Criminal Law - Prevention of Corruption – Requirement of Sanction for Prosecution – Cognizance Without Sanction Invalid – The applicant was accused of demanding and accepting a bribe through a co-accused, leading to his prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – The competent authority denied sanction twice, yet the chargesheet was filed, and cognizance was taken – The High Court held that Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act explicitly bars courts from taking cognizance of corruption charges against public servants without prior sanction – Held: The entire proceedings were flawed due to the absence of sanction, rendering the trial void ab initio [Paras 16-19, 32].

Sanction Under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act – A Mandatory Precondition for Cognizance – The Court reiterated that the sanctioning authority must apply its mind to the allegations before granting prosecution sanction – In this case, the Government of Maharashtra twice refused sanction, indicating no prima facie case against the applicant – Held: Without sanction, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to take cognizance, making the proceedings against the applicant legally unsustainable [Paras 17-21, 30-32].

Exoneration in Departmental Inquiry – Impact on Criminal Proceedings – The applicant was exonerated in the departmental inquiry conducted against him – The Supreme Court in Ashoo Surendranath Tewari v. DSP, CBI held that if an accused is exonerated on merits in departmental proceedings, a separate criminal trial may be unwarranted – Held: Since the departmental inquiry absolved the applicant of charges, continuing the criminal proceedings would be an abuse of process [Paras 25-27, 31].

Application for Discharge – Principles Governing Discharge Under Criminal Law – The Court applied the test for discharge under Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, which mandates that if the prosecution evidence does not disclose a prima facie case, the accused must be discharged – Held: The prosecution failed to establish a strong suspicion against the applicant, warranting his discharge from the case [Paras 13-14].

Decision: Criminal Revision Allowed – The High Court quashed and set aside the order dated 31.01.2022, which had rejected the discharge application – The applicant is discharged of all charges under Sections 7, 13(1)(d), and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Criminal proceedings against the applicant are terminated [Paras 33-36].
 

Land Acquisition – Delay and Laches – Writ Petition Dismissed – The petitioner challenged the acquisition of land in Village Akurdi, Pune, which was acquired under the MID Act in 1971, with possession taken in 1972 – Petition filed in 2010, nearly 38 years after the acquisition – Held: Delay of over three decades is unexplained and renders the petition non-maintainable – Principles of delay and laches bar the challenge, as acquisition proceedings had attained finality [Paras 1-4, 10-12].

Property Law – Land Acquisition and Possession – Once Vested, Cannot Be Reversed – The petitioner’s father had agreed to the acquisition in consent terms recorded before the High Court in 1968 – Held: Once land vests in the government upon acquisition, it cannot be challenged after decades on the ground that the petitioner was unaware of the process – Petitioner’s plea that possession was not taken is contradicted by official records – Land deemed lawfully acquired [Paras 8-10, 15-17].

Judicial Review – High Court Cannot Interfere After Conclusion of Acquisition Process – Petitioner argued that no compensation was paid, and therefore, the acquisition lapsed – Held: The remedy for non-payment of compensation lies in seeking proper legal recourse, not in challenging acquisition decades later – Supreme Court rulings reaffirm that land acquisition cannot be nullified solely on non-payment of compensation [Paras 20-25].

Final Decision – Writ Petition Dismissed – No Relief Granted – High Court dismissed the writ petition, upholding the validity of the acquisition – Held: No case for interference as the petitioner’s challenge was barred by delay, acquiescence, and past judicial orders – Costs imposed on the petitioner for abuse of legal process [Paras 30-32].
 

Service Law – Resignation Under Duress – No Break in Service – Writ Petition Allowed – The petitioner, an Assistant Engineer in the Howrah Municipal Corporation, was required to resign before being released for deputation as an Executive Engineer under the Ministry of Surface Transport – Upon termination of deputation, he was reappointed as an Assistant Engineer but was denied continuity of service due to an alleged break – Held: The resignation was not voluntary but imposed as a condition for deputation – Resignation letter was conditional and does not constitute a valid resignation – The break in service must be condoned [Paras 19-26].

Employment Law – Conditional Resignation – Not a Voluntary Relinquishment of Office – A valid resignation requires an unconditional intention to relinquish office – Held: Since the resignation was a forced precondition for deputation and not voluntary, it cannot be treated as a resignation in law – Relying on Dr. Prabha Atri v. State of U.P., (2003) 1 SCC 701 and Moti Ram v. Param Dev, (1993) 2 SCC 725, the court held that an employee cannot be deemed to have resigned if the act was compelled by the employer [Paras 20-22].

Continuity of Service – Break in Service Unjustified – Petitioner Entitled to Benefits – The Howrah Municipal Corporation imposed the resignation condition, which led to the break in service – Held: Since the break was due to the Corporation’s actions, the petitioner must be treated as being in continuous service from his original appointment date – Following Sushil Kumar Yadunath Jha v. Union of India, (1986) 3 SCC 325, the court directed reinstatement with full financial and retirement benefits [Paras 30-40].

Final Decision – Writ Petition Allowed – Break in Service Condoned – Financial Benefits Granted – High Court quashed the Corporation’s decision treating the period as a break in service – Directed the Corporation to restore continuity of service and pay arrears and retirement benefits within six weeks [Paras 41-42].

Landlord-Tenant Law – Eviction on Termination of Tenancy – Appeal Dismissed – Plaintiff, the owner of the suit premises, initiated eviction proceedings after serving a valid quit notice – Defendant claimed lower rent and denied arrears – Trial court decreed eviction, which was upheld by the first appellate court – Held: The tenancy was month-to-month and duly terminated under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act – The tenant failed to provide evidence of regular rent payments – Eviction order upheld [Paras 16-19].

Civil Procedure – Second Appeal – No Substantial Question of Law – Appeal Not Maintainable – Appellant sought to challenge concurrent findings of fact – Held: A second appeal under Section 100 CPC can only be admitted on substantial questions of law – No legal issues warranting interference were raised – High Court cannot reappreciate factual findings of lower courts unless there is a manifest error or violation of law – Appeal dismissed at admission stage [Paras 20-22].

Judicial Precedents – Scope of Second Appeal – Limited to Substantial Questions of Law – Following Boodireddy Chandraiah v. Arigela Laxmi, (2007) 8 SCC 155, and Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki, AIR 2006 SC 1975, the court held that factual determinations by lower courts are binding unless there is a legal infirmity – Mere dissatisfaction with concurrent judgments does not justify a second appeal [Paras 13-15, 22].

Final Decision – Second Appeal Dismissed – Three Months Time for Tenant to Vacate – High Court dismissed the second appeal, confirming the eviction order – Granted three months for the appellant/tenant to vacate the premises – No costs imposed [Para 23].

Service Law – Recruitment Criteria – CGLE Notice vs. Recruitment Rules – Tribunal’s Order Set Aside – Petitioners challenged CAT’s order granting relief to candidates who were rejected for failing to meet the CGLE 2019 eligibility criteria – Tribunal held that the Recruitment Rules (RRs) would override the CGLE Notice – Held: The CGLE Notice merely clarifies the RRs and does not contradict them – Requirement of studying Statistics for all three years of graduation is essential for SIG-II role, given its statistical analysis responsibilities – Tribunal’s order directing appointment of ineligible candidates set aside [Paras 10-18].

Administrative Law – Eligibility Conditions in Advertisement – Candidates Bound by Stipulated Criteria – Respondents participated in the recruitment process knowing the eligibility conditions but challenged them only after being declared ineligible – Held: A candidate who voluntarily takes part in a selection process cannot later dispute the prescribed qualifications upon failing – Doctrine of estoppel applies – Candidates cannot claim relaxation of criteria retrospectively [Paras 19-22].

Judicial Precedents – Recruitment Rules vs. Executive Instructions – Clarificatory Role of CGLE Notice Upheld – Tribunal erroneously held that the CGLE Notice imposed additional conditions beyond the RRs – Held: Where statutory rules are silent, executive instructions can supplement but not override them – CGLE Notice aligns with the job requirements of SIG-II and ensures competent selection – Precedents relied upon by respondents distinguishable [Paras 13-16].

Final Decision – Writ Petition Allowed – Tribunal’s Order Quashed – High Court allowed the petition, holding that CGLE 2019 eligibility conditions were valid and binding – Respondents not entitled to appointment – No costs imposed [Para 24].
 

Criminal Law - Murder Trial – Oral Dying Declaration – Acceptable and Corroborated – Conviction Upheld – Deceased Sanjay, before succumbing to gunshot wounds, made a statement to his father and uncle identifying Lachhman as the assailant – Court held that oral dying declarations, if reliable and supported by medical evidence, are admissible – Consistent medical and witness testimony validated prosecution's case [Paras 17–21].

Recovery of Weapon – Disclosure Statement and FSL Report – Strong Corroboration – Lachhman’s disclosure led to recovery of pistol and cartridges – FSL confirmed cartridge matched recovered weapon – Held: Recovery in pursuance of disclosure adds significant weight to the prosecution’s case [Para 22].

Extra-Judicial Confession – Use Against Co-Accused – Rejected – Lachhman’s alleged confession to deceased’s brother-in-law implicating co-accused Chand Singh held inadmissible against Chand – Court reiterated extra-judicial confessions are weak evidence, especially when made to interested witnesses, and cannot alone establish conspiracy [Paras 23–25].

Motive – Previous Murder Case – Not Sufficient for Co-Accused Conviction – Deceased was a witness in earlier case involving Chand Singh and Santro – Court held: While motive was strong, it cannot replace substantive evidence – No direct link established between Chand Singh and actual murder of Sanjay [Paras 26–28].

Acquittal of Co-Accused Santro – Conversation Insufficient to Prove Conspiracy – Witness claimed to overhear vague conversation between Santro and Lachhman – Court held it lacked specificity and credibility, and Santro’s acquittal was justified [Para 29].

Decision: Appeal of Lachhman dismissed – Conviction and life sentence for murder and Arms Act upheld – Appeal of Chand Singh allowed – Acquitted due to lack of independent and corroborated evidence – State’s appeal against Santro’s acquittal dismissed [Para 30].

Criminal Law – Attempt to Commit Rape – Prima Facie Case Not Made Out – Summoning Order Modified – The revisionists were summoned for attempt to commit rape (Section 376 read with Section 18 of POCSO Act) based on allegations that they grabbed the victim’s breasts, broke the string of her lower garment, and attempted to drag her beneath a culvert – The Court held that these acts did not establish a prima facie case of attempt to rape, as there was no evidence of an intent to commit penetrative sexual assault – Held: Summoning order modified; accused to be charged under Sections 354(b) IPC and Section 9/10 of the POCSO Act instead [Paras 26-29].

Standard for Attempt to Commit Rape – Distinction Between Preparation and Attempt – The Court applied the test for attempt in sexual offences, holding that an attempt requires an overt act beyond mere preparation – Citing Rex v. James Lloyd (1836) 7C & P 817 and Express v. Shankar (1881) ILR 5 Bom 403, the Court ruled that mere disrobing or touching without further decisive action does not constitute an attempt to rape – Held: The accused’s conduct did not indicate an unequivocal intent to commit rape, and therefore, the charge under Section 376 IPC was unsustainable [Paras 24-25].

POCSO Act – Aggravated Sexual Assault – Conviction Under Section 9/10 of POCSO Act Justified – The Court held that the allegations against Akash and Pawan constituted aggravated sexual assault under Section 9(m) of the POCSO Act, as the victim was below 12 years of age – The punishment for aggravated sexual assault under Section 10 of POCSO Act is imprisonment for not less than five years but up to seven years – Held: The accused shall face trial under Section 354(b) IPC and Section 9/10 of POCSO Act instead of Section 376 IPC [Paras 27-28].

Criminal Intimidation – Summoning Under Sections 504 and 506 IPC Upheld – The victim’s family was allegedly threatened with a country-made pistol, and the victim's mother was abused and intimidated when she complained – The Court held that these acts justified summoning the accused Ashok under Sections 504 and 506 IPC – Held: No modification required in summoning for criminal intimidation charges [Paras 22-23].

Decision: Revision Partly Allowed – The Court modified the summoning order, holding that the accused Akash and Pawan should be charged under Sections 354(b) IPC and Section 9/10 of the POCSO Act, instead of Section 376 IPC read with Section 18 of POCSO Act – The summoning of Ashok under Sections 504 and 506 IPC remains unaltered – Trial court directed to issue fresh summons accordingly [Paras 29-30].

Specific Performance – Readiness and Willingness – Appeal Dismissed – The appellant sought specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 29.11.1989 for 5 acres of land – The trial court rejected the relief on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove continuous readiness and willingness to perform his contractual obligations – Held: Readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act must be demonstrated throughout the proceedings – Mere assertion without evidence does not suffice – Appeal dismissed [Paras 22-25].

Contract Law – Breach of Agreement – No Proof of Compliance by Plaintiff – As per the agreement, the plaintiff had to pay the balance sale consideration by 01.08.1990 – The plaintiff neither paid the amount nor issued any legal notice expressing readiness and willingness – Held: Non-issuance of notice before filing suit weakens the plaintiff’s claim – Defendants had removed crops as per contract terms, but plaintiff failed to perform his part – Trial court rightly refused specific performance [Paras 15-19].

Judicial Precedents – Time and Essence of Contract – No Automatic Right to Specific Performance – Plaintiff contended that time was not of the essence – Relying on K.S. Vidyanadam v. Vairavan, (1997) 3 SCC 1, and Chand Rani v. Kamal Rani, (1993) 1 SCC 519, the court held that even where time is not expressly stated as essential, performance must be within a reasonable period – Plaintiff’s inaction for a long period negates the claim for specific performance [Paras 21-22].

Final Decision – Appeal Dismissed – Refund of Advance Upheld – High Court upheld the trial court’s decree, confirming the refund of ₹2,50,000/- advance amount with interest – Appeal dismissed with no order as to costs [Para 26].
 

Waqf Law – Jurisdiction Over Waqf Property – Commission of Inquiry Lacks Authority – Writ Petitions Allowed – Petitioners challenged the Kerala Government’s order appointing a Commission of Inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, to investigate ownership claims over a property declared as waqf – Held: Waqf Board has exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a property is waqf – Section 40(2) of the Waqf Act makes the Waqf Board’s decision final, subject only to Tribunal review – Government’s appointment of the Commission contravenes Section 85 of the Waqf Act, which bars jurisdiction of any other authority over waqf matters – Commission’s appointment quashed [Paras 30-35].

Administrative Law – Competence of State Government – Commission of Inquiry Not Justified – The Kerala Government claimed authority under the Commissions of Inquiry Act to resolve a matter of “public importance” – Held: The dispute relates to property rights, which fall under the exclusive purview of the Waqf Tribunal – The Government failed to consider relevant legal provisions and the ongoing appeal before the Tribunal – Mere public protests or agitations cannot justify the appointment of an inquiry commission – Government’s action held arbitrary and legally unsustainable [Paras 24-26, 39-42].

Judicial Review – Government’s Decision to Appoint Inquiry Commission Lacks Legal Basis – Petitioners argued that the Government acted without jurisdiction and in violation of existing legal orders – Held: Government ignored previous High Court orders and the statutory framework of the Waqf Act – Section 85 of the Act prohibits interference in waqf matters by civil or revenue courts, reinforcing the exclusive jurisdiction of the Waqf Board and Tribunal – The decision to appoint the Commission was made without application of mind and is liable to be struck down [Paras 40-43].

Final Decision – Writ Petitions Allowed – Government Order Quashed – Kerala High Court quashed the Government’s order appointing the Commission of Inquiry – Held: The Waqf Board’s authority stands, and any challenge to its decision must be adjudicated before the Waqf Tribunal – Government directed not to interfere in waqf-related disputes contrary to the Waqf Act [Paras 43-44].