred [Paras 10-11].

Judicial Review – Scope of Interference in Recruitment Process – Petitioners challenged the entire selection process, alleging irregularities in the written exam and viva-voce – High Court found no evidence of manipulation in the written exam or viva-voce but quashed the selection of OBC candidates due to retrospective application of reservation – Held: Interference by the Court was limited to the erroneous application of the OBC reservation [Paras 9-10].

Employment Law – Continuity of Service – Long-serving Teachers – Primary teachers appointed in 2011 continued to serve for over 13 years – Some of these teachers may lose their positions due to the revised selection list – Held: The Government is granted discretion to protect the service of long-serving teachers, even if their names do not appear in the revised list [Paras 17-18].

Decision: High Court’s judgment upheld – The revised selection list to be prepared within four weeks, excluding OBC candidates – Appointments based on the revised list to be made within four weeks of its publication – Notional appointment benefit from 09.12.2011 granted for superannuation purposes, but no arrears of salary to be paid – Government granted discretion to retain long-serving teachers not included in the revised list [Paras 17-18].

Labour Law – Kalelkar Award – Holidays on 2nd and 4th Saturdays – Overtime Compensation – The respondent-employees, who were employed in the Public Works Department, claimed entitlement to public holidays, including holidays on the 2nd and 4th Saturdays, and overtime pay for work performed on those days as per the Kalelkar Award – The Industrial Court allowed their complaint, granting the said benefits, which was affirmed by the High Court – Held: The Kalelkar Award explicitly provides for such benefits to all employees except daily-wage workers, and the respondents, being temporary employees, are entitled to these holidays and compensations – The appellants’ reliance on the Government Circular dated 27th May 1996 to deny these entitlements was misplaced – Appeal dismissed, and Industrial Court’s decision upheld [Paras 20-25].

Unfair Labour Practices – Denial of Holiday Benefits – Section 28, Maharashtra Act – The appellants-employer engaged in unfair labour practices by denying the respondent-employees their rightful entitlements under the Kalelkar Award – The Industrial Court held that the respondents were entitled to public holidays and overtime compensation for work performed on 2nd and 4th Saturdays – Held: The Industrial Court's order was justified, and the High Court rightly upheld it [Paras 8-9, 14-16].

Interpretation of Government Circular – Applicability of Benefits – The appellants relied on a Government Circular dated 27th May 1996 to argue that the respondents were ineligible for public holidays and overtime compensation – Held: The Circular did not apply to the respondents, who were on the Converted Temporary Establishment under the Kalelkar Award, which clearly granted them such benefits – The Circular was limited to cases disposed of or pending before the Industrial Court at Bombay and did not override the Kalelkar Award [Paras 22-23].

Decision – Appeal dismissed – Judgment of the Industrial Court and High Court affirmed – Appellants directed to comply with the order within eight weeks – No order as to costs [Paras 25-26].

Motor Accident Claims – Contributory Negligence – Reversal of Findings – The appellants, survivors, and legal heirs of passengers involved in a collision with a parked truck, contested the reduction of their compensation due to contributory negligence – The parked truck was abandoned in the middle of a highway at night, without any warning signs – Held: The deduction of 50% of compensation on the grounds of contributory negligence was unjustified – Full compensation to be awarded – The vicarious liability of the car driver could not be attributed to the passengers – Compensation reinstated to full amount [Paras 3-5, 16-42].

Vicarious Liability – Passengers Not Liable for Driver’s Negligence – The contributory negligence attributed to the driver of the car was improperly extended to the passengers and their legal heirs – This imputation of liability was inconsistent with established tort principles – Held: The passengers were not responsible for the driver's negligence and thus, their compensation should not have been reduced – Compensation to be restored to the full amount [Paras 17-20, 36-39].

Highway Safety – Parking Regulations Violated by Stationary Truck – The offending truck was abandoned in the middle of the highway at night without any illumination or warning indicators, creating a traffic hazard – The truck's driver was found in violation of various provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and the Rules of Road Regulation, 1989 – Held: The full responsibility for the accident rested on the truck's owner and driver – No contributory negligence can be imputed to the car driver under such circumstances [Paras 21-33].

Decision – Appeals allowed – Deduction of 50% of compensation on account of contributory negligence set aside – Full compensation to be paid as awarded by the Tribunal and modified by the High Court – Respondent No. 2 (Insurer of the offending truck) held jointly and severally liable with the truck's owner to indemnify the compensation – No costs [Paras 42-44].

Property Law – Common Passage – Right of Access – The plaintiff-respondents claimed use of the entire common passage marked X-Y, Y-Z, and Z-Z1 in the map attached to the sale deeds – Trial Court dismissed the suit, holding that only passage X-Y was designated for joint use, as per the sale deeds – The High Court, however, decreed the suit, granting the plaintiff-respondents the right to use the entire passage – Held: The sale deed of the plaintiff-respondents only granted a right of use over the passage X-Y, and there was no stipulation that they could use the passage Y-Z and Z-Z1 in portion B owned by the defendants-appellants – High Court’s interpretation was incorrect – The Trial Court's judgment restored [Paras 1, 10, 20-24].

Interpretation of Sale Deeds – No Right over Defendants' Portion – The sale deed executed in favor of the plaintiff-respondents only stipulated the right to a 15 feet wide common passage (X-Y) for access to the defendants-appellants' back portion (B) – The defendants-appellants’ sale deed did not mandate leaving any passage for the plaintiff-respondents' use – Held: The High Court erred in granting the plaintiff-respondents’ claim over the Y-Z and Z-Z1 passages in portion B, which exclusively belongs to the defendants [Paras 14-16, 22].

Literal Interpretation of Contracts – No Ambiguity – The language in both sale deeds is clear, and there is no ambiguity requiring inference beyond the literal meaning – Courts should give effect to the express terms of a contract where the wording is unambiguous – Held: The plaintiff-respondents' right to a common passage is limited to X-Y, and no further access is permissible through portion B [Paras 18, 22].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Judgment and order of the First Appellate Court set aside – Trial Court’s judgment restored, dismissing the plaintiff-respondents' suit – No order as to costs [Paras 24-25].