Courts Must Convict Only When Allegation Is Proven Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Delhi High Court Acquits Rape Accused Over Delayed, Contradictory Testimony

“It is a settled principle that when two views are possible — one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other towards his innocence — the view favourable to the accused must be adopted.” —  Delhi High Court acquitted a man convicted for rape and criminal intimidation under Sections 376(2)(n) and 506 IPC, holding that the prosecution failed to establish the allegations beyond reasonable doubt. In Nathu v. State, the Court found that the sole testimony of the prosecutrix was inconsistent and riddled with material improvements, and the delay in lodging the FIR remained unexplained. It ruled that the benefit of doubt must go to the accused, especially in the absence of medical or forensic corroboration.

The appeal was filed by Nathu, challenging his conviction by the Trial Court in SC No. 216/2018, where he had been sentenced to ten years of rigorous imprisonment under Section 376(2)(n) IPC and one year simple imprisonment under Section 506 IPC.

The case stemmed from a complaint by the prosecutrix, a young woman from the same neighbourhood, who alleged that the appellant repeatedly called her to his house under the pretext of playing Ludo, and on four to five occasions over six months, sexually assaulted her without consent. The last incident allegedly took place in October or November 2017. The complainant disclosed these events only after she developed abdominal pain, was diagnosed pregnant, and taken to the doctor by her sister-in-law in January 2018. An FIR was filed on 30.01.2018.

The appellant denied all charges, claiming false implication due to property disputes and asserting that the relationship, if any, was consensual.

The Court reiterated the principle from Sadashiv Ramrao Hadbe v. State of Maharashtra [(2006) 10 SCC 92]: “The accused could be convicted on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if it is capable of inspiring confidence… The courts shall be extremely careful in accepting the sole testimony… when the entire case is improbable and unlikely to happen.”

On delay, the Court was categorical: “The prosecutrix alleged repeated acts of sexual assault… Yet, the FIR was lodged only on 30.01.2018… There is no explanation offered for why she did not approach the authorities earlier, despite being an adult, educated, and living in the company of her family.”

Citing Parkash Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh [(2019) 5 SCC 628], the Court noted that delay, especially in absence of resistance, leads to loss of crucial forensic evidence. It held:

“The conduct of proceeding against the appellant only after the discovery of the pregnancy gives rise to a strong inference that the FIR was not the result of a spontaneous or genuine complaint of rape, but rather a reaction to the perceived social stigma of an out-of-wedlock pregnancy.”

“Prosecutrix’s Testimony Marred by Inconsistencies, Delayed Allegations of Threats”

One of the key concerns was the evolution of the prosecutrix’s narrative. Initially, in her Section 164 CrPC statement and complaint, there was no mention of any threat or coercion. It was only during her deposition in Court that she introduced the claim of threats to kill her parents and brother.

“This amounts to a material improvement, an afterthought that diminishes the credibility of her testimony.”

The Court cited Sajid v. State [2013 SCC OnLine Del 895] to emphasize that: “Although the Courts do not insist on corroboration of the testimony of the victim… it would be difficult to rely on her testimony without corroboration particularly when the explanation for the delay… is not very convincing.”

Moreover, the prosecutrix admitted during cross-examination that she had developed affectionate feelings toward the appellant and used to voluntarily visit his house for over a year. No complaints were made during this period, not even to her family.

“DNA Proves Paternity, Not Absence of Consent” — Court Cautions Against Misreading Evidence

Although a DNA report confirmed that the appellant fathered the prosecutrix’s child, the Court made it clear: “The DNA report merely proves paternity—it does not and cannot, by itself, establish the absence of consent. Mere proof of sexual relations, even if resulting in pregnancy, is insufficient to prove rape unless it is also shown that the act was non-consensual.”

The absence of any physical injury, medical signs of coercion, or evidence of force further weakened the prosecution’s case.

Conviction Under Section 506 IPC Also Set Aside: “Threat Must Be Real, Proximate, and Capable of Causing Alarm”

The Court scrutinized the charge of criminal intimidation under Section 506 IPC and found that: “Neither the initial complaint nor the Section 164 CrPC statement mentions any threat… It is only during her deposition before the Trial Court—after a significant lapse of time—that she added that the appellant had threatened to kill her family.”

The Court held that such uncorroborated improvements could not be the basis for conviction: “The law does not permit conviction on the basis of improved statements that were never tested or supported through contemporaneous conduct or evidence.”

In a deeply reasoned judgment, the High Court concluded: “The solemn duty of a criminal court is not to convict merely because an allegation is made, but to convict only when the allegation is proven beyond reasonable doubt.”

Finding the prosecutrix's testimony inconsistent and lacking corroboration, the Court acquitted the appellant of all charges.

“The evidence led by the prosecution does not meet the standard of proof required… The benefit of doubt must, and does, go to the appellant.”

Date of Decision: 20 March 2025