Civil Law - Debts Recovery – Cross-Examination – Denial of Opportunity – Tribunal Order Set Aside – The petitioner, a partner of the 1st defendant firm, contested liability for crop loans claimed by the bank and sought to cross-examine the bank’s witness – DRT rejected the application citing delay and the non-necessity of oral evidence from a bank official relying on records – Held: Given the contested liability and criminal proceedings against a former bank manager for fraud, denial of cross-examination violated principles of natural justice – Tribunal’s order quashed [Paras 1–13].

Natural Justice – Right to Cross-Examine – Procedural Fairness Required – The Court held that though DRT proceedings are summary in nature, when core facts are disputed and liability is denied, cross-examination becomes essential to ensure fair adjudication – Discretion under Rule 12(9) of DRT Rules must be exercised judiciously, not arbitrarily – The Tribunal failed to consider relevant facts and misapplied delay as a ground to deny a substantive right [Paras 10–13].

Delay – Not Sole Ground to Deny Cross-Examination – Absence of Prejudice – The Court observed that the O.A. was pending since 2006, and no specific delay was attributable to the petitioner – The finding of delay as a tactic to protract proceedings was not supported by record – Court emphasized that delay alone cannot override the need for fair hearing when substantial prejudice is shown [Paras 11–13].

Decision – Petition Allowed – Tribunal Directed to Permit Cross-Examination – The High Court set aside the DRT’s order and directed it to allow cross-examination of the bank’s witness – Tribunal was further directed to dispose of the matter expeditiously, with final orders to be passed on or before 31.12.2025 [Para 13].

Service Law – Recruitment by Transfer – Eligibility and Probation Requirement – Review Dismissed – Petitioners sought review of a common judgment holding that only candidates with declared probation were eligible for appointment by transfer to the post of Assistant Professor – Petitioners argued that both Health Services and Medical Education Departments constituted feeder categories and that probation should not have been the sole criterion – Held: Contentions were already considered and rejected in the original judgment – No error apparent on the face of the record [Paras 1–6, 12].

Judicial Review – Scope of Review under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC – Limited Reappreciation Not Permissible – The Court reiterated that a review is not an appeal in disguise and cannot be used to reargue settled contentions – Cited precedents including Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi and Shanti Conductors Pvt. Ltd. – Held: Absence of a manifest error or self-evident mistake precludes exercise of review jurisdiction [Paras 7–11].

Recruitment Mode – By Transfer vs Direct Recruitment – Notification Valid – Petitioners contended that recruitment should have been by direct entry since the vacancy was substantive – Held: Appointment by transfer in accordance with Special Rules was valid – Rule 5 of KS&SSR governs ratio, not recruitment mode – Rule 2(13) rightly applied to define “appointment by transfer” [Paras 5, 13].

Decision – Review Petitions Dismissed – The Court held that no grounds were made out under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC to review the earlier judgment – Alleged legal errors involved two possible interpretations and required elaborate reasoning – Hence, not errors apparent on the face of record – Review dismissed with no fresh directions issued [Paras 14].

Intellectual Property Law – Trademark Infringement – Use of Registered Trademark by Intermediary – Dispute over IndiaMART listing of 'PUMA' as a drop-down option – PUMA SE (PSE) alleged counterfeit listings of its trademarked products on IndiaMART – Single Judge restrained IndiaMART from providing 'PUMA' as an option and ordered takedown of infringing listings – Division Bench analyzed extent of 'use' under Section 29 TM Act and safe harbour under Section 79 IT Act – Held: Drop-down listing alone not infringing if reasonable diligence followed – Injunction lifted for drop-down use, but takedown obligation upheld [Paras 1–4, 49–59, 94–96].

Trademark Use – Section 29 TM Act – Interpretation – Court held that listing 'PUMA' in seller registration drop-down constitutes "use" of trademark under Sections 2(2)(b) and 2(2)(c)(i) of TM Act – However, such use, by itself, does not show dishonest practice unless it facilitates counterfeit trade or misleads consumers – Use not automatically actionable unless shown to unfairly benefit from or damage trademark's distinctiveness [Paras 21–23, 27, 63–66, 69–70].

Safe Harbour Protection – Section 79 IT Act – Applicability to IndiaMART – Court distinguished IndiaMART from traditional e-commerce platforms like Amazon – IndiaMART operates as B2B listing service akin to Yellow Pages – Prima facie found to meet intermediary criteria under Section 2(1)(w) IT Act – Held: Section 79(1) protection applies unless intermediary conspires or fails to act on specific knowledge of infringement – Absence of proactive conspiracy or inducement protected IndiaMART [Paras 58, 77–80, 81–83, 90–93].

Due Diligence Obligations – Rule 3(1)(b)(iv) IT Rules 2021 – Court found that IndiaMART must ensure sellers acknowledge IP compliance obligations prominently during registration – Sellers re-listing after takedown without scrutiny would breach due diligence standards – Court emphasized need for visible undertakings and a robust takedown policy to retain intermediary protection [Paras 84–89, 92].

Doctrine of Exhaustion and Descriptive Use – Court rejected overbroad interpretation of Section 29(4) TM Act as applied by Single Judge – Noted that mere drop-down use describing brand, without intent to mislead or misappropriate goodwill, could fall under permissible descriptive use – Emphasized that infringement must involve confusion or dilution beyond identification of category [Paras 36(b), 41, 64–67].

Distinction from Google LLC v. DRS Logistics and Amazon Case – Court found Single Judge’s reliance on Google LLC decision distinguishable – Google ad program involved adword manipulation, unlike IndiaMART’s passive drop-down menu – Amazon case involved brand ownership and product sale by platform itself, unlike IndiaMART’s third-party listing structure [Paras 60, 73–74].

Decision: Appeal partly allowed – Injunction restraining drop-down menu usage of 'PUMA' lifted – IndiaMART directed to maintain active takedown mechanism for counterfeit listings and ensure compliance with due diligence requirements – Appeal disposed of accordingly [Paras 94–96].

Criminal Law - Dishonor of Cheque – Acquittal by Trial Court – Opportunity to Examine Bank Manager Denied – Matter Remanded – The complainant filed a case under Section 138 of the NI Act which was dismissed by the Trial Court on the ground that the dishonor memos (Exts.P2 and P3) did not contain the cheque number – Held: As per Section 146 of the NI Act, bank’s dishonor memo is prima facie evidence, but it must contain the cheque number and related details – Trial Court erred in denying the complainant’s request to examine the Bank Manager to prove this crucial fact – Acquittal set aside – Matter remanded for fresh disposal after granting the complainant opportunity to examine the Bank Manager [Paras 6, 9-13].

Section 146 NI Act – Presumption of Dishonor – Applicability Explained – The Court clarified that while Section 146 creates a presumption based on the bank’s slip or memo, the memo must contain specific details like the cheque number, date, and amount to be effective evidence – In absence of these details, oral evidence through the Bank Manager is necessary to prove dishonor – Failure to permit such evidence amounts to violation of fair trial principles [Paras 9-11].

Natural Justice – Denial of Right to Adduce Evidence – Judgment Unsustainable – The dismissal of the complainant’s petition to summon the Bank Manager deprived him of a fair opportunity to prove his case – Held: Such denial vitiates the trial – Appellate Court exercised its jurisdiction to set aside the judgment and remand the case for proper adjudication [Paras 11-12].

Decision – Judgment of Acquittal Set Aside – Matter Remanded – The judgment dated 06.02.2014 in S.T. No.10 of 2012 passed by the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-II, Karunagappally is set aside – The complainant is directed to appear before the Trial Court on 01.07.2025 at 11:00 a.m. – Trial Court to dispose of the case afresh after permitting examination of the Bank Manager – Appeal allowed [Paras 13].

Criminal Law – Section 406, 420, 34 of the IPC - Debit Freeze of Bank Account – Power Under Section 102 CrPC – Applicability of BNSS Sections 106 and 107 – Debit Freeze Lifted – The petitioner challenged the debit freeze of its bank account imposed by the police during investigation of a cheating case involving transfer of money allegedly from the proceeds of crime – Held: While Section 106 of BNSS (similar to Section 102 CrPC) empowers police to seize property for investigation, attachment or freezing of bank accounts suspected to be proceeds of crime must follow the procedure under Section 107 of BNSS, requiring Magistrate’s order – Police cannot unilaterally impose debit freeze without such order – Debit freeze set aside, liberty granted to police to proceed under Section 107 BNSS if warranted [Paras 6-14].

Attachment vs Seizure – Distinction Clarified – Section 106 BNSS deals with seizure of property related to the offence or under suspicious circumstances for investigation purposes – Section 107 BNSS governs attachment of properties deemed to be proceeds of crime, requiring judicial oversight through Magistrate’s orders – Debit freezing of bank accounts amounts to attachment rather than mere seizure and must comply with Section 107, not Section 106 – Impugned action without following this procedure is invalid [Paras 10-13].

Proceeds of Crime – BNSS Section 107 – Mandatory Judicial Process – Court explained that proceeds of crime as defined under Section 111(c) BNSS can only be attached by a Magistrate after issuing notice, hearing parties, and satisfying statutory conditions – Interim attachment possible only if delay defeats the object – In this case, police acted without initiating such process, rendering the action illegal [Paras 11-12].

Decision – Debit Freeze Order Set Aside – Petition Allowed – The order dated 08.04.2025 passed by the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Kalamassery in C.M.P. No.739/2025 is quashed – The debit freeze imposed on the petitioner’s account is lifted – Police at liberty to proceed under Section 107 of BNSS if necessary [Para 14].

Civil Writ - Service Law - Disciplinary Proceedings – Disagreement with Inquiry Officer – Show Cause Notice Deficient – Punishment Quashed - Petitioner was exonerated by the Inquiry Officer on charges related to supervision of school building construction – Disciplinary Authority disagreed and imposed minor penalty without stating reasons in show cause notice – Held: The second show cause notice failed to disclose tentative reasons for disagreement as required under Rule 15(10)(i)(b), rendering the process unfair and violative of natural justice – Punishment order quashed [Paras 6–17].

Natural Justice – Procedural Safeguard – Right to Representation Undermined - The show cause notice merely mentioned decision to punish without offering grounds for differing from Inquiry Officer’s findings – Held: Such notice was an “empty formality” that deprived the petitioner of meaningful opportunity to respond – Cited judgments in Ram Kishan v. Union of India, Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra, and Yoginath D. Bagde to affirm requirement for reasons in notice [Paras 9–14].

Post-Retirement Status – No Remand Ordered – Punishment Set Aside - As the petitioner had already superannuated and the punishment was not enforced due to interim stay, Court declined to remand the matter – Final order dated 09.02.2016 quashed [Paras 17–19].

Final Decision – Petition Allowed – Punishment Order Quashed – No Remand - Writ petition allowed – Impugned order quashed – No costs awarded [Paras 18–19].

Civil Writ - Rehabilitation Policy – Eligibility of Minors – Cut-off Date Under 2015 Policy – Writ Petitions Dismissed - Petitioners were denied rehabilitation on the ground of being minors as on 01.01.2015 – Appellate Authority upheld ineligibility due to non-fulfillment of age and documentary criteria – Held: The 2015 Policy mandates that applicants must have attained 18 years of age by the cut-off date; absence of voter ID in qualifying years and reliance on documents post cut-off date rendered claims invalid – Court found no merit in the plea for relaxation based on subsequent documentation [Paras 58–62].

Rehabilitation Policy – Commercial Use of Jhuggi – Ineligibility under Clause 8 of Part B – Writ Petitions Dismissed - Petitioners’ claims rejected as their jhuggis were found to be used solely for commercial activities at the time of survey – Videographic evidence supported findings – Held: As per Clause 8 of Part B of the 2015 Policy, exclusive commercial use disqualifies applicants; mixed-use must be residential-cum-commercial with occupancy – Petitioners failed to establish residential use – Allotment rightly denied [Paras 63–67].

Survey Process and DUSIB’s Role – No Procedural Infirmity Found – Objection Overruled - Petitioners argued that DDA excluded DUSIB from survey and eligibility determination, vitiating process – Court held issue settled by prior judgment (Sanjeev Bhadra v. GNCTD) – Held: DDA, being the land-owning agency, acted within its mandate; DUSIB’s limited role as nodal agency does not invalidate the rehabilitation exercise undertaken by DDA [Para 57].

Decision – Dismissal of Petitions – Petitioners Held Ineligible – The Court found no merit in the factual or legal submissions raised in either category of petitions – Observing that rehabilitation under the 2015 Policy is conditional and not a fundamental right, the Court dismissed all writ petitions and related applications [Paras 62, 67–68].

Service Law – Writ - Army Officer Dismissal – Refusal to Participate in Regimental Religious Rituals – Dismissal Upheld – Petitioner, a Christian Army officer, declined to enter the sanctum sanctorum of Mandir/Gurudwara during religious parades citing faith-based reasons – Held: His conduct constituted willful disobedience of lawful command under Section 41 of the Army Act and adversely affected military discipline and unit cohesion – Army’s action under Section 19 read with Rule 14 of the Army Rules is valid [Paras 1–5, 66–73].

Religious Freedom vs Military Discipline – Article 25 of Constitution – Restrictions Permissible – Held: Article 33 empowers Parliament to restrict fundamental rights of Armed Forces personnel to maintain discipline – Refusal to participate in regimental rituals by Commanding Officer undermines esprit de corps and was rightly treated as misconduct – Army’s secular fabric is preserved while expecting uniform compliance with military customs [Paras 43–44, 55–65, 73].

Court Martial – Not Mandatory – Rule 14 of Army Rules – Disciplinary Action Valid – Court held that it was impracticable and inexpedient to conduct a Court Martial due to the sensitive nature of religious issues – Show Cause Notice was duly issued and proper procedure followed – No arbitrariness found in administrative termination under Section 19 of Army Act [Paras 74–84].

Judicial Review – Scope Limited in Military Discipline Cases – Military Leadership's Discretion Prevails – Held: Court must defer to military judgment in matters affecting unit cohesion and morale – Petitioner's insistence on prioritizing personal faith over command directives was rightly treated as indiscipline – Courts cannot second-guess military standards absent manifest arbitrariness [Paras 70–73].

Decision – Petition Dismissed – Delhi High Court upheld the Army’s decision to dismiss the petitioner from service, holding that the disciplinary procedure was compliant with law, and refusal to participate fully in religious parades was a valid ground for administrative termination [Para 85].

Land Acquisition – Challenge to Notification under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act – Acquisition Upheld – Petitioners contended that the term “Multipurpose Scheme” was vague and not a valid public purpose under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Court held that "Multipurpose Scheme No.10" constituted a valid and specific purpose and satisfied the statutory requirements – Notification and declaration under Sections 4 and 6 were properly issued and published – Held: No vagueness or illegality in purpose of acquisition [Paras 14(i), 37-39, 54].

Opportunity of Hearing – Section 5A of the Act of 1894 – Compliance Found – Petitioners alleged denial of personal hearing under Section 5A – Court found that individual notices were served, and legal representatives appeared via advocates – Dispatch records, appearance registers, and Vakalatnamas produced – Held: Requirement of personal hearing and consideration of objections was duly complied with [Paras 14(ii), 29-30, 43-44].

Limitation – Declaration under Section 6 and Award under Section 11 – Proceedings Not Lapsed – Petitioners alleged that declaration under Section 6 was beyond one year from notification under Section 4 and that award under Section 11 was passed beyond two-year period – Court held that Section 6 declaration and Section 11 award were issued within prescribed timeframes from last publication dates – Held: No lapse under Sections 6 or 11A [Paras 14(iii)-(v), 31-32, 41-42].

Section 24(2) of Act of 2013 – Inapplicability – Petitioners argued deemed lapse due to non-payment of compensation – Court held Section 24(2) applies only where award predates 01.01.2009 by five years – Award in this case passed on 22.10.2009 – Held: Section 24(2) not applicable and compensation either paid or deposited with competent authority [Paras 14(vi)-(vii), 45-46].

Notice under Section 9 – Directory Nature – Non-compliance Not Fatal – Petitioners challenged proceedings due to alleged non-service of Section 9 notices – Court held that even if notices were not individually served, provision is directory in nature – Held: Absence of notice under Section 9 does not vitiate acquisition [Paras 14(iv), 48-49].

Discrimination and Equitable Treatment – Allegation Unsubstantiated – Petitioners alleged discriminatory treatment in exclusion of some lands – Court held no factual foundation or evidence to support claims – Held: No discrimination made out in land selection [Paras 14(viii)-(ix), 47].

Delay and Laches – Writ Petitions Filed Post-Award – Challenge Barred – Writ Petitions were filed in 2012, years after award passed in 2009 – Court held challenge was delayed without sufficient explanation and barred by laches – Held: Petitions not maintainable on account of delay [Paras 16(i), 50-53].

Final Decision – Acquisition Proceedings Found Legal and Valid – No Constitutional or Procedural Violation – The High Court held that acquisition proceedings were carried out in accordance with law, with compliance to statutory mandates and procedural safeguards – No grounds made out for interference – Held: All intra-court appeals dismissed [Paras 55-57].