Specific Performance — Maintainability — Suppression of Earlier Agreement — Appeal Allowed — The plaintiff/first respondent filed a suit for specific performance of a sale agreement dated 09.10.2006 (Ex.A2) in respect of suit property, receiving an advance of Rs. 6,00,000/- against total consideration of Rs. 10,15,000/- — The appellant/first defendant terminated the agreement by notice dated 27.01.2007 (Ex.B2) — The plaintiff did not seek any declaratory relief challenging the said termination — The Trial Court decreed the suit, which order is assailed in this appeal — High Court, on re-appreciation of evidence and law, reverses the decree and dismisses the suit — Held: A suit for bare specific performance, without a prayer for declaration that the termination of the agreement is invalid, is not maintainable — Further, the plaintiff suppressed the material fact of the earlier agreement dated 01.12.2005 (Ex.B1) between the appellant and the plaintiff's husband, under which Rs. 5,00,000/- had already been paid and carried forward — The plaint was framed as if Ex.A2 was the first and only agreement, which constitutes suppression of material facts disentitling the plaintiff to equitable relief [Paras 18-20, 23-25].

Time as Essence of the Contract — Specific Stipulation — Effect of Prior Failed Transaction — Ex.A2 prescribed a period of three months for completion of the sale — The backdrop of the earlier failed transaction under Ex.B1 lends significance to such stipulation — The contractual period expired on 09.01.2007 and the plaintiff took no concrete or effective steps to perform her part of the contract before the termination notice was issued on 27.01.2007 — Held: On the facts and surrounding circumstances, the parties intended time to be the essence of the contract [Para 21].

Readiness and Willingness — Section 16(c), Specific Relief Act — Failure to Establish Continuous Readiness — The plaintiff adopted inconsistent stands by claiming readiness on the one hand and attributing delay to the defendant on the other — Evidence of P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 established that title documents had been verified even prior to Ex.B1, rendering untenable the contention that the defendant failed to furnish title deeds — The plaintiff's silence during the stipulated period and absence of satisfactory proof of financial capacity indicate failure to establish continuous readiness and willingness as mandated under Section 16(c) [Para 22].

Discretionary Relief — Equitable Jurisdiction — Disentitlement on Account of Suppression — Specific performance being an equitable and discretionary relief, the plaintiff who has suppressed material facts, failed to prove readiness and willingness, and omitted to seek necessary declaratory relief, cannot be held entitled to such relief — Decree for specific performance passed by the Trial Court set aside [Para 23-25].

Decision: Appeal allowed — Judgment and decree dated 20.04.2021 in O.S. No. 116 of 2007 set aside — O.S. No. 116 of 2007  dismissed — No order as to costs.

GST Law — Jurisdiction — Cross Empowerment — APGST Officers — IGST Act — Interstate Supply — In all these cases, officers appointed under the APGST Act intercepted consignments moving in interstate trade with both origin and destination outside Andhra Pradesh, and initiated proceedings under Sections 129 and 130 of the GST Acts primarily on grounds of undervaluation or quantification discrepancy — Held: An officer appointed under the APGST Act is cross empowered to exercise jurisdiction under the CGST or IGST Acts in relation to a taxpayer only when such taxpayer has been administratively allotted to the State and the State officer has been designated as the proper officer assigned to discharge that function by the Chief Commissioner — A proper officer under the APGST Act assigned functions under Sections 129 and 130 can exercise such functions under the IGST Act in relation to interstate sales only when the State of Andhra Pradesh is entitled to an allocation of a share of the tax under Section 17 of the IGST Act in relation to that transaction — Such officer cannot exercise powers under the IGST Act in relation to interstate sales which originate outside the State and culminate outside the State — In case of discrepancies, State officer may forward findings to the proper officer of the consignee and consignor [Paras 7–29, 37].

GST Law — Sections 129 and 130 — Interception — Valuation — Grounds for Detention and Confiscation — Held: Questions of valuation, undervaluation, or quantification discrepancy in invoices or e-way bills do not constitute valid grounds for detention, seizure or confiscation of goods and conveyances in transit under Sections 129 or 130 of the GST Acts — Power of seizure or confiscation during transit can be exercised only where there is blatant violation or contravention of provisions of the Act with a direct nexus to intention to evade payment of tax — Minor aberrations such as discrepancies in value between e-way bill and delivery challan or minor errors in vehicle number do not justify seizure — Proper officer cannot venture into assessment and valuation of goods at the point of interception — Statutory scheme of GST facilitates free movement of goods after self-assessment [Paras 30–33, 37].

GST Law — Section 129 — E-Way Bill — Inspection — Recording of Report — W.P. No. 3258 of 2026 — Respondents contended that goods were transported without e-way bills and that the driver refused to reveal details — Held: Where two inspections are alleged but only one is recorded in the online report and the first inspection finds no mention, this Court cannot accept the claim that inspection occurred prior to the officially recorded inspection — Rule 138C requires a summary report within 24 hours and a final report within three days — Contention of respondents rejected [Paras 34–35].

GST Law — Constitutional Framework — IGST — Parliament's Exclusive Power — Interstate Supply — Article 246A(2) and Article 269A of the Constitution confer exclusive power on Parliament to tax interstate supply of goods and services — Tax on inter-state supply under the IGST Act is levied and collected by the Union Government and apportioned among Union and States under Section 17 of the IGST Act — An intermediary State through which goods merely transit has no share in the IGST collected on such transaction — Accordingly, State officers of an intermediary State cannot press Sections 129 or 130 to collect penalties and fines in relation to transactions not taxable in that State, as amounts rightfully due to the origin or destination State would be appropriated by the intermediary State — No provision exists under the GST Acts for reimbursing such amounts to the entitled States [Paras 14–16, 27–29, 37].

Decision: All writ petitions allowed — Proceedings initiated against petitioners under Sections 129 and 130 of the GST Acts set aside — Respondents at liberty to forward records and samples drawn pursuant to the interlocutory order dated 16.02.2026 to the respective proper officers of the petitioners — Pending miscellaneous petitions closed — No costs.

Civil Law – Specific Performance – Oral Agreement to Sell – Burden of Proof – Suit Dismissed – Plaintiff claimed an oral agreement to sell was entered on 15.03.2000 in the presence of witnesses, with entire sale consideration of Rs. 1,40,000/- paid to the defendants and possession of the suit land handed over to him – Defendants denied the agreement, payment, and delivery of possession – Held: Where the agreement to sell is oral, the plaintiff is required to lead cogent and authentic evidence to substantiate his case – Bald statements of the plaintiff and his witnesses, unsupported by any documentary proof of payment or possession, are insufficient – Suit rightly dismissed by both courts below [Paras 27, 28].

Civil Law – Oral Agreement – Implausibility – Delay in Suit – Plaintiff filed the suit in 2015, more than 15 years after the alleged agreement of 15.03.2000, without any plausible explanation for the long silence – Held: No prudent man who has paid a sum of Rs. 1,40,000/- would remain silent for 15 years without taking any steps to enforce the agreement – The story projected by the plaintiff is highly improbable and the delay itself militates against the genuineness of the claim [Paras 30, 31].

Civil Law – Possession – Revenue Record – The copy of jamabandi for the year 2009-2010 shows the defendants as owners-in-possession of the suit land, falsifying the plaintiff's claim that possession was handed over to him pursuant to the oral agreement – No material record placed on record to establish possession by the plaintiff [Para 29].

Second Appeal – Scope of Interference – Section 100 CPC – Substantial Question of Law – Concurrent findings of two courts below that the plaintiff failed to prove the oral agreement, payment of sale consideration, and possession, are pure findings of fact – Appellant unable to point out any error, perversity, or illegality in the judgments of the courts below – Held: High Court cannot interfere with concurrent findings of fact in second appeal unless a substantial question of law arises – No such question arises in the present case [Paras 33, 34, 36].

Decision: Second appeal dismissed – Concurrent findings of the trial court and first appellate court affirmed – Pending miscellaneous applications disposed of.

Environment – Tree Felling – Interim Prohibition – Zirakpur–Panchkula Bypass – NHAI – PIL challenging the proposed felling of approximately 5,000 trees for the construction of the Zirakpur–Panchkula bypass — Court queried NHAI as to whether the States of Punjab and Haryana are ready and willing to provide public land in close vicinity for compensatory afforestation in lieu of the proposed tree felling — NHAI's counsel had no answer and sought time to seek instructions — NHAI also directed to submit all re-alignment proposals considered by its technical team to enable the Court to examine whether mind was applied to alternative sites — Held: Inactivity of respondents requires drastic remedial measures — This Court prohibits cutting of any tree of any age or species in the State of Haryana, including the 5,000 trees proposed for the bypass, without permission of this Court, till the next date of hearing [Paras 1, 1.1, 1.2, 4].

Forest Cover – State of Haryana – Ecological Catastrophe – As per the Indian State Forest Report 2023, forest cover in Haryana is only 3.65% of its geographical area — The Court observed that the functionaries of the State of Haryana appear neither serious nor conscious of the impending ecological catastrophe — The low forest cover lends urgency to the interim prohibition against tree felling [Paras 2, 3, 3.1].

Interim Directions – NHAI Assurance – NHAI's counsel assured the Court that no tree for the construction of the proposed bypass will be cut until further orders are passed — CM-156-CWPIL-2026 allowed; Annexures P-13 and P-14 filed by the petitioners taken on record [Paras 5, CM order].

Decision: CM-156-CWPIL-2026 allowed — Cutting of any tree of any age or species in the State of Haryana, including trees proposed for the Zirakpur–Panchkula bypass, prohibited without permission of this Court till further orders — NHAI directed to submit all re-alignment proposals — Matter listed on 17.04.2026.

Service Law — Dismissal from Service — Fraud at Entry — Forged Educational Certificates — BSF Constable — Petitioner enrolled in BSF on 28.02.1989 by submitting forged Madhyamik mark sheet, having actually failed in the secondary examination — Fraud detected upon character and antecedents verification; re-verification by District Magistrate, North 24-Parganas confirmed petitioner was not a student of the school mentioned — Petitioner himself admitted during Record of Evidence that he had failed the secondary examination and produced forged documents — Tried by Petty Security Force Court on five charges; found guilty on two charges under Section 23 of the BSF Act — Sentenced to dismissal from service and rigorous imprisonment of fifteen months — Held: An employer cannot retain an employee who does not possess the minimum educational qualification; once fraud at entry is established, dismissal is the only appropriate consequence — No interference warranted [Paras 29–35, 41, 44].

Delay in Initiation of Disciplinary Proceedings — Laches — Petitioner contended that delay of over 30 years in concluding disciplinary proceedings was attributable to the respondent authorities and prejudiced him — Held: Delay was substantially attributable to the petitioner himself, who filed successive litigations before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, Trial Court at Barasat, and this Court by way of Criminal Revision Application, consuming considerable time — Recruiting authority has the right to initiate disciplinary proceedings at any point of service career upon detection of fraud — Delay per se does not condone fraud or entitle the delinquent employee to relief [Paras 36–37].

Proportionality of Punishment — Fraud in Securing Appointment — Judicial Review — Submission that punishment of dismissal after 32 years of blemish-free service is disproportionate — Held: Fraud is the deciding factor; petitioner was ineligible even to apply for the post — Authority could have taken a stricter stand by recovering salary paid during entire service period — Punishment imposed is just and proper — Court ought not to interfere lightly with punishment imposed by employer in exercise of power of judicial review — Once the action of the authority is not shown to be vitiated by illegality, perversity, unreasonableness, or violation of principles of natural justice, the Writ Court should respect the decision under challenge [Paras 38–44].

Evidence — Admission — Headmaster's Testimony — Petitioner challenged reliability of headmaster's deposition on the ground that he could not prove his own identity during cross-examination — Held: Facts admitted need not be proved — Petitioner himself admitted during proceedings that documents were not genuine — Investigating agency independently verified documents from the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education and was unable to trace them — Testimony of headmaster inconsequential in view of petitioner's own admission [Para 31].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed — No costs.

Specific Performance – Oral Agreement for Sale – Readiness and Willingness – Non-Deposit of Balance Amount Not Fatal – Original Plaintiff entered into an oral agreement in 1978 to purchase Flat No. 13 from the original Defendant for ₹50,000/-, paying ₹30,000/- in part performance – Defendant inducted his brother into the flat, subsequently repudiated the agreement by returning the amount by cheque, claiming personal necessity – Trial Court rejected specific performance holding the Plaintiff not ready and willing as he had not deposited the balance ₹20,000/- during pendency of the suit – Held: Non-deposit of balance consideration cannot be a ground for refusing specific performance; Explanation (i) to Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act makes it clear that actual tender or court deposit is not essential – Plaintiff's letter dated 01.09.1981 and unchallenged oral evidence of his son clearly demonstrated continuous readiness and willingness to perform – Trial Court's findings erroneous [Paras 38–46].

Specific Performance – Discretion of Court – Section 20 – Equitable Considerations – Balance of Equities – Defendant's letter dated 05.09.1981 did not contain any reference to the alleged non-payment in October 1978, rendering that defence an afterthought unsupported by contemporaneous documentary evidence – Held: The Defendant having enjoyed possession of the flat since 1978 despite receiving over 50% of the agreed consideration, specific performance is warranted – However, given the steep rise in property prices in Mumbai since 1978, interests of justice require the Plaintiffs to pay an additional sum of ₹25 lakhs over and above the balance consideration of ₹20,000/-, so as to balance equities between the parties – Plaintiffs had themselves agreed to pay a reasonable additional amount [Paras 51–54].

Specific Performance – Ingredients for Grant – The Court reiterated that five considerations govern the grant of specific performance: existence of a valid concluded contract; readiness and willingness of the Plaintiff; actual part performance by the Plaintiff; equitable considerations including hardship to the Defendant; and entitlement to alternative relief – All ingredients in the present case satisfied in favour of the Plaintiffs [Paras 47–53].

Decision: First Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment and decree dated 19.12.2007 set aside – Decree for specific performance of the oral agreement granted in favour of Appellants/Plaintiffs, subject to payment of ₹25,20,000/- (₹25 lakhs additional amount plus balance consideration of ₹20,000/-) to the Respondents/Defendants – No order as to costs.

Discharge – Framing of Charge – Sections 227 and 228 CrPC / Sections 250 and 251 BNSS – Standard of Prima Facie Case – Defective Investigation No Ground for Discharge – Applicant, allegedly arrested on the spot during interception of a truck carrying 19 bulls, sought discharge contending false implication, fabricated arrest, and tainted investigation including removal of a case diary parcha (SCD-9) recording the Gunner's exculpatory statement – Held: At the stage of framing of charge, the court is not to conduct a mini trial or marshal evidence; the test is whether there is sufficient ground for presuming that the accused committed the offence, not whether conviction is certain – Material on record including statements of witnesses, FIR, and recovery memo disclosed prima facie case – The Gunner's statement related to 12.09.2019 whereas the incident occurred on 12.12.2019, rendering it irrelevant to the present case – Discharge application rightly rejected; charge framing orders valid [Paras 19–34].

Defective Investigation – No Benefit to Accused at Discharge Stage – Applicant alleged deliberate manipulation of the case diary by the Investigating Officer including substitution of Parcha SCD-9 – Held: An accused cannot be discharged or acquitted on the ground of defective, faulty or impartial investigation alone – Even where investigation is found to be designedly defective, the prosecution evidence must be scrutinised dehors such lapses; to acquit or discharge on grounds of defective investigation would be to play into the hands of a biased or interested investigator – Court's function is to evaluate the evidence independently of investigative lapses [Paras 14–18].

Decision: Application dismissed – No orders as to costs – Registrar (Compliance) directed to send a copy to the concerned trial court.

Criminal Law — Framing of Charge — Fake Allotment Orders — Kerosene Oil — CAPD Department Officials — Petitioners, serving as departmental employees, challenged the order framing charges against them under Sections 419, 420, 468, 120-B RPC and Sections 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act, arising from a racket involving fabrication and circulation of fake kerosene oil allotment orders — Trial court discharged petitioners for offences under Sections 467 and 471 RPC while proceeding against them for remaining offences — On revision, High Court finds material on record prima facie sufficient — Petitions dismissed [Paras 1, 12, 35].

Scope of Revisional Jurisdiction — Framing of Charge — Test of Prima Facie Case — At the stage of framing charge, the Court is not required to meticulously evaluate evidence as in a full-fledged trial — The test is whether the material on record, taken at face value, discloses a prima facie case or raises grave suspicion warranting trial — The threshold is intentionally low so as not to stifle legitimate prosecution at inception — Mere strong suspicion founded on material is sufficient — Defence material ordinarily cannot be considered at this stage [Paras 20, 21, 32].

Circumstantial Evidence — Conspiracy — Organised Modus Operandi — Seizure of twenty-five allotment orders, forensic indication of at least one being fake, and repeated typing of such orders by private individuals over a period of time prima facie suggests an organised and systematic racket — Conspiracy is seldom proved by direct evidence and may be inferred from surrounding circumstances — Direct evidence not a sine qua non for framing charge [Paras 22, 24, 33].

Statements under Section 161 CrPC — Co-accused — Corroborative Material — Implication of petitioner Bal Krishan Sharma on the basis of statements of co-accused under Section 161 CrPC challenged — Held: Such statements are not substantive evidence and a co-accused cannot be implicated solely on their basis — However, prosecution case not resting exclusively on such statements — Charge-sheet discloses additional material including existence of multiple forged orders, their circulation, verification by departmental officials and interaction between private accused and departmental authorities — At the stage of charge, admissibility and probative value are matters for trial [Paras 25, 26, 27, 28].

Role of Departmental Officials — Verification of Forged Document — Statement of PW-Omesh Sharma indicating that when suspicion arose regarding a forged allotment order, it was shown to petitioners Kali Dass and Swaran Singh who represented it to be genuine, whereafter kerosene oil was released — This prima facie indicates that petitioners were not passive spectators but facilitated use of a forged document — Whether such conduct constitutes criminal culpability is a matter for trial [Para 23].

Second FIR — Permissibility — Test of Sameness — FIR No. 91/2006 of Police Station Satwari pertained to a specific incident of black-marketing based on a particular allotment order — FIR No. 31/2006 of Police Station Peer Mitha pertained to a larger conspiracy involving preparation and circulation of multiple fake allotment orders — Two FIRs, though connected, operate in distinct spheres of criminality — Second FIR held permissible as it falls within the category where subsequent investigation reveals a wider conspiracy justifying independent registration [Paras 29, 30, 31].

Decision: Revision petitions dismissed — Order of the Principal Sessions Judge framing charges against the petitioners upheld — Interim direction, if any, vacated — Trial court directed to proceed with the trial in accordance with law [Para 35].

Industrial Licence – Hot Mix Plant – Panchayat Permission – Amendment to Section 233 – Words "or Refusing" Omitted – Deemed Sanction – Panchayat Directed to Grant Permission – Petitioners invested over Rs. 5 crore to establish a modern batch mix plant after obtaining all statutory clearances, including consent from the Kerala State Pollution Control Board and a No-Objection Certificate from the District Medical Officer – Nellanad Grama Panchayat repeatedly rejected the application citing public protest and health apprehensions, despite absence of any finding of statutory violation by any authority – High Court had previously in Ext.P1 judgment set aside the rejection and directed the Panchayat to reconsider the application dated 17.05.2025 under Section 233 of the Act, 1994, as amended by Act 14 of 2018 – In the impugned Ext.P3 order, the Panchayat rejected the application on the ground that the machinery was installed in 2017 prior to the 2018 amendment – Held: By Act 14 of 2018, the words "or refusing" were consciously omitted by the legislature from sub-section (4) of Section 233 of the Act, 1994; consequently, an application under Section 233 can only be absolutely or conditionally allowed and cannot be rejected – Ext.P3 order set aside – Panchayat directed to allow Ext.P26 application, with or without conditions, within two weeks [Paras 22–26, 56].

Deemed Permission – Section 236 of Kerala Panchayat Raj Act – Non-Communication Within Statutory Period – 1st Petitioner's Proprietary Concern – The 1st petitioner filed an application on 06.02.2017 under Section 233 of the Act, 1994, for establishing a proprietary hot mix plant – The Panchayat did not communicate any decision within 30 days – Held: In the light of the dictum in Sudhakaran V. v. Pallichal Grama Panchayat [2016 (2) KHC 481] and Abdul Shafeek v. Asamannoor Grama Panchayath [2018 (3) KHC 170], the 1st petitioner had obtained a deemed permission under Section 236(3) of the Act, 1994 – The subsequent Ext.P10 rejection and Ext.P12 stop memo both issued after the statutory period, were therefore invalid – The statement in Ext.P3 that the petitioners operated without any permit in 2017 is incorrect [Paras 30–33].

Factual Finding – Machinery Installed in 2017 – Partnership Firm and New Machinery Post-2022 – Panchayat's Finding Unsustainable – The Panchayat in Ext.P3 stated that 130 HP machinery was installed in 2017 without permission – Held: The partnership firm N&T Tar Hotmix Plant was registered only on 04.06.2022 as per Ext.P16; the ultra-modern batch mix plant was purchased only on 25.03.2022 as per Ext.P17 – New machinery purchased in 2022 cannot have been installed in 2017 – Confusion between the 1st petitioner's 2017 proprietary application and the partnership firm's 2025 application is apparent – Panchayat's findings in Ext.P3 to the contrary are set aside in toto [Paras 25–27, 35–36].

Violation of Court Direction – Ext.P1 Judgment – Application to be Considered Under Amended Law – Panchayat Cannot Ignore Court's Direction – The High Court in Ext.P1 directed the Panchayat to reconsider Ext.P26 (dated 17.05.2025) in accordance with the amended Section 233 of the Act, 1994 – Despite this, the Panchayat in Ext.P3 held that the amendment was not applicable as machinery was installed in 2017 – Held: The application filed by the partnership firm was in 2025, which is admittedly after Act 14 of 2018; the Panchayat is obligated to consider the application under the law in force as on the date of the application – The Ext.P3 decision is a clear violation of the directions in Ext.P1 judgment and is liable to be set aside on that ground as well [Paras 37–39].

Public Protest – Not a Valid Ground to Deny Statutory Permission – Rule of Law – Environmental Clearances in Place – Panchayat's Refusal Driven by Public Protest Lacks Basis – The Panchayat repeatedly rejected the petitioners' applications citing public protest and health apprehensions – District Medical Officer in Ext.P32 (dated 06.02.2025) certified that there are no health hazards and no public health problems are likely from the plant's operation – The plant is located at least 150 meters from the nearest residential houses – PCB granted consent to operate – Held: When all statutory authorities have cleared the unit, extra-legal resistance cannot be permitted to shut down a lawful enterprise – Public dissent, without proven illegality, cannot wholly thwart a venture that has complied with every statutory requirement – Compliance with law must be protection in a rule-of-law State [Paras 46, 50–51, 55–56].

Alternative Remedy – Article 226 – Writ Jurisdiction Invokable Despite Alternative Remedy – It is a settled position that an alternative remedy is a bar to a writ petition – However, where the decision-making process is erroneous and an entrepreneur has invested crores of rupees with all statutory clearances, and the Panchayat continues to reject the application despite a binding court direction, the High Court is justified in exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India – Failure to interfere in such circumstances would be an injustice to a law-abiding investor and would weaken the credibility of statutory approvals [Paras 49–50].

Decision: Writ Petition allowed – Ext.P3 order of Nellanad Grama Panchayat set aside – Respondents 4 and 5 directed to allow Ext.P26 application, imposing appropriate conditions if necessary, in tune with Section 233 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 – Orders to be passed within two weeks from receipt of certified copy of the judgment.