Facts:

An international arbitration award was passed against the appellant, making them jointly and severally liable to pay USD 6,948,100.

The award was challenged in the High Court, where a single judge held it enforceable only against one respondent, not the appellant.

A Division Bench of the High Court upheld the maintainability of an appeal despite the abolition of Letters Patent Appeal.

Issues:

Whether an appeal against the judgment of a Single Judge in an international arbitration matter is maintainable.

Whether the intra-court appeal would lie because of the Letters Patent.

Held:

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the High Court, holding that a Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable before the Division Bench. It construed Sections 5 and 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, and Section 50(1)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, to conclude that the appeal was permissible. The Court considered the judgment in P.S. Sathappan v. Andhra Bank Ltd. and others, (2004) 11 SCC 672, and Fuerst Day Lawson Limited v. Jindal Exports Limited, (2011) 8 SCC 333, among others, to establish that the Arbitration Act, 1996, is a self-contained code and that an appeal under Section 50(1)(b) is maintainable. The decision was affirmed for different reasons, dismissing the appeals without costs.

Facts:The appellants, employees of Nagarjuna Cooperative Sugars Limited, filed a petition challenging the denial of lay-off compensation. The State of Andhra Pradesh introduced a Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) that did not cover lay-off compensation. The employees, having accepted benefits under the VRS, sought lay-off compensation, leading to a legal dispute.

Issues:

Whether the Labour Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim for lay-off compensation under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, despite the employees accepting benefits under the VRS which did not cover lay-off compensation.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the Labour Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim for lay-off compensation under Section 33C(2) of the Act, even though it was not covered by the VRS. The Court clarified that if a claim like lay-off compensation is not covered by a VRS, affected employees can approach the Labour Court for adjudication. The judgment allowed the appeal, set aside the judgments of the High Court and Labour Court, and remitted the matter to the Labour Court for adjudication within three months.

Facts:

The case involved the validity of a sanction granted by the Minister-in-charge of the concerned department for initiating disciplinary proceedings against a retired government employee under Regulation 351-A of the Civil Services Regulations, 1975.

Issues:

Whether the sanction granted by the Minister-in-charge of the department was valid under Regulation 351-A.

Whether delegation of power from the Governor to the Minister was necessary for such sanctions.

Held:

T.S. Thakur, CJI's Opinion: The power to direct disciplinary proceedings against a government employee, whether in-service or retired, is an executive function of the State Government. This power can be exercised by the Governor or delegated to Ministers through rules framed under Article 166(3) of the Constitution (Para 16). The sanction granted by the Minister-in-charge of the concerned department was valid under Regulation 351-A as it was deemed an action taken by the Governor.

V. Gopala Gowda, J.'s Dissenting Opinion: The power under Regulation 351-A is framed under Article 309 of the Constitution, which pertains to legislative power, not executive power. Therefore, the rules framed under Article 166 cannot justify actions under Article 309 (Para 13). Without evidence of specific delegation of power by the Governor to the Minister under Regulation 351-A, the sanction granted by the Minister was invalid.

Facts:

The controversy arose from amendments made by the State of Bihar to introduce reservation in judicial services, which were challenged in a batch of writ petitions before the High Court of Judicature at Patna.

The amendments were not preceded by appropriate consultation with the High Court as required by Articles 233 and 234 of the Constitution.

Issues:

Whether the State of Bihar has the authority to provide reservation in favor of various backward classes in the judicial services.

Whether the amendments made by the State of Bihar for reservation in judicial services were preceded by appropriate consultation with the High Court.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that while the State of Bihar is entitled to initiate the process of consultation for providing reservation in judicial services, such consultation must meet the requisite standards. If there is a consensus between the State and the High Court, the State would be at liberty to make appropriate rules providing for reservation. However, if there is a difference of opinion, the Government must record reasons for its inability to accept the conclusions communicated by the High Court and proceed to amend the Rules in accordance with law. Additionally, the Court directed expeditious action to fill vacancies in the judicial services. The special leave petition stands disposed of.

Facts:

Gujarat Maritime Board (GMB) issued a Letter of Intent (LoI) to L&T Infrastructure Development Projects Ltd. for the development of Sutrapada Port.

Conditions of the LoI included the submission of a detailed project report and obtaining necessary clearances within specified timelines.

Due to certain difficulties, L&T requested a change of location to Kachchigarh, which was approved by GMB, and a bank guarantee was furnished.

L&T later expressed inability to proceed with the project at Kachchigarh, leading GMB to cancel the LoI and invoke the bank guarantee.

L&T challenged these actions before the High Court through a writ petition.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in exercising its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 to restrain GMB from invoking an unconditional bank guarantee.

Whether the cancellation of the LoI and invocation of the bank guarantee were legally justified.

Held:

Scope of Jurisdiction under Article 226: The High Court erred in analyzing the facts and law related to the cancellation of the LoI and invocation of the bank guarantee. The Court clarified that the jurisdiction under Article 226 should not be exercised unless exceptional circumstances exist.

Independence of Bank Guarantee Contract: The bank guarantee is an independent contract between the bank and GMB. The decision of GMB regarding breach of conditions is binding on the bank. Thus, the cancellation of the LoI and invocation of the bank guarantee were valid.

Injunction against Bank Guarantee Invocation: An injunction against the invocation of an unconditional bank guarantee can only be granted in cases of egregious fraud or irretrievable injury to one of the parties. Such circumstances did not exist in this case.

Facts:

Khalil Ahmed filed a civil suit against Nagar Palika Thakurdwara regarding the municipality's levy of taxes on his properties.

The suit sought a permanent injunction and a declaration stating that the properties were outside the municipal limits and thus not liable for taxation.

The trial court dismissed Khalil Ahmed's suit, but he succeeded on appeal to the Additional District Judge.

Nagar Palika Thakurdwara then appealed to the High Court, which dismissed the appeal citing Section 102 of the CPC due to the claim being less than Rs. 25,000.

Issues:

Whether Section 102 of the CPC applies when the suit involves not only the recovery of money but also a declaration and permanent injunction regarding municipal taxation.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that Section 102 of the CPC should not have been applied to dismiss the appeal solely based on the monetary value of the claim. The suit encompassed broader issues beyond mere recovery of money, including questions of jurisdiction and taxation. Therefore, the provision was not applicable, and the High Court's dismissal was erroneous. The Court remanded the case for fresh consideration, directing the High Court to hear the parties and decide the appeal promptly, preferably within six months.

Facts:

The case involved multiple accused individuals charged with conspiracy, abduction, and murder of the deceased. The trial court acquitted some accused and convicted others based on evidence provided by prosecution witnesses (PWs) and other evidence.

Issues:

The reliability of the evidence provided by the prosecution witnesses, the involvement of the accused in the crimes charged, and the interpretation of relevant sections of the Penal Code.

Held:

The majority opinion, delivered by Justice V. Gopala Gowda, acquitted the accused (A-3, A-4, and A-15) due to unreliable evidence and lack of individual involvement in each offense. The acquittal under the conspiracy charge further weakened the case against them.

However, Justice Arun Mishra dissented, upholding the conviction of the accused based on sufficient evidence, including witness testimony and corroborating evidence. The dissenting judge argued that the accused were involved in the conspiracy and their actions led to the abduction and murder of the victim.

Facts:The judgment revolves around the withdrawal of the 'Himachal Pradesh Government Corporate Sector Employees Pension Scheme' of 1999. The scheme was repealed through a notification dated December 2, 2004.

Issues:

The legality and constitutionality of the repeal notification, the vested right of employees to claim pension, applicability of estoppel, constitutional validity of the withdrawal vis-a-vis Article 21 of the Constitution, administrative decision-making, financial viability, and the jurisdiction of the court.

Held:

The repeal notification dated December 2, 2004, withdrawing the 1999 Scheme, was held to be legal and constitutional. The notification was within the authority of the State Government and was based on due consideration.

Employees who opted for the 1999 Scheme or were deemed to have opted for it had a contingent right to claim pension upon retirement. This contingent right vested in them, and they could not be prevented from fulfilling the conditions to claim pension.

The principle of estoppel was deemed inapplicable as the original position enjoyed by the employees under the Employees Provident Fund Scheme of 1995 was restored after the repeal of the 1999 Scheme.

The withdrawal of the 1999 Scheme did not violate Article 21 of the Indian Constitution as the Scheme was not aimed at providing basic human rights. It was reversible and did not violate constitutional provisions.

The withdrawal of the Scheme was considered a policy decision falling within the realm of executive determination. The State Government's decision was based on due consideration and was not unconstitutional, irrational, arbitrary, or unreasonable.

The State Government's rationale for withdrawing the Scheme due to financial unviability was accepted. It had the authority to fix a cut-off date for pension benefits based on the financial health of the employer.

The court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to impose monetary liabilities on the State Government resulting from the withdrawal of the Scheme, as budgetary allocations were matters of policy decisions.

Decision:The court upheld the withdrawal of the 1999 Scheme, rejecting the claims of the employees for pension benefits under that Scheme.

Facts:

Gulshera Khanam, the landlady, sought eviction of Aftab Ahmad, the tenant, from Shop No. 6.

The landlady claimed the eviction for the bona fide requirement of her daughter, Dr. Naheed Parveen, who was running a medical clinic in Shop No. 7.

The landlady argued that Dr. Naheed Parveen, being a co-owner of the building inherited from her father, fulfilled the criteria of having a legal right of residence, and thus fell within the definition of "family" under the Act.

The lower courts had granted eviction in favor of the landlady, but the High Court set aside the eviction order.

Issues:

Whether Dr. Naheed Parveen falls within the definition of "family" under Section 3(g) of the Act.

Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that Dr. Naheed Parveen, being a co-owner of the building inherited from her father, fulfilled the criteria of having a legal right of residence, and thus fell within the definition of "family" under Section 3(g) of the Act. Therefore, the landlady was entitled to seek eviction of the tenant for the bona fide requirement of her daughter (para 24).

The Court further held that the High Court had erred in reversing the findings of the lower courts without proper justification. The High Court should have confined its inquiry to whether there was any jurisdictional error committed by the lower courts, rather than re-evaluating factual aspects of the case. Therefore, the eviction order against the tenant was reinstated (para 36).

The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's decision was set aside. The eviction order against the tenant, Aftab Ahmad, in favor of Gulshera Khanam, the landlady, was restored (para 40,41).