Facts:

The Ministry of External Affairs had formulated an approved policy for the registration of PTOs facilitating Haj pilgrims for the period 2013-2017. The policy classified PTOs into Category I and Category II, further divided into Class-I and Class-II. Specific documents, including proof of payments for tickets and accommodation, were required for registration under stipulation (vii).

Issues:

The relevance and applicability of stipulation (vii) for PTOs seeking registration under Category I or Category II, especially regarding the production of specified documents for subsequent years.

Held:

Stipulation (vii) does not impose a substantive obligation on PTOs seeking consideration for the allotment of Haj quota. It serves as a rule of evidence to establish whether a PTO had conducted Haj programs in the past. (Para: 25)

The division of PTOs into Category I and Category II is based on the number of Haj operations conducted. Stipulation (vii) is relevant only for PTOs seeking registration for the first time under Category I or Category II. (Paras: 27, 28, 29)

Once registered under Category I or Category II, insisting on the production of documents specified in stipulation (vii) for each subsequent year is not supported by the text of the approved policy or logic. ( Paras: 30, 31, 32, 33)

The approved policy is not limited to Haj 2013 but applicable until 2017. The requirement to furnish documents for every subsequent year contradicts the text of the policy.(Para: 30)

The court emphasized that the approved policy did not specify the experience of conducting 7 Haj programs in consecutive years. Once registered under Category I or Category II, requiring proof for each subsequent year is inconsistent with the approved policy.(Para: 30, 34, 35)

The government has the power to deregister PTOs for valid reasons. However, the insistence on furnishing documents for each subsequent year is illogical and contrary to the approved policy.( Paras: 36, 37, 38)

PTOs seeking consideration for Haj 2016, falling under Class-II of Category-II, should be considered based on their previous year's qualification unless valid grounds for disqualification exist.(Paras: 39, 40)

Decision: The respondents are directed to consider the cases of all PTOs for allotment of quota in the light of the court's orders, specifically regarding stipulation (vii), and subject to the eligibility of PTOs according to the approved scheme.(Para: 42)

Facts:

The case involves allegations against the Manipur Police and armed forces for their role in extra-judicial executions and human rights violations. The petitioners, representing the Extra Judicial Execution Victim Families Association (EEVFAM), approached the court seeking relief. The context includes a prolonged internal disturbance in Manipur, with victims facing difficulties accessing legal remedies. Additionally, the filing of FIRs against victims' next of kin by local police further limited their legal recourse under the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.).

Issues:

The maintainability of the writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution.

Whether the ordinary criminal law remedy adequately addresses the situation, considering the prolonged internal disturbance in Manipur and the challenges faced by ordinary citizens in seeking justice.

Held:

The court finds the writ petition maintainable, emphasizing the extraordinary nature of the case involving allegations against law enforcement authorities for human rights violations. Denying access to constitutional remedies would result in grave injustice to the victims' families.

The judgment discusses constitutional provisions related to internal disturbance, public order, and the deployment of armed forces. It clarifies the distinctions between armed rebellion, internal disturbance, and the circumstances under which emergency powers can be invoked.

The court examines statutory provisions, including the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 (AFSPA), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.), Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA), and the Army Act, 1950. It analyzes the powers granted to the armed forces in disturbed areas and the interplay with civilian jurisdiction.

The court dismisses the notion of a war-like situation in Manipur, emphasizing the existence of an internal disturbance for nearly 60 years. It highlights the importance of differentiating between acts of violence and a full-scale war.

The judgment delves into the use of excessive force and retaliation, emphasizing the distinction between self-defense and retaliatory force. It underscores the need for scrutiny in cases of alleged extra-judicial killings, irrespective of the status of the victim.

The court discusses the concept of an 'enemy' and the necessity of a thorough inquiry before branding a person as a militant, terrorist, or insurgent. It emphasizes the duty of care and the applicability of the rule of law, even in dealing with alleged enemies.

The judgment refers to the guidelines issued by the Chief of Army Staff, emphasizing the use of minimum force even against terrorists, militants, and insurgents. It underscores the need for proportional responses and the applicability of international law principles.

The court clarifies that Army personnel are not immune from trial by criminal courts, and the decision to try an alleged offender lies with both the Army and civilian courts in certain circumstances.

The judgment addresses the issue of limitation under the Army Act and emphasizes the circumstances triggering the commencement of the limitation period.

The court expresses concern about the effectiveness of Magisterial Enquiries, highlighting deficiencies in their conduct. It stresses the need for judicial inquiries or inquiries by bodies like the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) for a more comprehensive examination of cases.

Further steps involve preparing a detailed tabular statement for documented cases, distinguishing between judicial inquiries and administrative ones. The court plans to address the NHRC's effectiveness and the nature of its guidelines in subsequent proceedings.

Facts:

The case involves a limitation issue related to the filing of a suit by Ajay Gupta against Raju @ Rajendra Singh Yadav.

The trial court disposed of the application under Order 7, Rule 11, based on the assumption that 01.01.2011 was a non-working Saturday.

The last date for filing the suit was 31.12.2010, the last day of winter vacation for the court.

Issues:

Whether filing a suit on a non-working Saturday due to confusion constitutes a bona fide mistake that can save limitation.

The applicability of Sections 4 and 5 of the Limitation Act to suits.

The correctness of the trial court's decision regarding the working status of 01.01.2011.

Held:

The court emphasizes that no court or tribunal can extend the period of limitation for filing a suit.

Even if there is a cause beyond the control of the plaintiff, the only extension allowed is under Section 4 of the Limitation Act, related to court holidays.

The trial court and the High Court erred in understanding the law of Limitation.

The impugned order is set aside, and the appellant's application under Order 7, Rule 11 is allowed.

Recovery Suit No. 1/2011 on the file of the ADJ, Gwalior, Madhya Pradesh is dismissed.

The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.

Facts:

The incident occurred on 01.02.2011 near Mohammadabad Crossing in Shahjahanpur Division, State of Uttar Pradesh.

The recruitment drive by Indo Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) resulted in a large gathering in Bareilly, leading to chaos and violence.

Hundreds of aspirants climbed atop Himgiri Express, leading to an accident at Hathaurda Railway Over Bridge, causing deaths and injuries.

Enquiry Report revealed the train's speed, infringement in vertical clearance at the bridge, and the Administration's attempt to disperse the crowd.

The Report concluded that the primary responsibility rested with the roof riders violating Section 156 of the Indian Railways Act, 1989.

Issues:

Responsibility for the railway accident involving deaths and injuries.

Assessment of damages and compensation for victims.

Implementation of safety measures to prevent similar incidents in the future.

Held:

The Railway Administration was not free from blame, and reasonable care should have been taken to prevent the accident.

Compensation awarded to the next of kin of the deceased and injured:

Rs. 5 lakhs for each death.

Rs. 1.5 lakhs for permanent disability.

Rs. 75,000 for grievous injury.

Rs. 25,000 for a simple injury.

The Committee, headed by a senior officer, to assess infringements and create an action plan to remove them within two years.

Copies of the order sent to the Minister of Railways and Secretary, Railways, for compliance.

Central Police Organisations directed to issue guidelines similar to ITBP's Standing Orders, limiting the number of candidates in recruitment cycles.

The petition was disposed of with these directions.

Facts:

The case involves the Commissioner of Income Tax, Kochi, and Trans Asian Shipping Services (P) Ltd., where the latter is engaged in the business of operating qualifying ships. The dispute revolves around the eligibility of the assessee for the Tonnage Tax Scheme (TTS) and the inclusion of income from slot charter arrangements.

Issues:

Eligibility for TTS.

Inclusion of income from slot charter arrangements in the deemed tonnage.

Held:

Section 115VD imposes an obligation on the assessee to produce a valid certificate in respect of a ship where a slot is chartered. However, this requirement does not apply when the entire ship is not chartered, and the arrangement pertains only to the purchase of slots, slot charter, and sharing of a break-bulk vessel (Paras 18, 19, 21).

The legal fiction created by sub-section (4) of Section 115VG exempts the requirement of producing a certificate in the case of slot charter arrangements. The computation of tonnage involves both actual tonnage (from the certificate) and deemed tonnage, with slot charter income falling under the latter (Paras 25, 26).

The purpose of TTS is to make the Indian shipping industry more competitive globally. Slot charter operations are considered essential for Indian shipping companies to compete with foreign counterparts. The exemption from the certificate requirement for slot charter arrangements aligns with the scheme's objective (Paras 25, 26).

Facts:

The case involves Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited (GUVNL) as the appellant and Tarin Infrastructure Ltd. & Others as respondents. The judgment pertains to the review of tariff under a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) and the statutory powers of the State Electricity Regulatory Commission.

Issues:

The determination and fixation of tariff, the statutory function of State Regulatory Commissions, and the interpretation of tariff stipulations in Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs).

Held:

The provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003 establish that the fixation of tariff is a statutory function to be performed by State Regulatory Commissions, aligning with the principles outlined in the Electricity Act. This applies apart from situations of open access or competitive bidding (997-F-G).( Para 9)

Section 61 of the Electricity Act defines the principles for tariff determination, emphasizing conducting electricity-related activities on commercial principles while safeguarding consumer interests. In Gujarat, the Gujarat Electricity Regulatory Commission (Multi-Year Tariff) Regulations, 2016 govern tariff fixation during a control period (1003-C-E).( Para 11)

Tariffs are subject to periodic review under the regulations, and adjustments are allowed for uncontrollable factors, including force majeure events. Regulation 23 specifies the pass-through of approved gains or losses due to uncontrollable factors as tariff adjustments (1003-H; 1004-A).( Para 12)

The court questions the binding nature of a specific tariff throughout the entire duration of a power project, especially when the tariff order itself is subject to periodic review. The court finds contradictions in modifying the tariff based on certain factors and denying modifications on other grounds (1005-C-D).( Para 14)

Section 86(1)(b) of the Electricity Act grants the State Commission wide powers to regulate the price of electricity transactions between generating companies and distribution licensees through agreements, indicating a broad scope of regulatory authority (1005-C-E).( Para 15)

The court advocates leaning towards flexibility in interpreting tariff stipulations, considering public interest and the surrounding events. Sections 14 and 21 of the General Clauses Act further support this interpretation (1007-G-H; 1008-A-B).( Para 16)

The tariff in the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) between the generating company and distribution licensee is a result of the State Regulatory Commission's statutory powers, not a contractual agreement. The court emphasizes that such tariffs are incorporated based on statutory determinations (1003-A-C).( Para 10)

Conclusion: The appeals are dismissed, affirming the view that tariff fixation is a statutory function performed by the State Regulatory Commission. The court emphasizes flexibility in interpreting tariff stipulations and rejects the notion of tariffs being inviolable in Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs).

Facts:

The advocate, Mahipal Singh Rana, was accused of intimidating and threatening a civil judge on two occasions. The High Court found him guilty of contempt of court and sentenced him to two months of simple imprisonment. The State Bar Council was directed to initiate proceedings against the advocate for professional misconduct. However, there was a delay and inaction on the part of the Bar Council.

Issues:

The advocate's contemptuous behavior, the delay in Bar Council action, and the appropriate disciplinary measures to be taken against the advocate.

Held:

The High Court's conviction of the appellant for contempt was upheld. The sentence of imprisonment was set aside due to the advocate's advanced age. [Para 49]

Section 24A of the Advocates Act was invoked, suspending the advocate's enrollment for two years. Additionally, the advocate's license was suspended for a further five years as a disciplinary measure for proved misconduct. [Paras 46, 47, 48]

The Court directed that the advocate would not be permitted to appear in courts in District Etah until he purges himself of contempt. [Para 49]

The judgment highlighted the Court's authority to exercise suo motu powers for punishing the contemnor for professional misconduct. Section 38 of the Advocates Act allowed the Court to intervene if the Bar Council failed to take appropriate action. [Para 25]

Concerns were raised about the inaction of Bar Councils, and the urgent need to review provisions of the Advocates Act related to the regulatory mechanism for the legal profession was emphasized. [Para 50, 52]

The Law Commission of India was requested to review the provisions of the Advocates Act in consultation with all concerned. The government was expected to take appropriate steps based on the Law Commission's report within six months. [Para 50, 52]

Facts:

Mukhtiar Singh, the appellant, a Revenue Patwari, was accused of demanding and accepting illegal gratification.

The complainant, Arjan Singh, alleged that the appellant asked for money to provide a copy of Jamabandi and was caught red-handed in a trap set by the Vigilance Department.

Currency notes smeared with phenolphthalein powder were handed over, and a raid was conducted leading to the recovery of the marked currency notes from the accused's possession.

Issues:

Whether the demand, acceptance, and recovery of illegal gratification were proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Whether the objections raised by the defense regarding the alleged fabrication of the case, discrepancies in recovery, and the complainant's alleged grudge were substantial.

Held:

The court found the prosecution had established the guilt of the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt, and the appeal was dismissed. Key points include:

The demand, acceptance, and recovery of incriminating currency notes were sufficiently proved.

Objections regarding the alleged fabrication of the case and discrepancies in the recovery process were dismissed.

The court rejected the defense's claim of the complainant nursing a grudge against the appellant.

The judgment emphasized that once demand and voluntary acceptance of illegal gratification are proven, conviction under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act must follow.

This appeal fails and the same is dismissed.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute related to the constitutional validity of Regulation 45-B of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission (Conduct of Business) Regulations, 1999. The issue centers around the determination of fuel surcharge and its compliance with the Electricity Act, 2003.

Issues:

The validity of Regulation 45-B in light of the provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003.

The exclusion of consumption by the agricultural sector until completion of metering and its legality.

The applicability and effect of Regulations of 1999 and 2005 in determining fuel surcharge.

Compliance with section 65 of the Electricity Act regarding the exclusion of farmers from meeting fuel surcharge adjustment charges.

Procedural lapses in framing amended regulations and their impact on validity.

The determination of fuel surcharge formula, taking into account the change in the cost of the rupee.

Held:

The court holds that Regulation 45-B is not ultra vires the provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003. The fuel surcharge formula in Regulation 45-B is deemed to be in line with the factors provided under sections 61 and 62 of the Act.( Para 18)

Differential treatment, including the exclusion of consumption by the agricultural sector, is considered permissible within the provisions of section 26 of the Electricity Act. Agriculturists and other consumers are not similarly placed, and paying capacity is a valid factor for discriminatory tariffs.( Para 27)

The determination of fuel surcharge formula, including the consideration of the change in the cost of the rupee, is deemed legal and in line with business norms.( Para 32)

The provision in condition No. 1 of Regulation 45-B, regarding the licensee's obligation to supply electricity after two years based on metered supply, is considered valid and in compliance with section 55(1) of the Electricity Act.( Para 34)

The exclusion of farmers from meeting the fuel surcharge adjustment charges is not a violation of section 65 of the Electricity Act. The matter involves the determination of fuel surcharge formula, not subsidy.( Para 35, 36)

The argument that Regulations of 1999 ceased to have effect is dismissed. Regulation 2 of Regulations of 2004 allows the continued application of Regulations of 1999 until new regulations are notified.( Para 37)

The submission of procedural lapses in framing amended regulations is rejected. Regulation 9/2004 was previously notified and complied with the publication requirement.( Para 38)

The claim that FSA can be realized under the Regulations of 2005 is rejected. Regulation 45-B remains in force, and there is a saving clause in Regulation 24 of Regulations of 2005.( Para 39, 40, 41)