Facts:

The case involves a dispute related to the constitutional validity of Regulation 45-B of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission (Conduct of Business) Regulations, 1999. The issue centers around the determination of fuel surcharge and its compliance with the Electricity Act, 2003.

Issues:

The validity of Regulation 45-B in light of the provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003.

The exclusion of consumption by the agricultural sector until completion of metering and its legality.

The applicability and effect of Regulations of 1999 and 2005 in determining fuel surcharge.

Compliance with section 65 of the Electricity Act regarding the exclusion of farmers from meeting fuel surcharge adjustment charges.

Procedural lapses in framing amended regulations and their impact on validity.

The determination of fuel surcharge formula, taking into account the change in the cost of the rupee.

Held:

The court holds that Regulation 45-B is not ultra vires the provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003. The fuel surcharge formula in Regulation 45-B is deemed to be in line with the factors provided under sections 61 and 62 of the Act.( Para 18)

Differential treatment, including the exclusion of consumption by the agricultural sector, is considered permissible within the provisions of section 26 of the Electricity Act. Agriculturists and other consumers are not similarly placed, and paying capacity is a valid factor for discriminatory tariffs.( Para 27)

The determination of fuel surcharge formula, including the consideration of the change in the cost of the rupee, is deemed legal and in line with business norms.( Para 32)

The provision in condition No. 1 of Regulation 45-B, regarding the licensee's obligation to supply electricity after two years based on metered supply, is considered valid and in compliance with section 55(1) of the Electricity Act.( Para 34)

The exclusion of farmers from meeting the fuel surcharge adjustment charges is not a violation of section 65 of the Electricity Act. The matter involves the determination of fuel surcharge formula, not subsidy.( Para 35, 36)

The argument that Regulations of 1999 ceased to have effect is dismissed. Regulation 2 of Regulations of 2004 allows the continued application of Regulations of 1999 until new regulations are notified.( Para 37)

The submission of procedural lapses in framing amended regulations is rejected. Regulation 9/2004 was previously notified and complied with the publication requirement.( Para 38)

The claim that FSA can be realized under the Regulations of 2005 is rejected. Regulation 45-B remains in force, and there is a saving clause in Regulation 24 of Regulations of 2005.( Para 39, 40, 41)

Facts:

The appellant, Shyam Lal, appeals against an eviction order following the expiration of the lease period. The appellant claims protection under the Punjab Security of Land Tenure Act, 1953. The lease was not a registered instrument, and Section 117 of the Transfer of Property Act was deemed inapplicable to the State of Haryana, affecting the admissibility of the lease terms as evidence.

Issues:

Whether a tenant retains protection under the Punjab Security of Land Tenure Act, 1953, after the fixed-term lease expires.

Admissibility of lease terms as evidence due to non-registration.

Held:

The court, considering the interplay between the Acts, rules, and relevant sections, held that after the fixed-term lease expires, the tenant acquires the status of a tenant holding over or a tenant at will under the 1953 Act, granting protection against eviction. Admissibility of lease terms was affected by the non-registration of the lease, and the court set aside the High Court's order, ruling in favor of the tenant. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The dispute involves joint family property comprising items 1, 2, and 3.

Plaintiffs claim a 1/5th share each in the property and allege attempts by the defendant to grab the assets.

Defendant asserts that plaintiffs No. 3 and 4 relinquished their shares in items 1 and 2 through a family settlement recorded in a panchayat resolution (Ex.D22).

The defendant also claims item 3 as self-acquired property due to the grant of patta.

The trial court and the High Court disagreed on the validity of the family settlement and the nature of item 3.

Issues:

Validity of the family settlement recorded in panchayat resolution (Ex.D22).

Nature of item 3 - whether joint family property or self-acquired property of the defendant.

Held:

The courts below erred in brushing aside the oral and documentary evidence supporting the family settlement (Ex.D22) regarding items 1 and 2. The judgment on items 1 and 2 is set aside, and the suit for partition is dismissed.

The grant of patta for item 3 was for the benefit of the entire family, and the defendant failed to establish it as self-acquired property. All the parties, including plaintiffs and defendant, are entitled to a 1/5th share each in item 3.

Accordingly, the appeal is partly allowed.

Facts:

Appellant is a tenant of a hardware shop since June 1, 2001.

Appellant obtained a license with the landlord's consent to run the hardware business.

Renewal application rejected for not producing fresh consent of the landlord.

The legal issue revolves around the interpretation of Section 492(3) of the Kerala Municipalities Act, 1994.

Issues:

Whether the consent of the landlord is required for the renewal of a tenant's license for running a hardware shop under Section 492(3) of the Kerala Municipalities Act, 1994?

Held:

The statutory provision (Section 492(3)) mandates the consent of the landlord only for obtaining a license for the first time. Renewal or subsequent applications during the tenancy do not require fresh consent. The valid tenancy itself implies the landlord's implied authority for the legitimate use of the premises by the tenant. The view taken by the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge is deemed correct, and the Division Bench erred in interfering with this view. Consequently, the appeal is allowed, the Division Bench's order is set aside, and the Tribunal's order, affirmed by the learned Single Judge, is restored.( Paragraphs 8-10)

Facts:

The case involves the arrest and detention of an individual ('N') from June 24, 1999, to June 28, 1999. A complaint was filed by the mother of the arrestee, alleging illegal and unauthorized detention by police officials.

Issues:

Whether the appellants, who are police officials, required sanction for prosecution under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Additionally, the court considers the relationship between Section 197 and Section 319 of the Cr.P.C.

Held:

The court emphasizes the significance of determining whether the alleged offense was committed "while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty." The period of apprehension from June 28, 1999, is considered to be in the discharge of official duties, but not the period from June 24, 1999, to June 28, 1999. Therefore, sanction for prosecution under Section 197 is not required for the latter period.

The court clarifies that the mandate of sanction under Section 197 is a mandatory prerequisite even when cognizance is taken under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C.

Sections 36, 49, 50, and 50A of Cr.P.C are referenced to establish the authority of the appellants to detain and arrest 'N' during the relevant period.

Decision: The court concludes that sanction for prosecution under Section 197 is not required for the appellants concerning the period of detention from June 24, 1999, to June 28, 1999, as it was not considered to be in the discharge of official duties during that specific time frame.

Facts:

The case involves the dismissal of writ petitions by the Delhi High Court concerning the competence of the CO to convene, constitute, and complete SCMs. The CO in question was from a unit other than the one to which the accused was attached. The Rajasthan High Court also dismissed cases on merit.

Issues:

The primary issue revolves around the competence of the CO in convening an SCM, specifically whether the CO of the accused's regular unit or the CO of the unit to which the accused is attached is permissible.

The challenge involves interpreting Sections 116 and 120 of the Army Act, 1950, along with relevant Army Rules and Defence Service Regulations.

Held:

The Army Act grants significant power to the CO to constitute a Court, emphasizing the need for rare exercise and articulation of reasons for immediate action. The Delhi High Court's observation that such power should be exercised sparingly aligns with maintaining discipline in the military.( Para 19-20)

Offenses under Sections 34, 37, and 69 of the Army Act are recognized as special categories requiring a reference to a superior authority. Deviation from this requirement must be justified on record, highlighting the gravity of the offenses.( Para 22-23)

The judgment clarifies three situations regarding the competence of the CO to convene an SCM based on the accused's association with a unit. It distinguishes scenarios based on the accused's regular unit, attachment to a different unit, or attachment after the offense was committed.( Para 24-25)

In the third category, where an accused is attached to another unit after committing an offense, the appropriateness of the former unit or considerations of fairness may determine the competent CO.( Para 26-27)

Regulation 9 of Defence Service Regulations is identified as a guiding factor, rejecting the High Court's finding that only the CO of the accused's unit is competent. The expression "to which the accused belongs" is discussed in the context of fairness and impartiality.( Para 29-30)

The judgment concludes that it is not imperative for the CO of the accused's regular unit to convene an SCM. The CO of the attached unit can be competent, provided legal requirements are met, and immediate action is justified.( Para 31-33)

The appeals are dismissed.

Facts:

The company was directed to be wound up by the Company Court, leading to the possession of its assets by the Official Liquidator. The Lender-Bank sought permission from the Company Court to initiate recovery proceedings under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. The Company Court granted permission on March 10, 2000, with the condition that no coercive steps should be taken against the company's assets during or after the proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. Subsequently, recovery proceedings were initiated, objections were raised, and the Recovery Officer proceeded with the sale of the company's properties.

Issues:

The recovery proceedings, the authority of the Company Court's order dated March 10, 2000, and the compliance of the Recovery Officer with the conditions imposed.

Held:

The Court held that the condition imposed by the Company Court was binding on the Recovery Officer, and the sale conducted in violation of this order lacked the authority of law. The acceptance of the bid and confirmation of the sale were impermissible, requiring them to be set aside (Para 39, 42).

Emphasizing that the Company Court had jurisdiction to pass the order dated March 10, 2000, the Court declared that it was neither invalid nor void (Para 44).

The Court reiterated that an order/judgment, until set aside by a competent court, has the force of law, and parties cannot consider it void or non-existent. Disobeying such an order may have disastrous consequences (Para 45).

The Court rejected the claim of equity regarding the sale, emphasizing that objections were raised, and challenges were made before the Recovery Officer. The fact that only two bids were received, with both bidders having a connection, added weight to the lack of fairness in the sale (Para 47).

It was deemed justifiable for the concerned parties to approach the High Court to enforce the order dated March 10, 2000, as the sale was in violation of this order (Para 48).

The Court clarified that the order dated March 10, 2000, was binding on the appellant, and therefore, the sale conducted by the Recovery Officer was equally binding on the appellant (Para 49).

Facts:

The appellant, R.K. Roja, faced an Election Petition challenging her election to the 289 Nagiri Assembly Constituency.

The appellant filed an application under Order 7, Rule 11 of CPC seeking the rejection of the Election Petition.

The court initially declined to consider the application due to the absence of a formal application and proceeded with the trial.

Subsequently, the appellant filed a formal application for rejection of the Election Petition.

Issues:

Whether the court can proceed with the trial without disposing of an application under Order 7, Rule 11 of CPC?

Whether an application under Order 7, Rule 11 can be filed at any stage of the suit?

Held:

The court held that an application under Order 7, Rule 11 of CPC can be filed at any stage before the conclusion of the trial.

The court emphasized that the consideration of the application should not be based on the allegations made by the defendant in the written statement.

Once an application is filed under Order 7, Rule 11, the court must dispose of it before proceeding with the trial.

The impugned order, which delayed the consideration of the application, was set aside.

The appellant was granted an opportunity to file a written statement within two weeks.

The High Court was directed to dispose of the Election Petition before the end of the year.

Facts:

Ramachandraiah, the deceased, was accused of misappropriation under IPC Sections 409, 468, and 471.

Ramachandraiah died during the trial, and the co-accused Subbarayudu was acquitted.

The trial court found Ramachandraiah responsible for the offenses, but he could not be adjudged guilty due to his demise.

The State applied for attachment of Ramachandraiah's property under the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944.

Issues:

Validity of continuing proceedings against a deceased person.

Legality of the attachment of the deceased's property under the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance.

Held:

The law authorizes the State to make an application for attachment even if proceedings have not resulted in a conviction. However, the Court emphasized that orders of attachment must be withdrawn if the prosecution abates or cannot result in a conviction due to the death of the accused.( Para 6)

Emphasized the presumption of innocence until conviction and rejected the contention that the presumption vaporizes upon the death of the accused.( Para 7)

Found a gross miscarriage of justice, as the trial court's finding that Ramachandraiah was solely responsible for the offenses was considered null and void due to his demise.( Para 8)

Concluded that the District Judge could not have proceeded with attachment proceedings against a dead person under the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944.( Para 10)

Declared the orders of the Criminal Court and the impugned judgment as illegal, setting them aside. The appeal succeeded in favor of the legal representatives.( Para 11)