Facts:

The respondents, plaintiffs in this case, asserted that the appellants approached them for the sale of the suit property and franchisee rights in relation to the running business of an automobile company ('T'). An agreement for the sale was allegedly concluded, with the respondents having paid Rs. 5 crores as part of the consideration. The appellants disputed the validity of the agreement, alleging forgery and fabrication.

Issues:

The alleged fabrication of the agreement, the dispute over the receipt of Rs. 3 crores, and the respondents' claim for specific performance.

Held:

The Court held that the admissions made by the appellants did not amount to categorical and unconditional admissions, especially considering their contention that certain pages of the agreement were tampered with. Mere admission of entering into an arrangement or contract could not be isolated from the appellants' objections regarding the fabrication of specific pages.( Para 33)

Given that the suit was filed in 2006, and the trial had commenced by 2010, the Court found no justification to decree the suit at the current stage. The Court emphasized the presence of serious factual disputes and the appellants' defense, making it inappropriate for a roving inquiry at this juncture.( Para 37)

The Court highlighted the equitable and discretionary nature of the relief sought (specific performance) and the necessity for the plaintiffs to prove readiness and willingness. The lack of an initial averment in the plaint and subsequent amendments raised concerns about the plaintiffs' conduct. A judgment in a referenced case supported the appellants' plea.( Para 38)

Concluding, the Court found the High Court's decision to be in error, decreeing the suit based on an application under Order XII, Rule 6 of CPC. The impugned judgment was set aside.( Para 40)

Facts:

The prosecution alleged that the accused were involved in selling fake foreign currency notes, and the appellant, accused no.4, was implicated based on statements made by co-accused during the investigation.

Issues:

The appellant's plea for discharge, arguing the lack of material evidence against him, primarily relying on the statements of co-accused. The legality of these statements in light of Section 25 of the Evidence Act and Sections 161 and 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was a central issue.

Held:

The Court emphasized that at the stage of framing charges, it must ensure that a case is made out for the accused to stand trial. The absence of material evidence, coupled with the co-accused being absconding, led the Court to conclude that the order framing charges against the appellant should be set aside, and he is entitled to discharge (Para 21, 47, 48, 50).

Section 25 of the Evidence Act renders confessions made to a police officer inadmissible. The Court clarified that even if a statement contains an admission, if made during the investigation to a police officer, it would not be admissible under Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Paras 25, 40, 41, 44, 46).

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order framing charges against the appellant and granting him the right to discharge.

Facts:

The respondent, a public limited company, was allotted a commercial plot by the appellant, Delhi Development Authority (DDA). A perpetual lease deed was executed, and subsequently, a demerger scheme was approved by the Company Judge, transferring assets to another company (respondent no.2). DDA demanded payment for UEI and misuse charges, leading to a legal challenge.

Issues:

Validity of DDA's demand for UEI and misuse charges.

Whether the transfer falls under the stipulations of the Lease Deed.

Applicability of DDA's policy and instructions in the case of a demerger.

Held:

The Company Judge's order clearly stated the transfer of property, assets, rights, and powers to respondent no.2. Compliance with clause 6(a) of the Lease Deed, including obtaining prior written consent and paying UEI, is mandatory for such transfers. The High Court misinterpreted clause 2(d) of DDA's policy in declaring it inapplicable to a demerger case.

The central clause is 6(a) of the Lease Deed, emphasizing the necessity of complying with the lessor's terms. Commonality of directors/shareholders does not exempt the transferor from UEI obligations. Clause 2(d) of the policy reinforces the charge of UEI irrespective of commonality in directorship and the name continuity of the parent company.

The order of demerger establishes a case of transfer, and respondents, not falling under specified categories, are liable to pay UEI as per clause 6(a) of the Lease Deed. The High Court erred in setting aside the demand, which was valid as per the Lease Deed.

The transfer of the subject plot from respondent no.1 to respondent no.2 is evident. The involvement of the same set of directors/shareholders in both companies does not absolve respondent no.1 from the obligations outlined in clause 6(a) of the Lease Deed. The Single Judge's decision is reinstated.

Facts:

The Appellant filed a complaint about an unauthorized building used for rubber sheet production. The matter went to Lok Adalat, resulting in an award requiring the respondent to demolish the structure within three months. The Executing Court, based on the appellant's plea, directed the removal of the structure. The respondent contended that the temporary shed was already demolished, and he had permission for a new structure.

Issues:

The interpretation of the Lok Adalat award, the validity of the respondent's new structure, and the appellant's concerns about potential pollution from rubber sheet-making machinery.

Held:

The High Court held that the Lok Adalat award didn't prevent the respondent from constructing a new structure with due permission. It also rejected the appellant's claim of a permanent prohibition on construction. The High Court granted the appellant the liberty to address pollution concerns through appropriate legal channels.

Decision: The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, emphasizing that the Lok Adalat's scope was limited to removing the existing structure. No prohibition was imposed on legitimate activities, and any violations could be addressed through relevant authorities.

Facts:

An oil tanker collided with a car, resulting in the death of 'RSJ' who was accompanied by his wife and children. The claimants, parents of the deceased and his wife and minor children, filed claims stating the deceased's age, occupation, salary, and prospects before the accident. The Tribunal awarded compensation, later enhanced by the High Court.

Issues:

The Tribunal's assessment errors, calculation of multiplicand, and failure to consider future prospects. Comparison with the principles established in the Pranay Sethi case.

The High Court's modification of the compensation and interest component. The deduction of an ex-gratia amount received by claimants.

Held:

The Tribunal's award suffered from fundamental errors, particularly in the assessment of multiplicand, deviating from the principles in the Pranay Sethi case.

The High Court's assessment, though slightly deviating in the enhancement of future prospects, remained in conformity with the principles in Pranay Sethi, and no modification was considered necessary.

The ex-gratia amount received by the claimants was not under any specific service rules, distinguishing it from the Shashi Sharma case. No deduction in the amount awarded by the High Court was deemed necessary.

The Tribunal's interest rate of 12% was deemed too high; the High Court's modification to 7.5% was considered reasonable.

The amount receivable by the claimants, as per the High Court's judgment, was upheld as just compensation, and no interference was warranted.

Accordingly, both these appeals fail, and are dismissed.

FACTS:

The incident occurred on 1st July 1987 in Village Prempara-Rampara, where the appellants caused injuries to Bhura Govind and Lakha Arjan, leading to their death.

The cause of the occurrence was a dispute over the right of way, as the appellants were not giving way to the deceased.

ISSUES:

Whether the appellants acted in self-defense.

Whether the injuries inflicted were in the right of private defense.

Whether the conviction under Section 302 of IPC is justified.

HELD:

The right of private defense is not available when the alleged assailants are unarmed. The appellants were armed with spears and other weapons, while the deceased were unarmed.

Multiple stab wounds on vital parts of the deceased indicate pre-meditation, ruling out the argument of a sudden fight.

The injuries on the deceased were not consistent with a right of private defense, justifying the conviction under Section 302 of IPC.

DECISION: The criminal appeal is dismissed, upholding the conviction under Sections 302 and 324 of IPC.

REFERRED CASES:

Decided on : 23-04-2019

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Sections 302, 304 and 324 - Murder - Appeal against conviction and sentence - Deceased had multiple stab wounds on the chest - Since there are multiple wounds, it cannot be said that the appellants have acted at the spur of the moment without pre-meditation and that the appellants are not taken any advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner - It is not a case of single injury which one can infer on account of sudden fight - Not find any merit in the alternate argument that the appellants are entitled to be convicted under Section 304 IPC as they have given multiple injuries on the vital parts of the deceased - Trial Court as well as the High Court was perfectly justified in law in convicting and sentencing the appellants for the offence under Section 302 IPC - Appeal dismissed.

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Sections 302, 304 and 324 - Murder - Right of Private defence - Appellants have lodged cross First Information Report - There is no evidence on the part of the appellants that the deceased were armed with any weapon in the first version, when they lodged report. The right of private defence is not available when the alleged assailants are unarmed. The right of private defence is to protect the person and the property. In such right, the person cannot cause more harm than what is necessary for the protection of the person and the property. What harm can be expected from the hands of the deceased when they were un-armed, whereas from the testimony of PW-3 and PW-4, the injured witnesses, the appellants were armed with spears and other weapons. The Post-Mortem report corroborates an oral testimony that both the deceased have received stab wounds. Therefore, the appellants cannot be said to have acted in the right of their private defence.

Counsel for Appearing Parties

Mr. Ravi Prakash Mehrotra, Advocate, Mr. Ankit Agarwal, Advocate and Ms. Deepti R. Mehrotra, Advocate, for the Appellant; Ms. Hemantika Wahi, Advocate and Ms. Puja Singh, Advocate, for the Respondent.

Facts:

The appellant's predecessor, Shri Bona Menezes, applied for occupancy rights over various parcels of land.

Landlord raised objections, specifically in relation to Survey No. 119/2A1, claiming it as 'Punja' land not leased to the applicant.

Issues:

Whether the land in Survey No. 119/2A1 qualifies as agricultural land under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961?

Whether the Land Tribunal's findings regarding possession and usage of the land were justified?

Held:

The High Court, on appeal, set aside the Land Tribunal's order, emphasizing that Punja land, if not brought under cultivation, cannot be classified as agricultural. The court also questioned the establishment of lawful tenancy and landlord-tenant relationship based on mere possession.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order. It remanded the case for reconsideration, noting that the High Court seemed to have overlooked relevant aspects and legal definitions. The Court directed the High Court to decide the writ petition afresh, emphasizing the broad definition of "land" under Section 2(18) of the Act of 1961.

Facts: The appellant, Globe Ground India Employees Union, raised an industrial dispute over the closure of their establishment and retrenchment by M/s Globe Ground India. The issue was referred to the Industrial Tribunal by the Central Government. The appellant claimed that the new company formed after closure, Bird Worldwide Flight Services Ltd., utilized the same equipment and retained most employees, alleging violation of labor laws.

Issues:

Whether the closure and retrenchment actions by M/s Globe Ground India were legal under the Industrial Disputes Act. The appellant sought reinstatement and benefits for the retrenched workers.

Held:

The court examined the corporate structure, noting that the first respondent, Lufthansa German Airlines, had a subsidiary (Globe Ground Deutschland GmbH) holding shares in the second respondent (Globe Ground India Pvt. Ltd.). The appellant argued the first respondent's involvement based on corporate relationships.

Decision: The court held that, considering the limited scope of adjudication under Section 10(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the first respondent was neither a necessary nor a proper party in answering the reference. The closure and retrenchment actions were found to be within legal bounds. The appeals were dismissed.

Facts:

The respondents allege that their father mortgaged the property for Rs. 2500 through a Deed (Ex.P-73) with a condition to repurchase within five years. The appellants argue that the transaction was a sale with a condition to repurchase. The trial court dismissed the suit, stating the debtor-creditor relationship wasn't established. The first Appellate Court reversed this decision, affirming that Ex.P-73 was a mortgage by conditional sale.

Issues:

Whether the document (Ex.P-73) should be classified as a "mortgage by conditional sale" or a "sale with a condition to repurchase."

Held:

By examining Ex.P-73, it's evident that the father of respondents borrowed Rs. 700 eight days before its execution, and this amount was adjusted from the total consideration of Rs. 2500. The intention of the parties was to terminate the debtor-creditor relationship, creating a vendor-vendee relationship. The document established a conditional sale with an option to repurchase within five years.

The mention of "borrowed a sum of Rs. 700" in the document is incidental. The recitals make it clear that the parties intended to end the debtor-creditor relationship and establish a vendor-vendee relationship. There is no mention of essential mortgage elements like interest rate or foreclosure in Ex.P-73.

The receipt Ex.P-69 cannot be relied upon as corroborative evidence of part payment. The burden of proving its genuineness was not discharged by the plaintiffs, and it cannot establish that Ex.P-73 is a "mortgage by conditional sale."

Despite the transaction and repurchase condition being in one document, Ex.P-73 does not fall within the proviso to Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act. It is a sale with a condition to repurchase, and the respondents lost their right to repurchase due to non-payment within the stipulated period.

The appeals are allowed.