Civil Court — Jurisdiction — Bar under Section 430, Companies Act, 2013 — NBFC Loan Dispute — Plaintiff-NBFC obtained loan of ₹19.25 crores from defendant-company under an agreement dated 4.4.2019 for a tenure of nine years — Defendant demanded premature repayment and had already filed petition under Section 45QA of the RBI Act before NCLT, Allahabad Bench — Plaintiff suppressed this fact and filed suit for permanent injunction restraining defendant from premature recovery — Held: Section 45QA of the RBI Act vests exclusive jurisdiction in the NCLT to adjudicate disputes regarding repayment of deposits/loans by NBFCs — Section 430 of the Companies Act, 2013 expressly bars civil courts from entertaining suits and granting injunctions in matters falling within NCLT's domain — Plaint rejection upheld [Paras 47–53, 58].

Order VII Rule 11 CPC — Rejection of Plaint — Scope of Inquiry — At the stage of deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the court must confine its examination strictly to the averments in the plaint and documents filed therewith — Defence averments and documents of the defendant cannot be looked into — Suit cannot be summarily rejected if triable issues arise from the plaintiff's pleadings — However, where the plaint itself discloses a statutory bar to the suit, rejection is warranted [Paras 39–41].

Section 45-I(bb), RBI Act — Definition of 'Deposit' — Loans Included — Plaintiff contended that money advanced as a loan by the defendant to it was not covered under Section 45QA of the RBI Act — Held: The definition of 'deposit' under Section 45-I(bb) expressly includes money received by way of loan — Accordingly, the defendant was entitled to invoke Section 45QA before the NCLT for recovery of loan advanced to the plaintiff-NBFC — Contention rejected [Para 47].

Injunction — Clean Hands — Suppression of Material Facts — Plaintiff suppressed from the civil court the pendency of the defendant's petition under Section 45QA before the NCLT, Allahabad Bench, which was filed prior to institution of the suit — Plaintiff also sought to pre-empt NCLT proceedings by filing the injunction suit — Held: A party seeking equitable relief of injunction must approach the court with clean hands and disclose all material facts — Suppression of pending proceedings before a statutory tribunal disentitles the plaintiff from any discretionary relief — Suit also barred under Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act [Paras 49–51, 58].

Procedural Error — Application Numbers — No Prejudice — Trial court inadvertently referred to the original application 17-C (dismissed for non-prosecution) instead of the subsequent application 27-C (on identical grounds) while passing the impugned order — Held: Mere mentioning of an incorrect application number due to inadvertent error does not prejudice the plaintiff where parties were fully aware of the application being argued and the court decided the correct controversy — Procedural irregularity does not vitiate the order [Paras 54–57].

Decision: Appeal dismissed with costs throughout — Impugned order of the trial court dated 01.03.2025 rejecting the plaint affirmed — Interim order earlier granted by the High Court, noted to have been patently erroneous, already vacated on 24.02.2026.

Service Law – Pay Scale – Post Graduate Scale – Teacher Appointed in 'Pass' Graduate Category – Acquisition of Higher Qualification During Service – Entitlement to Higher Pay Scale – Petitioner appointed as assistant teacher in 'pass' graduate category in 1998 – Subsequently obtained permission from school managing committee and acquired Master Degree during service – Application for post graduate scale of pay refused by District Inspector of Schools by impugned order dated 03.12.2013 on the ground that pay scale is determined by qualification at the time of appointment – Held: Controversy is no longer res integra in view of the Larger Bench judgment in Utpal Kanti Karan v. State of West Bengal and Others (2024 SCC OnLine Cal 2274) – G.O. No. 735 (03.06.2002) and G.O. No. 1334 (03.11.2004) amended G.O. No. 155-SE(B) dated 13.07.1999 to make teachers who improve qualifications with due permission eligible for higher scale of pay – Entitlement governed by rules operative at the time of acquiring qualification, such as ROPA 1998 – Eligibility for higher pay scale is not frozen at the stage of initial appointment but is capable of being altered upon acquisition of higher qualification with due permission [Paras 5-19].

West Bengal Schools (Control of Expenditure) Act, 2005 – Bar to Higher Pay Scale – Retrospective Operation – Estoppel – Respondent contended that Section 14(2) of the Act bars the petitioner's claim and that Notification No. 593-SE(B) dated 27.11.2007 mandates prior permission of the District Inspector of Schools as a condition for higher scale – Further contended that petitioner, having applied as 'pass' graduate, is estopped from claiming higher scale – Held: Control of Expenditure Act, 2005 has no retrospective operation and cannot bar claims arising from earlier Government Orders – Notification No. 593-SE(B) dated 27.11.2007 lacks statutory force as it was not published in the Official Gazette and cannot override earlier binding Government Orders and Rules – Doctrine of estoppel cannot be invoked against law; petitioner could not have disclosed higher qualification which she had not yet acquired at the time of applying – Permission of school managing committee constitutes prior permission of competent authority – All objections of State negatived [Paras 20-25].

Decision: Writ petition allowed – Impugned order dated 08.12.2013 passed by District Inspector of Schools (Secondary Education), Kolkata set aside and quashed – District Inspector directed to grant post graduate scale of pay to the petitioner with effect from the day after the last date of her Part-II Master Degree examination, by issuance of appropriate order and refixation of pay scale within three weeks – Arrear salary to be disbursed within eight weeks from communication of judgment.

Constitutional Law – Kerala Lok Ayukta Act, 1999 – Amendment – Declaration Replaced by Recommendation – Competent Authority Changed from Governor to State Legislature for Chief Minister – Challenge to Constitutional Validity – Petitioners challenged the Kerala Lok Ayukta Amendment Act, 2022 (Act 7 of 2024) whereby the "declaration" in Section 14 was replaced by "recommendation" and the "Governor acting in his discretion" as competent authority in relation to the Chief Minister was substituted by the "State Legislative Assembly" – Contended that the amendment converts a binding judicial or quasi-judicial order into a mere advisory opinion subject to executive review, thereby violating separation of powers, judicial independence, and basic structure of the Constitution – Held: The Lok Ayukta and Upa-Lok Ayukta are sui generis quasi-judicial authorities and neither courts nor tribunals exercising plenary judicial power – Their reports do not determine rights of parties in the manner of judicial adjudication – The substitution of a binding declaration with a recommendation, coupled with an obligation on the competent authority to record and communicate reasons, cannot be construed as conferring appellate powers on the executive or as an impermissible encroachment into the judicial domain – The amendments seek to harmonise the statutory provisions with the constitutional scheme under Articles 163 and 164 whereby Ministers hold office during the pleasure of the Governor [Paras 4–58].

Constitutional Validity of Statute – Grounds of Challenge – Basic Structure Doctrine Not Available Against Ordinary Legislation – Held: The constitutional validity of a statute can be challenged only on grounds of lack of legislative competence or violation of Part III or any other provision of the Constitution – The basic structure doctrine is not available to challenge the validity of ordinary legislation as a statute – Legislative competence to enact the impugned amendments was not in dispute – No case of violation of Part III or any other constitutional provision was established – Challenge on the ground of violation of basic structure of the Constitution therefore fails [Paras 20–24, 61–62].

Kerala Lok Ayukta Act – Section 14(2) – Deemed Acceptance – Reading Into Statute – The amended Section 14(2) provides a period of 90 days for the competent authority to examine the recommendation but does not contain any provision for "deemed acceptance" unlike the Karnataka Lokayukta Act – Held: In the absence of such a provision, the statute would be rendered otiose as Section 12(5) stage would never be triggered and other provisions would become redundant – The words "deemed acceptance" are read into amended Section 14(2) to give effect to the legislation and in consonance with its object — in the event the report is not rejected within 90 days from the date of receipt, it shall be deemed to have been accepted on the expiry of the said period and the procedure under Section 12(5) shall immediately trigger – Any other interpretation would make the provisions purposeless [Paras 65–73].

Lok Ayukta – Nature of Functions – Sui Generis Quasi-Judicial Authority – Not a Court or Tribunal – The petitioners contended that the Lok Ayukta exercises functions with all the trappings of a court and that the amendment therefore constitutes administrative review of a judicial or quasi-judicial decision – Held: Though the Lok Ayukta follows a procedure resembling adjudication, it does not ipso facto possess the status of a court or tribunal exercising plenary judicial power – The Lok Ayukta is best described as a sui generis quasi-judicial authority – Its report does not determine the rights of either the complainant or the person complained against – Any decision of the competent authority in response to the recommendation remains amenable to judicial review – Neither the independence of the Lok Ayukta nor fair procedure before it is diluted by the amendment [Paras 50–58].

Decision: Writ petitions disposed of — Challenge to constitutional validity of Sections 3 and 14 as amended fails — Deemed acceptance read into Section 14(2) to the effect that non-rejection of recommendation within 90 days shall amount to acceptance — Legislature observed to consider restoring the requirement of appointment of a retired Chief Justice of a High Court as Lok Ayukta.

Criminal Law — Deferment of Cross-Examination — Section 231(2) CrPC/Section 254(3) BNSS — Timing of Application — Petitioner accused in a case under BNS and SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act filed application on 02.03.2026 seeking deferment of cross-examination of four related prosecution witnesses (prosecutrix, her sister, mother and bua) till completion of their chief examination, on the ground that premature cross-examination would disclose defence strategy enabling prosecution to fill lacunae — Application filed after completion of chief examination of the prosecutrix — Trial Court dismissed the application — Held: Prayer for deferment of cross-examination should preferably be made before preparation of the trial programme/case-calendar — Application filed after completion of chief examination of first witness, with no sufficient reason assigned for deferment, is not maintainable — Criminal revision dismissed [Paras 8–9, 13, 15].

Criminal Trial — Section 231(2) CrPC — Discretion of Court — Guidelines — Settled law summarised: Jurisdiction under Section 231(2) CrPC/Section 254(3) BNSS can be invoked (i) before preparation of case-calendar; (ii) when premised on sufficient reasons justifying deferral of cross-examination; (iii) where specific reasons are given showing that defence strategy would be disclosed causing prejudice; (iv) only in very exceptional cases and for recorded reasons, not as a matter of routine — Bald assertion that defence would be disclosed prematurely, without assigning any specific reason, is not a sufficient ground — Cross-examination should as far as possible be completed on the same day or the following day after examination-in-chief — Long deferments are anathema to fair trial [Paras 7, 10–13].

Decision: Criminal revision dismissed — No interference with the order of the Special Judge (SC/ST) dismissing the deferment application — Pending applications disposed of.

Minor – Representation in Suit – Next Friend – Order XXXII CPC – Mohammedan Law – Secular Nature of CPC – Appellant minor impleaded as added defendant in partition suit through his mother as next friend – Respondent challenged representation on the ground that under Section 359 of Mulla's Principles of Mahomedan Law, the mother is excluded from being a legal guardian of the property of a Mohammedan minor – Held: Representation of a minor in court proceedings is governed by Order XXXII CPC, which is secular in nature and not tied to the personal law of the parties – Rule 4 of Order XXXII permits any person of sound mind who has attained majority and has no adverse interest to act as next friend – Concept of "legal guardian" under Mohammedan Law is not germane to the question of representation in court proceedings – Rule 3 of Order XXXII applies only where the minor is already a defendant in a suit; since the appellant entered the litigation by his own application for impleadment, Rule 3 was not attracted at the relevant stage – Mother qualified to act as de facto guardian under Section 361 of Mulla's Principles of Mahomedan Law – Respondent estopped from raising the objection for the first time in appeal, having not objected before the Trial Court – Representation of minor through mother as next friend held legal and valid [Paras 29-47].

Partition Suit – Temporary Injunction – Status Quo – Minor Co-sharer's Right – Balance of Convenience – Added defendant/appellant sought injunction restraining respondent/plaintiff from making construction on the best portion of the joint suit property – Trial Court refused injunction on the ground that no construction was going on and that the plaintiff had obtained conversion and sanction plan – Held: Findings of Trial Court were mutually contradictory and perverse – Commissioner's Report confirmed accumulation of construction materials indicating imminent threat of construction – Mere obtaining of conversion and sanction plan does not confer a right to construct on joint property as per one's own choice during pendency of partition suit – Courts are to maintain suit property in statu quo during partition proceedings so that no party steals a march over others by raising permanent construction on the best portion – Once construction is raised, courts generally allocate such portion to the constructing party and award owelty money to others, thereby prejudicing co-sharers – Plaintiff purchased property in 2013 but obtained conversion only in 2023 and filed partition suit in 2024 without making any construction, demonstrating absence of urgency – Affidavit-in-opposition filed without jurat; averments in injunction application to be accepted under doctrine of non traverse – Balance of convenience squarely in favour of appellant – Trial Court erred in refusing injunction [Paras 48-66].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned order dated 03.12.2025 set aside to the extent it dismissed the added defendant's injunction application – Temporary injunction granted restraining the plaintiff/respondent no.1 and his men and agents from changing the nature and character of the suit property and/or altering existing possession till disposal of the partition suit – CAN 1 of 2025 disposed of – No order as to costs.

Land Acquisition – Eviction Notice – Right to Fair Compensation Act, 2013 – Writ Dismissed – Petitioner's property acquired for IInd Phase of Atlantis Railway Over Bridge project – Award passed and compensation deposited before the District and Sessions Court – Petitioner filed representation under Section 64 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 seeking release of compensation and protection from dispossession pending consideration – Despite representation, eviction proceedings initiated – 3rd respondent (GCDA) contended that it is the rightful owner, land having been acquired from petitioner's grandfather for Elamkulam West Extension Scheme, and that petitioner's constructions were unauthorised encroachments – Structural valuation amount credited to petitioner's account not in dispute – Held: No ground warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution; petitioner at liberty to seek disbursement of compensation before competent court [Paras 1-4].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed – Liberty granted to petitioner to pursue remedies available in law for disbursement of compensation.

Senior Citizens – Maintenance – Section 16 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 – Right of Appeal Exclusively Available to Senior Citizens and Parents – Petitioner, an 83-year-old widow, obtained maintenance order from Sub-Collector directing one son to pay Rs. 5,000/- per month and the other son to maintain her — aggrieved son (Opposite Party No.3, neither a senior citizen nor a parent) preferred appeal before the Collector under Section 16 of the Act — Collector set aside the maintenance order and remanded the matter for fresh inquiry — petitioner challenged the appellate order — Held: Section 16 of the Act confers the right of appeal exclusively upon a senior citizen or parent aggrieved by an order of the Tribunal — children and relatives have no right of appeal thereunder — appeal filed by the son was not entertainable — appellate order passed without jurisdiction [Paras 10–12].

Beneficial Legislation – Purposive Construction – Object of the Act – The Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 is a beneficial legislation enacted to provide social justice to parents and senior citizens — all beneficial legislations must receive liberal and purposive construction in consonance with their objects — the language of Section 16 is plain, clear and unambiguous in restricting the right of appeal to senior citizens and parents — extending the right to any other person would defeat the object of the legislation — Held: No room to import any other interpretation when statutory language is clear and unambiguous [Para 10].

Jurisdiction – Appellate Tribunal – Appeal by Children Not Maintainable – Collector-cum-District Magistrate, Balasore, entertained an appeal under Section 16 of the Act filed by the son of the petitioner and set aside the maintenance order — such entertainment of appeal was without jurisdiction as the son was neither a senior citizen nor a parent — order passed by the Appellate Tribunal without jurisdiction cannot be sustained in law — Held: Impugned appellate order quashed; maintenance order of Sub-Collector confirmed [Paras 12–15].

Decision: Writ petition allowed — Impugned order dated 07.11.2025 passed by the Collector-cum-District Magistrate, Balasore in Misc. Appeal No.12 of 2024 quashed — Order dated 29.02.2024 passed by the Sub-Collector, Balasore in Misc. Case No.49 of 2023 confirmed.

Contempt of Court – Terms of Settlement – Trademark – Use of "SUPERON" – Territorial Restriction – Geo-Blocking – SM and SDM, brothers and co-directors of Superon Schweisstechnik India Ltd., executed a Memorandum of Family Settlement (10.09.2021) dividing the domestic and export business – SM received exclusive rights to use "SUPERON" within India while SDM was conferred rights to use it outside India – Parties subsequently executed Terms of Settlement (TOS) dated 27.04.2023 before the Division Bench – Clause 4 of TOS imposed an unequivocal prohibition on SDM from using "SUPERON" in any manner within the territory of India – Only a limited carve-out under Clause 7 permitted SDM to use "SUPERON" on visiting cards, letters, emails, communications, packaging etc. within India strictly for export purposes and not for retail – Held: Use of a mark on a website or social media handle accessible from India constitutes use of the mark in India – Use of "SUPERON" on social media platforms accessible from India clearly violates Clause 4 – Limited exception under Clause 7 cannot be expanded to permit SDM to proclaim any association with "SUPERON" in the Indian market [Paras 49-58].

Contempt of Court – Geo-Blocking – Websites and Social Media – TOS – Before the Facilitator appointed by the Division Bench, parties agreed in principle to geo-block their respective websites containing "SUPERON" – SDM subsequently sought to resile from this position – Held: Geo-blocking is the only permissible means by which SDM may continue to maintain websites or social media handles incorporating "SUPERON" without violating Clause 4 of TOS – If SDM is not amenable to geo-blocking, it is altogether precluded from maintaining any website or social media platform accessible from India that uses the mark "SUPERON" – Disclaimers on websites do not entitle SDM to use "SUPERON" within India in contravention of Clause 4 [Paras 59-68].

Contempt of Court – Physical Hoardings – Interlinking of Marks – SDM using prominent physical hoardings displaying "SUPERON" at factory premises in Gurugram held in violation of Clause 4 of TOS – SM's contention that Clause 6 prohibiting interlinking applies only to electronic/digital interlinking rejected – Held: The expression "either directly or indirectly" in Clause 6 is wide enough to cover physical interlinking and cannot be curtailed to electronic modes alone – Use of the conjunction "OR" negates the plea that the restriction is confined only to social media interlinking – SM required to refrain from conjoint use of "SUPERON" with "STANVAC" in any manner including physical hoardings [Paras 69-82].

Contempt of Court – Use of "SCHWEISSTECHNIK" – Separate Divisions – Industrial Products under "Stanvac Prime" – Clause 4 of TOS and Clause 2 of Agreed Terms dated 12.05.2023 only prohibit SDM from using "SCHWEISSTECHNIK" in the name of the parent company or any new entity in India – No provision in TOS addresses exclusivity, transfer or ownership of "SCHWEISSTECHNIK" – Use of the term "SCHWEISSTECHNIK" by SDM cannot be construed as contemptuous – SDM directed to demarcate parent company operations into three separate divisions (A, B and C) as per Clause 5 of TOS with separate non-interlinked websites – SDM expressly prohibited from manufacturing or marketing industrial products under "Stanvac Prime" brand as per Clause 5(ii) of TOS [Paras 77-76].

Contempt Jurisdiction – Power to Issue Remedial Directions – Apart from punishing contemners, the court has power to issue directions to nullify any advantage secured through contemptuous conduct and to give parties an opportunity to purge contempt – Both parties found to be in wilful disobedience of the TOS – Directions issued to each party to file affidavits of compliance within four weeks – Non-compliance to invite appropriate action [Paras 88-95].

Decision: Both SM and SDM found to be in wilful disobedience of the Terms of Settlement – Directions issued to SDM: (i) to refrain from using "SUPERON" on websites/social media accessible from India unless geo-blocked; (ii) to remove hoardings displaying "SUPERON" from physical premises in India; (iii) to demarcate operations into three divisions per Clause 5; (iv) to ensure separate non-interlinked divisional websites; (v) to refrain from manufacturing/marketing industrial products under "Stanvac Prime" – Directions issued to SM: (i) to refrain from interlinking "SUPERON" with "STANVAC/STARBLAZE" in any manner; (ii) to remove physical hoardings interlinking these marks; (iii) to geo-block its website/social media handles outside India – Both parties to file affidavits of compliance within four weeks – Matter listed for 30.04.2026.

Civil Law — Rejection of Plaint — Order VII Rule 11 CPC — Limitation — Partition Deed — Knowledge — In an application for rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the Court is confined only to the plaint averments, allegations and documents filed along with the plaint — Plaintiff herself admitted in the plaint that she received a reply notice dated 26.07.2002 wherein the existence and validity of the registered partition deed dated 13.12.1985 was specifically asserted — Plaintiff further sent notices in 2009 and 2014 alleging the partition deed to be forged, which presupposes knowledge of the document — Held: Clock of limitation started ticking from the moment the plaintiff came to know of the partition deed, i.e., at least from July 2002 — Suit filed in 2021, nearly 19 years after acquiring knowledge, is hopelessly barred under Article 59 of the Limitation Act — Trial Court rightly allowed the rejection application [Paras 15.1–15.5].

Limitation — Date of Knowledge — Fraud — Commencement of Limitation — Plaintiff contended that she obtained a copy of the partition deed only in 2018 in enquiry proceedings before the DRO and that the cause of action arose only then — Held: When the plaintiff had knowledge of the partition deed and was in a position to allege forgery thereof as early as 2002, it is not believable that she did not have a copy — Partition deed is a registered document and it was for the plaintiff to take diligent steps to obtain a certified copy and challenge it within the period of limitation — Approaching revenue authorities and writ courts for various directions does not enlarge the period of limitation — Contention that limitation runs from 2018 rejected [Paras 15.3, 15.5].

Civil Miscellaneous Petition — Additional Grounds — No Merit — All additional grounds raised in C.M.P. No. 5759 of 2026 had already been urged in the main appeal — No new grounds were raised warranting separate consideration — C.M.P. dismissed [Para 16].

Decision: Appeal suit dismissed with costs — Order dated 08.12.2025 rejecting plaint upheld — C.M.P. No. 5759 of 2026 dismissed.