Facts:

The case involves an appeal (Civil Appeal No. 944 of 2016) arising from a Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.1633 of 2015. The dispute centers around a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the parties, where the appellant, Bunga Daniel Babu, is aggrieved.

Issues:

The maintainability of a consumer complaint under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The MOU does not explicitly establish a joint venture, and the appellant is contended to be neither a partner nor a co-adventurer.

The appellant lacks control over the construction, does not actively participate in the business, and is entitled only to a specific constructed area.

Held:

The Division Bench, consisting of Dipak Misra and N.V. Ramana, JJ., concluded that the MOU did not indicate a joint venture. As the appellant was not a partner or co-adventurer, lacked control over the construction, and had a limited entitlement to a specific area, the appellant was deemed a consumer under Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The extent of the area did not affect this classification. Consequently, the judgments passed by the National Commission and State Commission were set aside.

Decision: The matter was remitted to the State Commission for re-adjudication, with specific directions to treat the appellant as a consumer under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

Facts:

Mrs. Santosh Singh, an advocate-on-record, filed a writ petition under Article 32, expressing concern about the degradation of moral values in society, specifically within the education system.

Mrs. Singh argued that the current education system failed to instill the true purpose of education, which, according to her, is to produce a good human being.

She contended that moral science should be made a compulsory subject in the school curriculum from classes I to XII.

Issues:

Whether the court has the jurisdiction to mandate the inclusion of moral science as a separate subject in the school curriculum.

Whether the petitioner's grievances about the degradation of moral values can be addressed through the judicial process.

Held:

The court dismissed the writ petition, holding that issues involving the structure and content of education, including the inclusion of moral science as a separate subject, are beyond the scope of judicial review. The court emphasized that it lacks the expertise to dictate the form and manner in which values should be inculcated and that such matters fall within the domain of educational policymakers. The judiciary is not a panacea for all social issues, and remedies for perceived grievances must be sought through competent authorities responsible for educational policies.

Facts:

The appellant's land was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

An agreement for compensation was reached on 27.2.2003, and the appellant received the consolidated amount, including additional amounts and solatium, without protest.

The appellant subsequently claimed interest under Section 34 from the date of possession (15.2.2001) until the date of payment (27.2.2003).

Issues:

Whether, after accepting the agreed compensation without protest, the appellant can claim interest under Section 34.

The impact of the agreement on the appellant's right to claim additional amounts.

Held:

The Court held that the appellant, having accepted the agreed compensation without protest and explicitly agreeing not to claim any additional amounts, including interest, was not entitled to claim interest under Section 34. The Court emphasized that the agreed compensation amount was accepted expeditiously, and equitable considerations did not favor the appellant. The Court referred to its judgments in Daya Shamji Bhai and Sangappa Dyavappa Biradar, reinforcing that the right to seek enhancement is lost when compensation is accepted without protest.

Facts:

Marico Industries Ltd., the respondent, challenged the imposition of entry tax on its products, Mediker and Starch (Revive), by the Additional Commissioner, Commercial Tax, Indore. The High Court, in a writ petition, considered the classification of Mediker as a medicinal product and questioned the applicability of entry tax on Starch (Revive), which is used in the production of other articles.

Issues:

Whether Mediker is to be considered a medicinal product or a hair shampoo for the purpose of entry tax.

Whether Starch (Revive) is liable for entry tax, considering its use in the production of other articles.

Held:

Classification of Mediker: The court held that Mediker, being an anti-lice treatment with medicinal properties, is not a hair shampoo. The active ingredients and purpose of Mediker were considered, and the court concluded that it qualifies as a drug and, therefore, is not subject to entry tax.

Entry Tax on Starch (Revive): The court rejected the imposition of entry tax on Starch (Revive), emphasizing that there was no evidence presented by the revenue to establish it as a chemical. The common parlance test and the absence of proof led to the conclusion that Starch (Revive) is not a chemical and, hence, not liable for entry tax.

The appeal is devoid of any substance and deserves to be dismissed.

Facts:

The case involves a Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 20525 of 2011. The petitioner, Avtar Singh, challenged certain aspects related to service law, specifically concerning appointment, verification of antecedents, and the termination of employees based on the alleged misrepresentation or suppression of information.

Issues:

The importance of truthful information in the verification process, the recourse available to the employer in cases of suppression or false information, the declaration of concluded and pending criminal cases by employees, and the termination of services based on misrepresentation.

Held:

Importance of Truthful Information and Recourse for Suppression or False Information The court held that candidates must provide accurate information regarding criminal convictions, arrests, or pending criminal cases. The employer has the discretion to take different actions based on the nature of the case, including ignoring the lapse, canceling candidature, or terminating services. The severity of the conviction or acquittal is a crucial factor in decision-making.

Declaration of Concluded and Pending Criminal Cases The court emphasized that even if an employee truthfully declares a concluded criminal case, the employer retains the right to consider antecedents and may choose not to appoint the candidate. In cases of pending criminal cases of trivial nature, the employer may, at its discretion, appoint the candidate subject to the decision of the case.

Termination Based on Misrepresentation or Suppression Termination is not automatic, and various aspects need to be considered. For confirmed employees with protection under Article 311(2), a due inquiry must be conducted before termination. The case of obtaining an appointment on the basis of forged documents has a different effect on eligibility compared to the verification of antecedents for suitability.

Discretionary Power of the Employer and Consideration of Acquittal The court highlighted the discretionary power of employers to condone lapses and the different standards applicable to higher officials/higher posts. Even in cases of acquittal, the employer has the right to consider fitness, taking into account the nature of the offense and the circumstances of the case.

Decision: The court concluded that suppression of material information presupposes the suppression of matters that genuinely matter, not every technical or trivial matter. Employers have the power to exercise reasonable and objective judgment, considering the nature of the post and the impact of suppression on suitability.

Facts:

The power of the Supreme Court to transfer cases within or outside the State of Jammu and Kashmir, considering the absence of specific enabling provisions in the Central and State Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedures.

Issues:

Whether the Supreme Court has the authority to transfer cases in the absence of relevant provisions in the Jammu and Kashmir legal codes and how access to justice is intertwined with the right to life guaranteed under Article 21.

Held:

The concept of 'access to justice' is recognized as an invaluable human right, linked to the right to life and supported by international declarations and covenants. The denial of access to justice affects the quality of human life, making it an integral facet of Article 21.

Access to justice is considered part of the right guaranteed under Article 14, ensuring equality before the law and equal protection for citizens and non-citizens.

The essence of access to justice involves the need for an adjudicatory mechanism, convenient accessibility, speedy adjudication, and affordability for the disputants.

The absence of specific provisions in the Central or State Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedures for Jammu and Kashmir does not diminish the Supreme Court's power to direct transfers if essential for the interest of justice.

The Supreme Court's powers under Article 32 and 142 can be invoked to direct transfer, preventing the violation of the fundamental right to access justice under Article 21.

Decision: The Supreme Court has the authority to direct the transfer of cases involving access to justice from a court in the State of Jammu and Kashmir to a court outside the state or vice versa, utilizing its powers under Articles 32 and 142.

Facts:

Disputes arose in a construction contract.

Arbitration was conducted as per Clause 29 of the contract.

The Addl. Housing Commissioner passed an award rejecting the respondent's claims.

The respondent filed an application under Section 11 for arbitrator appointment, which was rejected by the High Court.

The respondent later filed objections under Section 34(2) along with an application under Section 14 seeking exclusion of time.

Issues:

Whether the objection under Section 34(2) was condonable in aid of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

Held:

The Court noted the limitation period under Section 34(3) and cited Union of India v. Popular Construction Co., emphasizing that an application filed beyond the prescribed period would not be in accordance with Section 34(3). (Para 12)

The Court affirmed the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act, as established in State of Goa v. Western Builders and Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department. (Para 14)

The Court held that the respondent's actions did not exhibit due diligence or good faith, and the proceedings under Section 11 for arbitrator appointment were distinct from objections under Section 34. (Para 18)

The High Court's decision was deemed a grave error, and both orders were set aside. The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs.( Para 20)

Facts:

The case involves G.T. Venkataswamy Reddy and the State Transport Authority, among others.

The dispute centers around the increase in the number of trips of vehicles under existing permits upon the publication of an approved scheme.

Issues:

Whether the variation of a permit, specifically for increasing the number of trips or vehicles, can be granted after the publication of an approved scheme.

The interpretation of Sections 57(8), 68D, and 68FF in relation to the freezing effect on permits in areas covered by approved schemes.

Held:

A close reading of Section 57(8) mandates treating an application for the variation of a stage carriage permit, aiming to increase trips or vehicles, as an application for a new permit. Compliance with the rigorous procedures of sub-sections (1) to (7) is essential for such applications (Para 38, 39).

The requirement for public and personal hearings underscores the seriousness with which applications for variation should be considered, given their significant impact on the operation of vehicles in the relevant route (Para 40).

Section 68B establishes that Chapter IV-A supersedes inconsistent provisions in Chapter IV. Once a scheme under Section 68D is approved, Section 68FF freezes permits in the covered area or route, and any alteration or modification can only occur through Section 68E (Para 43).

The formulation of a scheme under Section 68D aims to provide an efficient, adequate, economical, and properly coordinated road transport service. Once approved, existing operators must adhere to the restrictions outlined in Section 68FF (Paras 44, 45).

Section 68FF restricts the grant of permits in areas covered by approved schemes, and any variation applied for must be considered within the framework of Section 68E. An increase in trips or vehicles under existing permits amounts to the grant of a new permit, not permissible under Section 68FF (Paras 46, 47).

Legal propositions affirm the superseding effect of Chapter IV-A, equating the grant of variation under Section 57(8) to a new permit. The freezing effect of Section 68FF prohibits the grant of new permits or variations in areas covered by approved schemes (Para 50).

Facts:

The case involved multiple appellants convicted at a single trial for various offenses. The central issue pertained to the application of Section 31 and the possibility of awarding consecutive life sentences.

Issues:

Whether consecutive life sentences could be awarded for a series of murders tried in a single trial.

Applicability of Section 31 in cases of life imprisonment.

Whether the court could direct life sentence and term sentences to run consecutively.

Held:

Section 31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is applicable only when a person is convicted at one trial for two or more offenses. The court can sentence the offender to punishments for the committed offenses, and these sentences can run consecutively unless the court directs otherwise. The section does not necessitate sending the offender for trial before a higher court solely based on the aggregate punishment.( Paragraph 7)

Imprisonment for life is a sentence for the remainder of the offender's life unless commuted or remitted by a competent authority. Section 31(1) allows consecutive running of sentences only if they are not life sentences. Consecutive life sentences would be anomalous and irrational, given that humans have only one life to live.( Paragraph 17)

Section 427(2) of the Cr.P.C. carves out an exception to the general rule, recognizing that in the case of life sentences for two distinct offenses separately tried and proved, the sentences cannot be directed to run consecutively.( Paragraph 20)

Section 31(2) deals with situations where the court awarding consecutive sentences is not competent to award the aggregate punishment. This provision is not applicable to cases tried by the Sessions Court, and it does not forbid a direction for consecutive running of sentences awardable by the Court of Session.( Paragraph 25)

The court has the power to direct the order in which sentences will run. It can legitimately direct that the prisoner undergo the term sentence before the commencement of his life sentence. However, the converse is not true, as directing the life sentence to start first would imply that the term sentence runs concurrently.( Paragraph 32)