Facts:

The appellant filed a petition under Section 23 of the Andhra Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 2001, seeking various reliefs.

A preliminary objection was raised regarding the jurisdiction of the court where the petition was filed.

The District Judge dismissed the preliminary objection, but a Revision Petition before the High Court was allowed, setting aside the District Judge's judgment.

The interpretation of "District Court concerned" under Section 23 of the Act was the subject of dispute.

Issues:

Whether the phrase "District Court concerned" in Section 23 refers only to the principal District Court of the place where the society is registered.

Whether the general principles of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to determine the jurisdiction of the District Court under the Act.

Held:

The Court held that the phrase "District Court concerned" under Section 23 of the Andhra Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 2001, should be interpreted in line with the general principles of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court reasoned that when a special enactment does not specify the territorial jurisdiction of a court, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure would apply. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the District Court should be determined based on the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The judgment referred to various precedents, including National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick & Bros. Ltd., emphasizing that when a statute directs an appeal to a court already established, the appeal must be regulated by the practice and procedure of that court.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court was set aside, and it was held that the District Court concerned, as mentioned in Section 23 of the Act, does not refer solely to the principal court of original jurisdiction of one particular place. The appeal was allowed.

Decided on : 16-08-2017

Counsel for Appearing Parties

Sridhar Potaraju, Prabhat Kumar, Ms. Ankita Sharma, Siddhartha Thalukdar, Advocates, for the Appellants; Y. Raja Gopala Rao, Y. Vismai Rao, K. Sharat Kumar, Ms. Savita Singh, Sibo Sankar Mishra, K. Subba Rao, Aniruddha P. Mayee, Abhay Pratap Singh, Vipin Nair, P.B. Suresh, Advocates, for the Respondents

Cases Referred

Stridewell Leathers P Ltd. Vs. Bhankerpur Simbhaoli Beverages P Ltd., (1994) 1 SCC 34

Secretary of State for India Vs. Chellikani Rama Rao, (1916) I.L.R. 39 Madras 617

National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. Vs. James Chadwick & Bros. Ltd., (1953) SCR 1028

National Telephone Co., Ltd. Vs. Postmaster-General, (1913) A.C. 546

R.M.A.R.A. Adaikappa Chettiar Vs. Ra. Chandrasekhara Thevar, (1947) 74 I.A. 264

Facts:

The petition (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 659 of 2007) was filed by the Environment and Consumer Protection Foundation, highlighting the appalling conditions faced by widows residing in Vrindavan.

The petition sought directions from the Union of India and the State of Uttar Pradesh to undertake measures for the rehabilitation of these widows, enabling them to lead lives with dignity.

Issues:

The court was to address the socio-economic challenges faced by widows in Vrindavan and other ashrams, particularly focusing on their rehabilitation and ensuring their rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Held:

The court acknowledged the social deprivation and ostracization faced by widows, particularly those residing in Vrindavan. It recognized the necessity for judicial intervention to address their plight and uphold principles of social justice .

Emphasizing the importance of utilizing the reports compiled by various authorities, the court directed the constitution of a committee to study these reports and formulate a comprehensive working plan for rehabilitation within a stipulated timeframe .

Additionally, the court highlighted the issue of widow remarriage as a potential solution to challenge societal stereotypes and empower widows. The committee was tasked with considering this matter during its deliberations .

The court underscored the significance of public interest litigation (PIL) in empowering economically weaker and socially disadvantaged groups. It affirmed that PILs serve to give voice to marginalized sections of society and protect their fundamental rights .

Further elucidating on the role of PILs, the court emphasized their focus on advocating for the rights of socially underprivileged groups who lack access to justice due to various barriers. It reiterated the importance of championing social justice for these marginalized populations .

Decision: In conclusion, the court directed the formation of a committee to devise a comprehensive rehabilitation plan for widows in Vrindavan, taking into account the suggestions from the reports submitted. It emphasized the need for proactive measures to address the social and economic challenges faced by widows and affirmed its commitment to upholding their dignity and rights.

Referred Cases in the above Judgment:

Decided on : 11-08-2017

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 21, Article 32

Counsel for Appearing Parties

Ravindra Bana, Advocate, for the Petitioner; Pragati Neekhra, Gurmeet Singh Makker, Anuvrat Sharma, Sushma Suri, Chanchal Kumar Ganguli, Aparna Bhat, S.K. Verma, M. Yogesh Kanna, Advocates, for the Respondents

Cases Referred

State of Uttaranchal Vs. Balwant Singh Chaufal, (2010) 3 SCC 402

Delhi Jal Board Vs. National Campaign for Dignity & Rights of Sewerage & Allied Workers, (2011) 8 SCC 568

People's Union for Democratic Rights Vs. Union of India, (1982) 3 SCC 235

Facts:

Sunder Marketing Associates formed a joint venture (JV) with Karamjeet Singh and Co. Ltd. (KJSL) to bid for a mining lease.

The JV won the bid but later sought cancellation of the contract or transfer of the lease to Sunder Marketing Associates alone.

Legal actions ensued, including a writ petition in the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the petitioner should be allowed to surrender the mining lease and under what conditions.

Compliance with relevant rules and regulations for surrendering mining contracts.

Held:

The Supreme Court criticized the irregularities in transferring the lease from the JV to Sunder Marketing Associates alone.

Compliance with Rules 25 and 41(v) of the Rules for surrendering mining contracts was mandated.

The petitioner was permitted to continue mining operations until November 30, 2017, with the obligation to implement a mine closure plan thereafter.

Continued payment of royalties until November 30, 2017, and settlement of all dues of employed persons were mandated.

The State Government was instructed to enforce all applicable laws, with the Chief Secretary held responsible for any lapses.

Any unrecovered security deposit was deemed forfeited to the state.

The petition for special leave was disposed of in accordance with the court's directives, modifying the High Court's judgment to reflect the specified terms.

Facts:

The suit property, previously used as 'Abadi', was declared 'Chakout' (outside the consolidation scheme).

One of the four co-tenure holders sold his share to the respondents.

The remaining three brothers filed a suit alleging the sale was void as permission from the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) was not obtained as required by Section 5(c)(ii) of the Act.

Trial court dismissed the suit, stating no permission was required since the land was outside the consolidation scheme.

First appellate court allowed the appeal, holding that Section 5(c)(ii) applied.

Defendants' second appeal was dismissed.

Issues:

Whether permission of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) was required for the sale of the suit property as per Section 5(c)(ii) of the Act?

Held:

The Court held that the purpose of the consolidation scheme is to consolidate agricultural holdings, excluding Abadi land and groves.

If land is not subject to consolidation proceedings, no permission is required for its transfer, even if it is part of the tenure holder's holding.

The suit property being 'Chakout', outside the consolidation scheme, did not require permission for sale, as clarified in para 8 of the judgment.

The appeal was dismissed, upholding the Single Judge's decision.

Facts:

The victim, allegedly raped by the accused 'P', was subjected to an acid attack during the pendency of the rape case. Despite her plight, there was a delay in filing the First Information Report (FIR). The High Court acquitted the accused on technical grounds, citing the delay in filing the FIR.

Issues:

Whether the delay in filing the FIR was justified given the victim's circumstances.

Whether the medical evidence supported the cause of death due to the acid attack.

Whether the failure to record a formal dying declaration affected the prosecution's case.

Whether the conduct of the treating doctor was professional and ethical.

Whether the trial court's conviction and sentencing were appropriate.

Held:

The Supreme Court criticized the High Court's focus on the delay in filing the FIR, emphasizing the victim's helpless situation and justifying the delay .

The medical evidence, including statements from treating doctors, corroborated the cause of death as burn injuries due to the acid attack .

While no formal dying declaration was recorded, the victim's statement in the FIR should have been treated as such, especially considering the circumstances .

The conduct of the treating doctor was deemed unprofessional for not allowing the recording of a dying declaration and inadequate maintenance of case history.

The Supreme Court overturned the High Court's acquittal, upholding the conviction of 'P'. However, the death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment considering various factors .

Decision: The conviction of 'P' was upheld, and the death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. The court emphasized the need for a fair trial, proper evaluation of evidence, and professionalism among medical practitioners.

Facts:

The case involved the promotion entitlements of ministerial cadre staff in the BSF.

Previous decisions regarding the creation of posts for ministerial cadre staff were not implemented.

A cadre review in 2003 led to the creation of posts for Assistant Commandants but not Deputy Commandants for the ministerial cadre.

Issues:

Whether the decision of 28.08.2000/31.08.2000 regarding promotion entitlements was superseded by the cadre review of 28.11.2003.

Whether the cadre review adequately addressed the promotion avenues for ministerial cadre staff.

Held:

The court held that the decision of 28.08.2000/31.08.2000 was superseded by the cadre review of 28.11.2003.

The court emphasized that it cannot interfere with the employer's decision regarding promotion avenues unless it's arbitrary or perverse.

The cadre review decision provided sufficient avenues for promotion for ministerial cadre staff up to the level of Assistant Commandant.

Consequently, the appeal by the Union of India was allowed, the judgment of the High Court was set aside, and the writ petition filed by the private respondents was dismissed.

Facts:

Section 260A was inserted into the Income Tax Act, 1961 in 1998, providing for statutory appeal against orders of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.

Initially, court fees for such appeals were fixed at Rs. 2,000, but this provision was later omitted, and court fees became payable as per the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959.

Section 52A was inserted into the 1959 Act in 2003, specifying the rates for court fees on such appeals.

The High Court held that appeals filed on or after October 26, 2002, would be governed by Section 52A of the 1959 Act.

Issues:

The determination of court fees payable on appeals filed under Section 260A of the IT Act.

Held:

The Supreme Court emphasized the substantive nature of the right to appeal, which accrues at the commencement of proceedings, and cannot be impaired by subsequent legislation unless expressly provided.

It held that Section 52A of the 1959 Act cannot be applied retrospectively to appeals filed before its enactment in 2003.

The court fees payable on appeals under Section 260A of the IT Act would be determined based on the law in force at the time of the assessment order or the decision of the appellate authority, as the case may be.

The appeals were allowed accordingly.

Facts:

Thirty-seven Assistant Sub-Inspectors, belonging to the Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe community, were appointed by the Government of Kerala during 1988.

These appointees were required to pass a special test conducted by the Kerala Public Service Commission for declaration of probation, but the test was not conducted for over twelve years.

The Government, recognizing the situation, passed an order invoking Rule 39 of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958, exempting these Assistant Sub-Inspectors from passing the test.

Issues:

The appellants challenged the Government Order before the High Court of Kerala, contending that under Rule 13AA, no exemption can be granted to members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes from passing tests prescribed for promotion in the Police Department.

They also argued that a Government Order dated 05.02.2000 specifically ruled out test exemption for certain categories of employees.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the Government Order granting exemption under Rule 39, emphasizing the importance of equity and justice in administrative decisions. The Court clarified that Rule 39 operates notwithstanding anything contained in the Rules or Special Rules, and it is an exception to the exemption under Rule 13AA. The Court cited previous decisions highlighting the importance of equity and justice in such matters, affirming the validity of the Government Order dated 17.11.2000.

Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the validity of the Government Order. The Court clarified that the judgment only addressed the issue of the validity of the Government Order, and any other grievances of the appellants should be pursued through appropriate proceedings before the appropriate forum.

Facts:

Agreement to sell property entered into between P. Savitri (Respondent) and B. Vijaya Bharathi (Appellant).

Partial payment made, but respondent backed out of executing General Power of Attorney (GPA).

Property subsequently sold to other parties, leading to Defendant No. 3 acquiring it.

Appellant filed suit for specific performance after being unable to obtain the property.

Issues:

Whether the appellant demonstrated readiness and willingness to perform their part of the agreement.

Whether the subsequent sale deeds executed by the respondent needed to be canceled for specific performance.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to dismiss the suit for specific performance due to the appellant's failure to demonstrate readiness and willingness and the absence of steps to cancel subsequent sale deeds. The court held that:

The appellant's inaction for nearly two years after the respondent's repudiation of the agreement indicated a lack of readiness and willingness .

The appellant's failure to seek cancellation of subsequent sale deeds executed by the respondent was necessary for specific performance .

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's judgment.