Service Law – Pension Entitlement – Deemed Opt-in Under Office Order – Pension Benefits Granted – The respondent, a retired Deputy Manager (Personnel) in Delhi Transport Corporation (DTC), did not explicitly opt for either the CPF Scheme or the GPF-cum-Pension Scheme within the prescribed period under the 1992 Office Order – As per para 9 of the 1992 Order, an employee who failed to exercise an option within 30 days was deemed to have opted for the Pension Scheme – The High Court, following the Supreme Court’s ruling in University of Delhi v. Shashi Kiran (2022) 15 SCC 325, held that the deeming clause in the 1992 Office Order automatically shifted the respondent to the Pension Scheme, irrespective of the fact that he continued contributing to CPF – Held: The respondent is entitled to pension benefits under the Pension Scheme [Paras 6-10, 28].

Retirement Benefits – Effect of Receiving CPF Benefits – No Estoppel Against Pension Claim – The DTC argued that the respondent continued contributing to CPF throughout his service and accepted CPF benefits on retirement, which should preclude him from switching to the Pension Scheme – The Court rejected this argument, holding that mere receipt of CPF benefits does not override the deemed pension opt-in provision in para 9 of the 1992 Order – Held: The respondent’s claim to pension remains valid, but he must return the CPF amount received upon retirement before receiving pension benefits [Paras 11-14, 29-31].

Applicability of Supreme Court Rulings – Deemed Pension Enrollment Irrevocable – S.L. Verma and Shashi Kiran Followed – The High Court relied on the Supreme Court’s ruling in S.L. Verma v. Union of India (2006) 12 SCC 53, which held that where a government notification or office order automatically transfers employees to a pension scheme unless they explicitly opt out, such transfer is irrevocable – The Court reiterated the principle from Shashi Kiran that any employee who did not exercise an option to remain in CPF by the cut-off date automatically shifted to the Pension Scheme, irrespective of subsequent contributions to CPF – Held: The DTC’s challenge is without merit as the legal fiction created by para 9 of the 1992 Order is binding [Paras 27-33].

Doctrine of Acquiescence and Estoppel – Not Applicable to Mandatory Legal Fiction – DTC contended that the respondent’s failure to claim pension earlier, coupled with acceptance of CPF funds, amounted to acquiescence and estoppel – The Court rejected this argument, holding that estoppel does not apply against statutory entitlements and legal fictions – Held: Pension entitlement arises from statutory rules and employer-issued office orders, and cannot be waived merely by conduct [Paras 34-35].

Reimbursement of CPF Amount – Condition for Pension Entitlement – While granting relief to the respondent, the Court directed that before receiving pension benefits, the respondent must refund the CPF amount received upon retirement, along with applicable interest – Held: Pension payments shall commence only upon reimbursement of CPF dues as per the conditions stipulated in the 1992 Office Order [Paras 36-37].

Decision: Writ Petition Dismissed – The High Court affirmed the CAT's orders dated 23 December 2015 and 8 February 2016 – DTC directed to extend pension benefits to the respondent in accordance with the GPF-cum-Pension Scheme – The respondent must return the employer's CPF contribution before receiving pension benefits – No order as to costs [Paras 38-40].
 

Tenancy Law - Eviction on Grounds of Bona Fide Requirement – Death of Landlord – Continuation of Need – The tenant contended that the eviction petition was not maintainable after the original landlord’s death – The Court held that the bona fide need of the landlord’s dependents, as pleaded in the eviction petition, survives even after the landlord’s demise – Held: The eviction petition remained valid, and the successor landlords could continue the proceedings [Paras 5, 13].

Landlord’s Bona Fide Need – Bequest of Property Irrelevant – The tenant argued that the property was bequeathed to one of the respondents, not the intended business beneficiaries (the landlord’s son and grandson), which indicated a lack of bona fide need – The Court rejected this argument, holding that a landlord's decision on ownership and business use are separate matters – Held: A bequest to one family member does not negate the bona fide requirement for another family member’s business [Paras 7-8].

Non-Production of Will – No Adverse Inference – The tenant sought to draw an adverse inference from the landlord’s failure to produce the Will in court – The Court held that an adverse inference can only be drawn if a party refuses to comply with a direct court order to produce evidence, which was not the case here – Held: The non-production of the Will did not affect the validity of the eviction order [Paras 11-12].

Tenant’s Failure to Prove Alternative Accommodation Unavailable – Under the first proviso to Section 11(3), a tenant can resist eviction by proving that no suitable alternative premises are available – The Court found that the tenant failed to provide such proof – Held: The tenant did not meet the burden of proof to invoke the protection under Section 11(3) [Paras 10-11].

Tenant’s Conditional Stay – Undertaking to Vacate Within Six Months – The Court granted the tenant six months to vacate the premises, subject to conditions – The tenant was required to file an undertaking before the Rent Control Court within two weeks and deposit any rent arrears within one month – Held: Non-compliance with these conditions would automatically cancel the extension and allow the landlord to execute the eviction order immediately [Paras 14-16].

Decision: Revision petition dismissed. Tenant permitted to remain in possession for six months under specified conditions.
 

Civil Law - Lease Renewal – Enforcement of Renewal Clause – Specific Performance Denied – The appellant sought specific performance of a lease renewal clause under a registered lease deed dated 01.04.1964, claiming entitlement to renewal for another 30 years commencing from 01.04.1994 – The appellant failed to issue legal notice to all defendants before instituting the suit and remained silent for four years before filing the claim – Held: Mere expression of desire for renewal without bona fide steps does not confer an automatic right to renewal – The appellant, having defaulted in rent payments for 20 years, acted in bad faith, and specific performance was rightly denied [Paras 16-24].

Burmah Shell Act – Automatic Lease Renewal – Not Absolute – The appellant argued that the lease renewal was statutorily protected under Section 5(2) and Section 7(3) of the Burmah Shell Act, 1976 – The Court held that statutory renewal under the Act does not confer an unfettered right and must be exercised in good faith – Since the appellant neither expressed a bona fide need for renewal nor complied with lease terms, the claim for automatic renewal was unsustainable [Paras 20-22].

Tenant’s Conduct – Failure to Pay Rent – Discretionary Relief under Specific Relief Act – The appellant defaulted on rent payments from 01.04.1994, and only after two decades began depositing rent in court – Under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, specific performance is a discretionary relief, and the appellant’s failure to fulfill contractual obligations disentitled it from such relief – Held: The appellant’s conduct in squatting on the property without payment demonstrated a lack of bona fide intention, justifying the refusal of specific performance [Paras 22-24].

Concurrent Findings of Lower Courts – Limited Scope of Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC – The High Court reiterated that under Section 100 CPC, it cannot interfere with concurrent factual findings unless they are perverse or based on an erroneous interpretation of law – Held: Both the trial and first appellate courts correctly assessed the factual matrix, and no substantial question of law warranted interference – Second appeal dismissed [Paras 14-25].

Decision: Second appeal dismissed. The judgments of the trial court and first appellate court were upheld. No costs imposed.
 

Civil Writ - Auction of Property – Challenge under Revenue Code – Sale Already Finalized – Writ Dismissed – Petitioners defaulted on loans taken in 1998 – Ancestral house auctioned in 2010 – Despite liberty granted by earlier High Court order (in 2010) to challenge the sale, petitioners failed to pursue timely remedies under Rules 40–41 – Sale deed and certificate already executed – Petition filed under Section 50 of MPLRC held not maintainable [Paras 3–5, 13–15].

Jurisdiction – Additional Collector’s Power – No Review Over Order by Counterpart – Proper Finding – Additional Collector rightly refused to entertain objection against auction citing lack of jurisdiction to review predecessor’s order – Held: Once sale confirmed and title passed, remedy lay only in civil suit under Rule 45(2), not revision under Section 50 [Paras 4, 15–17].

Interim Order Not Complied – Conditional Stay Ignored – Petitioners Failed to Deposit Amount – Court noted petitioners were required to deposit ₹10 lakhs as per interim relief in earlier writ petition but failed – Sale certificate and deed issued lawfully – No scope for interference [Paras 9–10].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed – Court held that once statutory limitation for challenging auction expired and title transferred via registered sale deed, remedy lies only through civil suit – No merit found in petition under writ or revisional jurisdiction [Para 18].
 

Waqf Law – Jurisdiction Over Waqf Property – Commission of Inquiry Lacks Authority – Writ Petitions Allowed – Petitioners challenged the Kerala Government’s order appointing a Commission of Inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, to investigate ownership claims over a property declared as waqf – Held: Waqf Board has exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a property is waqf – Section 40(2) of the Waqf Act makes the Waqf Board’s decision final, subject only to Tribunal review – Government’s appointment of the Commission contravenes Section 85 of the Waqf Act, which bars jurisdiction of any other authority over waqf matters – Commission’s appointment quashed [Paras 30-35].

Administrative Law – Competence of State Government – Commission of Inquiry Not Justified – The Kerala Government claimed authority under the Commissions of Inquiry Act to resolve a matter of “public importance” – Held: The dispute relates to property rights, which fall under the exclusive purview of the Waqf Tribunal – The Government failed to consider relevant legal provisions and the ongoing appeal before the Tribunal – Mere public protests or agitations cannot justify the appointment of an inquiry commission – Government’s action held arbitrary and legally unsustainable [Paras 24-26, 39-42].

Judicial Review – Government’s Decision to Appoint Inquiry Commission Lacks Legal Basis – Petitioners argued that the Government acted without jurisdiction and in violation of existing legal orders – Held: Government ignored previous High Court orders and the statutory framework of the Waqf Act – Section 85 of the Act prohibits interference in waqf matters by civil or revenue courts, reinforcing the exclusive jurisdiction of the Waqf Board and Tribunal – The decision to appoint the Commission was made without application of mind and is liable to be struck down [Paras 40-43].

Final Decision – Writ Petitions Allowed – Government Order Quashed – Kerala High Court quashed the Government’s order appointing the Commission of Inquiry – Held: The Waqf Board’s authority stands, and any challenge to its decision must be adjudicated before the Waqf Tribunal – Government directed not to interfere in waqf-related disputes contrary to the Waqf Act [Paras 43-44].
 

Negotiable Instruments Act – Deposit of 20% Compensation – Judicial Discretion – Orders Set Aside – The petitioner, convicted under Section 138 of the NI Act, challenged the ASJ’s order requiring him to deposit 20% of the compensation amount for suspension of sentence – Petitioner contended that the ASJ erroneously treated the deposit as mandatory and failed to exercise discretion – Held: The phrase “may order” in Section 148 of the NI Act grants discretion to the appellate court – Imposition of deposit must be reasoned and not automatic – ASJ failed to consider the petitioner’s financial capacity and wrongly assumed ownership of a business in its reasoning – Orders directing deposit quashed, and matter remanded for fresh consideration [Paras 15-20].

Criminal Procedure – Right to Appeal – Unjustified Financial Burden Not Permitted – Appellate courts must ensure that financial conditions do not unjustly deprive the convicted person of their right to appeal – Held: Courts must assess financial capacity before directing deposit – Blanket imposition of deposit without application of mind is not permissible – ASJ’s order lacked proper assessment, warranting remand for reconsideration [Paras 22-24].

Judicial Precedents – Applicability of Supreme Court Rulings – Failure to Follow Established Law – Petitioner relied on Jamboo Bhandari v. MP State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., (2023) 10 SCC 446, and Surinder Singh Deswal v. Virender Gandhi, (2019) 11 SCC 341 – Held: Supreme Court has clarified that while deposit under Section 148 is generally required, exceptions can be made where the deposit would be unjust or deprive the appellant of their right to appeal – ASJ failed to apply these principles, necessitating fresh consideration [Paras 21-22].

Final Decision – Orders Quashed – Case Remanded for Fresh Consideration – High Court set aside the ASJ’s orders dated 27.01.2025 and remanded the matter for reconsideration of the deposit requirement in light of the petitioner’s financial condition and Supreme Court precedents – ASJ directed to pass fresh orders after proper evaluation [Paras 30-35].

Land Acquisition – Delay and Laches – Writ Petition Dismissed – The petitioner challenged the acquisition of land in Village Akurdi, Pune, which was acquired under the MID Act in 1971, with possession taken in 1972 – Petition filed in 2010, nearly 38 years after the acquisition – Held: Delay of over three decades is unexplained and renders the petition non-maintainable – Principles of delay and laches bar the challenge, as acquisition proceedings had attained finality [Paras 1-4, 10-12].

Property Law – Land Acquisition and Possession – Once Vested, Cannot Be Reversed – The petitioner’s father had agreed to the acquisition in consent terms recorded before the High Court in 1968 – Held: Once land vests in the government upon acquisition, it cannot be challenged after decades on the ground that the petitioner was unaware of the process – Petitioner’s plea that possession was not taken is contradicted by official records – Land deemed lawfully acquired [Paras 8-10, 15-17].

Judicial Review – High Court Cannot Interfere After Conclusion of Acquisition Process – Petitioner argued that no compensation was paid, and therefore, the acquisition lapsed – Held: The remedy for non-payment of compensation lies in seeking proper legal recourse, not in challenging acquisition decades later – Supreme Court rulings reaffirm that land acquisition cannot be nullified solely on non-payment of compensation [Paras 20-25].

Final Decision – Writ Petition Dismissed – No Relief Granted – High Court dismissed the writ petition, upholding the validity of the acquisition – Held: No case for interference as the petitioner’s challenge was barred by delay, acquiescence, and past judicial orders – Costs imposed on the petitioner for abuse of legal process [Paras 30-32].
 

Landlord-Tenant Law – Eviction on Termination of Tenancy – Appeal Dismissed – Plaintiff, the owner of the suit premises, initiated eviction proceedings after serving a valid quit notice – Defendant claimed lower rent and denied arrears – Trial court decreed eviction, which was upheld by the first appellate court – Held: The tenancy was month-to-month and duly terminated under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act – The tenant failed to provide evidence of regular rent payments – Eviction order upheld [Paras 16-19].

Civil Procedure – Second Appeal – No Substantial Question of Law – Appeal Not Maintainable – Appellant sought to challenge concurrent findings of fact – Held: A second appeal under Section 100 CPC can only be admitted on substantial questions of law – No legal issues warranting interference were raised – High Court cannot reappreciate factual findings of lower courts unless there is a manifest error or violation of law – Appeal dismissed at admission stage [Paras 20-22].

Judicial Precedents – Scope of Second Appeal – Limited to Substantial Questions of Law – Following Boodireddy Chandraiah v. Arigela Laxmi, (2007) 8 SCC 155, and Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki, AIR 2006 SC 1975, the court held that factual determinations by lower courts are binding unless there is a legal infirmity – Mere dissatisfaction with concurrent judgments does not justify a second appeal [Paras 13-15, 22].

Final Decision – Second Appeal Dismissed – Three Months Time for Tenant to Vacate – High Court dismissed the second appeal, confirming the eviction order – Granted three months for the appellant/tenant to vacate the premises – No costs imposed [Para 23].

Criminal Law – Attempt to Commit Rape – Prima Facie Case Not Made Out – Summoning Order Modified – The revisionists were summoned for attempt to commit rape (Section 376 read with Section 18 of POCSO Act) based on allegations that they grabbed the victim’s breasts, broke the string of her lower garment, and attempted to drag her beneath a culvert – The Court held that these acts did not establish a prima facie case of attempt to rape, as there was no evidence of an intent to commit penetrative sexual assault – Held: Summoning order modified; accused to be charged under Sections 354(b) IPC and Section 9/10 of the POCSO Act instead [Paras 26-29].

Standard for Attempt to Commit Rape – Distinction Between Preparation and Attempt – The Court applied the test for attempt in sexual offences, holding that an attempt requires an overt act beyond mere preparation – Citing Rex v. James Lloyd (1836) 7C & P 817 and Express v. Shankar (1881) ILR 5 Bom 403, the Court ruled that mere disrobing or touching without further decisive action does not constitute an attempt to rape – Held: The accused’s conduct did not indicate an unequivocal intent to commit rape, and therefore, the charge under Section 376 IPC was unsustainable [Paras 24-25].

POCSO Act – Aggravated Sexual Assault – Conviction Under Section 9/10 of POCSO Act Justified – The Court held that the allegations against Akash and Pawan constituted aggravated sexual assault under Section 9(m) of the POCSO Act, as the victim was below 12 years of age – The punishment for aggravated sexual assault under Section 10 of POCSO Act is imprisonment for not less than five years but up to seven years – Held: The accused shall face trial under Section 354(b) IPC and Section 9/10 of POCSO Act instead of Section 376 IPC [Paras 27-28].

Criminal Intimidation – Summoning Under Sections 504 and 506 IPC Upheld – The victim’s family was allegedly threatened with a country-made pistol, and the victim's mother was abused and intimidated when she complained – The Court held that these acts justified summoning the accused Ashok under Sections 504 and 506 IPC – Held: No modification required in summoning for criminal intimidation charges [Paras 22-23].

Decision: Revision Partly Allowed – The Court modified the summoning order, holding that the accused Akash and Pawan should be charged under Sections 354(b) IPC and Section 9/10 of the POCSO Act, instead of Section 376 IPC read with Section 18 of POCSO Act – The summoning of Ashok under Sections 504 and 506 IPC remains unaltered – Trial court directed to issue fresh summons accordingly [Paras 29-30].