Facts:

The Income Tax Department (appellant) filed an appeal against the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.

The High Court dismissed the appeal as infructuous after learning that the respondent company's name was struck off under Section 560(5) of the Companies Act, 1956.

The High Court, however, failed to consider Section 506(5) proviso (a) of the Companies Act and Chapter XV of the Income Tax Act dealing with "liability in special cases" and its clause (L) on "discontinuance of business or dissolution."

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the appeal as infructuous without considering the relevant provisions of the Companies Act and the Income Tax Act?

Held:

The High Court erred in dismissing the appeal as infructuous solely based on the dissolution of the respondent company.

The High Court overlooked crucial provisions in the Companies Act and Income Tax Act that prescribe how liabilities against a dissolved company should be handled.

Sections 506(5) proviso (a) of the Companies Act and Chapter XV of the Income Tax Act specifically address the cases of companies struck off under Section 506(5) of the Companies Act.

The appeal is allowed, setting aside the impugned order, and remanding the case to the High Court for a fresh consideration on merits, taking into account relevant provisions of both Acts.

The Court refrains from making observations on the merits of the case.

The High Court is urged to decide the appeal preferably within six months due to its age.

Facts:

Advocate 'MN' representing the petitioners attempted to browbeat and insult Judges of the Supreme Court. This was not the first instance of such behavior by the advocate, with a history of similar conduct before Tribunals and the Bombay High Court.

Issues:

Contemptuous behavior by Advocate 'MN' and the need for appropriate punishment.

Legitimacy of the writ petition seeking a second review of the judgment.

Held:

When contempt is committed in the face of the Court, judges are empowered to take stern action. Referring to Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. Chief Justice S. Teja Singh, the Court emphasized the authority to address contempt, especially when a judge is personally attacked.( Paragraph 9)

In Leila David (2) v. State of Maharashtra, differing views on summarily dealing with contempt in the face of the Court were resolved in Leila David (6) v. State of Maharashtra. It was established that summary action, without notice, is within the Court's duty. Pasayat, J.'s perspective was affirmed.( Paragraph 10)

Contemptuous conduct deserves severe punishment. Although the Court could have imposed punishment in the order, in the interest of justice, a notice was issued to Advocate 'MN' to determine the appropriate punishment for committing contempt.( Paragraph 13)

Regarding the writ petition seeking a second review, it was held that it is barred by Order XLVII, Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013. Additionally, Article 32 petitions do not lie against the judgment of the Supreme Court. Section 16(2) of the Advocates Act, 1961 was affirmed as constitutional, stating that the designation of Senior Advocate is not an absolute right.( Paragraph 15)

Decision: The Court dismissed the writ petition, emphasizing the severity of contemptuous behavior and reserving the determination of the punishment for Advocate 'MN' for a later stage.

Facts:

The appellant, Mukesh Chand, a consumer of electricity, faced allegations of power theft by BSES Rajdhani Power Limited (BSES). BSES filed an FIR under Section 135 of the Electricity Act, 2003, and sent a bill to the appellant. The parties later settled the matter in a Lok Adalat, wherein BSES agreed to withdraw all cases against the appellant.

Issues:

The compounding of the offense of power theft in accordance with the settlement reached in the Lok Adalat, particularly considering Section 152 of the Electricity Act, 2003.

Held:

The appellant filed a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code in the High Court seeking the quashing of the FIR. The High Court dismissed the petition without considering Section 152 of the Electricity Act.

The Lok Adalat settlement played a crucial role, as condition (iii) stated that BSES agreed to withdraw all cases against the appellant.

The court, after hearing arguments, allowed the appeals and set aside the impugned order. The case was remanded to the High Court for a fresh examination, emphasizing the importance of considering Section 152 of the Electricity Act in the context of compounding offenses.

The court clarified that it had not applied its mind to the merits of the case and directed the High Court to decide the matter strictly in accordance with the law, uninfluenced by any observations made in their order.

Final Result: Allowed

Facts:

The respondent filed a civil suit against the appellants (HUDA) claiming a decree for declaration with consequential relief.

The trial court decreed the suit, and the first appellate court affirmed the judgment.

HUDA filed a second appeal in the High Court, which was barred by 1942 days, leading to an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay.

The High Court rejected the application, holding the cause pleaded by HUDA insufficient, resulting in the dismissal of the second appeal.

Issues:

Whether the delay in filing the second appeal was justifiable.

Whether the grounds presented for condonation constituted a sufficient cause.

Held:

The delay of 1942 days was inordinate, not properly explained, and the grounds under Section 5 of the Limitation Act were deemed insufficient.The appellant-HUDA, being a statutory authority with a legal department, was expected to handle legal matters diligently.The duty of the officers-in-charge of the legal cell to promptly file the appeal was emphasized.( Para 14-15)

The appellant-HUDA failed to discharge its duty with due diligence despite having all facilities and infrastructure.Officers-in-charge should be held accountable for the lapse, making good the loss suffered by HUDA.The delay could not be justified by the alleged inaction of the lawyer, and the duty to ensure timely filing rested with HUDA.( Para 16-20)

The delay of 1942 days was deemed wholly inordinate, and the explanation provided did not constitute a sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.The High Court's decision to not condone the delay was upheld, and the appeals were dismissed.( Para 21-22)

Facts:

The State of U.P. referred an industrial dispute to the Industrial Tribunal to decide the legality and correctness of the termination order of the appellant (workman).

The Industrial Tribunal awarded in favor of the appellant, directing reinstatement with back wages.

The employer filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the award.

The High Court allowed the writ petition, setting aside the Industrial Tribunal's award.

The appellant filed a review petition, which was also dismissed by the High Court.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court against the High Court's orders.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the award of the Industrial Tribunal, specifically regarding the continuous service of the appellant with the employer.

Held:

The Court found no merit in the appeals.

The main question was whether the appellant was in continuous service for one year with the employer, as required under Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act.

The Court held that it cannot examine this factual question de novo, as it was a finding of fact already determined by the High Court.

The decision in Sriram Industrial Enterprises Ltd. vs. Mahak Singh & Ors. was cited but deemed distinguishable on facts.

The High Court's order to not recover the substantial amount already paid to the appellant during the litigation was upheld.

The Court affirmed that proceedings under Section 17-B of the ID Act are independent and not dependent on the final order in the main proceedings.

The employer, even if successful in upholding the termination, cannot recover the amount paid during the proceedings.

The appeals were dismissed.

Facts:

The appeals arise from the judgment of the Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, dated 09.03.2012, concerning the implementation of Rule 5(g) and Annexure-III, item(ii) of TNRSS Rules. The issue pertains to the preference given to Direct recruit Assistants over Promotee non-graduate Assistants in the promotion process.

Issues:

The interpretation and implementation of the amended rule, considering the judgment in M. Rathinaswami, which upheld the amendment while reading it down to exclude Promotee graduate Assistants.

Held:

The Court framed the question around the implementation of the amended rule and the judgment in M. Rathinaswami.( Para 10)

The Court examined the State's issuance of G.O. Nos. 884 and 133, retrospectively amending Rule 5(g) and Annexure-III, item(ii), and the subsequent challenges in courts.( Para 11)

The Court highlighted the Supreme Court's decision in Rathinaswami, which upheld the amendment but limited its application to Promotee non-graduate Assistants.( Para 12)

The Court discussed the absence of specific directions in Rathinaswami regarding the mode of implementation and the subsequent confusion in the orders issued by District Collectors.( Para 13)

The Court noted the State's letter (MS) No. 392 dated 30.12.2011, accepting the recommendation to dispense with the graduation requirement for the post of Deputy Tahsildar.( Para 14)

The Court criticized the High Court's reliance on the letter dated 30.12.2011 and highlighted the error in directing the State to treat all categories as one group for promotion, which contradicted the Supreme Court's judgment.( Para 15)

The Court discussed the State's stand not to disturb the promotions of Direct recruit Assistants made between 1995 and 2009, in compliance with the amended rule.( Para 16)

The Court emphasized the potential confusion and prejudice to Direct recruit Assistants if the implementation is made retrospective from 04.12.1978.( Para 17)

The Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court's judgment, and provided specific directions for the prospective implementation of the judgment in Rathinaswami.( Para 18)

Facts:

Respondent enrolled in the Indian Army as a Sepoy in the Army Service Corps on 25 April 1996.

Dispatched on a permanent posting to 874 ASC Battalion in Jammu and Kashmir on 11 November 2007.

Declared absent without leave on 22 November 2007, leading to a Court of Inquiry under Section 106 of the Army Act 1950.

Respondent reported to ASC Centre (North) at Gaya on 18 September 2008 after 302 days of unauthorized absence.

Summary Court Martial held on 12 November 2008, where respondent pleaded guilty to unauthorized absence and loss of equipment.

Tribunal's order on 21 August 2015 affirmed the finding but considered the dismissal as disproportionate, directing a notional service till pension eligibility.

Issues:

Whether the punishment of dismissal from service is disproportionate under the circumstances.

Interpretation of Section 39 of the Army Act regarding punishment for overstaying leave.

Held:

The Tribunal erred in finding the dismissal disproportionate, considering the respondent's 302 days of unauthorized absence and previous disciplinary action.

Section 39 of the Army Act does not mandate imprisonment for overstaying leave; Section 71(e) allows dismissal as a valid punishment.

The appeal is allowed, setting aside the Tribunal's order, and the respondent's Original Application stands dismissed.

No order as to costs.

Facts:

The appeal challenges the order dated 08.02.2019, passed by NCLAT, setting aside the NCLT's order dated 10.10.2018 and directing the admission of the application against the appellant under Section 7, IBC.

Appellant contends a violation of audi alteram partem, asserting that no notice was served as required by NCLAT Rules, specifically Rule 48.

Respondent No. 1 argues that an advance copy of the appeal paper book was sent to the appellant, indicating an intent to challenge the NCLT's order.

Issues:

Whether the NCLAT proceedings violated the appellant's right to be heard and adhered to the procedural rules, especially Rule 48 of the NCLAT Rules.

Held:

The NCLAT, despite issuing notice on the appeal, failed to comply with Rule 48, which mandates service of notice along with the appeal papers on the other party.

Rule 52 necessitates the record of service details in the order sheet, which is not reflected in the materials presented.

The appellant's right to be heard, a fundamental principle of natural justice, has been violated.

The NCLAT order is set aside, and the matter is remanded back to the NCLAT for fresh consideration, emphasizing adherence to procedural rules.

The appellant and respondents are directed to approach the NCLAT for early listing on March 13, 2019, without the need for fresh notice to the appellant.

The court refrains from expressing any opinion on the case's merits, leaving it to the NCLAT's independent adjudication.

The appeal stands disposed of