Facts:

The appellant, SGT Chaman Lal, challenged the denial of his promotion on the grounds of alleged discrimination in consideration due to his disability status. He claimed that officers with higher disability percentages were promoted while he was not.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's disability status was improperly considered in his promotion evaluation.

Whether the exemption of the establishment under the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995, affected the appellant's promotion claim.

Whether the appellant's listing as a candidate for promotion conferred a vested right to promotion.

Whether the appellant's eleven years of service alone warranted promotion despite lacking medical fitness for the selective promotion to JWO.

Held:

The Tribunal justly rejected the appellant's plea of discrimination, as it was based on a thorough analysis of relevant facts. The appellant's argument that officers with higher disability percentages received preferential treatment was unfounded.(Para 9, 11)

The medical category assessment of the appellant was conducted objectively, in accordance with established parameters. The categorization was not solely based on the percentage of disability but also considered other factors. Thus, the appellant's lower disability percentage did not automatically warrant a higher medical category.( Para 12, 13)

Section 47(2) of the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995, allows for exemptions of establishments from its provisions. The establishment where the appellant was employed was exempted from this Act, thereby affecting the applicability of certain benefits to the appellant's promotion claim.( Para 16, 17)

Mere listing as a candidate for promotion did not grant the appellant a vested right to promotion. The appellant's lack of medical fitness for selective promotion to JWO rendered him ineligible, despite his years of service. The promotion policy clearly stipulated eligibility criteria, including medical fitness, for selective promotion.( Para 18, 19)

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the Tribunal's decision. The appellant's promotion claim was rejected due to his failure to meet the requisite eligibility criteria, including medical fitness for selective promotion.

Facts:

The case concerns the implementation of Rule 16-A, inserted by the Uttar Pradesh Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education (First Amendment) Rules, 2014, which deals with the absorption of 'Shiksha Mitras' as Assistant Teachers in junior basic schools. The issue revolves around the relaxation of minimum educational qualifications for this position, as provided under Section 23 of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009.

Issues:

Whether the absorption of 'Shiksha Mitras' as Assistant Teachers in junior basic schools, through relaxation of minimum educational qualifications, is constitutionally valid.

Whether the State has the authority to relax qualifications for teacher appointments under the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009.

Whether 'Shiksha Mitras' are entitled to be appointed or absorbed as teachers despite not meeting the prescribed qualifications.

Held:

The fundamental right to free and compulsory education encompasses the right to quality education, which necessitates the presence of qualified teachers. The appointment of unqualified teachers undermines this mandate and cannot be justified. (Para 16, 17, 19)

The statutory requirement for minimum qualifications for teacher appointments after a specified date must be adhered to. The relaxation of qualifications can only apply for a limited period or for individuals already appointed in accordance with existing rules. (Para 20, 21)

'Shiksha Mitras' were not appointed as teachers in compliance with the prescribed qualifications and were not covered by relaxation orders. Therefore, their appointment as teachers contravened the law, and the State lacked the authority to relax qualifications. (Para 22, 23)

'Shiksha Mitras' should be given the opportunity to be considered for recruitment if they acquire the requisite qualifications. Until then, they may continue working under their existing terms if the State so decides. (Para 26)

Decision: The appeals and writ petitions are disposed of in accordance with the above findings.

Facts:

The National Council for Teachers Education (NCTE) issued qualifications and guidelines for the recruitment of elementary education teachers.

The State of Uttar Pradesh amended its rules to align with the NCTE notifications but later amended them again, stating that weightage to TET marks was not mandatory.

Challenges were raised against the cancellation of an earlier advertisement and the issuance of a fresh one, alleging inconsistency with NCTE guidelines.

Issues:

Whether the State Government's actions were consistent with NCTE guidelines.

Whether weightage to TET marks was mandatory.

What relief should be granted considering the interim developments.

Held:

The NCTE, acting under relevant statutes, was competent to issue the notifications regarding teacher qualifications and guidelines.While qualifications prescribed by the NCTE were binding, the requirement of weightage to TET marks was not mandatory, as clarified by the NCTE (Para 16).

The State's advertisement dated December 7, 2012, could not proceed due to interim developments. However, appointments already made (66,655 posts) based on interim orders could not be disturbed, but the State could fill remaining vacancies through a fresh advertisement (Para 17).

Decision: The Court upheld the qualifications prescribed by the NCTE but ruled that weightage to TET marks was not mandatory. It allowed the State to fill remaining vacancies through a fresh advertisement while respecting previously made appointments.

Facts:

The respondent-plaintiff filed a suit against the defendant, the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants.

The suit proceeded ex parte against the defendant and was decreed.

The defendant filed an application under Order IX, Rule 13 to set aside the ex parte decree, which was dismissed in default.

Subsequently, the defendant died, and the legal heirs, i.e., the appellants, filed an application praying for the restoration of the application filed under Order IX, Rule 13.

The trial court dismissed the application, but the appellate court allowed the appeal and restored the application.

The High Court questioned the maintainability of the appeal and observed that the application was barred by time.

Issues:

Whether the appeal against the trial court's order of dismissal was maintainable?

Whether the application for restoration was barred by time?

Held:

The application filed by the appellants for restoration was registered in miscellaneous proceedings and governed by Section 141 CPC, making provisions of Order IX applicable.

Therefore, the order rejecting such application was appealable under Order XLIII Rule 1(c) CPC, rendering the appeal maintainable.

The appellants provided sufficient explanation for the delay in filing the application for restoration.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act was attracted, and there was just and equitable cause for condoning any delay.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the appeal against the trial court's order of dismissal was maintainable under Order XLIII Rule 1(c) CPC. Additionally, it upheld the condonation of delay in filing the application for restoration under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, considering the circumstances explained by the appellants.

Facts:

Respondent No. 1, a former Minister of Transport, Tamil Nadu, was accused of acquiring assets disproportionate to his known sources of income.

Charge-sheet was filed against the respondents under relevant sections of the Prevention of Corruption Act and the Indian Penal Code.

Respondent No. 1 explained alleged disproportionate assets, claiming they were received from his son, Arun, who earned remuneration and paid taxes.

Issues:

Whether the discharge of respondents before the completion of the investigation into the source of income of Respondent No. 1's son was premature and unsustainable.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the discharge of respondents before the completion of the investigation into the source of income of Respondent No. 1's son was premature and unsustainable. It upheld the direction for further investigation and set aside the order of discharge.

The Court emphasized the need for thorough investigation into allegations of corruption and instructed the Investigating Agency to conduct the investigation expeditiously while considering the seriousness of the charge and the objectives of anti-corruption laws.

Facts:The writ petition (C) No. 857 of 2015 was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India seeking the implementation of the National Food Security Act, 2013 (NFS Act) by the State Governments.

Issues:

The inadequate implementation of the NFS Act, including the absence of a transparent and accountable Grievance Redressal Mechanism, non-establishment of a fully functional State Food Commission, failure to conduct social audits and set up Vigilance Committees as mandated by the Act.

Held:

The Court emphasized the necessity for a transparent and accountable Grievance Redressal Mechanism under the NFS Act (Para 30-31).

It stressed the importance of establishing fully functional State Food Commissions and highlighted practical difficulties in dual functioning of statutory commissions (Paras 32, 33, and 34).

The Court underscored the significance of social audits and directed their establishment in accordance with the standards framed (Paras 36, 37, and 38).

It mandated the establishment of Vigilance Committees as required by the NFS Act (Para 40).

The Court issued directions to ensure effective implementation of the NFS Act, including the notification of appropriate rules for Grievance Redressal Mechanism, establishment of State Food Commissions and Vigilance Committees, and conducting social audits (Para 42).

Co-operative federalism was emphasized, urging consultation and collaboration between the Centre and States for uniform enforcement of the Act (Para 71).

Decision: The Court directed the concerned ministries of the Government of India to collaborate with State Governments and Union Territories to ensure the effective implementation of the NFS Act. This includes the establishment of Grievance Redressal Mechanisms, State Food Commissions, Vigilance Committees, and social audit machinery.

Facts:

The appellants participated in the selection process for the position of Deputy Surveyor. They contested the inclusion of a physical endurance test, arguing that it was not prescribed under the Rules governing such selections.

Issues:

Whether executive instructions regarding the selection procedure, including the imposition of a physical endurance test, were valid despite not being explicitly prescribed under the Rules.

Held:

The Court held that in the absence of specific guidelines in the Rules, it was within the powers of the Executive, as per Article 162 of the Constitution of India, to provide instructions regarding the selection procedure, as long as they did not contradict the Rules.

The Court further noted that since all the appellants had participated in both the written examination and the physical endurance test without raising any objections, they could not later challenge the procedure. Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeals, finding no merit in them.

Facts:

The appellant was charged with civil contempt for arresting the respondent under a charge added after the respondent had been granted bail under Section 438, CrPC.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's actions constituted contempt of court.

Held:

The court found the appellant's explanation plausible, stating there was no intentional violation of the court order. While it would have been preferable to inform the court of the development and seek modification, the appellant's apology was deemed sincere and genuine.( Para 4)

The Division Bench concluded that, in the circumstances of the case, the appellant's apology must be accepted.( Para 6)

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant were set aside, accepting his sincere, genuine, and unconditional apology in writing before the Court and the High Court.( Para 7)

Facts:The prosecution alleged that the accused, with the common intention of murdering the informant, committed various heinous acts resulting in the deaths of multiple individuals.

Issues:

Validity of evidence regarding the burning lantern.

Reliability of witness testimonies for the identification of the accused.

Existence of a previous dispute as a motive for the crime.

Validity and timing of the First Information Report (FIR).

Evaluation of the High Court's judgment.

Modification of sentencing.

Held:

The trial court's observation regarding the burning lantern and the absence of blackening on the wall due to the lantern's placement was deemed credible. The High Court's dismissal of this evidence was criticized for being unfounded. (Para 26-30)

Witnesses' testimonies regarding the identification of the accused were deemed reliable by the trial court. The High Court's skepticism about the ability to identify the accused in the given circumstances was rejected. (Para 31-32)

The High Court's dismissal of the existence of a previous dispute between the informant and one of the accused was deemed incorrect. The Supreme Court asserted that such disputes could indeed contribute to the motive behind the crime. (Para 33)

The High Court's doubts about the timing and authenticity of the FIR were refuted, with the Supreme Court highlighting the sequence of events and the consistency in the evidence provided by the prosecution. (Para 34-37)

The Supreme Court criticized the High Court for relying on minor inconsistencies and inadequate grounds to overturn the trial court's decision. It was emphasized that there were no substantial reasons to doubt the testimonies of key witnesses. (Para 38, 41)

Considering the time elapsed since the incident and the circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court commuted the capital punishment to life imprisonment for the remaining accused. The appeal is accordingly allowed. (Para 42)