Facts:

Anil Kumar was convicted under Section 22 of the NDPS Act and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment and fine.

He was later convicted under Section 27(b)(ii) and Section 28 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, and sentenced to imprisonment and fine.

An appeal was filed seeking concurrent running of sentences.

Issues:

Whether concurrent sentences should be ordered under Section 427 of the CrPC.

Held:

The power conferred on the Court under Section 427 Cr.P.C. to order concurrent sentence is discretionary.

Whether or not the discretion is to be exercised in directing sentences to run concurrently would depend upon the nature of the offence/offences and the facts and circumstances of each case.

In the present case, the appellant was earlier convicted under Section 22 NDPS Act and subsequently convicted under Section 27(b)(ii) and Section 28 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.

Considering the nature of the offences for which the appellant was convicted and the facts and circumstances of the case, we deem it appropriate to direct that the sentences imposed on the appellant in FIR No.37 and Complaint No.638 shall run concurrently.

The substantive sentences imposed on the appellant are ordered to run concurrently and the appeal is thus allowed.

Facts:

The appellant, S. Muthu Kumaran, was inducted into the Indian Army in 1994.

He was alleged to be involved in a fraudulent recruitment racket and obtaining illegal gratification during his posting in Jammu and Kashmir in 2006.

Despite denial and subsequent reply, the appellant's services were terminated under Section 20(3) of the Army Act read with Rule 17 of the Army Rules.

The appellant approached the Armed Forces Tribunal challenging his dismissal, but his application was dismissed.

Issues:

Whether the dismissal of the appellant from service was justified.

Whether the punishment could be modified considering the appellant's long and unblemished service.

Held:

The dismissal of the appellant from service was within the powers of the authorities under Section 20(3) of the Army Act coupled with Rule 17 of the Army Rules.

However, considering the appellant's long and unblemished service of more than 17 years, the extreme punishment of dismissal could be modified.

The modification of the punishment from dismissal to discharge from service would allow the appellant to receive benefits such as gratuity and other attendant benefits for his service rendered, while not affecting his ability to seek employment outside the army.

Therefore, the Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal and directed the respondents to release benefits available to the appellant for his service in the army. No costs were ordered.

Facts:

Meera Santosh Pal, a 22-year-old appellant, approached the Court seeking permission to undergo medical termination of her pregnancy due to fetal anencephaly, a condition incompatible with extra-uterine life.

A Medical Board was constituted to evaluate the petitioner's medical condition.

Issues:

Whether the petitioner should be permitted to terminate her pregnancy due to the fetal condition and potential risks to her life.

Held:

The Court considered the petitioner's plea for medical termination of her pregnancy in light of the fetal condition and potential risks to her life. The Medical Board confirmed that continuation of the pregnancy posed grave risks to the physical and mental health of the petitioner. [Para 4]

Referring to the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 and the Supreme Court's precedent in Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration (2009) 9 SCC 1, which recognizes a woman's right to make reproductive choices as part of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution, the Court emphasized the importance of a woman's consent in matters of termination of pregnancy. [Para 9]

The Court, therefore, deemed it appropriate to allow the petitioner to terminate her pregnancy. The Solicitor General did not oppose this decision. [Para 12]

The termination of pregnancy was to be conducted by the hospital's doctors under the supervision of the Medical Board, maintaining complete records of the procedure. [Para 13]

The writ petition was allowed, permitting the petitioner to undergo medical termination of her pregnancy. The petitioners did not press other prayers mentioned in the petition. [Para 14-16]

Facts:

The case involves challenges by telecom service providers to the terms and conditions set by the Central Government for spectrum auction in 2015, particularly regarding minimum bidding criteria and capping. The Notice Inviting Application (NIA) outlined these conditions. Various aspects of the auction procedure, including spectrum allocation and eligibility criteria, were under scrutiny.

Issues:

The validity of the tender conditions imposed by the Central Government and whether they infringed upon the constitutional rights of the telecom service providers, particularly concerning Article 14.

Additionally, the role of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) recommendations in shaping government policy and the interpretation of the NIA's clauses were in contention.

Held:

The Court held that the challenge to the tender conditions was not tenable. The minimum spectrum requirement was deemed reasonable and aligned with the objective of ensuring efficient service provision.

The concept of legitimate expectation was deemed inapplicable in this case unless there was an abuse of power by the State.

The Court emphasized limited judicial review in complex auction procedures, intervening only in cases of obnoxious arbitrariness or extraneous considerations.

TRAI recommendations were considered non-binding but deserving of due weightage by the Central Government.

The interpretation of the NIA was subject to contractual principles, and the Court would not compel the State to interpret clauses in a particular way.

Spectrum allocation and capping were upheld as measures to prevent monopolies and promote healthy competition, benefiting consumers.

The auction structure and procedure were deemed within the discretion of the Department of Telecommunications (DoT), considering factors like spectrum availability and market competition.

Changes in auction procedures were found not to violate legitimate expectations if they served the public interest and revenue maximization.

Facts:

The Armed Forces Tribunal allowed applications by doctors seeking DACP, relying on a previous decision.

However, the factual position regarding DACP's applicability to AMC cadre doctors wasn't adequately presented to the tribunal or the court.

Issues:

Whether the DACP scheme is applicable to medical doctors serving as Commissioned Officers in the AMC cadre of the Armed Forces.

Held:

The court recognized the importance of examining the applicability of DACP to Commissioned Officers of the Armed Forces due to significant financial and structural ramifications.

The AMC cadre officers' service conditions differ from other Commissioned Officers, and extending DACP to them might create an anomalous situation.

The previous tribunal decision didn't conclusively determine DACP's applicability to AMC cadre doctors but directed authorities to consider implementing DACP in accordance with the law.

The case is remanded to the tribunal for reconsideration, instructing both parties to present their arguments and relevant documents afresh.

The tribunal should reassess the matter without being influenced by previous observations or decisions.

Both parties are allowed to submit additional pleadings and documents to the tribunal.

The appellants are instructed to file a comprehensive affidavit explaining why DACP shouldn't be extended to AMC cadre doctors, and respondents are given the opportunity to respond.

A writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution is disposed of, granting the petitioner the option to intervene in the remanded proceedings or file a fresh Original Application for the relief sought.

Facts:

The appellant owned agricultural land which the Government of Kerala sought to acquire for the development of Techno Park. The acquisition process was initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and the appellant agreed to sell the land to Techno Park for a negotiated compensation amount.

Issues:

Whether the appellant was entitled to exemption under Section 10(37) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, considering the nature of the acquisition.

Held:

The Court determined that the acquisition of the land was compulsory as all procedures under the Land Acquisition Act were followed. It emphasized that the negotiations for compensation were solely regarding the quantum of compensation and did not alter the compulsory nature of the acquisition.( Para 9)

The Court overruled the judgment of the Kerala High Court in Info Park Kerala vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, stating that the mere execution of sale deeds does not change the compulsory nature of acquisition if statutory procedures are followed.( Para 10)

Consequently, the Court allowed the appellant's appeal and quashed the proceedings initiated by the Income Tax Department under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act.( Para 11)

Facts:

The petitioners filed interlocutory applications seeking the constitution of a Special Investigation Team (SIT) to investigate alleged unlawful activities based on incriminating documents recovered during raids on the premises of Aditya Birla Group and Sahara Group.

The materials presented by the petitioners included documents indicating suspicious transactions and possible involvement of influential personalities and corporate entities in unlawful activities.

Issues:

Whether the materials presented by the petitioners are sufficient to warrant the constitution of an SIT and direction for investigation.

Whether the documents provided have legal admissibility and evidentiary value.

Held:

The court held that the materials presented lacked legal admissibility and evidentiary value as they did not conform to the requirements of Section 34 of the Indian Evidence Act.

The documents provided were not maintained in the regular course of business and were deemed unreliable by the concerned authorities.

The Income Tax Settlement Commission had found the transactions noted in the documents to be doubtful and lacking evidentiary value.

Considering the principles laid down in previous cases such as C.B.I. v. V.C. Shukla and Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh, the court emphasized the importance of reliable and admissible evidence in initiating investigations.

Therefore, the court dismissed the interlocutory applications, finding no merit in them.

Facts:

The appellant was charged with the murder of Anusha Sarkar and her mother Maya Sarkar under IPC Sections 302 and 34.

The prosecution alleged a motive based on a love affair between A1 and Anusha, leading to A1's desire to eliminate Anusha and her mother.

The appellant's involvement was based on circumstantial evidence, including the recovery of blood-stained clothes, a laptop, and fingerprints.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution proved the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Whether the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to establish the appellant's involvement in the crime.

Held:

The court concluded that there was no direct evidence linking the appellant to the crime and that the prosecution failed to establish a clear motive for his involvement (Paragraphs 6-8).

It was held that the recovery of blood-stained clothes and a laptop from the appellant's house was not sufficient to establish his guilt, as the evidence did not directly pertain to the commission of the crime (Paragraphs 6-8).

The court found the fingerprint evidence unreliable, as one crucial print was missing and others were inconclusive (Paragraph 10).

Based on the above factors, the court held that the appellant should be given the benefit of the doubt, and his conviction was set aside (Paragraph 11).

Facts:

The appellant, United Finance Corporation, purchased property through a court auction sale as a decree-holder.

The sale was made absolute on June 1, 2002, and a sale certificate was issued on March 17, 2003.

The respondent, M.S.M. Haneefa, the judgment-debtor, filed applications to set aside the auction sale, which were dismissed by the executing court.

The respondent also filed a revision before the High Court, which was dismissed on July 9, 2003.

The appellant filed an application under Order 21, Rule 95 CPC for delivery of possession on August 30, 2003.

Issues:

Whether the application filed under Order 21, Rule 95 CPC for delivery of possession was barred by limitation.

Determination of the date from which the limitation period should be reckoned for filing such an application.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the application for delivery of possession was not barred by limitation. It concluded that the sale became absolute only when the revision filed by the judgment-debtor was disposed of on July 9, 2003.

Therefore, since the application for delivery of possession was filed on August 30, 2003, which was well within one year from the date the sale became absolute, the Court ruled that it was not barred by limitation.

The Court set aside the High Court's order and directed the Executing Court to restore the application and dispose of it in accordance with the law.