POCSO Act — Section 15(2) — Child Sexual Abuse Material — Discharge of Accused — Subjective Satisfaction Test — Accused persons chargesheeted for storing, possessing, and transmitting Child Sexual Exploitation Material (CSEM) through mobile phones and WhatsApp groups — Sessions Court discharged accused under Section 15(2) POCSO Act solely on the ground that age of children depicted in pornographic videos could not be conclusively established through documentary proof or medical examination — High Court, on suo motu revision, holds that Sessions Court erred in applying rigid age-determination criteria to CSEM cases involving unidentified child victims — Impugned discharge order set aside — Sessions Court directed to frame charges under Section 15(2) POCSO Act and proceed to trial [Paras 2, 42–44].

Definition of 'Child' — Section 2(1)(d) vs. Section 2(1)(da) POCSO Act — Distinction in standard of proof — Section 2(1)(d) defines 'child' as any person below eighteen years — Section 2(1)(da) defines 'child pornography' to include visual depictions which 'appear to depict a child' — Legislature consciously departed from objective age-determination criteria under Section 2(1)(d) when enacting Section 2(1)(da) so as to prevent Section 15 from being rendered unworkable — Held: For offences under Section 15 POCSO Act relating to CSEM, courts are not required to conclusively establish age of depicted persons through objective means; it suffices if the material appears to depict a child to a prudent ordinary person [Paras 30–36].

Subjective Satisfaction Test — Expert Opinion — Application to Unidentified Child Victims — Two medical experts from Maulana Azad Medical College, on perusal of videos and photographs recovered from accused's devices, opined that some persons depicted therein were children below eighteen years based on physical development, genital development, and secondary sexual characteristics — Witnesses from Delhi Commission for Women similarly opined that material depicted children in sexually explicit manner — CFSL forensic report confirmed storage and transmission of CSEM by both accused — Held: Expert opinions and investigation material prima facie satisfy the test of subjective satisfaction; Sessions Court failed to properly appreciate such evidence while passing the discharge order [Paras 37–42].

Interpretation of POCSO Act — Purposive Construction — Section 15 and Section 2(1)(da) to be read conjunctly — Rigid application of age-determination procedure under Section 34 POCSO Act read with Section 94 JJ Act confined to cases where victim is identifiable and traceable — In CSEM cases involving unidentified victims, such procedure is wholly impractical and unjust — To discharge accused solely on failure to produce documentary or medical proof of age would defeat the object of the statute and leave countless unidentified child victims without protection — Held: Mandatory age-determination procedure under Section 34 POCSO Act and Section 94 JJ Act inapplicable where child victims are unidentified and cannot be produced before Court [Paras 27–36].

Relied upon: Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2611 — Held: For any offence under POCSO relating to child pornographic material, courts are only required to form a prima facie subjective satisfaction that the material appears to depict a child from the perspective of an ordinary prudent person; such satisfaction may be arrived at from FSL report, expert opinion, or court's own assessment of material.

Decision: Revision petition allowed — Impugned order dated 01.09.2023 set aside to the extent it discharged Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 under Section 15(2) of the POCSO Act — Sessions Court directed to frame charges against Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 under Section 15(2) POCSO Act, Section 67B IT Act, and Section 120B IPC, and to proceed with trial in accordance with law [Paras 43–44].

Criminal Law – Criminal Conspiracy – False Implication in Rape Case – Extortion – Advocate and Police Officer – Conviction Upheld – A1 a practising advocate and A2 a Sub-Inspector of Police conspired with two deceased accused to falsely implicate PW12, an innocent person who was the principal witness in a molestation case against a police official, in a fabricated gang rape case with a view to extort money from him – A false FIR was registered, false documents were prepared by A2 in his official capacity, PW12 was arrested, subjected to custodial violence and remanded to custody – Investigation by Crime Branch ultimately exonerated PW12 – Held: The evidence of PW1, PW2, PW6, PW7 and PW12, corroborated by DNA evidence, clearly establishes the conspiracy and the roles played by A1 and A2 – Conviction under Sections 120B, 193, 195, 218, 465 and 389 read with 120B IPC upheld – CRL.A. 286/2016 and CRL.A. 326/2016 dismissed [Paras 20–36].

Accomplice Evidence – Competency of Witness – Section 133 Indian Evidence Act – Sections 306, 307 Cr.P.C. Not Mandatory Conditions – The defence contended that PW1, PW2, PW6 and PW7 being accomplices could not be examined as prosecution witnesses as the procedure under Sections 306 or 307 Cr.P.C. was not followed and therefore their testimony was inadmissible – Held: A person who was not arraigned as an accused at any point of time cannot be equated with the situation of a co-accused sought to be examined as a witness without pardon – Under Section 118 of the IEA all persons are competent to testify unless prevented from understanding questions – Under Section 133 of the IEA an accomplice is a competent witness against an accused – The competency of an accomplice is not destroyed because he could have been tried jointly with the accused but was not – The provisions of Section 306 or 307 Cr.P.C. are not mandatory conditions for examining a witness who was never arraigned as accused – Distinction from case where the additional witness had been arraigned as co-accused [Paras 16–19].

Evidence – Cross-Examination – Wilful Non-Examination – Section 33 Indian Evidence Act – Admissibility of Uncross-Examined Testimony – PW12 Sushil Gulati appeared before the trial court on over 20 occasions over a period of nearly three years after completion of examination-in-chief but was sent back without cross-examination solely on account of adjournments sought by the defence – He died on 19.12.2014 without being cross-examined – Held: Where ample and repeated opportunity was granted to the defence to cross-examine PW12 but was not availed, the ingredients of Section 33 IEA are clearly attracted and PW12's evidence is admissible as though cross-examined – This Court expressed concern at the extent of harassment caused to PW12 who was not only falsely implicated but summoned to court repeatedly without any productive purpose – The trial court erred in granting adjournments without restraint in violation of this Court's earlier direction to dispose of the matter expeditiously – Granting repeated adjournments on mere asking was a clear abuse of process [Paras 30–34].

Victim's Appeal – Compensation – Enhancement – Section 372 Cr.P.C. – Proviso – Victim's legal representatives appealed under the proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C. seeking enhancement of compensation – Held: The trial court's direction that Rs. 2,00,000 out of the total fine of Rs. 3,00,000 be paid as token compensation is inadequate considering the extent of harassment and humiliation, custodial violence, false implication in a heinous offence, and prolonged trial endured by the victim – Compensation enhanced to the entire fine amount of Rs. 3,00,000 payable to the legal representatives of PW12 Sushil Gulati [Paras 39–40].

Appeal Not Pressed – Cannot Be Dismissed for Default – Must Be Decided on Merits – The legal representatives in CRL.A. 691/2016 expressed unwillingness to prosecute the appeal – Held: Once an appeal is admitted, the appellate court must decide it on merits and cannot dismiss it for default or non-prosecution – Decided on merits after going through the record [Para 37–38].

Decision: CRL.A. 286/2016 dismissed — CRL.A. 326/2016 dismissed — CRL.A. 691/2016 partly allowed — Compensation enhanced from Rs. 2,00,000 to Rs. 3,00,000 (entire fine amount) payable to legal representatives of PW12 Sushil Gulati — Pending applications closed.

Domestic Violence Act — Section 12 — Interim Maintenance — Prima Facie Case — Allegations of Illicit Relationship — Effect — Respondent-wife filed application under Section 12 PWDV Act alleging physical, mental, and economic abuse by petitioner-husband and his family — Trial Court granted consolidated interim maintenance of ₹25,000/- per month — Appellate Court partially modified order — On revision, husband contended wife was in illicit relationship with female friend and had subjected him to cruelty — Held: Unlike Section 125(4) CrPC, PWDV Act contains no express statutory bar disentitling a woman from seeking reliefs on allegation of living in adultery — At stage of interim maintenance, only prima facie satisfaction is required — Allegations of illicit relationship being unsubstantiated and a disputed question of fact, cannot disentitle respondent-wife from interim maintenance at this stage [Paras 13–22].

Interim Maintenance — Quantum — Voluntary Financial Liabilities — Deductions Not Permissible — Petitioner-husband sought to set off home loan EMIs, health insurance premiums, LIC premiums, and school fees while calculating his net income for maintenance purposes — Held: Voluntary expenses such as repayment of loans, LIC premiums, and health insurance premiums cannot override statutory duty to pay maintenance — Only statutory deductions from salary are ordinarily taken into account — Determination of maintenance must be based on "free income" and not on net income remaining after voluntary financial commitments — Petitioner's admitted monthly salary of ₹80,000/- taken as basis — Assessment of ₹25,000/- per month as interim maintenance for wife and minor child upheld as reasonable [Paras 23–26].

Maintenance — Educational Qualification of Wife — Capacity to Earn vs. Actual Earning — Petitioner contended respondent-wife was a postgraduate (M.A.) who had deliberately quit employment to claim maintenance — Held: Mere educational qualification or capacity to earn does not ipso facto establish that wife is actually earning — Clear distinction exists between ability to earn and actual income — In absence of material to demonstrate that respondent-wife is gainfully employed or earning any independent income, interim maintenance cannot be denied solely on the basis of educational qualification [Paras 27–30].

Interim Maintenance — Adjustment of Sale Proceeds — Date of Adjustment — Date of Application vs. Date of Separation — Respondent-wife received ₹20,00,000/- from sale of property in Rohini and utilised the same for personal expenses and upkeep of minor child — Trial Court adjusted said amount from date of separation (April 2019) at a notional rate of ₹40,000/- per month — Appellate Court recalculated adjustment at rate of ₹25,000/- per month from April 2019, resulting in maintenance becoming payable from 01.01.2026 — Held: Interim maintenance is ordinarily to be granted from date of filing of application and not from date of separation — Adjustment of sale proceeds must also be computed from date of filing of application (20.10.2020) and not from date of separation — ₹20,00,000/- adjusted at ₹25,000/- per month from 20.10.2020, covering period till 20.06.2027 — Consolidated interim maintenance of ₹25,000/- per month payable to respondent-wife and minor son from 21.06.2027 [Paras 37–42].

Relied upon: Rajnesh v. Neha, (2021) 2 SCC 324 — Held: Maintenance ought to be granted from date of application in all cases, as significant delays occur in disposal of maintenance applications and interests of justice require such approach.

Decision: Revision petition disposed of — Adjustment of ₹20,00,000/- computed from date of filing of application (20.10.2020) till 20.06.2027 at ₹25,000/- per month — Consolidated interim maintenance of ₹25,000/- per month payable to respondent-wife and minor son with effect from 21.06.2027 — Nothing expressed to be treated as opinion on merits [Paras 40–45].

Habeas Corpus – Custody of Minor Child – Maintainability – Writ Petition dismissed by Single Judge on the ground that remedy under Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 was available and that no illegality in custody was established – Minor child aged approximately 15–20 months retained by respondent no. 6 (father, a police constable) despite order dated 10.09.2025 of the Child Welfare Committee (C.W.C.) directing handover to appellant no. 1 (mother) – Police officers of the department providing protection to respondent no. 6 in violating C.W.C. directions – Held: View of learned Single Judge contrary to settled law – A writ of habeas corpus cannot be dismissed merely on the ground that remedy is available under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 – Writ court is not foreclosed from exercising extraordinary jurisdiction in custody matters – Order set aside – Writ petition restored [Paras 4, 15–16, 19–21].

Child Custody – Welfare of Child – Paramount Consideration – Habeas corpus jurisdiction of the High Court can be invoked in custody disputes involving minors regardless of whether the detaining party is the other natural guardian – Father, being a natural guardian, is not immune from a writ of habeas corpus if retention of the child is contrary to the child's welfare – At such a tender age, welfare of the minor is best served with the mother – It is too late in the day to urge that a writ of habeas corpus is not maintainable where the child is in custody of another parent – Court can invoke its extraordinary writ jurisdiction for the best interest of the child [Paras 11–12, 16–18].

Child Welfare Committee – Non-Compliance of Orders – Conduct of Police Officers – Despite order dated 10.09.2025 of C.W.C. directing respondent no. 6 to hand over custody of the minor child to the mother, the same was not complied with – Police officers, instead of enforcing the order, were found to be writing letters to one another and providing protection to the errant respondent – Superintendent of Police, Jaunpur communicated to take appropriate steps but no action followed – Court expressed strong disapproval of the conduct of police officers in shielding respondent no. 6 [Paras 5–6].

Decision: Special appeal allowed – Order dated 06.11.2025 of the learned Single Judge set aside – Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 931 of 2025 restored to its original number and status – Matter to be listed before appropriate Bench on 16.04.2026 as a fresh case for consideration on merits [Paras 19–21].

Industrial Disputes Act – Reference to Labour Court – Section 10(1) – Scope of Appropriate Government's Power – Letters Patent Appeal Dismissed – Respondent No. 3, a Senior Executive/Manager Administration-Supervisor drawing Rs. 76,268/- per month, was relieved from service by appellant company upon acceptance of alleged voluntary resignation with full and final settlement of Rs. 4,43,468/- – Respondent No. 3 filed complaint before Assistant Labour Commissioner challenging termination – Reference ordered by respondent No. 2 to Labour Court under Section 10(1)(c) of the ID Act – Appellant challenged reference contending respondent No. 3 was not a 'workman' and no industrial dispute existed – Held: While forming an opinion under Section 10(1) of the ID Act, the appropriate Government is required only to satisfy itself that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended; it is not required to adjudicate whether the employee is a 'workman' under Section 2(s), as that falls within the exclusive domain of the Labour Court [Paras 35–39, 50, 60].

Industrial Disputes Act – Nature of Order of Reference – Administrative Function – The function discharged by the appropriate Government under Section 10(1) is administrative and not judicial or quasi-judicial in nature – The appropriate Government cannot delve into the merits of the dispute or determine the lis between the parties while making a reference – Making a reference presupposes formation of opinion and is not required to be reduced in writing with reasons, as that would amount to adjudication on merits – Reasons are required only when the appropriate Government refuses to make a reference, as mandated by Section 12(5) [Paras 34, 47–48, 58].

Industrial Disputes Act – Section 2(s) – Whether Employee is 'Workman' – Disputed Question of Fact – Appellant's contention that respondent No. 3 was working in managerial and supervisory capacity and therefore not a 'workman', and further that voluntary resignation had severed employer-employee relationship, are disputed questions of fact and merit — Held: Both questions are required to be adjudicated by the Labour Court on evidence and cannot be decided by the appropriate Government or the High Court in writ jurisdiction; appellant is at liberty to raise all such contentions before the Labour Court [Paras 54–56, 61].

Judicial Review – Order of Reference – Scope of Interference under Article 226 – High Court has jurisdiction to interfere with an order of reference only when futility of the reference is demonstrable from its bare reading or when the appropriate Government had no material before it or failed to apply its mind — Contention that an employee is not a 'workman' requires examination of facts and evidence and cannot be adjudicated by the High Court in writ jurisdiction; such contention goes to the merits of the dispute which is within the adjudicatory domain of the Labour Court [Paras 41–44, 57].

Decision: Letters Patent Appeal dismissed — Civil Application disposed of.

Contempt of Courts Act – Civil Contempt – Section 2(b) – D.K. Basu Guidelines – Alleged Custodial Torture – Application Dismissed – Applicant, a farmer and Congress party office-bearer, alleged that while in custody on 20.05.2020, he was taken to the office of the Police Commissioner, Rajkot City, where respondents No. 1 and 2 (DCP and Police Inspector) brutally assaulted him – FIR registered against respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and two unknown police personnel for offences under IPC – Investigation concluded with filing of "A" Summary report stating insufficient evidence against accused – Held: No prima facie case established for violation of the guidelines issued under paragraphs 35 and 36 of D.K. Basu to initiate proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 against the respondents [Paras 25–27].

D.K. Basu Guidelines – Scope of Contempt Proceedings – Before initiating contempt proceedings for non-compliance of the D.K. Basu directions, the applicant must prima facie establish violation of the specific requirements set out in paragraphs 35 and 36 of D.K. Basu pertaining to arrest, detention, identification of police personnel, medical examination, and intimation of arrest – In the present case, on perusal of the entire record, none of the said directions are shown to have been violated so as to attract the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 [Para 26].

Contempt Proceedings – "A" Summary Report – Pending JMFC Proceedings – Where FIR has been registered and investigation has concluded with filing of "A" Summary stating offence was committed but offenders are unknown, the applicant has a remedy to contest the matter on merits before the learned JMFC and is not without recourse – In such circumstances, initiation of contempt proceedings against respondents is not warranted [Paras 24, 27].

Decision: Application dismissed — Notice discharged — Applicant granted liberty to raise contentions in pending proceedings before the learned JMFC.

Criminal Law – POCSO and BNS Offences – Quashing of FIR – Post-Settlement Marriage – Petition Allowed – FIR was lodged at the instance of the parents of the prosecutrix at Police Station Dhamnod, District Dhar, under BNS and POCSO Act – Prosecutrix had been a consenting party and was forced to depose against the petitioner by her parents – Subsequent to recording of her statement in the Trial Court, the parties solemnized marriage – Both parties appeared before the High Court, prosecutrix confirmed compromise and stated she does not intend to prosecute the petitioner – Held: When parties have settled and are residing together as husband and wife, allowing criminal proceedings to continue would be catastrophic for both; though Court should be slow to quash proceedings involving heinous offences, the peculiar facts and circumstances, including post-settlement marriage and the prosecutrix's own assent to quashment, warrant exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction — FIR and all subsequent proceedings quashed [Paras 3, 7–8].

Decision: Petition allowed — FIR No. 560/2024 registered at Police Station Dhamnod, District Dhar and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

Service Law – Disciplinary Proceedings – Removal from Service – Excess Loading of Fuel Tanker – Petitioner, an Executive Operations Officer and Gantry Officer at HPCL's Visakhapatnam Terminal, was suspended on 10.09.2007 and issued a charge memo dated 26.11.2007 alleging that he instructed the crew of tanker No. AP31U2529 to load fuel in excess – Disciplinary authority held the charges proved and ordered removal from service vide proceedings dated 29.12.2009 – Appellate authority affirmed the order on 24.06.2011 – Petitioner challenged both orders under Article 226 of the Constitution – Held: No grounds for interference made out – Writ petition dismissed [Paras 1, 11, 15–16].

Departmental Enquiry – Participation – Refusal to Cross-Examine Witnesses – Petitioner declined to cross-examine management witnesses MW.2, MW.3 and MW.4 on the ground that his defence assistant sought permission to visit the site and inspect the tanker – Court held that such request ought to have been made after fully participating in the enquiry and demonstrating necessity during cross-examination – By evading cross-examination, petitioner disentitled himself from claiming absence of evidence or lack of quality evidence [Paras 7, 12, 14].

Judicial Review – Scope – Disciplinary Proceedings – Constitutional courts cannot re-appreciate evidence or act as appellate authority over disciplinary authorities – Interference permissible only where punishment is shockingly disproportionate or there is a complete absence of evidence – On facts, disciplinary authority considered available material and returned a finding of guilt – No case of no evidence or perversity made out – Court declined to interfere [Paras 13–15].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed – No costs – Miscellaneous petitions pending stand closed.

Excise Law – License Cancellation – Procedural Impropriety – Collector Acting as Judge in Own Cause – Commissioner Influenced by Subordinate's Recommendations – Impugned Order Quashed – Petitioner's Brewery and Distillery inspected on 04.05.2025 at 2:00 a.m. and unauthorized manufacturing activities found — FIR registered — Parallel proceedings initiated before both the Collector (Excise) and Commissioner State Taxes & Excise — Collector conducted prior inquiry, recorded statements of officers, passed recommendatory order dated 02.06.2025 recommending cancellation, filed rejoinder before Commissioner in support of his own inquiry report and recommendations, and thereby became judge in his own cause — Commissioner kept his own proceedings in abeyance pending Collector's inquiry and then passed cancellation order dated 04.07.2025 relying upon Collector's recommendations and pleadings — Held: The impugned order of the Commissioner does not reflect independent and impartial application of mind; procedure followed was neither contemplated under the statute nor in furtherance of justice — Order of cancellation quashed and set aside [Paras 4(ii)(b), 4(ii)(c), 5].

H.P. Excise Act – Section 6 as Amended – Section 8 Notification dated 26.04.2025 – Composition of Inspection Team – Mandatory Requirement of Executive Magistrate, Excise Officer and Police Officer of Specified Rank – The amended Section 6 authorizes three classes of officers to exercise powers under Sections 8 and 10 — The Notification dated 26.04.2025 mandates that powers under Section 8 shall be exercised by an Officer under Section 6(1)(ii) (Executive Magistrate not below rank of Tehsildar) accompanied by an Officer of the State Taxes and Excise Department not below the rank of Assistant State Taxes & Excise Officer and a Police Officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police — Harmonious construction of the Act and Notification shows that the inspection under Section 8 requires all three components — The inspection team constituted did not include Executive Magistrate of First Class and inspection report does not clearly establish presence of Police Officers of specified rank — Team not constituted in consonance with the Act and Notification — However, since FIR already registered and petitioner failed to demonstrate specific prejudice, entire edifice not quashed on this ground alone [Paras 4(i)(b)–4(i)(d), 5].

Natural Justice – Nemo Judex in Causa Sua – An adjudicating authority that has previously conducted an inquiry, recorded evidence, and formed opinions regarding the licensee's conduct cannot thereafter adjudicate upon show cause notices and pass recommendatory orders relying on that very inquiry and evidence — The Collector (Excise) having conducted the initial inquiry, recorded statements of officers, and furnished report cannot adjudicate and recommend cancellation on the same basis — His allowing himself to influence proceedings before the Commissioner by filing rejoinder supporting his own inquiry report compounded the procedural impropriety — Held: Petitioner was prejudiced; recommendations/orders/pleadings of the Collector (Excise) are treated as non-est [Para 4(ii)(c)].

Decision: Writ petition allowed in part — Impugned order dated 04.07.2025 cancelling petitioner's licenses in Forms D-2 and L-11 quashed and set aside — Commissioner State Taxes & Excise directed to adjudicate the notice dated 26.05.2025 afresh without relying upon recommendations, orders or pleadings of the Collector (Excise) — Petitioner to be given reasonable opportunity — Exercise to be completed within two months — Respondents directed to ensure inspection teams are constituted strictly in consonance with the applicable Act, Rules and Notifications in future.