Facts:

The appellant filed a civil suit seeking declaration of title over certain properties. The dispute focused on a specific portion of land, referred to as "the suit land," which the appellant claimed was encroached upon by the respondents. The respondents asserted adverse possession as a defense, claiming ownership over the suit land.

Issues:

Whether the respondents had perfected their title over the suit land through adverse possession.

Held:

The court emphasized the classical requirement for adverse possession, stating that mere possession, no matter how long, does not necessarily imply adverseness to the true owner's title.( Paragraph 18)

Quoting precedents, the court outlined the elements of adverse possession, emphasizing the need for hostile, open, and exclusive possession for a sustained period. The burden of proving adverse possession lies with the party making such a claim.( Paragraph 20)

The court found that the lower courts were unjustified in holding that the respondents had perfected their title through adverse possession. It highlighted several reasons, including the absence of adversity or hostility between co-owners, failure of the respondents to prove their continuous and open assertion of ownership rights, and the lack of knowledge by the appellant about the extent of encroachment until 1983.( Paragraph 22)

The court noted that the appellant filed the suit within 12 years of discovering the encroachment in 1983, making the plea of adverse possession unavailable to the respondents.( Paragraph 24)

Consequently, the court set aside the impugned judgment, decreeing the appellant's suit in its entirety against the respondents. The respondents were granted three months to vacate the encroached portion and hand over possession to the appellant.( Paragraph 26)

Facts:

The dispute involves a building named "Moti Building" in the city of Jalna, consisting of four houses.

Defendant No.3 sold the property to Bansilal Shivlal in 1965.

A previous civil suit in 1971 resulted in a decree in favor of defendant Nos.1 and 2, declaring them as owners of the property.

The current suit challenges the previous decree and the sale deed, alleging it was ancestral property.

Issues:

Whether the current suit was barred by limitation.

Whether the suit was a collusive attempt to avoid execution of the previous valid decree.

The validity of the sale deed and the plaintiffs' claim to the ancestral property.

The binding nature of the previous decree on the current plaintiffs.

Held:

The findings of all three courts, including the Trial Court, first Appellate Court, and the High Court, were concurrent and deemed binding.

The suit was considered collusive, filed at the behest of defendant No.3 to avoid execution of the valid 1975 decree.

The sale of the property by defendant No.3 was found to be for legal necessity and the benefit of the family, binding on all family members, including the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs failed to prove their claim or that the sale was not for the benefit of the family.

The suit was dismissed as it was not filed for a bona fide cause but as a collusive attempt.

Facts:

The High Court of Delhi disposed of writ petition No. 5734 of 2016, challenging an order dated 30.06.2016 issued by the Union of India, based on a statement made by the counsel for the Union of India. The High Court did not delve into the merits of the case but set aside the order solely on the basis of the counsel's statement.

Issues:

The disposal of the writ petition without considering its merits. The appellant challenges this disposal, claiming it was based on incorrect briefing to the counsel for the Union of India.

Held:

The Court, after considering the application made by the Union of India, allows the appeal, sets aside the impugned order, and restores Writ Petition No. 5734 of 2016 to its original number before the High Court for fresh disposal on merits. The decision is based on the grounds that the High Court did not decide the writ petition on its merits but disposed of it based on an incorrect statement made by the counsel for the Union of India.

Decision: The application by the Union of India (IA No. 163521 of 2018) is allowed, and as a consequence, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order is set aside, and the writ petition is restored for fresh disposal on merits before the High Court.

Facts:

The appellants booked a residential apartment with the respondent developer in the "Adarsh Palm Retreat" project. The dispute arises from the booking amount, payment issues, and the subsequent cancellation of the allotment by the respondent.

Issues:

The dispute over the booking amount, the alleged reduction from 25% to 15%, the failure to execute necessary agreements, and the subsequent cancellation of the allotment by the respondent.

Held:

The court, after considering the correspondence between the parties, concludes that there was an agreement to reduce the booking amount from 25% to 15%. The court emphasizes the developer's obligation to enter into a written agreement for sale under Section 4 of the Karnataka Ownership Flats Act. It finds that the appellants' insistence on the execution of necessary documentation for loan disbursement was reasonable and consistent with statutory obligations.

Decision: The court allows the appeal and directs the appellants to pay the balance of the sale consideration, along with other charges. The developer is instructed to execute necessary agreements for title transfer. The court maintains the interim order until the completion of registration formalities.

Facts: The petitioner was sentenced to 7 years RI for an offense under Section 395 IPC, 5 years for offenses under Section 3/25(1A) of the Arms Act, and life imprisonment for offenses under Sections 307 and 302 IPC and Section 27(3) of the Arms Act. The petitioner's representation for premature release in 2010 was rejected, and a fresh representation in 2018 yielded no response, leading to the filing of the present writ petition.

Issues:

Validity of the petitioner's representation for premature release.

Consideration of convictions and sentences under different sections of the IPC and Arms Act.

Relevance of the declaration of Section 27(3) of the Arms Act as ultra vires and unconstitutional.

Held and Decision:

The court held that the conviction and sentence under Section 27(3) of the Arms Act were not valid due to its declaration as ultra vires. However, sentences under Section 395 IPC and Section 3/25(1A) of the Arms Act, though completed concurrently, cannot be considered for premature release.

Remission or commutation for one offense does not automatically release the petitioner for other offenses. The court emphasized that the Competent Authority must consider each offense separately.

Given the invalidity of Section 27(3) of the Arms Act and completion of the sentence for Section 3/25(1A), these offenses are not considered in the premature release representation. The court directed that the representation be considered only in reference to the sentence of life imprisonment concerning offenses under Sections 302 and 307 IPC.

The petitioner, convicted on multiple counts under Sections 302 and 307 IPC, may be released prematurely if the competent authority grants remission for all seven life sentences. However, this decision rests with the competent authority.

Grant or non-grant of remission is the prerogative of the Competent Authority, and the court should not interfere with this process. The decision on premature release must consider all relevant factors, including the nature of the crime and its societal impact.

The court did not direct the immediate release of the petitioner but instructed the Competent Authority to consider the representation expeditiously, focusing on the sentence of life imprisonment for offenses under Sections 302 and 307 IPC.

The court clarified that the earlier rejection of the petitioner's request for premature release should not hinder the consideration of the fresh representation dated February 5, 2018.

The Competent Authority is directed to process the representation within four months, without the need for consultation with the Central Government.

Facts:

The respondent, a public limited company, was allotted a commercial plot by the appellant, Delhi Development Authority (DDA). A perpetual lease deed was executed, and subsequently, a demerger scheme was approved by the Company Judge, transferring assets to another company (respondent no.2). DDA demanded payment for UEI and misuse charges, leading to a legal challenge.

Issues:

Validity of DDA's demand for UEI and misuse charges.

Whether the transfer falls under the stipulations of the Lease Deed.

Applicability of DDA's policy and instructions in the case of a demerger.

Held:

The Company Judge's order clearly stated the transfer of property, assets, rights, and powers to respondent no.2. Compliance with clause 6(a) of the Lease Deed, including obtaining prior written consent and paying UEI, is mandatory for such transfers. The High Court misinterpreted clause 2(d) of DDA's policy in declaring it inapplicable to a demerger case.

The central clause is 6(a) of the Lease Deed, emphasizing the necessity of complying with the lessor's terms. Commonality of directors/shareholders does not exempt the transferor from UEI obligations. Clause 2(d) of the policy reinforces the charge of UEI irrespective of commonality in directorship and the name continuity of the parent company.

The order of demerger establishes a case of transfer, and respondents, not falling under specified categories, are liable to pay UEI as per clause 6(a) of the Lease Deed. The High Court erred in setting aside the demand, which was valid as per the Lease Deed.

The transfer of the subject plot from respondent no.1 to respondent no.2 is evident. The involvement of the same set of directors/shareholders in both companies does not absolve respondent no.1 from the obligations outlined in clause 6(a) of the Lease Deed. The Single Judge's decision is reinstated.

Facts:

The deceased spouse of the respondent took a life insurance policy from Reliance Life Insurance Co Ltd. Subsequently, two months later, he submitted a proposal for another life insurance policy to the same company. In the proposal, he denied having any current insurance or pending applications. The insurer issued the policy. About a year later, the insured passed away, and the insurer repudiated the claim, citing the suppression of material facts regarding previous insurance.

Issues:

The validity of the insurer's repudiation based on the non-disclosure of a previous life insurance policy by the insured.

Held:

Section 45 of the Insurance Act stipulates restrictions on insurers challenging a policy after two years. Beyond two years, the insurer must establish inaccuracies, suppression of material facts, and fraudulent intent by the policyholder.( Para 12, 13)

Insurance operates under the doctrine of uberrima fidei, demanding complete good faith. Mutual obligations of trust and good faith are fundamental in the insurer-insured relationship.( Para 15)

Regulation 2(d) defines the "proposal form" and emphasizes the proposer's duty to provide all material information. Regulation 4(3) guides proposers to adhere to Section 45 during form filling, placing the onus on the insurer to prove any suppression.( Paras 23, 24)

"Material" in the context of insurance refers to any information impacting the insurer's risk assessment. It includes vital details influencing the insurer's decision to assume the risk and determine policy terms.( Para 25)

Proposal forms serve to gather essential information for risk assessment and premium fixation. The duty of utmost good faith requires accurate disclosure, as any misrepresentation renders the policy voidable.( Para 26)

The insurer sought information about previous policies, crucial for assessing the risk. The failure to disclose the earlier cover within a short timeframe justified the insurer's inquiry and repudiation.( Paras 27, 28)

The proposer's claim of ignorance about the form's contents was rejected. The insurer relied on the statements in the proposal form for coverage, and the failure to disclose the earlier policy entitled the insurer to repudiate the claim.( Paras 29, 31)

Facts:

The respondents, plaintiffs in this case, asserted that the appellants approached them for the sale of the suit property and franchisee rights in relation to the running business of an automobile company ('T'). An agreement for the sale was allegedly concluded, with the respondents having paid Rs. 5 crores as part of the consideration. The appellants disputed the validity of the agreement, alleging forgery and fabrication.

Issues:

The alleged fabrication of the agreement, the dispute over the receipt of Rs. 3 crores, and the respondents' claim for specific performance.

Held:

The Court held that the admissions made by the appellants did not amount to categorical and unconditional admissions, especially considering their contention that certain pages of the agreement were tampered with. Mere admission of entering into an arrangement or contract could not be isolated from the appellants' objections regarding the fabrication of specific pages.( Para 33)

Given that the suit was filed in 2006, and the trial had commenced by 2010, the Court found no justification to decree the suit at the current stage. The Court emphasized the presence of serious factual disputes and the appellants' defense, making it inappropriate for a roving inquiry at this juncture.( Para 37)

The Court highlighted the equitable and discretionary nature of the relief sought (specific performance) and the necessity for the plaintiffs to prove readiness and willingness. The lack of an initial averment in the plaint and subsequent amendments raised concerns about the plaintiffs' conduct. A judgment in a referenced case supported the appellants' plea.( Para 38)

Concluding, the Court found the High Court's decision to be in error, decreeing the suit based on an application under Order XII, Rule 6 of CPC. The impugned judgment was set aside.( Para 40)

Facts:

The prosecution alleged that the accused were involved in selling fake foreign currency notes, and the appellant, accused no.4, was implicated based on statements made by co-accused during the investigation.

Issues:

The appellant's plea for discharge, arguing the lack of material evidence against him, primarily relying on the statements of co-accused. The legality of these statements in light of Section 25 of the Evidence Act and Sections 161 and 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was a central issue.

Held:

The Court emphasized that at the stage of framing charges, it must ensure that a case is made out for the accused to stand trial. The absence of material evidence, coupled with the co-accused being absconding, led the Court to conclude that the order framing charges against the appellant should be set aside, and he is entitled to discharge (Para 21, 47, 48, 50).

Section 25 of the Evidence Act renders confessions made to a police officer inadmissible. The Court clarified that even if a statement contains an admission, if made during the investigation to a police officer, it would not be admissible under Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Paras 25, 40, 41, 44, 46).

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order framing charges against the appellant and granting him the right to discharge.