Facts:

The appellant, a landlord, challenged the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court, which set aside the eviction order passed by the Rent Tribunal and the Appellate Rent Tribunal. The dispute involved the arrears of rent demanded by the landlord and the tenant's contention that the rent paid was sufficient.

Issues:

Whether the tenant could unilaterally revise the rent based on Section 6 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001?

Whether the tenant's payment covered the demanded arrears, preventing eviction under Section 9(a)?

Held:

The Court examines the statutory scheme of Act 2001, noting changes from the previous Act of 1950. Section 6 is highlighted, emphasizing the landlord's right to seek revision of rent under this section.( Para 7)

The Court considers the tenant's argument to re-determine the rent as per Section 6, concluding that the tenant cannot unilaterally revise the rent and must follow the procedure outlined in Section 6.( Para 14)

Addressing the High Court's observation, the Court reaffirms that the landlord cannot claim a revision of rent exceeding 5% after the enforcement of Act 2001.( Para 18)

The Court clarifies that if the landlord does not invoke Section 6, the agreed rent between the parties remains, and the tenant cannot unilaterally reduce it.( Para 20)

The Court criticizes the High Court for not appreciating the true import of Sections 6 and 7, stating that the tenant is, indeed, in default.( Para 21)

Analyzing Section 9(a) of the Act, the Court explains that the tenant's payment must cover the arrears demanded by the notice for the last four months to avoid eviction.( Para 23)

Reiterating the tenant's default, the Court asserts that the demanded arrears, despite partial payment, establish a valid ground for eviction under Section 9(a).( Para 24)

Facts:

Dispute arises from a civil suit for specific performance filed in 1982.

Plaintiffs allege breach of agreement by defendant No.1 (Amar Nath).

Legal representatives involved due to deaths during the pendency.

Trial court dismissed the suit, finding Amar Nath incompetent to sell joint family property.

First Appellate Court reversed, decreeing plaintiffs' suit.

High Court upheld the decision.

Appeal before the Supreme Court challenges these findings.

Issues:

Competence of Amar Nath to sell joint family property.

Validity of sale to defendant Nos. 2 and 3.

Readiness and willingness of plaintiffs to perform the agreement.

Inclusion of all legal representatives in the appeal.

Held:

The finding on readiness and willingness is crucial; once recorded, it's binding unless proven against pleadings or evidence. No challenge raised during the first appellate stage.( Para 19)

Majority of legal representatives already on record, no conflict of interest. No objection raised in the first appeal, making inclusion unnecessary.( Para 26)

Legal representatives failed to challenge the concurrent finding that the sale to defendant Nos. 2 and 3 was collusive. Conclusive finding binds this Court.( Para 34)

Amar Nath's agreement was binding on legal heirs; no objection raised, indicating consent.( Para 43)

Decree modification for justice. Return of Rs. 48,000 to defendants, execution of sale deed, and deposit of Rs. 41,000 to plaintiffs.( Para 48-49)

Appeal disposed with directions for enforcement; parties entitled to execute decree in case of default.( Para 54)

Facts:

The appellant, Satya Raj Singh, was accused of murdering Bhaiya alias Narendra.

The incident occurred on 19.09.1999 around 7 p.m. in village Imaliya.

The Additional Sessions Judge convicted Satya Raj Singh under Section 302/34 IPC, while the other two accused were acquitted.

Issues:

The appellant challenged the judgment on the grounds of the delayed lodging of the FIR and the credibility of eyewitness testimony.

Held:

The High Court rightly rejected the argument that the delayed FIR made the prosecution case doubtful.

The evidence of eyewitnesses (PW-1, PW-3, PW-2, PW-6, PW-4) established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant assaulted the deceased.

No major contradictions were found in the witnesses' testimony, and their accounts were consistent.

The delay in lodging the FIR was deemed reasonable due to the circumstances of the incident occurring at night, and the Police Station being 25 KM away.

The appellant's appeal was found devoid of merit, and the conviction was upheld.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed.

Facts:

The case involved the challenge to the validity of certain High Court Rules (rr. 14A to 14D) inserted in 2016, which conferred the power on the High Court to debar an advocate from practicing. The rules were questioned on the grounds that they impinged upon the independence of the Bar and exceeded the powers conferred by Section 34 of the Advocates Act.

Issues:

Validity of High Court Rules granting power to debar advocates.

Whether Section 34 of the Advocates Act authorizes the High Court to frame rules for disciplinary control.

Implications of the rules on the independence of the Bar and encroachment on the powers of Bar Councils.

Held:

The Advocates Act, 1961, emphasizes the independence of the Bar, ensuring the autonomy of Bar Councils to maintain the rule of law. The judiciary relies on an independent Bar for a strong judicial system. The High Court Rules in question were challenged as exceeding the powers granted by Section 34, and it was asserted that the Act never intended to confer disciplinary powers on the High Court.( Para 1-13)

The significance of an independent Bar in upholding fundamental rights, rule of law, and ensuring the proper functioning of various institutions was highlighted.( Para 16)

The Bar is integral to judicial administration, and the mutual reverence between the Bar and the Bench is essential for the effective functioning of the judiciary. Independent Bar and Bench form the backbone of democracy.( Para 18-21)

The Advocates Act entrusts the ethical standards of the legal profession to Bar Councils. The power to discipline lawyers is vested in the Disciplinary Committees of Bar Councils, and an appeal lies to the Supreme Court under Section 38 of the Act.( Para 31-32)

A bar association is considered independent when it is mostly free from external influence, ensuring the regulation of the legal profession and the right of lawyers to join the association.( Para 36)

Section 34 of the Advocates Act does not confer disciplinary powers upon the High Court. The High Court may prescribe conditions to practice, but disciplinary control is beyond its purview.( Para 40)

The High Court has the authority to regulate practice under Section 34, but disciplinary control, including the framing of rules for debarment, is not within its ambit.( Para 44-51)

The High Court faced a grave situation necessitating security measures due to advocates' misconduct. The Court acknowledged its power under the Contempt of Courts Act to address such situations.( Para 66-70)

The Disciplinary Committee of Bar Councils is urged to improve its functioning to maintain the independence of the Bar, as its failure could be supervised by the courts.( Para 71)

In case of Bar Council inaction, the High Court can entertain writ petitions to issue appropriate directions for disciplinary action, but it cannot assume the disciplinary control envisioned under the Advocates Act.( Para 72)

Contempt of court must be used sparingly, and the judiciary should ensure fair administration of justice. Advocates should adhere to professional ethics and refrain from denigrating the judiciary in the media.( Para 74)

The separation of powers must be maintained, and attempts to malign the judiciary through unscrupulous means are detrimental to the independence of the system.( Para 75)

The Bar Council's duty to protect the nobility of the legal profession is highlighted, and the Court may supervise the Bar Council's non-performance or delayed performance of its duties.( Para 76)

The High Court's powers under the Contempt of Courts Act are emphasized, and it is urged not to assume disciplinary control, as it may compromise the independence of the Bar.( Para 77)

Facts:

The respondent (landlord) sought the eviction of the appellant (tenant) based on the bona fide need for personal residence and family.

The appellant argued that the execution of an agreement to sell terminated the landlord-tenant relationship.

Issues:

Whether the execution of an agreement to sell between a landlord and tenant automatically severs the lessor-lessee relationship.

Whether the landlord's claim for eviction based on bona fide need is justified.

Held:

Examines the applicability of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act and the intention of the parties regarding the termination of the lease.Discusses the legal principle established in Shah Mathuradas Maganlal & Co. vs. Nagappa Shankarappa Malage & Ors. regarding the surrender of lease .( Para 24-26)

Evaluates the Agreement to Sell dated 13.05.1993 to determine if it contains provisions indicating the surrender of tenancy rights.Concludes that the agreement does not manifest an intention to surrender the tenancy.( Para 33-38)

Affirms that the tenancy remains unaffected by the execution of the agreement to sell.Grants three months for the appellant to vacate the premises, subject to certain conditions.( Para 39-41)

FACTS:

Mr. Ramesh Sanka, the petitioner, is a former employee of Respondent No. 12, a Limited Company.

He worked as the CEO of the company from June 2014 to December 31, 2016.

The petitioner alleges financial irregularities by Respondent No. 12, its directors, and employees in their business dealings.

Allegations extend to other companies, individuals, and firms associated with Respondent No. 12 (Respondent Nos. 13 to 22, 24, and 25).

ISSUES:

Whether the petitioner can seek enforcement of personal contractual rights through a writ petition under Article 32.

Validity of the allegations made by the petitioner against Respondent No. 12 and others.

HELD:

The writ petitioner cannot seek relief under Article 32 for personal contractual matters. Civil suit or other civil law remedies are the appropriate avenues.

Ongoing civil suits between the parties should be pursued in accordance with the law.

The court refrains from expressing opinions on factual issues raised by the parties.

The dismissal of the writ petition does not influence ongoing inquiries or proceedings.

DECISION: The writ petition is dismissed, and the parties are directed to pursue their grievances through appropriate legal channels.

Facts:

The case involves the appointment of Adhoc Judges under Andhra Pradesh Judicial Services Rules, 2007, specifically Rule 6. The candidates, including Sunitha Busireddy and S. Sarada Devi, had secured marks close to the qualifying threshold in a written examination and viva voce for the purpose of regularizing their positions as Additional District and Session Judges.

Issues:

Whether the candidates qualified for the written examination and viva voce, considering the rounding off of marks.

Whether the imposition of minimum qualifying marks for viva voce was in accordance with the relevant Rules.

Held:

The Court observed that Sunitha Busireddy and S. Sarada Devi, with rounded-off marks, should be treated as having qualified both the written examination and interview.

The Court held that the decision of the Selection Committee imposing minimum qualifying marks for viva voce was illegal and arbitrary. The Court directed the High Court to conduct another examination within six months for candidates who fell short of aggregate qualifying marks.

Decision: The Court, exercising powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, directed the High Court to reevaluate the candidates' performance and conduct another examination. Sunitha Busireddy and S. Sarada Devi were deemed qualified, and the other candidates were given another chance to appear in the examination.

Facts:

The case involves allegations of cheating in the sale of agricultural land owned by a regimental Welfare Trust. The appellant, Brig. Sukhjeet Singh (Retd.), sought to introduce additional evidence, including a Trust Deed dated October 18, 1989, and Resolution No.112, during the appellate stage.

Issues:

Admissibility of additional evidence at the appellate stage.

Jurisdiction under Section 391 Cr.P.C. to accept additional evidence.

Allegations of malafide motive in filing applications for additional evidence.

Held:

The appellant filed an application under Section 391 Cr.P.C. to introduce a certified copy of the Trust Deed dated October 18, 1989, and Resolution No.112. The trial court had noted the availability of a photocopy of the Trust Deed but did not consider it proved.

The facts indicate that the prosecution took twelve years to present its evidence, leading to the appellant's conviction on October 7, 2013, for offenses under Section 420/34 IPC. The appellant filed a criminal appeal on October 8, 2013.

The Appellate Court rejected applications under Section 391 Cr.P.C., deeming them belated and filed with ulterior malafide motive. The High Court upheld this decision, but the Supreme Court found it unjustified.

Observations by the High Court that filing additional evidence was belated and for delaying the decision of the appeal were deemed misplaced and incorrect.

The second Trust Deed dated October 18, 1989, which was part of the record and referred to by the trial court, was not proved by the appellant. The application before the High Court sought to accept the certified copy and allow the appellant to lead evidence.

The Court emphasized that when necessary, taking additional evidence is not confined to a fixed formula but depends on the facts of each case. The lapse in proving the second Trust Deed was attributed to the appellant and his counsel.

The High Court's observation that the appellant intended to delay the appeal to eternity was criticized, given the twelve years taken by the prosecution to present evidence.

The Appellate Court erred in not exercising jurisdiction under Section 391 Cr.P.C. The Trust Deed and Resolution were crucial for understanding the conduct of the appellant and other trustees in the sale of agricultural land.

Facts:

Advertisement issued on 26 August 1991 for the post of Projectionist at Dr. S.N. Medical College and Associated Group of Hospitals.

Appellant appointed as Projectionist, challenged by the third respondent via a writ petition.

Main contention: Appellant lacked qualification as he did not possess a license for a cinema projector.

Issues:

Whether the appellant fulfilled the requirement of holding a license for a cinema operator on the last date for submission of applications.

Held:

The third respondent argued that Rule 68(2) of the Rajasthan Cinemas (Regulation) Rules, 1959, requires possessing a license. The Court examined Rule 68, emphasizing sub-rule (2)(f), which allows obtaining a certificate within three months from the date of appointment.( Para 11)

Clause (f) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 68 clarifies that possession of a license on the date of appointment is not mandatory. Acquisition within three months of the appointment is permissible. The appellant acquired the license after the date of his appointment, validly complying with the rule.( Para 13)

The Division Bench erred in setting aside the appellant's appointment, as he validly obtained the required license within the stipulated period. The appellant has served for 28 years.( Para 15)

The appeal is allowed, setting aside the High Court judgment. The writ petition filed by the third respondent stands dismissed.( Para 16)