FACTS:

The respondent floated tenders for the execution of work on a water treatment plant.

Three work orders were assigned to the appellant on different dates.

The contracts had a common arbitration clause, and the appellant claimed non-payment under the contracts.

The respondent delayed responding to the appellant's representations regarding outstanding payments.

The appellant approached the Settlement Committee, and after no response, requested the appointment of an arbitrator in 2002.

ISSUES:

Whether the Arbitration Applications were barred by limitation?

Applicability of the 1940 Act or the 1996 Act to the Arbitration Applications.

HELD:

The court addressed the facts, issues, and background of the case, leading to the appeals from the High Court's judgment dismissing the Arbitration Applications.( Paragraphs 1-4)

The court discussed the applicability of the 1940 Act or the 1996 Act, emphasizing the commencement of arbitral proceedings as per Section 21 of the 1996 Act.( Paragraphs 5-6)

The court examined the limitation under Section 43 of the 1996 Act and applied principles from relevant precedents to determine the starting point for the limitation period.( Paragraphs 7-8)

The court discussed the negotiation history between parties and clarified the need to plead and place on record such history for determining the "breaking point" when settlement becomes impossible.( Paragraphs 9-11)

The court found an element of mala fide conduct in the appellant's case and held that the Arbitration Applications were barred by limitation.( Paragraph 12)

REFERRED CASES:

Decided on : 03-09-2019

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 11(6), 43(3), 85, 21, 85(2)(a), 43, 43(1), 43(3) - Arbitration Act, 1940 - Section 8(2) - Contract Act, 1872 - Section 28 - Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 114(g) - Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 - Payment of dues - Appointment of arbitrator - Appellant’s own default in sleeping over his right for 14 years will not constitute a case of ‘undue hardship’ justifying extension of time under Section 43(3) of the 1996 Act or show ‘sufficient cause’ for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act - Appellant should have approached the Court for appointment of an arbitrator under Section 8(2) of the 1940 Act within the appropriate limitation period - This Court agree with the High Court’s observation that the entire dispute seems concocted so as to pursue a monetary claim against the respondents, taking advantage of the provisions of the 1996 Act - Appeal dismissed.

Counsel for Appearing Parties

Mr. S.D. Singh, Advocate, Mrs. Bharti Tyagi, Advocate, Mr. Jitender Singh, Advocate, Mr. Ram Kripal Singh, Advocate, Ms. Shweta Sinha, Advocate and Mr. Vishwajit Singh, Advocate, for the Appellant; Ms. Pratibha Jain, Advocate, for the Respondent.

Cases Referred

Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd v. Jindal Exports Ltd., (2001) 6 SCC 356

Grasim Industries Limited vs. State of Kerala, (2018) 14 SCC 265

Hari Shankar Singhania and Others vs. Gaur Hari Singhania and Others, (2006) 4 SCC 658

Major (Retd.) Inder Singh Rekhi vs. Delhi Development Authority, (1988) 2 SCC 338

Milkfood Ltd. vs. GMC Ice Cream (P) Ltd, (2004) 7 SCC 288

Panchu Gopal Bose vs. Board of Trustees for Port of Calcutta, (1993) 4 SCC 338

Shetty's Constructions Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. Konkan Railway Construction and Another, (1998) 5 SCC 599

Shree Ram Mills Ltd. vs. Utility Premises (P) Ltd., (2007) 4 SCC 599

State of Orissa and Another vs. Damodar Das, (1996) 2 SCC 216

Sunder Kukreja and Others vs. Mohan Lal Kukreja and Anr., (2009) 4 SCC 585

Union of India vs. Momin Construction Company, (1997) 9 SCC 97

Facts:

Appellant, Ex-Sepoy Ram Khilawan, discharged on August 31, 1993, due to "CNS (IN) Seizure."

Discharge under Rule 13(3)(III)(iii) of Army Rules, 1954, for medical unfitness, not under residual clause (v).

Discharge proceeded without reference to Invalidating Medical Board.

Issues:

Whether the discharge of the appellant adhered to the prescribed procedure under Army Rules?

Applicability of Rule 13(3)(III)(v) in the discharge.

Held:

The discharge of the appellant was not under the residual clause (v) but under clause (iii) of Rule 13(3)(III) of the Army Rules. As the discharge was solely based on medical unfitness, it required adherence to the procedure laid down in Rule 13. Since the discharge proceeded without reference to the Invalidating Medical Board, it was deemed legally unsustainable.

The appellant, in accordance with General Principles of Army Order 46 of 1980, is entitled to be retained for ten years, and he would be deemed to be discharged only on October 22, 1997. Consequently, the appellant became entitled to pension, in addition to the disability pension granted for a period of five years. However, no arrears of salary were granted for the period up to the date of discharge due to "no work, no pay." Arrears of pension for a period of three years prior to filing the Writ Petition were directed to be paid to the appellant within six months from the date of the order.

Facts:

Appellant faced discharge due to seven instances of absence from duty with punishments ranging from 2 to 28 days of rigorous imprisonment.

Show-cause notice issued, and the appellant's reply mentioned family problems as the cause for mistakes.

Commanding Officer recorded the appellant as a habitual offender.

Issues:

Whether the discharge based on absence from duty was justified.

Adherence to para 5(a) of the Circular dated December 28, 1988, in conducting the enquiry.

Held and Decision:

The judgment emphasized the importance of an impartial enquiry before discharging a member from the armed forces.

Para 5(a) of the Circular dated December 28, 1988, outlined the enquiry process, excluding a court of inquiry but requiring a semblance of a fair decision-making process.

The appellant had the opportunity to provide an explanation but failed to do so, offering vague family circumstances.

The court found that the appellant had been given adequate opportunity to put forth his defense, satisfying the parameters laid down in para 5(a).

Absence from duty on multiple occasions with imposed punishments of imprisonment supported the conclusion that the appellant was a habitual offender.

In light of these factors, the order of discharge was considered justified.

Facts:

The case involves JBIMS, a department of the University of Mumbai, granted autonomous status for five years. The autonomous status, effective from 2014-15 to 2018-19, allowed 85% seat admissions based on merit from Maharashtra universities and 15% from the all-India quota. JBIMS sought an extension of autonomous status, facing delays in processing, leading to confusion during the 2019-2020 admissions.

Issues:

The delay in processing JBIMS's application for extension, the confusion in its status during the 2019-2020 admission process, and the subsequent legal challenge by students from other universities in Maharashtra.

Held:

The Court clarified that JBIMS, as a department of the University of Mumbai, did not need UGC approval for autonomous status, as it applies directly to the university under Section 122 of the Maharashtra Public Universities Act, 2016 (Para 11.2).

Despite the Directorate of Technical Education treating JBIMS as non-autonomous for 2019-2020 admissions, the Court held that the autonomous status had not been revoked or surrendered. The delay in the extension application processing contributed to the confusion (Para 11.5).

The decision emphasized that for the academic year 2019-2020, admissions must be conducted according to the High Court's judgment, treating JBIMS as an autonomous department of the University of Mumbai. The Directorate of Technical Education and CET-Cell were directed to follow the merit list for admissions (Para 12, 13).

Facts:

The employee in question served in a work-charged establishment for approximately 37 years before being regularized. Upon superannuation, the employee sought pension benefits, which were denied.

Issues:

Whether the period of work-charged services could be included in the qualifying service for the grant of pension.

Held:

Qualifying Service Definition (Paras 10 and 11): The court emphasized that qualifying service, as per Regulation 368 of Uttar Pradesh Civil Services Regulations, entails holding a substantive post on a permanent establishment. Rule 3(8) clarified that continuous, temporary, or officiating service followed by confirmation in the same or any other post is included in qualifying service. However, periods of temporary and officiating service in a non-pensionable establishment, work-charged establishment, and service in a post paid from contingencies do not count. The Note appended to Rule 3(8) allowed for counting service in work-charged, contingency paid, and non-pensionable establishments under specified exigencies.

Exclusion of Service (Paras 12, 13, and 14): Regulations 370 and 361 of Civil Services Regulations excluded service in a non-pensionable establishment, work-charged establishment, and a post paid from contingencies from qualifying service. Para 669 of the Financial Handbook Vol. VI further restricted pension entitlement for members of work-charged establishments.

Misuse of Work-Charged Employment (Para 29): The court criticized the misuse of the concept of work-charged employment for regular and perennial work. The appointment was made on a monthly salary with no qualitative difference from regular employees.

Unfair Treatment (Para 30): The Court deemed it unfair for the state government to take work on a work-charged basis for an extended period, depriving employees of their due emoluments and pensionary benefits.

Reading Down of Note to Rule 3(8) (Para 33): The Note to Rule 3(8) was deemed irrational and discriminatory. The court read down the Note, allowing for the counting of work-charged services even before regularization.

Striking Down of Regulations (Para 34): The provisions of Regulation 370 and instructions in Para 669 of the Financial Handbook were struck down as a result of the reading down of Rule 3(8).

Directive for Regularization (Para 35): Some employees who had not been regularized despite long service were directed to be treated as regular for pension purposes. However, they were not entitled to claim any dues for the difference in wages.

Conclusion on Qualifying Service (Para 36): In light of the read-down Note to Rule 3(8), services rendered in the work-charged establishment were deemed qualifying service for pension purposes.

Facts:

The challenges posed by the increasing number of vehicles, leading to a severe shortage of parking spaces in residential areas.

The court notes the failure of the government to provide sufficient public transport and highlights the need for comprehensive parking policies.

Issues:

Inadequate parking space in residential areas and the resulting impact on the social fabric and neighborhood harmony.

Lack of proper planning and infrastructure to accommodate the growing number of vehicles.

The need for regulatory measures to address parking issues in various areas, including transport hubs, institutional areas, and commercial zones.

Held:

The court directs municipal corporations and authorities to clear pavements from encroachments, making them usable for pedestrians.

Notifies the draft rules for the Delhi Maintenance and Management of Parking Places Rules 2019, with a compliance deadline of 30.09.2019.

Emphasizes the duty of all concerned to enforce the parking rules once notified.

Directs the Government of NCT to ensure proper assessment of parking needs for the next 25 years before granting permission for new structures.

Recommends the evaluation and effectiveness of the pilot project in Lajpat Nagar, with reports to be submitted by 30.12.2019.

Urges consideration of the viability of introducing RFID tags, parking guidance systems, and last-mile connectivity, with a report submission deadline of 30.09.2019.

Facts:

At the relevant time, respondent No.2 faced a default of Rs. 6.7 Crores and was declared an NPA by the bank. A Recovery Certificate was issued in 2001, leading to a Section 7 petition filed by Respondent No.1 before the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT). The NCLT admitted the petition, and an appeal to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) was subsequently dismissed.

Issues:

• Whether the default by Respondent No.2 is time-barred under the Limitation Act?

• Applicability of Section 23 of the Limitation Act to save limitation.

Held:

The court cites para 27 of B.K. Educational Services Private Limited vs. Parag Gupta and Associates, stating that the right to sue accrues when a default occurs. If the default happened over three years before filing the application, it would be barred under Article 137 of the Limitation Act.( Paragraph 3)

The appellant argues for the applicability of Section 23 of the Limitation Act. The court rejects this, citing Balkrishna Savalram Pujari and Others vs. Shree Dnyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan & Others, which distinguishes between a continuing wrong and a continuing right. The court holds that the Recovery Certificate in 2001 effectively and completely injured the appellant's rights, initiating the limitation period.( Paragraph 4)

Concluding that the claim is time-barred, the court sets aside the orders of the NCLT and NCLAT. The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.( Paragraph 5)

FACTS:

The appellant filed a suit under Section 6 of the Wakf Act, 1954, disputing the declaration of a property as Wakf-Al-Allah.

The Survey Commissioner's report confirmed the property as Wakf-Al-Allah, published in the Official Gazette on December 2, 1965.

The appellant filed the suit on January 17, 1967, beyond the one-year limitation period prescribed by the Act.

ISSUES:

Whether the suit filed by the appellant is barred by the limitation period under the Wakf Act, 1954.

Whether the nature of the Wakf property can be challenged beyond the limitation period.

HELD:

The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' decisions, confirming that the suit was time-barred. The key points include:

The property was declared Wakf-Al-Allah by the Survey Commissioner, and the list published on December 2, 1965.

The appellant's arguments regarding the nature of the Wakf and the applicability of Section 56 were rejected.

The Court affirmed that the suit was filed beyond the statutory one-year period, as per Section 6 of the Wakf Act.

The Court found no error in the lower courts' decisions and affirmed the dismissal of the appeal.

Facts:

Appellants were respondents 2 and 3 in a writ petition before the Rajasthan High Court.

High Court directed appellants to consider the candidature of the private respondent for appointment as a Civil Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate.

Private respondent initially applied as a "General" candidate and did not indicate any disability.

Subsequently claimed visual impairment and submitted a representation with a disability certificate indicating Hemiplegia.

Issues:

Whether the private respondent, who initially applied as a General candidate, can claim consideration under the Differently Abled Persons category.

Interpretation of disability-related provisions under the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995, and the Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010.

Held:

The court held that the private respondent's claim under the Differently Abled Persons category should have been made in the application, and the disability certificate should have been produced at the appropriate stage. The nature of the disability (locomotor or visual impairment) and the percentage of disability were crucial factors. The court, being unable to act as an expert, found the High Court's direction unjustified, especially when the appellants followed the Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010. The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's order was set aside.