Bail — Espionage — Official Secrets Act, 1923 — BNS, Section 152 — Petitioner accused of transmitting sensitive defence information to Pakistani intelligence operatives — FIR registered on basis of disclosure statement made during custody in a prior Arms Act case — Petitioner had visited Pakistan in November 2024 on a religious trip to Kartarpur Sahib and Nankana Sahib — Alleged to have remained in contact with Pakistani contacts through WhatsApp and Snapchat upon return — Accused of recording movements of Indian Army and sharing confidential information including details of Army establishments at Patiala — Held: Bail granted on consideration of weak evidentiary foundation, absence of prosecution sanction, clean antecedents, and arguable points of law [Paras 1–17].

Disclosure Statement — Sole Basis for FIR — Second FIR Registered Immediately After Bail in First Case — Petitioner's mobile phone already in police custody pursuant to FIR No. 108 (Arms Act) — Present FIR No. 31 registered on the same date bail was granted in FIR No. 108, based solely on petitioner's disclosure statement — No independent recovery effected in the present case — Court questioned the occasion for registering a second FIR when the solitary evidence (mobile phone) was already in custody — State unable to answer specific queries posed by Court regarding circumstances of disclosure and basis of second FIR [Paras 3, 5, 9].

Corroborative Evidence — Absence Thereof — No material to show video or photographs transmitted to Pakistani contacts — Alleged communications between petitioner and "Shah Ji" confined to period 18.04.2025 to 10.05.2025 — Operation Sindoor commenced 09.05.2025 — No allegation of communication after commencement of Operation — State unable to identify specific information shared, confirm period of video recording, establish pecuniary motive, or demonstrate that "Shah Ji" was an intelligence operative — Motive attributed to petitioner's ancestral affinity for Pakistan, not substantiated by evidence [Paras 5–12].

Prosecution Sanction — Official Secrets Act, 1923 — Mandatory Precondition — Proposal for sanction forwarded to Union of India in July 2025 — No sanction accorded despite lapse of approximately nine months — Trial cannot commence in absence of such sanction — Held: Non-grant of prosecution sanction is a relevant consideration militating against continued detention [Paras 7, 14, 16].

Decision: Petition allowed — Petitioner directed to be released on regular bail on furnishing requisite bail/surety bond to satisfaction of Trial Court — Petitioner not to threaten or influence prosecution witnesses — Observations not to be construed as expression on merits — Trial Court to decide on available material [Paras 16–19].

Industrial Licence – Hot Mix Plant – Panchayat Permission – Amendment to Section 233 – Words "or Refusing" Omitted – Deemed Sanction – Panchayat Directed to Grant Permission – Petitioners invested over Rs. 5 crore to establish a modern batch mix plant after obtaining all statutory clearances, including consent from the Kerala State Pollution Control Board and a No-Objection Certificate from the District Medical Officer – Nellanad Grama Panchayat repeatedly rejected the application citing public protest and health apprehensions, despite absence of any finding of statutory violation by any authority – High Court had previously in Ext.P1 judgment set aside the rejection and directed the Panchayat to reconsider the application dated 17.05.2025 under Section 233 of the Act, 1994, as amended by Act 14 of 2018 – In the impugned Ext.P3 order, the Panchayat rejected the application on the ground that the machinery was installed in 2017 prior to the 2018 amendment – Held: By Act 14 of 2018, the words "or refusing" were consciously omitted by the legislature from sub-section (4) of Section 233 of the Act, 1994; consequently, an application under Section 233 can only be absolutely or conditionally allowed and cannot be rejected – Ext.P3 order set aside – Panchayat directed to allow Ext.P26 application, with or without conditions, within two weeks [Paras 22–26, 56].

Deemed Permission – Section 236 of Kerala Panchayat Raj Act – Non-Communication Within Statutory Period – 1st Petitioner's Proprietary Concern – The 1st petitioner filed an application on 06.02.2017 under Section 233 of the Act, 1994, for establishing a proprietary hot mix plant – The Panchayat did not communicate any decision within 30 days – Held: In the light of the dictum in Sudhakaran V. v. Pallichal Grama Panchayat [2016 (2) KHC 481] and Abdul Shafeek v. Asamannoor Grama Panchayath [2018 (3) KHC 170], the 1st petitioner had obtained a deemed permission under Section 236(3) of the Act, 1994 – The subsequent Ext.P10 rejection and Ext.P12 stop memo both issued after the statutory period, were therefore invalid – The statement in Ext.P3 that the petitioners operated without any permit in 2017 is incorrect [Paras 30–33].

Factual Finding – Machinery Installed in 2017 – Partnership Firm and New Machinery Post-2022 – Panchayat's Finding Unsustainable – The Panchayat in Ext.P3 stated that 130 HP machinery was installed in 2017 without permission – Held: The partnership firm N&T Tar Hotmix Plant was registered only on 04.06.2022 as per Ext.P16; the ultra-modern batch mix plant was purchased only on 25.03.2022 as per Ext.P17 – New machinery purchased in 2022 cannot have been installed in 2017 – Confusion between the 1st petitioner's 2017 proprietary application and the partnership firm's 2025 application is apparent – Panchayat's findings in Ext.P3 to the contrary are set aside in toto [Paras 25–27, 35–36].

Violation of Court Direction – Ext.P1 Judgment – Application to be Considered Under Amended Law – Panchayat Cannot Ignore Court's Direction – The High Court in Ext.P1 directed the Panchayat to reconsider Ext.P26 (dated 17.05.2025) in accordance with the amended Section 233 of the Act, 1994 – Despite this, the Panchayat in Ext.P3 held that the amendment was not applicable as machinery was installed in 2017 – Held: The application filed by the partnership firm was in 2025, which is admittedly after Act 14 of 2018; the Panchayat is obligated to consider the application under the law in force as on the date of the application – The Ext.P3 decision is a clear violation of the directions in Ext.P1 judgment and is liable to be set aside on that ground as well [Paras 37–39].

Public Protest – Not a Valid Ground to Deny Statutory Permission – Rule of Law – Environmental Clearances in Place – Panchayat's Refusal Driven by Public Protest Lacks Basis – The Panchayat repeatedly rejected the petitioners' applications citing public protest and health apprehensions – District Medical Officer in Ext.P32 (dated 06.02.2025) certified that there are no health hazards and no public health problems are likely from the plant's operation – The plant is located at least 150 meters from the nearest residential houses – PCB granted consent to operate – Held: When all statutory authorities have cleared the unit, extra-legal resistance cannot be permitted to shut down a lawful enterprise – Public dissent, without proven illegality, cannot wholly thwart a venture that has complied with every statutory requirement – Compliance with law must be protection in a rule-of-law State [Paras 46, 50–51, 55–56].

Alternative Remedy – Article 226 – Writ Jurisdiction Invokable Despite Alternative Remedy – It is a settled position that an alternative remedy is a bar to a writ petition – However, where the decision-making process is erroneous and an entrepreneur has invested crores of rupees with all statutory clearances, and the Panchayat continues to reject the application despite a binding court direction, the High Court is justified in exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India – Failure to interfere in such circumstances would be an injustice to a law-abiding investor and would weaken the credibility of statutory approvals [Paras 49–50].

Decision: Writ Petition allowed – Ext.P3 order of Nellanad Grama Panchayat set aside – Respondents 4 and 5 directed to allow Ext.P26 application, imposing appropriate conditions if necessary, in tune with Section 233 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 – Orders to be passed within two weeks from receipt of certified copy of the judgment.

Environment – Tree Felling – Interim Prohibition – Zirakpur–Panchkula Bypass – NHAI – PIL challenging the proposed felling of approximately 5,000 trees for the construction of the Zirakpur–Panchkula bypass — Court queried NHAI as to whether the States of Punjab and Haryana are ready and willing to provide public land in close vicinity for compensatory afforestation in lieu of the proposed tree felling — NHAI's counsel had no answer and sought time to seek instructions — NHAI also directed to submit all re-alignment proposals considered by its technical team to enable the Court to examine whether mind was applied to alternative sites — Held: Inactivity of respondents requires drastic remedial measures — This Court prohibits cutting of any tree of any age or species in the State of Haryana, including the 5,000 trees proposed for the bypass, without permission of this Court, till the next date of hearing [Paras 1, 1.1, 1.2, 4].

Forest Cover – State of Haryana – Ecological Catastrophe – As per the Indian State Forest Report 2023, forest cover in Haryana is only 3.65% of its geographical area — The Court observed that the functionaries of the State of Haryana appear neither serious nor conscious of the impending ecological catastrophe — The low forest cover lends urgency to the interim prohibition against tree felling [Paras 2, 3, 3.1].

Interim Directions – NHAI Assurance – NHAI's counsel assured the Court that no tree for the construction of the proposed bypass will be cut until further orders are passed — CM-156-CWPIL-2026 allowed; Annexures P-13 and P-14 filed by the petitioners taken on record [Paras 5, CM order].

Decision: CM-156-CWPIL-2026 allowed — Cutting of any tree of any age or species in the State of Haryana, including trees proposed for the Zirakpur–Panchkula bypass, prohibited without permission of this Court till further orders — NHAI directed to submit all re-alignment proposals — Matter listed on 17.04.2026.

Public Interest Litigation — Right to Health — Article 21 — Burn Care Infrastructure — State-wide Systemic Failure — PIL instituted on the backdrop of a kerosene fire incident in Hazaribagh in 2021 caused by adulterated PDS kerosene with a flash point of 13.5°C, far below the prescribed safety minimum of 35°C — Incident resulted in four deaths including a two-year-old child and approximately fifteen persons suffering grievous burn injuries and permanent facial disfigurement — State admitted during proceedings that no specialised burn care facility with modern infrastructure existed in Government hospitals across the entire State of Jharkhand — Held: Once a matter of grave public importance is brought before the Court in PIL, the Court may expand the scope of inquiry to protect the fundamental rights of a larger class of citizens — PIL scope expanded from individual Hazaribagh incident to state-wide burn care infrastructure — Directions issued for operationalisation of dedicated burn units in all 24 district hospitals and government medical colleges within 120 days [Paras 22–25, 43–44].

Right to Health — Article 21 — Positive Obligation of State — Welfare State — The right to life under Article 21 encompasses the right to live with human dignity and access to specialised, time-sensitive medical intervention — In burn trauma, every minute is critical to preventing multi-organ failure and permanent disfigurement — The NPPMBI Operational Guidelines constitute a standard of care voluntarily undertaken by the State — Burn mortality in India exceeds one death every four minutes, surpassing Malaria and Tuberculosis — Failure to operationalise sanctioned infrastructure represents a significant gap in fulfillment of Article 21 mandate — State cannot plead financial constraints to shirk primary obligation of providing emergency medical care — A welfare State's constitutional mandate is not satisfied by the mere existence of buildings lacking life-saving machinery and trained manpower [Paras 30–41].

State Affidavit — Inconsistencies — Paper-based Compliance — CAG Audit Findings — State's supplementary affidavit claimed burn wards operational across all 24 districts with "adequate logistics" — However, Annexure-I listed only 22 units, with Jamshedpur appearing twice — CAG Report (No. 3 of 2021) revealed 20 burn units constructed under 12th Five Year Plan sanctioned at Rs. 1.35 crore each could not be made functional due to non-procurement of equipment — Funds allocated to four trauma care facilities also unaccounted for in affidavit — Held: Paper-based compliance where infrastructure exists in budgetary allocations but remains absent in clinical practice renders fundamental right to health illusory [Paras 27–29].

Compensation — Kerosene Fire Victims — Victim Compensation Scheme — Compensatory jurisprudence firmly entrenched in public law since Rudul Sah — Grant of specific monetary compensation requires determination of facts including nature of incident, extent of negligence and identification of responsible parties, which cannot be adjudicated in PIL — FIR (Muffasil P.S. Case No. 45/2021) registered and matter under investigation/trial — Held: Specific compensation not directed at this stage — Victims and legal heirs entitled to invoke Victim Compensation Scheme under Section 357-A CrPC/Section 396 BNSS before jurisdictional court — DLSA Hazaribagh directed to identify victims unable to make such application and facilitate filing with assistance of Para Legal Volunteers [Paras 14–21, 44(j)–(l)].

Directions — Time-bound Implementation — State directed to: (a) operationalise dedicated burn units in all district hospitals and government medical colleges within 120 days; (b) ensure availability of trained medical and paramedical personnel, essential equipment and supporting infrastructure; (c) ensure uninterrupted availability of essential medicines and consumables; (d) treat burn patients exclusively in designated burn units with isolation and infection-control measures; (e) provide round-the-clock specialist and emergency care; (f) undertake comprehensive training and capacity-building for burn care staff within 90 days; (g) constitute/operationalise State Implementation Committee under NPPMBI Guidelines within four weeks; (h) Director-in-Chief, Health Services to function as nodal authority for day-to-day implementation — Trial in Muffasil P.S. Case No. 45/2021 to be concluded expeditiously [Para 44].

Decision: PIL disposed of — Comprehensive directions issued for state-wide operationalisation of burn care infrastructure — Victims and legal heirs directed to pursue compensation through jurisdictional court and DLSA Hazaribagh — No costs — Appreciation recorded for Amicus Curiae.

Matrimonial Law – Divorce – Mental Cruelty – Repeated Filing of False Complaints – Husband, a doctor, sought dissolution of marriage under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on the ground of cruelty – Trial Court dismissed the petition holding the incidents to be mere trivial normal wear and tear of married life – On appeal, High Court finds that wife had filed false FIR No. 54 under Section 498-A IPC in which husband and his parents were acquitted; filed FIR No. 1470 alleging forgery of signatures in income tax returns which was not charge-sheeted by police and was subsequently quashed; filed complaint under Section 12 of the DV Act which was dismissed by the Magistrate; and filed repeated complaints to the Director General, Health Department against the husband causing difficulties in discharge of his official duties – Held: Acquittal in criminal proceedings and quashing of false FIR, coupled with repeated complaints to the employer, constitute legal proof of mental cruelty; grant of divorce does not amount to giving benefit to the husband of his own wrongs – Appeal allowed; marriage dissolved [Paras 9, 22, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33].

Mental Cruelty – Concept and Scope – "Cruelty" not defined in Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Mental cruelty broadly defined as conduct which inflicts upon the other party such mental pain and suffering as would make it impossible for that party to live with the other – No straitjacket formula applicable; each case to be examined on its own facts and circumstances taking into account social status, educational level, cultural background and cumulative effect of conduct – Isolated incidents over a period of years do not amount to cruelty; ill conduct must be persistent for a fairly lengthy period causing the wronged party to find it extremely difficult to continue living with the other – Relied upon: Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi; V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat; Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh; K. Srinivas Rao v. D.A. Deepa; Amutha v. A.R. Subramanian [Paras 13–17, 20, 29, 30].

Cruelty – Adultery by Husband – Effect on Husband's Right to Seek Divorce – Allegation that husband was in adulterous relationship with a nurse, Sheela, supported by birth certificate recording his name as father and departmental enquiry concluding possibility of live-in relationship could not be ruled out – Held: Even if husband had some adulterous relationship, if the conduct of the wife independently reveals cruelty unrelated to such adultery, his right to seek divorce on the ground of cruelty is not forfeited or ousted; adulterous relationship of husband may furnish wife a ground to seek divorce but does not in every situation furnish a defence to oppose divorce when the wife's cruelty is not in retaliation to such relationship [Para 27].

Maintenance and Permanent Alimony – Husband directed to deposit Rs. 16 lakhs as maintenance for wife and daughter (in ratio of 60:40) and Rs. 30 lakhs as permanent alimony in the Family Court within six weeks – Amount of Rs. 30 lakhs to be adjustable against permanent alimony, if any, awarded in proceedings under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 if wife chooses to prefer such petition [Paras 34].

Kidnapping – Section 363 and 366 IPC – Criminal Conspiracy – Section 120-B IPC – Victim a Minor – Conviction Partly Upheld – Accused Sanjeev Kumar @ Sanju instigated the minor victim (aged 16 years) to leave her home by threatening her about public knowledge of their relationship, paying her ₹800/- and promising to marry her – Accused Kanchan Kumar accompanied the victim from the spot to Jukhala, facilitating her travel to Shimla with juvenile P, thereby acting at the behest of Sanjeev Kumar – Conspiracy between Sanjeev Kumar and Kanchan Kumar duly proved – Held: Conviction of Sanjeev Kumar and Kanchan Kumar under Section 366 read with Section 120-B IPC upheld; conviction of Sanjeev Kumar under Section 506 IPC upheld – Insufficient evidence to sustain conviction of Pawan Kumar and Brij Lal; their appeals allowed [Paras 60–69].

Age of Victim – Proof of Minority – Pariwar Register and Birth Certificate – Radiological Opinion – Where documentary evidence in the form of Pariwar Register entries and school-leaving certificate consistently showed the victim's date of birth as 02.08.1992, making her 16 years old on the date of the incident, the radiological opinion placing skeletal age between 16–18 years does not displace such documentary evidence – Held: Entries in official registers are admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act without examining the person who made the entry; documentary proof of age prevails over radiological opinion – Victim proved to be a minor [Paras 13–21].

Kidnapping – Consent of Minor Immaterial – Section 361 IPC – The victim left her home after being persuaded by the accused Sanjeev Kumar who had paid her money and instilled fear of public disgrace – Held: Consent of a minor is wholly immaterial for the offence of kidnapping under Section 361 IPC; only the consent of the lawful guardian can take the case outside the purview of Section 361 – Persuasion and enticement by the accused sufficient to constitute kidnapping even where the minor willingly accompanies the accused [Paras 52–59].

Evidence – Contradiction of Witnesses – Section 145 Evidence Act – Procedure – Confrontations put to the victim in cross-examination were not put to the Investigating Officers (PW17 and PW19), and no portion of the prior statements was marked or proved through the Investigating Officers – Held: A previous statement can be used to contradict a witness only after following the procedure under Section 145 of the Evidence Act; if the witness denies having made a prior statement, the Investigating Officer must be examined to prove it; unproved confrontations cannot be relied upon to discredit testimony [Paras 32–42].

Section 71 IPC – Bar on Double Conviction for Major and Minor Offence – Learned Trial Court convicted the accused under both Section 363 and Section 366 read with Section 120-B IPC – Held: Section 366 IPC is an aggravated form of Section 363 IPC; when a person is convicted for the aggravated offence, he cannot simultaneously be punished for the lesser included offence by virtue of Section 71 IPC – Conviction under Section 363 read with Section 120-B set aside for Sanjeev Kumar and Kanchan Kumar [Paras 65–66].

Decision: Appeals of Pawan Kumar (Cr. Appeal No. 202/2014) and Brij Lal (Cr. Appeal No. 203/2014) allowed – Conviction and sentence set aside; both acquitted – Fine amounts, if deposited, to be refunded after expiry of limitation period – Appeals of Sanjeev Kumar (Cr. Appeal No. 205/2014) and Kanchan Kumar (Cr. Appeal No. 204/2014) partly allowed – Conviction and sentence under Section 363 read with Section 120-B IPC set aside; conviction under Section 366 read with Section 120-B IPC and, in the case of Sanjeev Kumar, under Section 506 IPC upheld – Pawan Kumar and Brij Lal directed to furnish bail bonds of ₹25,000/- each with one surety to the satisfaction of the Trial Court within four weeks.

Specific Performance – Oral Agreement for Sale – Readiness and Willingness – Non-Deposit of Balance Amount Not Fatal – Original Plaintiff entered into an oral agreement in 1978 to purchase Flat No. 13 from the original Defendant for ₹50,000/-, paying ₹30,000/- in part performance – Defendant inducted his brother into the flat, subsequently repudiated the agreement by returning the amount by cheque, claiming personal necessity – Trial Court rejected specific performance holding the Plaintiff not ready and willing as he had not deposited the balance ₹20,000/- during pendency of the suit – Held: Non-deposit of balance consideration cannot be a ground for refusing specific performance; Explanation (i) to Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act makes it clear that actual tender or court deposit is not essential – Plaintiff's letter dated 01.09.1981 and unchallenged oral evidence of his son clearly demonstrated continuous readiness and willingness to perform – Trial Court's findings erroneous [Paras 38–46].

Specific Performance – Discretion of Court – Section 20 – Equitable Considerations – Balance of Equities – Defendant's letter dated 05.09.1981 did not contain any reference to the alleged non-payment in October 1978, rendering that defence an afterthought unsupported by contemporaneous documentary evidence – Held: The Defendant having enjoyed possession of the flat since 1978 despite receiving over 50% of the agreed consideration, specific performance is warranted – However, given the steep rise in property prices in Mumbai since 1978, interests of justice require the Plaintiffs to pay an additional sum of ₹25 lakhs over and above the balance consideration of ₹20,000/-, so as to balance equities between the parties – Plaintiffs had themselves agreed to pay a reasonable additional amount [Paras 51–54].

Specific Performance – Ingredients for Grant – The Court reiterated that five considerations govern the grant of specific performance: existence of a valid concluded contract; readiness and willingness of the Plaintiff; actual part performance by the Plaintiff; equitable considerations including hardship to the Defendant; and entitlement to alternative relief – All ingredients in the present case satisfied in favour of the Plaintiffs [Paras 47–53].

Decision: First Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment and decree dated 19.12.2007 set aside – Decree for specific performance of the oral agreement granted in favour of Appellants/Plaintiffs, subject to payment of ₹25,20,000/- (₹25 lakhs additional amount plus balance consideration of ₹20,000/-) to the Respondents/Defendants – No order as to costs.

Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 – Sections 8B and 8C – Rights of Persons Whose Conduct Is Inquired Into – Violation Renders Report Non-Est Against Such Persons – One-Man Commission appointed by State of Assam to inquire into anomalies and malpractices in APSC's Combined Competitive Examinations 2013 and 2014 submitted reports wherein findings, observations and recommendations touching the conduct and reputation of petitioners were made – Commission issued notices to petitioners calling for written responses only, without recognizing their status under Section 8B, without informing them of evidence being recorded, and without affording them the right to adduce defence evidence, to cross-examine witnesses, or to be represented by a legal practitioner – Held: Commission failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of Sections 8B and 8C of the Act; notices issued were at best in terms of Rule 5(2)(a) of the Rules of 1972 and not notices under Section 8B; all findings, observations and recommendations in Report 2013 and Report 2014 touching upon the conduct and reputation of the petitioners are rendered non-est and cannot be used against petitioners in any forum — Reports, however, not set aside in their entirety as they contain public-interest findings [Paras 78–101].

Commissions of Inquiry – Section 8B – Scope and Trigger – Section 8B is attracted when the Commission considers it necessary to inquire into the conduct of any person (Clause a) OR when it is of the opinion that the reputation of any person is likely to be prejudicially affected (Clause b) — Use of the word "or" makes it clear that fulfillment of either Clause is sufficient — Once so triggered, the Commission is under a statutory obligation to afford the person a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the inquiry including the right to adduce evidence in defence — The reasonable opportunity of being heard in the inquiry as per Section 8B is supplemented and exemplified by Section 8C, which confers the right of cross-examination, the right to address the Commission, and the right to be represented by a legal practitioner — These rights are inbuilt and cannot be made conditional upon the person asserting them [Paras 70, 76–80, 100].

Commission of Inquiry – Procedure – Order of Recording Evidence – Rights Under Section 8B Cannot Be Inverted – A person coming within the ambit of Section 8B cannot be called to produce defence evidence at the inception of the inquiry as that would reduce the right of cross-examination to a formality — The proper procedure requires that evidence against such person is adduced first, the person is given opportunity to cross-examine, and thereafter is permitted to adduce defence evidence — In absence of Rules framed by the State under Section 12 of the Act, the Commission must apply the procedure conceptualized in Rule 5(5)(a) of the Rules of 1972 as judicially sanctioned — It was also obligatory for the Commission to inform petitioners when evidence of other participants would be taken and when they would be permitted to adduce defence evidence [Paras 75, 80–81, 98–99].

Departmental Proceedings – Effect of Violation of Section 8B and 8C – Reports Cannot Form Basis of Disciplinary Action – Report 2013 and Report 2014 cannot be used against petitioners to initiate or sustain disciplinary proceedings — The entire basis of the show cause notices and statements of allegations being the impugned reports, the second paragraphs of the show cause notices and statements of allegations stand stricken off — Extracts of the reports furnished as list of documents also cannot be relied upon — However, disciplinary proceedings are not set aside in entirety; the State, as employer, retains inherent right to proceed on materials de hors the reports — If State wishes to include additional documents or list of witnesses, it must do so within 45 days, during which disciplinary proceedings stand stalled [Paras 115–127].

Doctrine of Severability – Disciplinary Proceedings – When one of several grounds for initiation of disciplinary proceedings is found to be invalid, the proceedings can be continued if the remaining grounds are sufficient and the competent authority would have initiated proceedings on those grounds alone — Since State has contended availability of other materials beyond the reports, it is not appropriate to quash disciplinary proceedings at the nascent stage — Observation of Court on materials is consciously avoided to avoid prejudicing parties [Paras 117–123].

Suspension – Rule 6(1), Assam Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964 – Suspension Valid but Protracted Suspension Impermissible – Suspension orders not interfered with as disciplinary and criminal proceedings are pending — However, prolonged suspensions violate Article 21 — Respondent authorities directed to conduct periodical reviews within 45 days to examine whether continuation of suspension is necessary in public interest — Failure to review within 45 days will render suspension notifications invalid and petitioners shall be reinstated to non-sensitive posts [Paras 128–138].

Decision: Batch of writ petitions disposed of — Report 2013 and Report 2014 declared non-est against petitioners to the extent they touch upon conduct and reputation of petitioners — Second paragraphs of show cause notices and statements of allegations stricken off — Disciplinary proceedings to continue de hors the reports, with State given liberty to include additional documents/witnesses within 45 days — Suspension orders upheld subject to mandatory periodic review within 45 days — Interim orders vacated — No order as to costs.

Criminal Trespass – Section 447 IPC – Encroachment on Forest Land – Ingredients Not Proved – Accused alleged to have encroached upon approximately 30 bighas 13 biswas of Reserved Forest land by raising an apple orchard and a house – Complaint merely stated that encroachment had occurred without averring that the accused entered with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy the State – Held: Mere unauthorised entry or possession, even if illegal, does not constitute criminal trespass unless the specific intent enumerated under Section 441 IPC is proved – Prosecution failed to establish the requisite intent; ingredients of Section 447 IPC not satisfied [Paras 22–24].

Demarcation – Validity – Procedure Not Followed – Accused Absent – Demarcating officer (PW5) admitted that he could not recall whether three permanent points were taken, that he was not competent to carry out demarcation, and that no notice was issued to the accused – HC Sanjay Kumar (PW7) confirmed the accused was absent during demarcation – Patwari, through whom intimation was allegedly given, was not examined – Held: Demarcation not conducted as per law; report does not describe the procedure adopted and cannot be relied upon – Conviction cannot be based on a demarcation conducted in the absence of the accused and without following prescribed instructions [Paras 15–21].

Indian Forest Act – Section 26 – Reserved Forest – Proof of Notification Mandatory – Prosecution relied on a notification (Ex.PW6/B) which did not mention any Khasra number corresponding to the disputed land – No copy of notification declaring Khasra Nos. 644/1, 646/1 and 804/641/1 as Reserved Forest was placed on record – Held: Issuance and publication of notification under Sections 4 and 6 of the Indian Forest Act are mandatory prerequisites to attract Section 26 – In the absence of proof of notification, no offence under Section 26 is made out [Paras 25–29].

Appeal Against Acquittal – Scope of Interference – Held: Appellate court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is patently perverse, based on misreading or omission to consider material evidence, or where no two reasonable views are possible – Trial Court's findings on invalidity of demarcation and absence of proof of Reserved Forest notification constitute a reasonable view – Interference not warranted [Paras 12–14].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Acquittal of respondent confirmed – Respondent directed to furnish bail bonds of ₹25,000/- with one surety to the satisfaction of the Trial Court within four weeks, effective for six months