Excise Law – Exemption Notification – Rebate Claim on Exported Goods – The petitioner challenged the rejection of their rebate claim on biscuits exported out of India – The petitioner had voluntarily paid excise duty on the goods exported, arguing that since the biscuits did not bear a retail sale price in rupees, they were not covered by the exemption notification – Held: Goods exported without a retail sale price in rupees are not eligible for exemption under Notification No. 3/2006 – The petitioner was entitled to pay duty and claim a rebate under Rule 18 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 [Paras 13-14, 20].

Article 265 of the Constitution – Retention of Duty Paid Without Authority of Law – The revenue contended that the goods were exempt under Notification No. 3/2006 and that the petitioner was not required to pay duty, thereby not entitled to a rebate – The Court held that if goods were exempt, retaining the duty paid without the authority of law would violate Article 265 of the Constitution – The Court rejected the revenue’s argument, emphasizing that duty paid without legal obligation cannot be retained [Paras 15-16].

Cenvat Credit and Tribunal Decision – Consistency in Rebate Claims – The petitioner’s earlier rebate claims had been allowed by appellate authorities and accepted by the revenue – The Court noted that the revenue could not take a contrary position after accepting similar claims in the past – The tribunal’s order allowing the petitioner’s appeal was also accepted by the revenue, further supporting the petitioner’s claim for a rebate [Paras 17-19, 23-24].

Decision – The petitioner’s claim for a rebate of excise duty paid on exported biscuits was allowed – The order of the Revisional Authority was quashed – The respondents were directed to grant the rebate claims [Paras 30-31].

Motor Vehicle Accident – Rash and Negligent Driving – The prosecution alleged that the respondent, driving a tipper, failed to notice the turn signal given by the deceased bicyclist and caused a fatal accident – The trial court convicted the respondent for rash and negligent driving under Sections 279 and 304-A of the IPC – The appellate court, however, acquitted the respondent, holding that the accident occurred on a busy national highway, and the deceased could have avoided the collision by exercising caution while crossing the road – Held: The appellate court's view was reasonable as the deceased was turning at a road junction and the evidence, including skid marks, suggested that the respondent had attempted to stop the vehicle [Paras 6-8].

Road Safety Regulations – Duty of Driver and Bicyclist – Under Rule 8 of the Rules of the Road Regulation, 1989, drivers must slow down at road junctions to ensure safety – The court observed that both the deceased and the driver had duties under the law, and in this case, the deceased's negligence in entering the junction was a contributing factor – The appellate court's finding that the deceased bicyclist should have exercised caution was upheld [Paras 10-12].

Appellate Review – Scope of Interference in Acquittal – The court reaffirmed the principle that an acquittal should not be overturned unless the findings are perverse or unreasonable – In this case, the appellate court's decision to acquit the respondent was found to be a plausible view based on the evidence, and no interference was warranted [Paras 15-18].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – The appellate court's judgment acquitting the respondent is upheld as the view taken was reasonable and supported by the evidence [Para 18].

Criminal Law – Sexual Assault – Anticipatory Bail – Petition under Section 438 of Cr.P.C. by the petitioner/accused for offences under Sections 376(2)(n), 376(2)(k), 354(A), 354(B), 354(C), 506 IPC and Section 66E of the IT Act – Petitioner accused of repeated sexual assault on a maid working at his house – Alleged crimes include sexual advances, assault, recording without consent, and threats – Sessions court rejected anticipatory bail, and the High Court upheld the decision, citing prima facie evidence and risk of absconding [Paras 1, 11, 16].

Delay in Filing Complaint – Explanation and Legal Precedents – Petitioner argued that the complaint filed in May 2024 for incidents occurring in 2021-2022 is delayed, rendering it unreliable – Defense referred to precedents where delay in sexual assault complaints led to acquittals – However, the court found the delay explained, as the victim feared societal stigma and her daughter's marriage prospects, and rejected the argument based on prior case law [Paras 5, 9, 14].

Prima Facie Case – Forensic Evidence and Video Recordings – The charge sheet included Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) reports confirming that videos of the alleged incidents had not been tampered with – Both the petitioner's and victim's voices were matched in the recordings – The court held that the evidence satisfied the ingredients of offences under Sections 376(2)(n) (repeated rape), 376(2)(k) (dominance), 354A (sexual harassment), 354B (intent to disrobe), and 354C (voyeurism) IPC [Paras 9, 10].

Risk of Absconding and Witness Tampering – Petitioner stayed in Germany for 35 days, avoiding investigation – Court expressed concern over flight risk and potential threats to witnesses if released – Based on the petitioner’s prior attempts to block circulation of incriminating videos, the court concluded that the petitioner had the propensity to repeat the offense and influence witnesses [Paras 6, 11, 15].

Court's Discretion in Denying Bail – The High Court referenced the Supreme Court’s guidelines for bail in serious offenses, including the gravity of the accusations, severity of punishment, and risk of flight – Citing Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee and Bhagwan Singh v. Dilip Kumar, the court held that the petitioner’s influence and prior conduct made him ineligible for anticipatory bail [Paras 11, 12].

Decision: Petition dismissed – Anticipatory bail denied – Court emphasized the seriousness of the allegations, the strong prima facie evidence, and the potential risks associated with releasing the petitioner on bail – Observations made for the purpose of bail will not influence pending proceedings [Paras 15, 16].
 

Criminal Law - Section 498-A IPC – Acquittal - Cruelty – Mental and Physical Harassment – Dowry Demand – The appellants were convicted by the Trial Court under Section 498-A IPC for allegedly subjecting the deceased to cruelty through dowry demands and taunting her character – The appellants challenged the conviction, arguing that the prosecution failed to prove the allegations beyond reasonable doubt – Held: The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were vague and inconsistent, and no substantial evidence of dowry harassment was provided – The appellate court noted discrepancies in the witnesses' statements and found that the demand for dowry, including a refrigerator and television, was introduced late during the trial, lacking credibility [Paras 10-14].

Dowry Harassment – Lack of Evidence – Witness Credibility – The court observed that key prosecution witnesses contradicted each other, and the allegations of dowry harassment were not substantiated by any independent evidence – Furthermore, the deceased’s Ward Punch had not received any complaint of dowry demand, weakening the prosecution’s case – Held: The learned Trial Court erred in convicting the appellants based on uncorroborated and exaggerated claims [Paras 15-19].

Appellate Review – Reversal of Conviction – The court found that the appellants were wrongly convicted under Section 498-A IPC, as the prosecution failed to establish continuous harassment or cruelty related to dowry demands – Held: The appellants are acquitted, and the judgment of the Trial Court is set aside [Para 20].

Decision: Appeal allowed – The appellants are acquitted of the charges under Section 498-A IPC, and their personal bonds are to be furnished in compliance with Section 437-A of the CrPC [Para 22].

Criminal Procedure – Summoning Under Section 319 CrPC – Standard of Evidence – The petitioner challenged the order of the Trial Court summoning him as an accused under Section 319 CrPC, arguing that the evidence did not meet the threshold to justify his implication – Held: Section 319 CrPC allows summoning of additional accused only when strong and cogent evidence points to their involvement – The evidence presented, including testimonies of PW-3 and PW-7, indicated that the petitioner was involved in the fraudulent transfer of property – The court found that un-rebutted evidence would likely result in conviction, thus justifying the summoning order [Paras 10-15].

Forgery and Criminal Conspiracy – Allegation of Forged Signatures – Witnesses testified that the petitioner forged signatures on a sale deed to transfer land – The court noted that although forensic evidence on signature comparison was inconclusive, the witness testimonies provided a prima facie case – Held: The Trial Court correctly exercised its discretion under Section 319 CrPC to summon the petitioner based on this evidence [Paras 11-14].

Appellate Jurisdiction – No Challenge to Remand Order – The petitioner argued that the Appellate Court wrongly remanded the case to the Trial Court for reconsideration – The court dismissed this contention, stating that the remand order was not challenged and had attained finality – Further, the Trial Court did not review its own order but acted on directions from the Appellate Court [Paras 16-18].

Decision: Petitions dismissed – The Trial Court’s order summoning the petitioner as an accused under Section 319 CrPC is upheld [Para 18].
 

Preventive Detention – Delay in Consideration of Representation – No Merit in Challenge – The petitioner argued that the delay in considering her representation against her husband's preventive detention under KAA(P)A should result in the annulment of the detention order – Held: The petitioner filed an earlier writ petition (W.P.(Crl) No. 686/2024) without waiting for the government’s decision on her representation, and the same grounds were already adjudicated upon in that case – The Court found no merit in the argument regarding delay as the representation was promptly disposed of, and the petitioner cannot raise the same challenge repeatedly [Paras 5-7].

Preventive Detention – Maximum Detention Period – No Specific Mention of Duration Not a Ground for Annulment – The petitioner also contended that the confirmation order by the government did not specify the reason for imposing the maximum six-month detention period – Held: As per the ruling in Vijayakumar v. Union of India, the government is presumed to have applied its mind when confirming the maximum period of detention – The absence of specific mention of the detention period does not vitiate the order when the government has the power to revoke or modify the order at any time – This challenge was dismissed [Para 8].

Abuse of Court Process – Repeated Filing of Writ Petitions – Petition Dismissed – The Court observed that the present writ petition raised the same issues that were previously considered and dismissed in W.P.(Crl) No. 686/2024 – Filing successive petitions on the same grounds amounts to an abuse of the process of law – Held: The writ petition is devoid of merit and dismissed [Paras 6-7, 9].

Decision: The Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the petitioner’s challenge based on delay in considering the representation and the government’s failure to mention the reason for imposing the maximum detention period was without merit. The earlier writ petition (W.P.(Crl) No. 686/2024) had already addressed these issues, and filing successive petitions on the same grounds constitutes an abuse of the process of law. The detention order was upheld, and the petition was dismissed [Paras 7-9].

Domestic Violence – Right of Residence – Shared Household – The petitioner, who married the second respondent, claimed her right to reside in the shared household under Section 19 of the Domestic Violence Act. The Magistrate’s earlier order protecting her right to stay in the shared household was recalled on the grounds that the property was owned by her father-in-law, respondent No. 3 – Held: The property, though owned by the father-in-law, was a shared household under Section 2(s) of the DV Act since the petitioner resided there after marriage – However, the petitioner does not have an absolute right to continue residing there – The Court balanced her right by directing the husband to provide alternate accommodation [Paras 19-22].

Civil Suit for Possession – Right to Evict Under Law – Balance of Interests – The respondents, including the father-in-law, had filed a civil suit for possession of the shared household – Held: The filing of a civil suit is in accordance with law, and Section 19(1)(f) of the DV Act allows eviction, provided alternate accommodation is arranged for the petitioner – The Court emphasized the need to balance the rights of the petitioner and the father-in-law’s right to peaceful living [Paras 20, 23].

Income of Petitioner – Recall of Maintenance Order – The petitioner’s interim maintenance was recalled after it was revealed that she was employed and earning Rs. 40,000 per month – Held: The recall of the maintenance order is justified given her financial independence [Para 16].

Judicial Precedents – Shared Household and Eviction – The petitioner relied on earlier cases such as Hiral P. Harsora and Sarika Mahendra Sureka, but the Court found that the precedents applied only to certain facts – In Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja, the Supreme Court held that while the daughter-in-law has a right to residence, she may be evicted from the shared household following due process of law [Paras 9, 11, 20].

Decision: The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner’s right to reside in the shared household is not absolute. The father-in-law, as the owner of the property, has a right to seek possession through legal means. The learned Magistrate’s order, directing the husband to provide alternate accommodation, was upheld as a reasonable balance between the parties’ rights. The petition lacked merit and was dismissed [Paras 22-24].

Negotiable Instruments Act – Appeal Against Conviction – Deposit of 20% Fine Under Section 148 N.I. Act – Exceptional Circumstances – The petitioner challenged the order of the Additional Sessions Judge directing him to deposit 20% of the fine amount as a condition for admitting the appeal against his conviction under Section 138 N.I. Act – Held: The deposit of 20% of the fine is not an absolute rule, and courts may consider exceptional circumstances where the deposit may be waived – The petitioner cited his resignation from the company before the issuance of cheques, his unemployment, and the liquidation of the company as exceptional circumstances – The impugned order was set aside to allow the petitioner an opportunity to present his exceptional circumstances before the trial court for reconsideration [Paras 9-13].

Judicial Precedents – Applicability of Section 148 N.I. Act – Scope of Waiver in Special Circumstances – Relying on the Supreme Court's ruling in Surender Singh Deswal v. Virender Gandhi and Jamboo Bhandari v. M.P. SIDC Ltd., the Court emphasized that while Section 148 requires the deposit of 20% of the fine amount, it is not mandatory in all cases – Courts must assess whether the imposition of such a condition would deprive the appellant of the right to appeal, especially in cases of financial incapacity or other exceptional reasons [Paras 10-12].

Exceptional Circumstances – Financial Hardship – Resignation from Company – The petitioner argued that he had resigned as a director before the issuance of the cheques and had no control over the company's affairs at the relevant time – Additionally, he had been unemployed since 2018 and the company was under liquidation, making it difficult for him to pay the 20% deposit – Held: These exceptional circumstances may justify a waiver of the deposit, and the petitioner should be given an opportunity to present his case before the trial court [Paras 4-5, 13].

Decision: The Court set aside the order directing the petitioner to deposit 20% of the fine amount and remanded the matter to the Additional Sessions Judge to reconsider the deposit requirement in light of the petitioner’s exceptional circumstances. The petitions were allowed, and the petitioner was granted an opportunity to present his case for exemption from the deposit of the fine [Paras 13-14].

Labour Law – Provident Fund Contributions – Canteen Subsidy – Basic Wages – Section 2(b) of EPF Act – Not Included – The canteen subsidy, being optional and dependent on employee attendance, was held not to form part of basic wages under Section 2(b) of the EPF Act. The Court referenced the principles from Bridge & Roofs Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, concluding that wages universally paid to all employees are included in basic wages, whereas selective payments, such as the canteen subsidy, are excluded [Paras 34, 37].

Provident Fund Contribution – Canteen Subsidy – Explanation 1 to Section 6 of EPF Act – Deemed as Dearness Allowance – The subsidy of Rs.475/- per month, provided under statutory settlement, had a direct nexus to the cost of living. The supply of food at subsidized rates in canteens established that the cash value of the food concession fell within Explanation 1 to Section 6, thus attracting provident fund contributions. The decision distinguished the Tata Power Co. Ltd. case, where no food was supplied [Paras 39-43].

Cash Value of Food Concession – Legal Interpretation – Distinction from Tata Power Case – The Bombay High Court's interpretation in Tata Power Co. Ltd. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner was examined. Unlike Tata Power, where no actual food was provided, the present case involved subsidized food supply, justifying the inclusion of canteen subsidy as dearness allowance [Paras 40-42].

Decision: The appeal was allowed, holding that the cash value of the canteen subsidy must be considered part of the dearness allowance under Explanation 1 to Section 6 of the EPF Act, thereby requiring provident fund contributions [Para 43].