Facts:

The respondents allege that their father mortgaged the property for Rs. 2500 through a Deed (Ex.P-73) with a condition to repurchase within five years. The appellants argue that the transaction was a sale with a condition to repurchase. The trial court dismissed the suit, stating the debtor-creditor relationship wasn't established. The first Appellate Court reversed this decision, affirming that Ex.P-73 was a mortgage by conditional sale.

Issues:

Whether the document (Ex.P-73) should be classified as a "mortgage by conditional sale" or a "sale with a condition to repurchase."

Held:

By examining Ex.P-73, it's evident that the father of respondents borrowed Rs. 700 eight days before its execution, and this amount was adjusted from the total consideration of Rs. 2500. The intention of the parties was to terminate the debtor-creditor relationship, creating a vendor-vendee relationship. The document established a conditional sale with an option to repurchase within five years.

The mention of "borrowed a sum of Rs. 700" in the document is incidental. The recitals make it clear that the parties intended to end the debtor-creditor relationship and establish a vendor-vendee relationship. There is no mention of essential mortgage elements like interest rate or foreclosure in Ex.P-73.

The receipt Ex.P-69 cannot be relied upon as corroborative evidence of part payment. The burden of proving its genuineness was not discharged by the plaintiffs, and it cannot establish that Ex.P-73 is a "mortgage by conditional sale."

Despite the transaction and repurchase condition being in one document, Ex.P-73 does not fall within the proviso to Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act. It is a sale with a condition to repurchase, and the respondents lost their right to repurchase due to non-payment within the stipulated period.

The appeals are allowed.

Facts:

The Cantonment Board, Meerut, and others issued notices under Section 185 of the Cantonments Act, 1924, alleging unauthorized constructions by the respondents. The respondents filed writ petitions challenging these notices in the High Court.

Issues:

The authority of the appellants, and the validity of the notices. It also examined the failure to consider objections, the absence of reasons, and the stereo-typed orders by the appellate authority.

Held:

The High Court rejected jurisdictional challenges and the plea of not taking action within 12 months. However, it found procedural irregularities and lack of consideration for objections. The High Court quashed the notices but left it open for the appellants to initiate fresh proceedings.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed. The liberty granted by the High Court to initiate fresh proceedings was maintained. The appellants were directed to take fresh action in accordance with the Cantonment Act, 2006. The fresh show cause notice was to be in continuation of the earlier one, with a copy of the Inspection Report provided to the respondents.(Para 12)

Facts:

The appellant, VST Industries Limited, filed an appeal against an interim order dated 11.07.2018 by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court.

The High Court's interim order directed the deposit of 50% of the interest demanded by way of recovery within a week, with a stay on coercive measures until 18th July 2018.

Approximately 33 percent of the interest had already been realized from the appellant after the interim order.

Issues:

The pending writ petition (Writ-Tax No. 961 of 2018) of VST Industries Limited in the High Court needed a final decision.

The judgment in Civil Appeal Nos. 3257-3268 of 2019, involving Indian Oil Corporation Limited, addressed issues related to the liability of interest under the U.P. Act 2007.

Held:

The appeal was disposed of, and no further recovery was allowed against VST Industries Limited concerning the demand for interest on arrears of Entry Tax.

Any recovery of interest from the appellant would be subject to the final outcome of their writ petition (Writ-Tax No. 961 of 2018).

The appeal is disposed of.

Facts:

The respondents in the respective appeals were convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to life imprisonment. They filed writ petitions challenging the constitutional validity of Rule 8(2)(i) of the Rajasthan Prisons Rules, 2006, which imposed conditions for the consideration of premature release for those sentenced to life imprisonment.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 59 of the Prisons Act, 1894, and the constitutional validity of Rule 8(2)(i) in light of Section 433-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Held:

The High Court had struck down Rule 8(2)(i) on the grounds of non-compliance with the laying procedure before the legislature and its alleged inconsistency with Section 433-A. The Supreme Court, however, held that Section 59(2) did not require the rules to be laid before the legislature before promulgation. It also emphasized that remission is not a matter of right, and the state can impose restrictions as done by Rule 8(2)(i).

Decision: The Supreme Court set aside the impugned orders of the High Court and allowed the appeals, declaring Rule 8(2)(i) of the Rules, 2006, valid and consistent with the law.

Facts:

The appellant, an elected Municipal Councillor, faced disqualification under Section 44(1)(e) due to unauthorized constructions by her husband.

The appellant argued that her husband had deemed permission under Section 45(5) of the Maharashtra Municipal Council Act.

The appellant contended that the construction's illegality should not result in disqualification as it attracts penal provisions.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's disqualification under Section 44(1)(e) is valid?

Does the deemed permission under Section 45(5) exempt the appellant from disqualification?

Does the criminal nature of unauthorized construction affect the applicability of Section 44(1)(e)?

Held:

The first limb of Section 44(1)(e) holds the Councillor accountable for constructions made by themselves, their spouse, or dependents, and it suffices for disqualification if illegal.

Deemed permission does not negate disqualification, and the court distinguishes between constructions by the Councillor, spouse, or dependents.

Section 44(1)(e) creates independent liability for disqualification, irrespective of criminal actions or convictions.

Temporary constructions also fall under the scope of Section 44(1)(e), and the appellant's disqualification is upheld.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed, and no costs are awarded.

Facts:

Appellant, Naresh Chandra Bhardwaj, a Scale II Officer at Bank of India, sanctioned loans later classified as Non-Performing Assets.

Procedural abnormalities in the loan process were identified, posing a potential loss of Rs. 70.32 lakh to the Bank.

Disciplinary proceedings ensued, leading to the appellant's removal from service.

Issues:

Whether the punishment of removal from service could be altered to compulsory retirement.

Parity in punishment concerning two other officers, Mr. R.K. Mishra and Mr. V.K. Srivastava, who faced compulsory retirement for similar losses.

Held:

The Court emphasized limited judicial review on the quantum of punishment, primarily within the domain of disciplinary authorities.

Parity in punishment must be based on identical charges and post-incident conduct, with absolute equality.

Financial implications, specifically the appellant's pension option, played a role in the decision.

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal, altering the appellant's punishment from "removal from service" to "compulsory retirement," citing the lack of financial difference and identical roles with other officers.

Facts:

The State of Bihar issued an advertisement on July 24, 1985, inviting applications for 40 posts of Assistant Conservator of Forests (ACF). The appellants participated in the selection but were unsuccessful. Representations were made to appoint them against vacant posts beyond the advertised 40. The State appointed them on April 13, 1988, purportedly with reference to the 1985 advertisement. Further appointments occurred in 1987, 1990, 1992, and 1995. The proposal to regularize the appellants' services was approved in 2005.

Issues:

Determination of the legality of the appellants' appointment.

Seniority calculation concerning substantive appointments.

The regularisation proposal's impact on seniority.

Held:

Rule 35 of the Bihar Forest Service Rules, 1953, dictates that seniority is determined with reference to the date of substantive appointment. The appellants secured their appointments through representations, rendering them illegal and fortuitous.

The recruitment initiated in 1985 culminated with the exhaustion of the Merit List in 1987. No further appointments could be made from it. The appellants' appointments were illegal and contrary to the statutory rules.

The appellants, through persistent lobbying, secured appointments against the 1985 Advertisement, which was illegal and in violation of the rules.

A proposal to regularize their services was made, considering their 17 years of service. The irregularity of their 1988 appointments was acknowledged in the proposal.

The High Court rightly dismissed writ petitions and Letters Patent Appeals, holding that seniority is reckoned from the date of regularization in 2005, not from the illegal appointment in 1988.

Facts:

The appellant appealed against the judgment of the Sikkim High Court that enhanced his sentence from seven years to ten years under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The case originated from an incident where the appellant was convicted of attempting to sexually assault a minor girl, and the Special Judge sentenced him to seven years.

Issues:

Whether the High Court had the authority to enhance the sentence in an appeal challenging the conviction.

Whether the procedure prescribed under Section 386 proviso was followed, specifically regarding notice for enhancement.

Held:

The High Court's enhancement of the sentence from seven years to ten years was not in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The judgment was set aside to the extent of the enhancement. The sentence awarded by the Special Judge was maintained.

Decision: The appeal was partly allowed, affirming the conviction but setting aside the enhancement of the sentence. The Special Judge's sentence of seven years under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, and one month under Section 341 of IPC was upheld.

Facts:

The Respondent-State enacted the 2007 Act after the High Court declared the 2000 Act ultra vires. The challenge to the levy of Entry Tax was referred to a nine-Judge Bench by the Supreme Court. The High Court upheld the legislative competence in enacting the 2007 Act. The Supreme Court granted interim stay subject to the appellants depositing 50% of the accrued tax liability. The matter was referred to a Regular Bench after a nine-Judge Bench decision. The appellant was granted liberty to question the levy of Entry Tax under the 2007 Act, leading to Writ Petition No. 25730 of 17, challenging the validity of the 2007 Act.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in upholding the preliminary objection on the writ petition being a second petition on the same and consequential cause of action.

Whether Section 13 of the U.P. Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas Act, 2007, applies mutatis mutandis to Section 33 of the U.P. Value Added Tax Act, 2008.

Whether the 2007 Act contains substantive law for the levy of interest on Entry Tax.

Held:

Writ Petition No. 25730 of 2017 was filed in pursuance of the liberty granted, challenging the vires of the 2007 Act. The Division Bench, in its judgment, explicitly restricted the consideration to the questions framed by the Regular Bench, thereby excluding issues not expressly permitted for consideration. The plea regarding the leviability of interest was specifically raised but not permitted for consideration. The Division Bench's restriction cannot operate as res judicata in a subsequent writ petition where the challenge was to the leviability of interest.

Section 13 of the U.P. Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas Act, 2007, applies mutatis mutandis to Section 33 of the U.P. Value Added Tax Act, 2008. Even if Section 33 is treated as a machinery provision, it must be interpreted to make the liability effective and treated as substantive law for the levy of interest on Entry Tax.

The High Court erred in upholding the preliminary objection, and the matter is remitted to the High Court for determining the liability of interest under the 2007 Act. The questions regarding the nature and extent of liability to pay interest on Entry Tax need examination.