Criminal Law – Attempt to Murder – Unlawful Assembly – Acquittal – Appellants convicted by 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Ghazipur under Sections 148 and 307 read with Section 149 IPC for alleged armed attack on injured-informant Moinuddin Khan on 19.01.1986 – Three other alleged assailants remained unidentified and un-charge-sheeted – Prosecution relied upon testimony of injured (PW-6) and three related eye witnesses (PW-3, PW-4, PW-5) along with medical evidence – High Court finds material infirmities in prosecution case including unexplained delay in lodging FIR, absence of signature/thumb impression of injured on medico-legal report, non-production of X-ray plate, and vague description of unnamed accused – Held: Prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt; appellants acquitted [Paras 28–32].

Unlawful Assembly – Common Object – Section 141 and 149 IPC – Applicability – Charge sheet submitted only against two appellants while three other alleged members of assembly remained unidentified and un-traced – Trial court convicted appellants under Section 148 and Section 307 read with Section 149 IPC without establishing that unlawful assembly of five or more persons was constituted – Held: Invocation of Section 149 IPC unsustainable unless it is established by evidence that persons before court along with others numbering more than five composed an unlawful assembly; mere mention of three unnamed accused in FIR without identification or description insufficient to attract Section 141 IPC [Paras 17–20].

Medical Evidence – Infirmities – Medico-legal examination report (Exhibit Ka-11) prepared by PW-10 did not carry signature or thumb impression of injured in the space specifically provided therefor – X-ray report (Exhibit Ka-6) not supported by X-ray plate – No supplementary medical report or document of admission filed – No reference in MLR to the time or manner of injury – Held: Medical evidence was vague and insufficient to conclusively establish the gun shot injury suffered by the informant [Paras 25–26].

Delay in FIR – Previous Enmity – Incident alleged to have occurred at 8:30 a.m.; injured reached hospital at 11:00 a.m.; FIR lodged at 17:40 hours – Delay of over nine hours left wholly unexplained by prosecution – Defence established through certified copies of prior judgment that appellants had been previously acquitted of an earlier attempt to murder charge by the same informant – Held: Unexplained delay combined with admitted previous enmity raises serious doubt and lends credence to defence plea of false implication [Paras 27–29].

Interested Witnesses – Scrutiny – PW-3 and PW-4 are real nephews of injured; PW-5 is real brother – Testimonies of related witnesses cannot be discarded solely on ground of relationship but must be closely scrutinised – Inconsistency noted between eye witness accounts and injured's own deposition regarding firing of revolver by injured — Held: Testimony of interested witnesses must be carefully examined; relationship alone not a ground for rejection but corroboration required [Para 23–24].

Appellate Court – Power to Acquit – Held: Appellate court should not shy away from giving benefit of doubt where evidence indicates prosecution has failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt and a plausible view different from that of trial court can be taken [Para 30].

Decision: Criminal appeal allowed – Conviction and sentence dated 11.10.1988 passed by 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Ghazipur, set aside – Appellants Shalauddin and Kamaluddin acquitted of offences under Sections 148 and 307 read with Section 149 IPC.

Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 – Sections 8B and 8C – Rights of Persons Whose Conduct Is Inquired Into – Violation Renders Report Non-Est Against Such Persons – One-Man Commission appointed by State of Assam to inquire into anomalies and malpractices in APSC's Combined Competitive Examinations 2013 and 2014 submitted reports wherein findings, observations and recommendations touching the conduct and reputation of petitioners were made – Commission issued notices to petitioners calling for written responses only, without recognizing their status under Section 8B, without informing them of evidence being recorded, and without affording them the right to adduce defence evidence, to cross-examine witnesses, or to be represented by a legal practitioner – Held: Commission failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of Sections 8B and 8C of the Act; notices issued were at best in terms of Rule 5(2)(a) of the Rules of 1972 and not notices under Section 8B; all findings, observations and recommendations in Report 2013 and Report 2014 touching upon the conduct and reputation of the petitioners are rendered non-est and cannot be used against petitioners in any forum — Reports, however, not set aside in their entirety as they contain public-interest findings [Paras 78–101].

Commissions of Inquiry – Section 8B – Scope and Trigger – Section 8B is attracted when the Commission considers it necessary to inquire into the conduct of any person (Clause a) OR when it is of the opinion that the reputation of any person is likely to be prejudicially affected (Clause b) — Use of the word "or" makes it clear that fulfillment of either Clause is sufficient — Once so triggered, the Commission is under a statutory obligation to afford the person a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the inquiry including the right to adduce evidence in defence — The reasonable opportunity of being heard in the inquiry as per Section 8B is supplemented and exemplified by Section 8C, which confers the right of cross-examination, the right to address the Commission, and the right to be represented by a legal practitioner — These rights are inbuilt and cannot be made conditional upon the person asserting them [Paras 70, 76–80, 100].

Commission of Inquiry – Procedure – Order of Recording Evidence – Rights Under Section 8B Cannot Be Inverted – A person coming within the ambit of Section 8B cannot be called to produce defence evidence at the inception of the inquiry as that would reduce the right of cross-examination to a formality — The proper procedure requires that evidence against such person is adduced first, the person is given opportunity to cross-examine, and thereafter is permitted to adduce defence evidence — In absence of Rules framed by the State under Section 12 of the Act, the Commission must apply the procedure conceptualized in Rule 5(5)(a) of the Rules of 1972 as judicially sanctioned — It was also obligatory for the Commission to inform petitioners when evidence of other participants would be taken and when they would be permitted to adduce defence evidence [Paras 75, 80–81, 98–99].

Departmental Proceedings – Effect of Violation of Section 8B and 8C – Reports Cannot Form Basis of Disciplinary Action – Report 2013 and Report 2014 cannot be used against petitioners to initiate or sustain disciplinary proceedings — The entire basis of the show cause notices and statements of allegations being the impugned reports, the second paragraphs of the show cause notices and statements of allegations stand stricken off — Extracts of the reports furnished as list of documents also cannot be relied upon — However, disciplinary proceedings are not set aside in entirety; the State, as employer, retains inherent right to proceed on materials de hors the reports — If State wishes to include additional documents or list of witnesses, it must do so within 45 days, during which disciplinary proceedings stand stalled [Paras 115–127].

Doctrine of Severability – Disciplinary Proceedings – When one of several grounds for initiation of disciplinary proceedings is found to be invalid, the proceedings can be continued if the remaining grounds are sufficient and the competent authority would have initiated proceedings on those grounds alone — Since State has contended availability of other materials beyond the reports, it is not appropriate to quash disciplinary proceedings at the nascent stage — Observation of Court on materials is consciously avoided to avoid prejudicing parties [Paras 117–123].

Suspension – Rule 6(1), Assam Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964 – Suspension Valid but Protracted Suspension Impermissible – Suspension orders not interfered with as disciplinary and criminal proceedings are pending — However, prolonged suspensions violate Article 21 — Respondent authorities directed to conduct periodical reviews within 45 days to examine whether continuation of suspension is necessary in public interest — Failure to review within 45 days will render suspension notifications invalid and petitioners shall be reinstated to non-sensitive posts [Paras 128–138].

Decision: Batch of writ petitions disposed of — Report 2013 and Report 2014 declared non-est against petitioners to the extent they touch upon conduct and reputation of petitioners — Second paragraphs of show cause notices and statements of allegations stricken off — Disciplinary proceedings to continue de hors the reports, with State given liberty to include additional documents/witnesses within 45 days — Suspension orders upheld subject to mandatory periodic review within 45 days — Interim orders vacated — No order as to costs.

Land Acquisition – National Highways – Enhanced Compensation – Post-notification Sale Deed – NHAI acquired land for widening of National Highway No. 6 from Jalgaon to Gujarat boundary under notification dated 11/11/2011 under Section 3A of the National Highways Act, 1956 – CALA awarded compensation at Rs. 340/- per sq. metre – Arbitrator, relying on sale deed dated 13/02/2012 (executed about three weeks after the notification), enhanced compensation to Rs. 2,800/- per sq. metre – Also awarded compensation for severance, loss of easementary rights and loss of business under Section 3G(7)(b) and (c) – District Court dismissed challenge under Section 34 – High Court upheld concurrent findings – Held: No case made out for interference under Section 37 [Paras 1–34].

Post-notification Sale Deed – Reliance – Permissibility – Arbitrator relied upon sale deed dated 13/02/2012, executed about three weeks after the notification under Section 3A (11/11/2011) – NHAI contended that only pre-notification sale instances can be relied upon for determining market value – Held: There is no absolute bar on relying upon post-notification sale deeds; such deeds may be considered if (i) they are proximate in point of time, (ii) they are genuine transactions, and (iii) the acquisition itself has not motivated a higher price – Sale deed in question was proximate, bona fide, and unchallenged as to genuineness or inflation of price; reliance thereon by Arbitrator not perverse [Paras 17–22].

Compensation – Severance and Loss of Easementary Rights – Section 3G(7)(b) and (c), National Highways Act, 1956 – Acquisition for road widening results in partial acquisition of larger land holdings causing severance and adverse effect on remaining land – Claimants made specific statements in affidavits regarding losses suffered; statements not controverted by NHAI – Held: Even if no specific issue is framed or plea taken, severance must be considered if facts justify it; compensation under Section 3G(7)(b) and (c) properly awarded by Arbitrator on the basis of uncontroverted affidavit evidence [Paras 23–27].

Arbitration – Scope of Interference – Sections 34 and 37, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Held: Court under Section 34 is not an appellate court and cannot reappreciate evidence; interference is limited to grounds of violation of public policy of India, patent illegality going to the root of the matter, or perversity; a finding based on no evidence or ignoring vital evidence would be perverse and liable to be set aside – Under Section 37, scope of interference is narrower still and cannot travel beyond the restrictions under Section 34; court must be extremely cautious in disturbing concurrent findings of Arbitrator and District Court [Paras 28–32].

Interest – Date of Commencement – NHAI contended interest should run only from date of taking physical possession and not from date of notification – Held: Issue not accepted; award of interest from the date of declaration under Section 3D (10/10/2012) upheld in the facts of the case [Para 9(III)].

Decision: All arbitration appeals dismissed — Award of Arbitrator confirmed — Civil applications seeking withdrawal of deposited amounts allowed subject to undertaking to redeposit in the event of any favourable order in favour of NHAI — All other pending applications disposed of.

Education Law — Admission to LLM Course — Merit List — Zone of Consideration — Petitioner ranked 86th in merit list while last admitted unreserved category candidate held rank 46 — Even upon consideration of enhanced marks following review of sixth semester papers, petitioner's CGPA would increase marginally from 6.66 to 6.69, upgrading his rank only to 82/83 — Held: Petitioner not within zone of consideration even after enhancement of marks — Allotment in his favour would require bypassing 36–37 candidates ranked above him, resulting in gross injustice and arbitrary allotment — Relief refused [Paras 7, 17–19, 26–27].

Review of Examination Papers — Delay — Vicarious Liability of University — Petitioner applied for review of sixth semester LLB papers on April 24, 2025, more than one year after the review timeline closed on March 7/11, 2024 — Online payment of review fee without intimation to the University does not constitute admission by the University to allow review beyond stipulated time — Any grievance for non-forwarding of marks within time lies against the college, not the University — Held: University cannot be fastened with vicarious liability for delay attributable to the petitioner or the college [Paras 9–11, 25].

Vacant Seats — Counseling Process — Closure — Upon completion of admissions on December 3, 2025, only one unreserved and one reserved seat remained vacant at the Government Centre of Legal Education due to non-payment by successful candidates — Phase 3 was the last phase of counseling — Held: Any allotment subsequent to closure of the counseling process would amount to selective and arbitrary allotment disrupting the entire admission process — No direction for allotment can be issued [Paras 21–24].

Affidavit-in-Opposition — Authorization — Locus — Deponent stated to have been authorized by Respondents 1–3 — Held: The question of improper authorization can only be raised by such respondents and not by the petitioner [Para 6].

Delay in Approaching Court — Laches — University informed petitioner on December 6, 2025 that review could not be considered — Petitioner chose to approach the Court only on February 19, 2026, by which time counseling was closed and classes had commenced — Held: Delay in approaching the Court disentitles petitioner from equitable relief [Para 20].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed.

Discharge – Framing of Charge – Sections 227 and 228 CrPC / Sections 250 and 251 BNSS – Standard of Prima Facie Case – Defective Investigation No Ground for Discharge – Applicant, allegedly arrested on the spot during interception of a truck carrying 19 bulls, sought discharge contending false implication, fabricated arrest, and tainted investigation including removal of a case diary parcha (SCD-9) recording the Gunner's exculpatory statement – Held: At the stage of framing of charge, the court is not to conduct a mini trial or marshal evidence; the test is whether there is sufficient ground for presuming that the accused committed the offence, not whether conviction is certain – Material on record including statements of witnesses, FIR, and recovery memo disclosed prima facie case – The Gunner's statement related to 12.09.2019 whereas the incident occurred on 12.12.2019, rendering it irrelevant to the present case – Discharge application rightly rejected; charge framing orders valid [Paras 19–34].

Defective Investigation – No Benefit to Accused at Discharge Stage – Applicant alleged deliberate manipulation of the case diary by the Investigating Officer including substitution of Parcha SCD-9 – Held: An accused cannot be discharged or acquitted on the ground of defective, faulty or impartial investigation alone – Even where investigation is found to be designedly defective, the prosecution evidence must be scrutinised dehors such lapses; to acquit or discharge on grounds of defective investigation would be to play into the hands of a biased or interested investigator – Court's function is to evaluate the evidence independently of investigative lapses [Paras 14–18].

Decision: Application dismissed – No orders as to costs – Registrar (Compliance) directed to send a copy to the concerned trial court.

Public Interest Litigation — Right to Health — Article 21 — Burn Care Infrastructure — State-wide Systemic Failure — PIL instituted on the backdrop of a kerosene fire incident in Hazaribagh in 2021 caused by adulterated PDS kerosene with a flash point of 13.5°C, far below the prescribed safety minimum of 35°C — Incident resulted in four deaths including a two-year-old child and approximately fifteen persons suffering grievous burn injuries and permanent facial disfigurement — State admitted during proceedings that no specialised burn care facility with modern infrastructure existed in Government hospitals across the entire State of Jharkhand — Held: Once a matter of grave public importance is brought before the Court in PIL, the Court may expand the scope of inquiry to protect the fundamental rights of a larger class of citizens — PIL scope expanded from individual Hazaribagh incident to state-wide burn care infrastructure — Directions issued for operationalisation of dedicated burn units in all 24 district hospitals and government medical colleges within 120 days [Paras 22–25, 43–44].

Right to Health — Article 21 — Positive Obligation of State — Welfare State — The right to life under Article 21 encompasses the right to live with human dignity and access to specialised, time-sensitive medical intervention — In burn trauma, every minute is critical to preventing multi-organ failure and permanent disfigurement — The NPPMBI Operational Guidelines constitute a standard of care voluntarily undertaken by the State — Burn mortality in India exceeds one death every four minutes, surpassing Malaria and Tuberculosis — Failure to operationalise sanctioned infrastructure represents a significant gap in fulfillment of Article 21 mandate — State cannot plead financial constraints to shirk primary obligation of providing emergency medical care — A welfare State's constitutional mandate is not satisfied by the mere existence of buildings lacking life-saving machinery and trained manpower [Paras 30–41].

State Affidavit — Inconsistencies — Paper-based Compliance — CAG Audit Findings — State's supplementary affidavit claimed burn wards operational across all 24 districts with "adequate logistics" — However, Annexure-I listed only 22 units, with Jamshedpur appearing twice — CAG Report (No. 3 of 2021) revealed 20 burn units constructed under 12th Five Year Plan sanctioned at Rs. 1.35 crore each could not be made functional due to non-procurement of equipment — Funds allocated to four trauma care facilities also unaccounted for in affidavit — Held: Paper-based compliance where infrastructure exists in budgetary allocations but remains absent in clinical practice renders fundamental right to health illusory [Paras 27–29].

Compensation — Kerosene Fire Victims — Victim Compensation Scheme — Compensatory jurisprudence firmly entrenched in public law since Rudul Sah — Grant of specific monetary compensation requires determination of facts including nature of incident, extent of negligence and identification of responsible parties, which cannot be adjudicated in PIL — FIR (Muffasil P.S. Case No. 45/2021) registered and matter under investigation/trial — Held: Specific compensation not directed at this stage — Victims and legal heirs entitled to invoke Victim Compensation Scheme under Section 357-A CrPC/Section 396 BNSS before jurisdictional court — DLSA Hazaribagh directed to identify victims unable to make such application and facilitate filing with assistance of Para Legal Volunteers [Paras 14–21, 44(j)–(l)].

Directions — Time-bound Implementation — State directed to: (a) operationalise dedicated burn units in all district hospitals and government medical colleges within 120 days; (b) ensure availability of trained medical and paramedical personnel, essential equipment and supporting infrastructure; (c) ensure uninterrupted availability of essential medicines and consumables; (d) treat burn patients exclusively in designated burn units with isolation and infection-control measures; (e) provide round-the-clock specialist and emergency care; (f) undertake comprehensive training and capacity-building for burn care staff within 90 days; (g) constitute/operationalise State Implementation Committee under NPPMBI Guidelines within four weeks; (h) Director-in-Chief, Health Services to function as nodal authority for day-to-day implementation — Trial in Muffasil P.S. Case No. 45/2021 to be concluded expeditiously [Para 44].

Decision: PIL disposed of — Comprehensive directions issued for state-wide operationalisation of burn care infrastructure — Victims and legal heirs directed to pursue compensation through jurisdictional court and DLSA Hazaribagh — No costs — Appreciation recorded for Amicus Curiae.

Constitutional Law – Kerala Lok Ayukta Act, 1999 – Amendment – Declaration Replaced by Recommendation – Competent Authority Changed from Governor to State Legislature for Chief Minister – Challenge to Constitutional Validity – Petitioners challenged the Kerala Lok Ayukta Amendment Act, 2022 (Act 7 of 2024) whereby the "declaration" in Section 14 was replaced by "recommendation" and the "Governor acting in his discretion" as competent authority in relation to the Chief Minister was substituted by the "State Legislative Assembly" – Contended that the amendment converts a binding judicial or quasi-judicial order into a mere advisory opinion subject to executive review, thereby violating separation of powers, judicial independence, and basic structure of the Constitution – Held: The Lok Ayukta and Upa-Lok Ayukta are sui generis quasi-judicial authorities and neither courts nor tribunals exercising plenary judicial power – Their reports do not determine rights of parties in the manner of judicial adjudication – The substitution of a binding declaration with a recommendation, coupled with an obligation on the competent authority to record and communicate reasons, cannot be construed as conferring appellate powers on the executive or as an impermissible encroachment into the judicial domain – The amendments seek to harmonise the statutory provisions with the constitutional scheme under Articles 163 and 164 whereby Ministers hold office during the pleasure of the Governor [Paras 4–58].

Constitutional Validity of Statute – Grounds of Challenge – Basic Structure Doctrine Not Available Against Ordinary Legislation – Held: The constitutional validity of a statute can be challenged only on grounds of lack of legislative competence or violation of Part III or any other provision of the Constitution – The basic structure doctrine is not available to challenge the validity of ordinary legislation as a statute – Legislative competence to enact the impugned amendments was not in dispute – No case of violation of Part III or any other constitutional provision was established – Challenge on the ground of violation of basic structure of the Constitution therefore fails [Paras 20–24, 61–62].

Kerala Lok Ayukta Act – Section 14(2) – Deemed Acceptance – Reading Into Statute – The amended Section 14(2) provides a period of 90 days for the competent authority to examine the recommendation but does not contain any provision for "deemed acceptance" unlike the Karnataka Lokayukta Act – Held: In the absence of such a provision, the statute would be rendered otiose as Section 12(5) stage would never be triggered and other provisions would become redundant – The words "deemed acceptance" are read into amended Section 14(2) to give effect to the legislation and in consonance with its object — in the event the report is not rejected within 90 days from the date of receipt, it shall be deemed to have been accepted on the expiry of the said period and the procedure under Section 12(5) shall immediately trigger – Any other interpretation would make the provisions purposeless [Paras 65–73].

Lok Ayukta – Nature of Functions – Sui Generis Quasi-Judicial Authority – Not a Court or Tribunal – The petitioners contended that the Lok Ayukta exercises functions with all the trappings of a court and that the amendment therefore constitutes administrative review of a judicial or quasi-judicial decision – Held: Though the Lok Ayukta follows a procedure resembling adjudication, it does not ipso facto possess the status of a court or tribunal exercising plenary judicial power – The Lok Ayukta is best described as a sui generis quasi-judicial authority – Its report does not determine the rights of either the complainant or the person complained against – Any decision of the competent authority in response to the recommendation remains amenable to judicial review – Neither the independence of the Lok Ayukta nor fair procedure before it is diluted by the amendment [Paras 50–58].

Decision: Writ petitions disposed of — Challenge to constitutional validity of Sections 3 and 14 as amended fails — Deemed acceptance read into Section 14(2) to the effect that non-rejection of recommendation within 90 days shall amount to acceptance — Legislature observed to consider restoring the requirement of appointment of a retired Chief Justice of a High Court as Lok Ayukta.

Civil Court — Jurisdiction — Bar under Section 430, Companies Act, 2013 — NBFC Loan Dispute — Plaintiff-NBFC obtained loan of ₹19.25 crores from defendant-company under an agreement dated 4.4.2019 for a tenure of nine years — Defendant demanded premature repayment and had already filed petition under Section 45QA of the RBI Act before NCLT, Allahabad Bench — Plaintiff suppressed this fact and filed suit for permanent injunction restraining defendant from premature recovery — Held: Section 45QA of the RBI Act vests exclusive jurisdiction in the NCLT to adjudicate disputes regarding repayment of deposits/loans by NBFCs — Section 430 of the Companies Act, 2013 expressly bars civil courts from entertaining suits and granting injunctions in matters falling within NCLT's domain — Plaint rejection upheld [Paras 47–53, 58].

Order VII Rule 11 CPC — Rejection of Plaint — Scope of Inquiry — At the stage of deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the court must confine its examination strictly to the averments in the plaint and documents filed therewith — Defence averments and documents of the defendant cannot be looked into — Suit cannot be summarily rejected if triable issues arise from the plaintiff's pleadings — However, where the plaint itself discloses a statutory bar to the suit, rejection is warranted [Paras 39–41].

Section 45-I(bb), RBI Act — Definition of 'Deposit' — Loans Included — Plaintiff contended that money advanced as a loan by the defendant to it was not covered under Section 45QA of the RBI Act — Held: The definition of 'deposit' under Section 45-I(bb) expressly includes money received by way of loan — Accordingly, the defendant was entitled to invoke Section 45QA before the NCLT for recovery of loan advanced to the plaintiff-NBFC — Contention rejected [Para 47].

Injunction — Clean Hands — Suppression of Material Facts — Plaintiff suppressed from the civil court the pendency of the defendant's petition under Section 45QA before the NCLT, Allahabad Bench, which was filed prior to institution of the suit — Plaintiff also sought to pre-empt NCLT proceedings by filing the injunction suit — Held: A party seeking equitable relief of injunction must approach the court with clean hands and disclose all material facts — Suppression of pending proceedings before a statutory tribunal disentitles the plaintiff from any discretionary relief — Suit also barred under Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act [Paras 49–51, 58].

Procedural Error — Application Numbers — No Prejudice — Trial court inadvertently referred to the original application 17-C (dismissed for non-prosecution) instead of the subsequent application 27-C (on identical grounds) while passing the impugned order — Held: Mere mentioning of an incorrect application number due to inadvertent error does not prejudice the plaintiff where parties were fully aware of the application being argued and the court decided the correct controversy — Procedural irregularity does not vitiate the order [Paras 54–57].

Decision: Appeal dismissed with costs throughout — Impugned order of the trial court dated 01.03.2025 rejecting the plaint affirmed — Interim order earlier granted by the High Court, noted to have been patently erroneous, already vacated on 24.02.2026.

Minor – Representation in Suit – Next Friend – Order XXXII CPC – Mohammedan Law – Secular Nature of CPC – Appellant minor impleaded as added defendant in partition suit through his mother as next friend – Respondent challenged representation on the ground that under Section 359 of Mulla's Principles of Mahomedan Law, the mother is excluded from being a legal guardian of the property of a Mohammedan minor – Held: Representation of a minor in court proceedings is governed by Order XXXII CPC, which is secular in nature and not tied to the personal law of the parties – Rule 4 of Order XXXII permits any person of sound mind who has attained majority and has no adverse interest to act as next friend – Concept of "legal guardian" under Mohammedan Law is not germane to the question of representation in court proceedings – Rule 3 of Order XXXII applies only where the minor is already a defendant in a suit; since the appellant entered the litigation by his own application for impleadment, Rule 3 was not attracted at the relevant stage – Mother qualified to act as de facto guardian under Section 361 of Mulla's Principles of Mahomedan Law – Respondent estopped from raising the objection for the first time in appeal, having not objected before the Trial Court – Representation of minor through mother as next friend held legal and valid [Paras 29-47].

Partition Suit – Temporary Injunction – Status Quo – Minor Co-sharer's Right – Balance of Convenience – Added defendant/appellant sought injunction restraining respondent/plaintiff from making construction on the best portion of the joint suit property – Trial Court refused injunction on the ground that no construction was going on and that the plaintiff had obtained conversion and sanction plan – Held: Findings of Trial Court were mutually contradictory and perverse – Commissioner's Report confirmed accumulation of construction materials indicating imminent threat of construction – Mere obtaining of conversion and sanction plan does not confer a right to construct on joint property as per one's own choice during pendency of partition suit – Courts are to maintain suit property in statu quo during partition proceedings so that no party steals a march over others by raising permanent construction on the best portion – Once construction is raised, courts generally allocate such portion to the constructing party and award owelty money to others, thereby prejudicing co-sharers – Plaintiff purchased property in 2013 but obtained conversion only in 2023 and filed partition suit in 2024 without making any construction, demonstrating absence of urgency – Affidavit-in-opposition filed without jurat; averments in injunction application to be accepted under doctrine of non traverse – Balance of convenience squarely in favour of appellant – Trial Court erred in refusing injunction [Paras 48-66].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned order dated 03.12.2025 set aside to the extent it dismissed the added defendant's injunction application – Temporary injunction granted restraining the plaintiff/respondent no.1 and his men and agents from changing the nature and character of the suit property and/or altering existing possession till disposal of the partition suit – CAN 1 of 2025 disposed of – No order as to costs.