Facts:

Pawan Kumar was set on fire, and appellants were accused.

Dying declaration by Pawan Kumar implicated the appellants.

Trial Court and High Court convicted the appellants; the appeal challenged this decision.

Issues:

Reliability of the dying declaration.

Claim of grave provocation based on victim's presence in the appellant's brother's house.

Juvenility claim of one of the appellants.

Held:

The court found the dying declaration to be reliable and consistent with circumstantial evidence, rejecting arguments of discrepancies.

The defense's argument of grave provocation was rejected, stating that the victim's presence in the house did not support the theory, especially considering the victim was found with tied hands.

The court conducted an inquiry and accepted the claim of juvenility for one of the appellants, remitting the matter to the Juvenile Justice Board for determining an appropriate quantum of fine.

In accordance with Section 20 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, the court clarified that proceedings in pending cases involving juveniles above 16 but below 18 years would continue, and upon finding guilt, the case would be referred to the Juvenile Justice Board.

Facts:

The case involved the assessment of sales tax exemption for one of Hindustan Lever Limited's manufacturing units under a 1991 Notification. The revenue contended that the exempted unit had included the tax component in the sale price, thus violating the conditions outlined in the Notification. The assessing authority, appellate authority, and the Appellate Tribunal supported the revenue's view.

Issues:

The uniform pricing of products across multiple manufacturing units, the statutory requirements of the Standards of Weights and Measures Act, and the allegation of the exempted unit adding the tax component to the sale price.

Held:

The Court held that an assessee is entitled to fix a uniform price for its products throughout India, even if there are differences in sales tax payable at different locations (Para 20).

The Court emphasized the statutory requirement under Rule 2 of the Standards of Weights and Measures (Packaged Commodities) Rules, 1977, that the maximum sale price should be inclusive of all taxes. This, however, should not be construed as an admission that the assessee charged sales tax (Para 17).

The Court considered substantial evidence provided by the assessee, including invoices and price circulars, demonstrating the non-collection of sales tax (Para 19).

Uniform pricing across India, according to the Court, serves various purposes, and it cannot be a ground to conclude that the assessee was collecting sales tax on goods from the exempt unit (Para 20).

The Court rejected the idea of bifurcating sale consideration based on an assumption that it included tax, emphasizing that such a fiction has no application in this case (Paras 22, 23).

Facts:

Outlook Magazine published an article on 10.11.2008 regarding the Provident Fund Scam, naming judges allegedly involved.

Advocates from the High Court of Allahabad filed an application on 18.11.2008, seeking contempt proceedings against the appellants, citing insult to the Higher Judiciary.

High Court took suo motu action on 28.04.2015, initiating contempt proceedings against the appellants.

Issues:

Whether the initiation of contempt proceedings by the High Court after four years is within the limitation prescribed by Section 20 of The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

Held:

The Supreme Court rejected the High Court's argument, emphasizing that contempt proceedings, whether suo motu or otherwise, should comply with The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

Interpreting Section 20, the Court stated that the action for contempt must be initiated, either by filing an application or by the court issuing notice suo motu, within one year from the date of the alleged contempt.

Since the High Court initiated suo motu action only on 28.04.2015, beyond the one-year limitation, the proceedings were held to be barred by limitation.

The appeal was allowed, and the impugned order was set aside.

Facts:

The petitioners, persons with disabilities employed with Prasar Bharati, challenged two office memoranda issued by the Department of Personnel and Training, Government of India, dated 18.02.1997, and 29.12.2005. The memoranda were alleged to deprive them of the statutory benefit of reservation under the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995, concerning Group A and Group B posts in Prasar Bharati.

Issues:

Legality of denial by the impugned memoranda of the statutory benefit of three percent reservation in identified posts falling in Groups A and B.

Applicability of the embargo on reservation in promotions as laid down by the court in Indra Sawhney.

Held:

The Court declared the impugned memoranda as illegal and inconsistent with the 1995 Act. It directed the Government to extend three percent reservation to persons with disabilities in all identified posts in Group A and Group B, irrespective of the mode of filling up such posts. The judgment emphasized the crucial nature of the identification exercise under Section 32 and the obligation to reserve not less than three percent in identified posts as per Section 33 of the 1995 Act.

Facts:

Diler Singh, a constable in CRPF, faced charges of leaving the campus without permission, consuming liquor, and quarreling with civilians.

A departmental enquiry resulted in the finding of guilt by the disciplinary authority.

The respondent initiated a civil suit challenging his dismissal.

Issues:

Whether the punishment of dismissal under Section 11(1) of the CRPF Act is valid.

Jurisdiction of the trial court in deciding the suit.

Held:

The Court held that the punishment of dismissal could be imposed under Section 11(1) of the CRPF Act. The Court disagreed with the Calcutta High Court's decision in Akhilesh Kumar, emphasizing the power to award dismissal as a punishment. The Court noted that leaving the camp without permission and engaging in misconduct was a serious breach of discipline, justifying the dismissal. The High Court's failure to frame substantial questions of law was criticized.

Facts:

The first respondents granted prior permission for provisional affiliation to the appellant for a period of 3 years for imparting Education in the Arts Faculty.

The University did not grant permanent affiliation within the specified schedule, and no appeal was preferred by the appellant College.

The High Court held that it cannot issue a writ contrary to the judgment of the Court.

Issues:

Whether the University's failure to grant permanent affiliation within the specified schedule affects the appellant College's admission process.

Can the High Court issue a writ contrary to the judgment of the Court?

Held:

The Division Bench dismissed the intra-court appeal, upholding the University's decision not to grant permanent affiliation due to non-compliance with the specified schedule. The Court directed the University to consider the application for affiliation within four weeks. If granted, students admitted during the provisional affiliation period would be considered admitted for the academic session covered by the future affiliation.

Facts:

The DDA auctioned 'residential' land on an 'as is where is' basis for construction of houses.

The respondent-builder's bid was accepted, and the project land was allotted to them.

A development agreement was signed, placing the responsibility for various approvals and clearances, including environmental ones, on the builder.

Issues:

Obstacles arose due to objections by the Department of Forests, claiming the land fell within the Ridge.

Despite environmental clearance subject to DPCC's "consent to establish," DPCC refused due to the absence of a "ridge demarcation report."

Held:

The objection to the maintainability of the writ petition, raised by the DDA during the final hearing, was dismissed as it was raised too late.( Para 27)

The respondent-builder took all necessary steps for construction, but government agencies created an impasse, invoking Section 56 of the Contract Act, making the contract impossible of performance.( Para 32)

The term "impossible" in Section 56 does not imply physical impossibility but impracticability due to unforeseen circumstances. The DDA did not contemplate a prohibition on construction in the Ridge, leading to frustration of the contract.( Para 33 and 34)

The notification of the land as "Residential" did not change its legal position. The DDA was unaware of the need for permission from the Ridge Management Board and the Court due to morphological similarity.( Para 35)

The failure of the DDA to provide a clear passage due to unforeseen circumstances frustrated the contract's implementation.( Para 37)

Intervening circumstances made the contract impossible of performance under Section 56. The contract between DDA and the builder was frustrated.( Para 39)

DDA directed to refund the deposit made by the builder with 6% interest calculated from the date of deposit.( Para 40)

The question of whether DDA was the final authority in determining land use, particularly concerning the Ridge, was left open for consideration in an appropriate case.( Paras 41 and 42)

Facts:

The case involved the acquisition of land by GNIDA for planned industrial development.

The urgency clause was invoked, leading to objections by the landowners.

The respondents, original petitioners, challenged the acquisition through a writ petition, contesting the invocation of the urgency clause and wrongful possession claims.

Issues:

Whether the invocation of the urgency clause was justified.

Whether the landowners were entitled to relief, including the quashing of acquisition notifications.

Held:

The Division Bench, relying on the Full Bench judgment in Gajraj, held that while the invocation of the urgency clause was unjustified, the relief of quashing the acquisition was not granted due to substantial development on the acquired land.

The respondents were entitled to higher compensation (increased by 64.7%) and allotment of developed abadi land to the extent of 10% of the acquired land, in line with the principles established in Savitri Devi.

The Court distinguished cases where acquisition was quashed based on the extent of development on the acquired land.

The appeal is allowed, setting aside the impugned judgment. The writ petitions of the respondents should be disposed of in terms of the judgment in Savitri Devi.

Facts:

The respondent, Gram Panchayat of village Kalehri, filed a suit against the State of Haryana claiming ownership of a piece of land.

The Trial Court decreed the suit in favor of the respondent.

The State of Haryana appealed, but both the first appellate court and the High Court upheld the Trial Court's decision.

The High Court, while dismissing the second appeal, held that there were no substantial questions of law to be determined.

Issues:

Ownership rights over the disputed land.

Proper interpretation of documents (exhibits) to prove ownership rights.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after hearing the appeal, disagreed with the High Court's decision and held that issues related to ownership rights and the interpretation of documents constitute substantial questions of law. The High Court's order was set aside, and the case was remanded for the second appeal to be decided afresh on its merits.

The Supreme Court emphasized that the High Court should admit the appeal, frame substantial questions of law, and decide the appeal finally on merits, considering the nature of the controversy and the issues involved. Additionally, the Court highlighted that Order 27, Rule 5B of the Civil Procedure Code requires the Court, in suits against the Government, to assist parties in arriving at a settlement.

In this case, no such endeavor was made, and the Court should have attempted settlement before deciding the case on merits. The High Court was requested to decide the second appeal finally on merits within six months, taking into account the issues raised and the observations made.