Facts:

The appellant, S. Satyanarayana, filed a private complaint as a Promoter Director of a company against several individuals and companies for various offenses under the Companies Act and IPC. The complaint alleged conspiracy, cheating, and false statements by the accused parties in inducing investment in a biomass-based power project.

Issues:

Whether the Special Court has jurisdiction to try offenses under both the Companies Act and IPC for the same transaction.

Whether the trial could continue against accused parties for offenses under IPC, even if they were not subject to prosecution under specific sections of the Companies Act.

Held:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the ruling of the High Court. The Court held that if the Special Court had jurisdiction to try offenses under both the Companies Act and IPC, the trial could continue for offenses not requiring the complainant to belong to specified categories under Section 621 of the Companies Act.

The Court observed that the complainant had made allegations against certain accused parties only under IPC, and there was no legal basis to quash the complaint against them on the grounds of immunity from prosecution under Section 621 of the Companies Act.

The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the Special Court had jurisdiction to try all offenses based on the same transaction, whether under the Companies Act or IPC, to avoid multiplicity of proceedings.

Facts:

The respondent sought to import a trophy of a stuffed leopard, a protected species, into India, having hunted it in Zambia.

The leopard falls under Schedule I of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, and is also listed as an endangered species under CITES.

The respondent applied for permissions from various authorities, including the Regional Deputy Director and the DGFT, which were granted conditionally. However, CITES refused permission.

The High Court ruled in favor of the respondent, stating that permissions from the DGFT and the Chief Wildlife Warden were sufficient.

The Supreme Court disagreed, emphasizing the importance of CITES in regulating international trade to protect endangered species.

Issues:

Whether the permissions granted by the DGFT and Chief Wildlife Warden were sufficient for the importation of the leopard trophy.

The role and jurisdiction of CITES in regulating the importation of endangered species.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the permissions granted were conditional and subject to approval from CITES, which had been refused. Thus, the conditions for importation were not met.

The Court emphasized the significance of CITES in regulating international trade to prevent over-exploitation and ensure the survival of endangered species.

The judgment set aside the orders of both the High Court and CITES, directing the respondent to apply to the Scientific Authority for necessary permission within four weeks.

The Scientific Authority would then have three months to consider the application and pass an order. Depending on the outcome, the respondent would either be allowed to keep the trophy or surrender it to Customs authorities.

Facts:

The case revolves around the dismissal of Ved Mitier Gill (VMG) and other jail staff after a jailbreak incident where four under-trial prisoners, including those facing trial for serious charges like the assassination of a former Punjab Chief Minister, escaped through a 94 feet long underground tunnel. The dismissal was carried out by the Advisor to the Administrator of the Union Territory under Article 311(2) clause (b), which allows for dismissal from service without holding a departmental inquiry if it is not reasonably practicable to do so.

Issues:

Whether the dismissal of VMG and the other jail staff was justified under the circumstances of the jailbreak incident and whether all the necessary conditions for invoking Article 311(2) clause (b) were met.

Held:

The punishment of dismissal from service was justified based on the lapses committed by VMG and the other jail staff, which directly contributed to the escape of the prisoners (Para 20, 21).

The competent authority was satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable to hold a regular departmental inquiry against the employees due to various reasons, including fear of retaliation from VMG and the potential influence of the escaped prisoners' connections with a terrorist organization on witnesses (Para 22, 23).

All the parameters laid down for a valid application of Article 311(2) clause (b) were duly complied with (Para 24).

VMG's senior position distinguished him from the other staff, and the argument that witnesses appearing in open court proceedings should also appear in a departmental inquiry was rejected (Para 26, 27).

Decision: The court upheld the dismissal of VMG and the other jail staff, finding it justified under the circumstances of the jailbreak incident.

Facts:

The case involves the interpretation of interim and final orders passed in previous cases, particularly Buxa Dooars Tea Company Ltd. and Goodricke Group Ltd.

Issues:

The validity and effect of the 1989 Amendment Act on previous judgments, the interpretation of interim orders, and the calculation of interest on the refunded amount.

Held:

The court held that the 1989 Amendment Act retrospectively changed the basis of levying rural employment cess and education cess, thereby invalidating the previous judgment in Buxa Dooars Tea Company Ltd.'s case (Para 14).

Interest payment is to be calculated from the dates of assessment, as per the final judgment in Goodricke Group Ltd.'s case (Para 19).

The appeal is disposed of, affirming the refund of cess with interest but recalculating the interest payment based on assessment dates (Para 21).

Facts:

The government issued two notifications for the acquisition of land. The first notification was for the development of Missing Link-II road, while the second was for a residential urban estate. The appellants challenged the notifications, alleging that the acquired land was also intended for commercial purposes, which was not disclosed.

Issues:

Whether the notifications for land acquisition were valid.

Whether the realignment of the road was done lawfully.

Whether the acquisition of surplus land for commercial purposes was justified.

Held:

The court found that the purpose stated in the notification was for the development of Missing Link-II road. However, the lack of specific mention of commercial use deprived landowners of the opportunity to file objections, violating procedural rights.

The realignment of the road was deemed lawful, as due deliberations were undertaken, and the realignment was necessary to avoid heavily constructed areas.

The acquisition of surplus land beyond what was required for Missing Link-II for commercial development was not in the public interest and violated principles of natural justice.

The court encouraged the appellants to make representations to the government regarding suitable alternatives for land acquisition.

Decision: The court partly allowed the appeals, setting aside the notifications that acquired surplus land beyond what was needed for Missing Link-II. The appellants were granted liberty to engage with the government regarding alternative land acquisition.

Facts:

The plaintiff, a promoter of a limited company engaged in manufacturing, entered into a "Buy Back Agreement" with the defendant, Haryana Financial Corporation, for financial assistance.

The defendant invested a sum of Rs. 30 Lacs in the plaintiff's company but later issued a notice for recovery of Rs. 18.03 Lacs as arrears of land revenue due to the plaintiff's alleged failure to comply with the terms of the agreement.

The plaintiff filed a suit challenging the validity of the agreement and the recovery notice.

The trial court, the Additional District Judge, and the High Court dismissed the suit on the grounds that it was barred by Section 3(4) of the Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979.

Issues:

Whether the suit challenging the recovery notice and agreement is maintainable in the Civil Court despite being barred by the provisions of the Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979.

Held:

The court held that the suit was barred by law under Section 3(4) of the Act. The plaintiff's appeal based on a precedent (Unique Butyle case) was deemed inapplicable as the provisions of the Haryana Act were different from those in the cited case. The court upheld the decisions of the lower courts to dismiss the plaintiff's suit, clarifying that since it was held that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, it did not examine the legality and correctness of the demand on its merits.

Facts:

Punra Devi, an Anganwari Helper (AWH) at Anganwari Centre, Chori, sought promotion to the position of Anganwari Worker (AWW) at Anganwari Centre, Hardeeppur. The High Court of Himachal Pradesh allowed her petition for this promotion, which was appealed by the State of Himachal Pradesh and others.

Issues:

Whether an AWH from one Anganwari Centre can seek promotion or appointment to the position of AWW in another Anganwari Centre.

Held:

The High Court erred in unnecessarily interpreting the guidelines to make them applicable for the promotion or appointment of an AWH from one Anganwari Centre to another. The communication dated 10.5.2012 does not reflect that honorarium is required to be added in the income of AWH of that centre for her appointment as AWW in the same centre.

The High Court erred in directing the Appellants to consider Punra Devi's case for promotion from one Anganwari Centre to another. The area of one Anganwari Centre is not the feeder area of another, rendering Punra Devi's promotion request impermissible.

The appeals are allowed, and the orders of the High Court are set aside.

Facts:

The property in question, Plot No. N-73, Panchsheel Cooperative House Building Society Ltd., New Delhi, was initially a leasehold property under the Delhi Development Authority (DDA).

Jan Talwar, the owner, failed to execute a sale deed despite receiving the full sale consideration, leading to a suit for specific performance filed by Gaurav Kukreja and his father against Jan Talwar and Raymen Kukreja.

Issues:

Whether the decree for specific performance conferred the right upon Gaurav Kukreja to claim conversion of the property from leasehold to freehold.

Whether Gaurav Kukreja satisfied the requirements of the conversion scheme under Clause 13.

Held:

The suit for specific performance filed by Gaurav Kukreja and his father was deemed collusive, as they used it to avoid stamp duty and registration charges, and thus, did not confer any right upon Gaurav Kukreja to claim conversion.

Under Clause 13 of the Conversion Scheme, conversion could only be sought by a person holding power of attorney from the lessee/sub-lessee/allottee, which Gaurav Kukreja did not meet.

The High Court's order was set aside, and the appeal was allowed. Gaurav Kukreja was directed to pursue the matter with DDA in accordance with the law, and DDA was directed to return the deposited money with 10% interest.

Facts:

The case involved an appeal regarding the constitutional validity and interpretation of Section 143(1A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Issues:

The constitutionality of the retrospective amendment to Section 143(1A) and the interpretation of the provision regarding the levy of additional tax.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the retrospective clarificatory amendment to Section 143(1A) and affirmed its constitutional validity. The court emphasized that the objective of Section 143(1A) is to prevent tax evasion and deter those who attempt to evade tax properly payable by them. The provision allows for the imposition of a 20% additional tax on the difference between the declared income and the assessed income. However, Section 143(1A) can only be invoked when it is found, based on facts, that the lesser amount stated in the return filed by the assessee is a result of an attempt to evade tax lawfully payable. The burden of proof lies with the revenue authorities to establish through facts and circumstances that such an attempt has been made by the assessee. The term "income" in Section 143(1A) is interpreted broadly to include losses as well.

Decision: The court allowed the appeals and affirmed the constitutional validity of Section 143(1A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, as amended in 1993.