Taxation Law – Limitation for Reopening Assessment – The petitioner challenged the reopening of its assessment for the year 2011-12 under the Kerala Value Added Tax Act (KVAT Act) – The assessment was reopened by notice issued on 24.01.2018, beyond the five-year limitation period set by Section 25(1) of the KVAT Act as it stood prior to 01.04.2017 – The High Court held that under the unamended Section 25(1), the period for reopening assessments was five years, and the amended six-year period, introduced through the 2017 amendment, applied only prospectively from 01.04.2017 – Since the reopening notice was issued after the five-year limitation period expired on 31.03.2017, the reopening of the assessment was barred by limitation [Paras 2-6, 12-14].

Interpretation of the Third Proviso to Section 25(1) – The third proviso to Section 25(1) extended the period for reopening assessments until 31.03.2018 for cases where the five-year limitation period expired on 31.03.2017 – The petitioner contended that this proviso could not revive assessments that were already time-barred – The Court referred to the Supreme Court decision in Cholayil Pvt. Ltd., which clarified that the phrase “proceed to determine” in the third proviso meant completing assessments already initiated, not initiating new proceedings – The Court held that the third proviso could not extend the limitation period for reopening the petitioner’s assessment beyond the five-year period applicable under the unamended Section 25(1) [Paras 7-9, 13-14].

Prospective Application of Amended Provisions – The 2017 amendment, which extended the limitation period to six years, was held to apply prospectively from 01.04.2017 – The Court ruled that the petitioner's assessment, which was reopened after the five-year limitation period, could not be sustained under the amended provisions – The reopening notice issued on 24.01.2018 was found to be invalid as it was issued after the limitation period had lapsed [Paras 6-7, 13-14].

Decision: Petition Allowed – The High Court allowed the revision petition, setting aside the orders of the lower authorities – It held that the reopening of the assessment was barred by limitation and thus invalid – The question of limitation was answered in favor of the petitioner [Paras 14-15].
 

Tender Process – Deviation from Tender Terms – Arbitrary Selection – The petitioner challenged the award of a tender for loading and transportation of coal, arguing that the respondents deviated from the tender conditions in selecting the final L-1 bidder through a random algorithm under the GeM Portal's General Terms and Conditions, instead of following Clause 25.2(B) of the tender document, which prescribes a "Reverse Auction" or submission of a revised price for final L-1 selection – Held: The terms of the NIT (Notice Inviting Tender) and Clause 25.2(B) override the GeM portal’s general conditions – The method of random selection of L-1 bidder through "Run L-1" was arbitrary, discriminatory, and illegal [Paras 14-19].

Judicial Review – Scope of Interference in Tender Matters – The court reiterated that while judicial review in tender matters is limited, it can intervene where there is arbitrariness, irrationality, or procedural impropriety – The random selection of L-1 bidder without following the prescribed tender terms constituted such impropriety, warranting judicial intervention [Paras 6-7, 19-21].

Decision: Petition allowed – The Letter of Acceptance dated 22.05.2024 issued in favor of respondent No. 4 is quashed – The respondents are directed to adhere to Clause 25.2(B) of the Tender Terms and proceed afresh with the selection of the L-1 bidder in accordance with the law [Para 22].

Trade Marks Law – Opposition to Registration – The appellant, "M/s Abbott GmbH," opposed the registration of the mark "MEBUFEN" by respondent No.2, "M/s Meridian Medicare Ltd.," on grounds of deceptive similarity with their mark "BRUFEN" – The Registrar of Trademarks dismissed the opposition and granted registration to "MEBUFEN" – The appellant contended that "MEBUFEN" and "BRUFEN" were phonetically and structurally similar, particularly since both marks contained the common element "FEN," derived from the chemical "Ibuprofen" – The appellant argued that this similarity would likely confuse the public, especially given the identical medicinal nature of the products [Paras 1-6].

Deceptive Similarity – Analysis of Competing Marks – The Court analyzed the principles of deceptive similarity as laid down in Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. and F. Hoffmann-LA Roche & Co. Ltd. v. Geoffrey Manners & Co. Pvt. Ltd. – It reiterated that marks must be considered as a whole and not through a meticulous, letter-by-letter comparison – The Court noted that the common suffix "FEN" was derived from a non-proprietary name, "Ibuprofen," and thus could not be monopolized by the appellant – The marks "BRUFEN" and "MEBUFEN" were found to be visually, structurally, and phonetically dissimilar due to the distinct prefixes "BRU" and "MEBU" – The mere use of "FEN" in both marks was insufficient to establish confusion or deceptive similarity [Paras 6-12, 13-14].

Reliance on Previous Cases – Distinction from Appellant’s Precedents – The appellant relied on the judgments in Boots Company PLC v. Registrar of Trade Marks and Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Sun Pharma Laboratories Ltd., where competing marks were found to be deceptively similar – The Court held that those cases involved marks with clear structural and phonetic similarity, which was not evident in the present case – Therefore, those precedents did not support the appellant's case, as "BRUFEN" and "MEBUFEN" were not similarly confusing [Paras 15-17].

Decision: Appeal Dismissed – The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decision of the Registrar of Trademarks – It concluded that the marks "BRUFEN" and "MEBUFEN" were not deceptively similar, and no confusion would arise in the market from their concurrent use [Paras 18-19].

Civil Service – Seniority Dispute – Promotion – Appointment as In-charge Principal Quashed – The appellant was appointed as the In-charge Principal of a school through an order dated 30.03.2023, which was challenged by the respondent on the ground of seniority – The Single Judge quashed the appointment due to the appellant being junior – Held: The appellate court upheld the decision, noting that the respondent had been in service since 1998 based on a valid appointment, and his seniority should be counted from the date of joining [Paras 2, 6, 7].

Simultaneous Degrees – Misconduct – Validity of Degree – The respondent’s B.Ed and M.A. degrees were obtained simultaneously from two different universities without prior permission from the appointing authority – The appellant argued that this constituted misconduct under Rule 13 of the Assam Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965 – The Court held that while obtaining a degree without permission constitutes misconduct, it does not invalidate the degree itself, and the respondent's seniority remained unaffected [Paras 4, 5, 8].

Ad hoc Appointments and Seniority – Counting Service for Seniority – The appellant contended that the respondent’s initial service was ad hoc and could not be counted for seniority purposes – The Court rejected this argument, holding that where an ad hoc appointment follows the proper selection process and is regularized, seniority must be counted from the date of initial joining, as confirmed by the Supreme Court in Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers Assn. v. State of Maharashtra [Para 8].

Intra-Court Appeals – Scope of Interference – The appellate court emphasized that in writ appeals under Article 226, it will not interfere with the discretion of the Single Judge unless there is a patent error or violation of settled legal principles – The Court found no such error in the Single Judge's judgment and refused to substitute its discretion [Para 9].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – The appointment of the appellant as Principal was quashed – The Court affirmed the respondent’s seniority and right to promotion – The judgment of the Single Judge was upheld, and no interference was warranted [Paras 9, 10].
 

Motor Vehicle Accident – Rash and Negligent Driving – The prosecution alleged that the respondent, driving a tipper, failed to notice the turn signal given by the deceased bicyclist and caused a fatal accident – The trial court convicted the respondent for rash and negligent driving under Sections 279 and 304-A of the IPC – The appellate court, however, acquitted the respondent, holding that the accident occurred on a busy national highway, and the deceased could have avoided the collision by exercising caution while crossing the road – Held: The appellate court's view was reasonable as the deceased was turning at a road junction and the evidence, including skid marks, suggested that the respondent had attempted to stop the vehicle [Paras 6-8].

Road Safety Regulations – Duty of Driver and Bicyclist – Under Rule 8 of the Rules of the Road Regulation, 1989, drivers must slow down at road junctions to ensure safety – The court observed that both the deceased and the driver had duties under the law, and in this case, the deceased's negligence in entering the junction was a contributing factor – The appellate court's finding that the deceased bicyclist should have exercised caution was upheld [Paras 10-12].

Appellate Review – Scope of Interference in Acquittal – The court reaffirmed the principle that an acquittal should not be overturned unless the findings are perverse or unreasonable – In this case, the appellate court's decision to acquit the respondent was found to be a plausible view based on the evidence, and no interference was warranted [Paras 15-18].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – The appellate court's judgment acquitting the respondent is upheld as the view taken was reasonable and supported by the evidence [Para 18].

Anticipatory Bail – Non-Bailable Warrant and Proceedings under Section 82 CrPC – Exceptional Circumstances for Granting Bail – The applicant sought anticipatory bail after non-bailable warrants and proclamation under Section 82 CrPC were issued against him in a fraud case involving the sale of government land. Citing precedents from the Supreme Court, the Court held that there is no absolute bar on granting anticipatory bail after issuance of a proclamation if exceptional circumstances warrant it. Considering that the applicant was not in possession of the disputed land and had initiated civil proceedings for cancellation of the sale, the Court granted anticipatory bail – Held: Anticipatory bail granted in the interest of justice, subject to conditions [Paras 19-25].

Fraud in Land Sale – Victim of Fraud – Anticipatory Bail Granted – The applicant was alleged to have been involved in a fraudulent transaction concerning government land. However, the Court found that the applicant had paid part of the sale consideration and initiated proceedings for cancellation of the fraudulent sale agreement. The co-accused, including the seller, had already been granted bail. In light of these facts, the applicant was deemed to be a victim of the fraud, and anticipatory bail was granted – Held: Anticipatory bail granted [Paras 22-24].

Conditions for Anticipatory Bail – The Court imposed several conditions for the grant of anticipatory bail, including regular appearance before the trial court, non-interference with the investigation, and not leaving the country without permission. The Court emphasized that the anticipatory bail was subject to compliance with these conditions – Held: Bail granted with conditions [Paras 26].

Decision: The application for anticipatory bail was allowed, subject to conditions to ensure the applicant’s cooperation with the investigation and compliance with court orders [Paras 25-26].

Excise Law – Exemption Notification – Rebate Claim on Exported Goods – The petitioner challenged the rejection of their rebate claim on biscuits exported out of India – The petitioner had voluntarily paid excise duty on the goods exported, arguing that since the biscuits did not bear a retail sale price in rupees, they were not covered by the exemption notification – Held: Goods exported without a retail sale price in rupees are not eligible for exemption under Notification No. 3/2006 – The petitioner was entitled to pay duty and claim a rebate under Rule 18 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 [Paras 13-14, 20].

Article 265 of the Constitution – Retention of Duty Paid Without Authority of Law – The revenue contended that the goods were exempt under Notification No. 3/2006 and that the petitioner was not required to pay duty, thereby not entitled to a rebate – The Court held that if goods were exempt, retaining the duty paid without the authority of law would violate Article 265 of the Constitution – The Court rejected the revenue’s argument, emphasizing that duty paid without legal obligation cannot be retained [Paras 15-16].

Cenvat Credit and Tribunal Decision – Consistency in Rebate Claims – The petitioner’s earlier rebate claims had been allowed by appellate authorities and accepted by the revenue – The Court noted that the revenue could not take a contrary position after accepting similar claims in the past – The tribunal’s order allowing the petitioner’s appeal was also accepted by the revenue, further supporting the petitioner’s claim for a rebate [Paras 17-19, 23-24].

Decision – The petitioner’s claim for a rebate of excise duty paid on exported biscuits was allowed – The order of the Revisional Authority was quashed – The respondents were directed to grant the rebate claims [Paras 30-31].

Criminal Law – NDPS Act – Conviction under Section 15-C – Appeal – Procedural Violations – Acquittal Granted – Procedural Lapses – Conviction Under Section 15-C of NDPS Act Set Aside – Appellant Avtar Singh’s appeal against conviction allowed due to non-compliance with mandatory procedures under the NDPS Act – Trial Court had sentenced the appellant to 15 years of rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹1,50,000/-; an additional one-year rigorous imprisonment in default of fine payment – High Court found significant procedural lapses including lack of homogeneous mixing, absence of proper inventory procedures under Section 52-A, and issues with sample handling and FSL reporting – Held: Prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt due to these procedural deficiencies [Paras 28-38].

Homogeneous Mixing of Contraband – Incomplete Compliance – Benefit of Doubt – Acquittal - High Court noted the absence of homogeneous mixing of the poppy husk seized, stored in 40 separate bags – No evidence provided to confirm that the bags were mixed prior to sampling, which is crucial to ensure a representative sample for testing – The Court observed that non-compliance with this requirement left room for doubt as to the validity of the sample tested [Paras 29, 31(i)].

Section 52-A NDPS Act – Inventory and Magistrate Certification – Failure in Mandatory Procedure - No inventory prepared as required under Section 52-A(2) detailing the narcotics’ description, quantity, packing mode, or identification marks – No application submitted to a Magistrate to certify the inventory or allow sample extraction in their presence – Court emphasized that compliance with Section 52-A is essential to uphold the evidentiary value of seized contraband – Held: Procedural non-compliance undercuts the prosecution's case and entitles the appellant to benefit of doubt [Paras 30, 31(ii)].

Sample Handling and FSL Reporting – Procedural Discrepancies - Discrepancies noted in the FSL report, which lacked details of sample seals or seal impressions on cloth parcels, raising doubts on sample integrity – Constable Ramesh Kumar (PW-5) stated samples were bulk-tied in cloth, while the FSL report lacked mention of seals or impressions, weakening the reliability of the forensic findings [Paras 21, 31(iii), 31(iv)].

Non-Presentation of Residual Bulk Samples in Court – Evidentiary Gap – Acquittal - Failure to present the residue from the bulk poppy husk seizure during trial along with the FSL report – Court observed this as a major gap in evidentiary procedure, which precluded proper verification of whether the tested samples were truly representative of the entire seizure – Held: Non-production of residual samples in court creates sufficient doubt to warrant acquittal [Paras 31(v)].

Decision: Appeal Allowed – Conviction Set Aside - Appeal allowed – Conviction and sentence under Section 15-C of NDPS Act are set aside – Appellant acquitted and directed to be released if not wanted in any other case – Any fine paid to be refunded as per law – Case property to be disposed of in line with legal procedure after the appeal period expires [Paras 32-38].

Criminal Law - Section 498-A IPC – Acquittal - Cruelty – Mental and Physical Harassment – Dowry Demand – The appellants were convicted by the Trial Court under Section 498-A IPC for allegedly subjecting the deceased to cruelty through dowry demands and taunting her character – The appellants challenged the conviction, arguing that the prosecution failed to prove the allegations beyond reasonable doubt – Held: The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were vague and inconsistent, and no substantial evidence of dowry harassment was provided – The appellate court noted discrepancies in the witnesses' statements and found that the demand for dowry, including a refrigerator and television, was introduced late during the trial, lacking credibility [Paras 10-14].

Dowry Harassment – Lack of Evidence – Witness Credibility – The court observed that key prosecution witnesses contradicted each other, and the allegations of dowry harassment were not substantiated by any independent evidence – Furthermore, the deceased’s Ward Punch had not received any complaint of dowry demand, weakening the prosecution’s case – Held: The learned Trial Court erred in convicting the appellants based on uncorroborated and exaggerated claims [Paras 15-19].

Appellate Review – Reversal of Conviction – The court found that the appellants were wrongly convicted under Section 498-A IPC, as the prosecution failed to establish continuous harassment or cruelty related to dowry demands – Held: The appellants are acquitted, and the judgment of the Trial Court is set aside [Para 20].

Decision: Appeal allowed – The appellants are acquitted of the charges under Section 498-A IPC, and their personal bonds are to be furnished in compliance with Section 437-A of the CrPC [Para 22].