Facts:

The Abhyankar Road Widening and Buty Mahal Street Scheme, framed under the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act in 1960, included a provision for a 15-meter internal road. Subsequently, the Development Plans under the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act (MRTP Act) did not incorporate this 15-meter road. The Nagpur Improvement Trust (NIT) decided to implement the scheme, leading to legal challenges when notices for shop demolitions were issued.

Issues:

Conflict between the provisions of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act and Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act regarding the 15-meter internal road.

Validity of the modification of the scheme, specifically the deletion of the 15-meter wide road, in line with the Development Plan sanctioned under the MRTP Act.

Held:

The Final Development Plan of 1976 did not include the 15-meter internal road. Section 59 of the MRTP Act emphasizes the importance of the Development Plan, stating that it shall prevail. Development contrary to the MRTP Act is not permitted, even if the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act allows it.

Changed circumstances and widened existing roads in subsequent Development Plans override the 15-meter road provision in the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act. The impugned judgment by the High Court, favoring the original scheme, cannot be sustained.

Layout plans and building permits are in accordance with the MRTP Act. The High Court's view that the NIT's actions were legally problematic is flawed. Equitable considerations also favor the landowners/developers, who have faced prolonged litigation.

Section 39 of the MRTP Act empowers the Planning Authority to modify schemes in line with the Development Plan. The modification deleting the 15-meter road, in conformity with the DP, is not illegal.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over inheritance rights arising from the marriage of a Muslim man (Mohammed Ilias) with a Hindu woman (Valliamma/Souda Beebi). The plaintiff, Shamsudeen, claims legitimacy and inheritance rights, while the defendants argue that the marriage was irregular and, therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to any share.

Issues:

The validity of the marriage between Mohammed Ilias and Valliamma, the legitimacy of the plaintiff, and the subsequent inheritance rights over the properties owned by Mohammed Ilias.

Held:

The court establishes the timeline of events and concludes that the plaintiff was born two months before the death of Mohammed Ilias, supporting the legitimacy of the marriage.( Para 7)

The court analyzes Muslim law, distinguishing between valid, void, and irregular marriages. It emphasizes that a fasid (irregular) marriage, though not void, does not create mutual rights of inheritance between the parties.( Para 8)

The court reaffirms that a batil (void) marriage and a fasid (irregular) marriage are distinct, clarifying that the former is void ab initio and results in illegitimate offspring, while the latter, though irregular, produces legitimate children.( Para 9)

Referring to legal texts and previous judgments, the court underscores that a marriage between a Hindu woman and Muslim man is irregular (fasid) but does not render the offspring illegitimate.( Para 10)

The court concludes that the marriage of a Muslim man with a Hindu woman is irregular (fasid), and any child born out of such wedlock is entitled to claim a share in the father's property.( Para 13)

The court upholds the decisions of the trial court and the high court, confirming the legitimacy of the plaintiff and awarding the appropriate share in the property.( Para 14)

Facts:

A winding-up petition (No. 42 of 2014) was filed by the appellant before the High Court of Delhi in 2014.

Notice under Rule 26 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, had been served.

Another operational creditor filed an application under Section 9 of the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (the Code).

Respondent No. 1, a financial creditor, moved the NCLT under Section 7 of the Code in 2017.

The appellant appealed the NCLT's order, arguing the independence of winding-up proceedings.

Issues:

Whether winding up proceedings should continue in parallel with insolvency petitions under the Code.

The interpretation of Rule 26 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959.

Applicability of Section 434 of the Companies Act, 2013, and its amendments.

Held:

Rules 26 and 27 pertain to a pre-admission scenario, indicating that notice under Rule 26 is served before the hearing.The expression "was admitted" in Form No. 6 only means that notice has been issued, and the petition is fixed for a hearing. (Para 17)

The statutory scheme evolved with amendments to Section 434, allowing the transfer of winding-up petitions to NCLT even if notice has been served.The objective is to avoid parallel proceedings and resuscitate corporate debtors under the Code.( Para 18)

Citing Jaipur Metals & Electricals Employees Organization case, the Court emphasizes the independent nature of proceedings under Section 7 or Section 9 of the Code.Section 238 of the Code prevails in case of any inconsistency.( Para 19)

Referring to PSL Limited v. Jotun India Private Limited, the Court upholds the applicability of the Code to post-notice winding-up proceedings.( Para 20)

Section 11 of the Code is of limited application and does not bar the filing of an Insolvency Petition until a liquidation order is made against the corporate debtor.( Para 21)

While not interfering with the Appellate Tribunal's order, the appellant is granted liberty to apply under the proviso to Section 434 to transfer the winding-up proceedings to the NCLT.( Para 23)

Facts:

MERC (Multi Year Tariff) Regulations, 2011, were notified on 04.02.2011.

Regulation 44.2(d) imposed a more stringent Station Heat Rate (SHR) for Reliance Infrastructure Limited's Dahanu TPS compared to other thermal generating stations in the state.

Issues:

Applicability of Article 226 in challenging the validity of regulations framed by MERC.

Alleged discrimination in the imposition of a tighter standard for Dahanu TPS.

Held:

The High Court overlooked the Constitution Bench's judgment in PTC India Limited v Central Electricity Regulatory Commission. The Constitution Bench established that the validity of regulations framed under Section 178 of the Electricity Act 2003 can only be tested before a court exercising judicial review, not the Tribunal. Thus, the High Court's imposition of costs for using Article 226 was unjustified.

The appellant's plea of discrimination was based on the CPRI report, alleging similarity with other units. However, the Court emphasized that MERC, as an expert body, followed statutory procedures and considered various factors mandated by the statute. The Court rejected the claim of manifest unreasonableness or arbitrariness and upheld the validity of Regulation 44.2(d).

The High Court's decision to dismiss the writ petition under Article 226 was affirmed. However, the direction on the imposition of costs was set aside, concluding that there was no infirmity in the impugned regulation. The Civil Appeal is, accordingly, disposed of.

Facts:

Respondent no. 1 appointed as Coach Grade-III on 20 March 1986.

Promotions: Coach Grade-II on 22 February 1990, Coach Grade-I on 10 January 1997.

Dispute arises from the promotion of respondent No. 2 for vacancies in 2003-2004.

High Court reverses the Single Judge's decision, citing the inapplicability of 2006 criteria to pre-existing vacancies.

Issues:

Applicability of criteria for promotion to the post of Sports Officer.

Interpretation of Rule 9(4) of the Rajasthan State Sports Council Service Rules, 2006.

Held:

The respondent had no vested right to promotion but only a right to be considered as per the rules in effect at the time of promotion.

Rule 9(4) does not specify that vacancies must be filled based on rules prevailing in the year they occurred.

The High Court's direction to reconsider promotion as Sports Officer against 2003-2004 vacancies using criteria applicable at that time is unsustainable.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, and the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. No order as to costs.

Facts:

The suit was filed for a permanent injunction against the defendants, restraining interference with the possession of the plaintiff over disputed agricultural land.

The trial court dismissed the suit on the grounds of failure to prove possession.

The subsequent appeals were also unsuccessful.

Issues:

Whether the provisions of Section 144 of CPC are attracted in this case.

Whether the plaintiff was placed in possession by the court under any decree or order.

Held:

The interim order of the trial court did not mandate the defendant to hand over possession to the plaintiff.

No decree or order of the trial court gave possession to the appellant, and Section 144 was not applicable.

The remedy of the respondent did not lie in an application for restitution under Section 144.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, setting aside the judgment of the High Court. The application for restitution is dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant was aggrieved by the rejection of his claim for financial upgradation by CSIR and non-promotion to the higher post.

The appellant contended that the failure to communicate the Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs), in which he had failed to meet the benchmark, violated the O.Ms issued by the Department of Personnel and Training.

The appellant moved the Central Administrative Tribunal, and subsequently, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, challenging the decisions of CSIR.

Issues:

Whether the non-communication of ACRs to the appellant violated principles of natural justice?

Whether the appellant was entitled to financial upgradation under the MACP scheme?

Whether the appellant's representation for financial upgradation and promotion was considered appropriately?

Held:

The Tribunal and the High Court were in error in concluding that CSIR, being an autonomous entity, was exempt from the obligation to communicate ACRs as per the principles established in Dev Dutt v. Union of India & Ors.

The failure to communicate the ACRs deprived the appellant of the opportunity to submit a representation for financial upgradation. The appellant should be granted an opportunity to submit his representation, and CSIR must consider it within a specified time frame.

If the ACRs for the relevant period are upgraded, the appellant's case for financial upgradation and promotion shall be considered afresh by the Screening Committee and the Departmental Promotion Committee, respectively.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. The appellant is granted an opportunity to submit representations for ACRs, and decisions on financial upgradation and promotion shall be made within specified time frames.

Facts:

The appellant, aged about 50 years, was convicted for offenses under IPC Sections 302, 363, 366, and 376(2)(i) and Sections 5 and 6 of the POCSO Act.

The case involved the rape and murder of a minor girl at a 'Mela.'

The trial court imposed the death sentence, considering the crime as 'rarest of rare.'

The appellant claimed denial of proper legal assistance, and there was no finding on the possibility of reformation.

Issues:

Validity of the conviction based on circumstantial evidence.

Compliance with Section 354(3) of CrPC in imposing the death penalty.

Consideration of mitigating circumstances and reformation possibilities.

Held:

The conviction is upheld based on circumstantial evidence, considering identification in the Test Identification Parade, witness accounts, and forensic and medical evidence (Paras 10-11).

Death sentence must be supported by special reasons as per Section 354(3) of CrPC.

The trial court and High Court failed to provide special reasons for imposing the death penalty, and reasons cited are not within the ambit of Section 354(3) (Para 13).

Mitigating circumstances like socio-economic background, lack of criminal antecedents, and possibility of reformation were not adequately considered (Para 13).

Refusal of legal assistance by the local Bar Association and the appellant's occupation as a manhole worker were factors overlooked (Para 13).

Death sentence modified to life imprisonment with an actual period of 25 years, without remission. Sentences for all offenses to run concurrently (Para 13).

Facts:

The respondent claimed that the appellant issued a cheque to repay a borrowed sum of Rs. 15 lakhs, which subsequently bounced. The appellant, in defense, asserted an absence of a legally enforceable debt, alleging misuse of cheques and providing a detailed narrative of events.

Issues:

Whether there exists a legally enforceable debt between the parties?

Whether the appellant's defense of cheque misuse and absence of debt is credible?

Held:

The appellant contested the existence of a legally enforceable debt and successfully rebutted the presumption under Section 139 of the Act. The defense raised cast doubt on the complainant's version, justifying the order of acquittal by the first appellate court.( Paragraph 8)

The Court emphasized that the standard of proof for rebuttal under Section 139 is a 'preponderance of probabilities.' The appellant's defense, creating doubts about the debt's existence, rendered the presumption rebutted.( Paragraph 10)

The first appellate court's analysis of evidence, including discrepancies in the complainant's testimony and non-disclosure of crucial facts, formed the basis for acquittal. The High Court's failure to appreciate these findings led to an unsatisfactory judgment.( Paragraph 12)

In alignment with the precedent in Rangappa, the Court concluded that the appellant effectively rebutted the presumption, justifying the order of acquittal. Consequently, the High Court's decision to convict the appellant under Section 138 was set aside.( Paragraph 15)