Facts:

The case involved the importation of alcohol where allegations of under-invoicing were made against the respondents.

The Department issued a show cause notice proposing duty demand, confiscation of goods, and penalties.

The Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) partially allowed the appeals filed by the respondents, setting aside some penalties but upholding unauthorized import and confiscation.

The appellant, not the importer but a purchaser of the goods, deposited a substantial amount as per a court order for the release of seized goods.

The appellant sought a refund of the deposited amount after the Tribunal's decision favored the respondents, which was rejected based on the doctrine of unjust enrichment.

Issues:

Whether the doctrine of unjust enrichment applied to the refund of the deposited amount.

Whether the deposited amount was considered duty payment.

Held:

The court allowed the appeal, ruling that the deposited amount was not towards duty and therefore unjust enrichment did not apply.

The court ordered a refund of the entire amount deposited by the appellant, along with interest as directed by the High Court.

The court referred to circulars issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs, stating that refunds of pre-deposits should be made promptly, as these deposits are not considered duty payments.

Facts:

The plaintiff, Ganeshram, contested the validity of a will and a sale deed executed by Phoolbasa Bai, claiming ownership of the property.

The trial court dismissed the suit, finding the will and sale deed legal and valid.

The High Court partially upheld the trial court's decision, affirming the validity of the sale deed but questioning the validity of the will.

The High Court found suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will, including inconsistencies in the document and lack of mention of the will in Phoolbasa Bai's written statement before her death.

Issues:

Validity of the will executed by Phoolbasa Bai.

Ownership rights over the property in question.

Held:

The court held that the will executed by Phoolbasa Bai was not proved to be valid due to several suspicious circumstances surrounding its execution. The court emphasized that the execution of a will requires more than just a mechanical act of signing; it requires an intelligent understanding of its contents and acceptance thereof. The burden of proof for establishing the validity of a will is high, requiring clear evidence from witnesses. In this case, the suspicious circumstances surrounding the will were not adequately addressed by the defendants. Therefore, the will was held to be invalid.

The court also addressed the issue of the marital relationship between Phoolbasa Bai and Chhatrapati. Despite the absence of direct evidence of marriage, the court found strong evidence supporting their relationship as husband and wife, including their long cohabitation and recognition as a married couple by their community. The court upheld the presumption of marriage based on these factors.

In conclusion, the court dismissed the appeals, affirming the High Court's decision to invalidate the will and confirming the ownership rights based on the legal heirs of Phoolbasa Bai's husband.

Facts:

Ambica Prasad claimed ownership of a property through exchange deeds executed with his brother in 1975. Despite this exchange, the brother continued to collect rent from tenants, including the father of the respondents, Abdul Karim.

Ambica Prasad filed an eviction suit against Abdul Karim, citing non-payment of rent and a genuine need for the property to open a medical clinic. Abdul Karim denied Ambica Prasad's ownership and contested the suit.

Issues:

Whether Ambica Prasad can establish himself as the landlord under the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972, and thereby seek eviction of Abdul Karim.

Whether the ownership transfer through exchange deeds is valid and entitles Ambica Prasad to seek eviction.

Held:

The Supreme Court clarified that for the purpose of eviction based on personal need or reasonable requirement, Ambica Prasad must establish himself as the owner of the building. This is in accordance with the provisions of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972.

The Court emphasized that despite Ambica Prasad's brother acting as a landlord by receiving rent, it did not negate Ambica Prasad's right to file for eviction as the original owner. The Court referred to a previous case, Sirajuddin alias Siraj Vs. State of Karnataka, to support this interpretation.

The Court invoked Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act, clarifying that after the transfer of landlord's rights, the transferee (Ambica Prasad) inherits all rights and liabilities of the landlord. The tenant's attornment is not necessary for the validity of the transfer.

Considering these points, the Supreme Court allowed Ambica Prasad's appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment and ordering the eviction of Abdul Karim from the property.

Facts:

The prosecution alleged that the accused, forming an unlawful assembly, attacked the deceased and the complainant party with weapons including lathis, farsa, and bombs. The trial court initially acquitted the accused, but the High Court convicted them based on the evidence presented.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution's evidence was sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

Held:

The prosecution convincingly established the appellant's presence and active participation in the unlawful assembly. The witnesses, including those who were injured in the incident, provided consistent and reliable testimony supporting the prosecution's version (Para 15, 17, 20, 21).

The witnesses' testimonies were closely scrutinized due to their relation to the deceased and their status as interested parties. However, minor discrepancies and omissions did not undermine their credibility, as their presence at the scene of occurrence and their injuries lent credence to their accounts (Para 15, 17, 20, 21).

The trial court's emphasis on minor discrepancies and omissions to record an acquittal was deemed erroneous by the High Court. The High Court rightly reversed the judgment of acquittal, considering the substantial evidence presented by the prosecution (Para 26, 27, 29, 30).

Facts:

Defendant Nos. 1 to 11 entered into an agreement to sell a property to the Plaintiff, agreeing to sell 2.08 acres of land for Rs. 65,000. The Plaintiff paid an advance but failed to pay the remaining balance within the specified time. Subsequently, Defendant Nos. 12 to 15 entered into an agreement with Defendant Nos. 1 to 11 to purchase a part of the property for Rs. 80,000.

Issues:

The Plaintiff sought specific performance of the contract, while Defendant Nos. 12 to 15 argued against it, claiming they were bona fide purchasers.

Held:

Time as Essence of Contract: The Plaintiff failed to pay the balance consideration within the agreed timeframe, which was a crucial aspect of the contract. Therefore, the Plaintiff's failure to adhere to the stipulated time rendered the contract repudiated.

Compliance with Legal Requirements: The Plaintiff's pleadings did not strictly conform to legal requirements under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, which was necessary for specific performance.

Bona Fide Purchasers: Defendant Nos. 12 to 15 were deemed bona fide purchasers as they had properly verified the property's status and paid the sale consideration in good faith.

Facts:

Narendra Kumar Tripathi was initially appointed on a temporary ad hoc basis in 1985 by the Department of Minor Irrigation, Rural Engineering in the State of Uttar Pradesh.

His appointment was regularized by the government in 1989.

The question at hand was whether Tripathi's service should be counted from the date of his initial ad hoc appointment in 1985 or from the date when his appointment was regularized in 1989.

Issues:

Whether Tripathi's service should be counted from the date of his initial ad hoc appointment or from the date when his appointment was regularized.

Interpretation of the Uttar Pradesh Regularisation of Ad hoc Appointments Rules, particularly Rule 4 and Rule 7.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that Tripathi was entitled to count his service from the date of his initial ad hoc appointment in 1985. The Court reasoned that his appointment was not made against the rules or as a stopgap arrangement. Instead, it was a regular appointment made after due selection, and the terms of his appointment did not indicate a temporary or stopgap nature.

Therefore, his service from the initial appointment date should be counted for the purpose of seniority. The appeal of the writ Petitioner is accordingly allowed to the above extent and appeal of the State is accordingly dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant, Shanti Lal Meena, a Sub-Inspector of Police, was convicted for offenses under Section 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The conviction stemmed from an incident where Meena allegedly demanded a bribe of Rs. 25,000 for releasing the nephew of a complainant. Following a successful trap set by the Anti-Corruption Branch of the CBI, Meena was convicted and sentenced to two years rigorous imprisonment for each offense, along with fines.

Issues:

The appeal was the determination of the quantum of sentence for the offenses under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Held:

The court upheld the punishment awarded by the trial court and confirmed in appeal. It emphasized the severity of corruption offenses and the legislative intent behind imposing stringent punishments to deter such conduct. The court highlighted the importance of denunciation and deterrence in cases of corruption, noting that the primary objective of punishment in such cases is not reformation but rather denunciation and deterrence. It warned against leniency in sentencing, stressing the duty of the judiciary to reflect public abhorrence of corruption through appropriate punishment. Thus, the appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

The Respondent, a pharmaceutical company, was licensed under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, and both manufactured certain medicaments and outsourced certain manufacturing to job workers. The Commissioner sought to treat the Respondent as a manufacturer under the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, leading to a dispute.

Issues:

Whether the Respondent can be considered a manufacturer for excise duty purposes when using job workers for manufacturing, and the determination of the assessable value of the goods manufactured.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Customs Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) that the job workers were the manufacturers, not the Respondent. The Court clarified that the terms 'loan licensee' and 'manufacturer' under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act were not relevant to excise duty provisions. The assessable value was determined based on the cost of raw materials, labor charges, and profit of the job workers. The appeals were dismissed, with no costs awarded.

Facts:

Shamima Farooqui filed an application under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), contending that she was married to Shahid Khan, who later divorced her.

She alleged harassment and ill-treatment by her husband, which led her to seek refuge at her parental home.

Shamima Farooqui sought maintenance from her husband, stating that he was capable of earning a sufficient income.

The Family Court granted maintenance, but the High Court reduced the amount.

Issues:

Applicability of Section 125 of the CrPC to a Muslim woman after divorce.

Determination of the quantum of maintenance.

Delay in the disposal of maintenance applications.

Held:

The court held that Section 125 of the CrPC is applicable to a Muslim woman even after divorce, emphasizing that she is entitled to maintenance similar to the one she would have received in her matrimonial home. (Para 10)

It reiterated that maintenance must be adequate to allow the woman to live with dignity. Financial constraints of the husband cannot be an excuse if he is capable of earning. (Para 16)

The court expressed concern over the delay in disposing of maintenance applications and urged Family Court judges to be proactive in such matters. (Para 14)

The High Court's decision to reduce the maintenance amount was deemed unjustified, especially considering the husband's retirement. The original maintenance amount ordered by the Family Court was reinstated. (Para 20)