Facts:

The appellant filed a civil suit in the High Court at Calcutta seeking a declaration, damages, and injunction. The respondents raised a plea of territorial jurisdiction, arguing that no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in revoking the leave granted to the appellant based on the respondents' plea of territorial jurisdiction.

Held:

The respondents did not file a written statement but instead raised the plea of territorial jurisdiction through an application for revocation of leave.

The Court emphasized that the issue of territorial jurisdiction is a mixed question of law and fact, and such matters should be raised in the written statement as part of the defense.

The Court referred to the precedent set in Secretary of State v. Golabrai Paliram and Indian Mineral & Chemicals Co. v. Deutsche Bank, asserting that questions of difficulty and importance should not be dealt with by revoking leave but should be part of the written statement.

The Court held that the respondents should be allowed to raise the plea of territorial jurisdiction in the written statement to enable a thorough examination of the issue on its merits.

The application for revocation of leave was set aside, and the case was remanded to the Single Judge for a fresh decision on the issue in accordance with law.

The Court clarified that it did not express any opinion on the merits of the controversy but directed the Single Judge to decide the issue strictly in accordance with the law.

FACTS:

Birla Institute of Technology (BIT) is the appellant.

The State of Jharkhand and others are respondents.

The appeal involves the entitlement of teachers to gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.

The court initially relied on the decision in Ahmadabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Association, allowing the appeal.

Later, the court realized that the Parliament had amended the definition of "employee" in the Payment of Gratuity Act in response to the Ahmadabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Association case.

The amendment had retrospective effect from 03.04.1997.

ISSUES:

Whether teachers are entitled to gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act.

The impact of the amendment made by Act No. 47 of 2009 on the Ahmadabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Association case.

HELD:

The court acknowledged the error in its initial judgment due to not considering the amendment to the Payment of Gratuity Act.

The amendment widened the definition of "employee," including teachers, with retrospective effect from 03.04.1997.

The reliance on Ahmadabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Association by the appellant was misplaced in light of the amendment.

The court recalled its previous order and restored the appeal for disposal on its merits.

Pendency of a writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of Act No. 47 of 2009 does not affect the right of teachers to claim gratuity.

DECISION: The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was directed to pay costs to the teacher.

REFERRED CASES:

Ahmadabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Association vs. Administrative Officer and Others (2004) 1 SCC 755

Facts:

The case pertains to the succession of an interest in agricultural lands in the State of Himachal Pradesh. The matter involves the application of Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and the relevance of the deleted Section 4(2) in the context of devolution of tenancy rights concerning agricultural holdings.

Issues:

Applicability of Section 22 to agricultural land in Himachal Pradesh.

Impact of the deletion of Section 4(2) on the applicability of Section 22.

Whether devolution of tenancy rights in agricultural holdings is exempt from Section 22.

Held:

The court notes that there is no conflicting State legislation in Himachal Pradesh regarding succession to agricultural lands. Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act exclusively occupies this field in the state, and the High Court was correct in affirming its applicability to agricultural lands.

The court observes that, before its deletion, Section 4(2) of the Act explicitly exempted the applicability of the Act in cases of devolution of tenancy rights concerning agricultural holdings. The High Court's conclusion on the inapplicability of Section 22 in such cases was accurate. However, the deletion of Section 4(2) removes this exception, making Section 22 universally applicable.

The court explores the exclusive competence of State legislatures over matters related to land, land tenures, etc. It emphasizes that the preferential rights under Section 22 are linked to the principles of succession. Three illustrations are provided to clarify scenarios involving joint purchase, joint purchase by siblings, and inherited agricultural holdings.

The court delves into the historical context, stating that preferential rights were introduced to prevent outsiders from easily acquiring family properties. This objective supports the conferment of preferential rights upon heirs under Section 22, even in the case of agricultural land.

The court conclusively affirms that the preferential right under Section 22 applies to heirs of Hindus, even when the property in question is agricultural land. The High Court's decision upholding the judgment and decree passed by the District Judge is validated.

FACTS:

Appellant obtained a life insurance policy in 1993 with a term of 25 years and a sum insured of Rs 75,000.

Appellant stopped premium payments in 2001 and sought surrender value.

Respondent computed surrender value, deducting a loan amount and outstanding interest.

Appellant disputed the computation, claiming entitlement to the full bonus amount.

ISSUES:

Interpretation of Section 113 of the Insurance Act, 1938, and Condition 7 of the policy document.

Calculation method of surrender value for bonus.

HELD:

The dispute revolves around Section 113 of the Insurance Act, 1938, and Clause 7 of the policy document. The appellant contends for the entirety of the bonus, challenging the computation method used by the respondent.

Section 113(1) stipulates the acquisition of surrender value after a certain period, with the surrender value of any subsisting bonus to be added. The first proviso allows for calculation methods including bonus surrender value. The second and third provisos specify policy display requirements and their effective period.

Regulation 18(2) of the Life Insurance Corporation Regulations 1959 empowers the Executive Committee to accept surrender on terms it deems fit.

Condition 7 of the policy document specifies surrender value computation, involving 30% of total premiums paid, excluding certain premiums.

The computation method, as per the provided formula, includes the paid-up value and vested bonus, with a surrender value factor of 32.92%.

The appellant's contention that the surrender value should include the entire bonus is rejected. The surrender value is correctly calculated based on the approved formula.

The dispute stems from a misconception about the nature of surrender value in life insurance. The concept of 'reserve' is explained, emphasizing the proportional return based on the law of averages and actuarial tables.

Citing Charles C. Burlingham v Charles M. Crouse (1913), the Court distinguishes between insurance policies with and without surrender value.

The computation, as per the approved formula and regulations, aligns with the legal provisions and policy conditions.

The appeal is dismissed, finding no merit in the appellant's claim. No costs are awarded.

REFERRED CASES:

Branch Manager, LIC of India vs A Paulraj, (1996) 2 CPJ 69.

Charles C. Burlingham v Charles M. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459(1913)

In re McKinney, 15 Fed. Rep. 535

Facts:

The original suit involved a challenge to a sale deed dated 23.03.1985, executed by defendant No. 1 in favor of defendant No. 2.

The original plaintiff passed away, and legal representatives were impleaded.

Subsequent developments included the sale of the suit property to third parties, transposition of parties, and renumbering of the suit.

Issues:

The original plaintiffs sought permission to withdraw the suit after reaching a settlement with defendant Nos. 1 and 2.

Defendant Nos. 3 to 6, originally transposed as defendants, filed objections to the withdrawal and sought transposition as plaintiffs.

Held:

The Court emphasized the wide powers under Rule 1-A of Order XXIII and Rule 10 of Order I CPC for effectual adjudication of all matters in controversy in the suit.

The Court observed that the basic requirement is to examine if the plaintiff seeks to withdraw, and the defendant seeking transposition has an interest in the subject matter with a substantial question to be adjudicated.

Defendant Nos. 3 to 6 were rightly allowed to be transposed as plaintiffs to continue with the suit against defendant Nos. 1 and 2.

The Court justified the decision by noting the common interest of the existing plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 3 to 6 against defendant Nos. 1 and 2.

The right of defendant No. 3 (plaintiff No. 5 earlier) to challenge the sale deed remained unaffected by his transposition as a defendant.

Facts:

The appellant claims an ad hoc appointment as a Lecturer in a Post Graduate College affiliated with Gorakhpur University. The appointment, dated 02.08.1991, was allegedly based on the recommendations of a Selection Committee. Dispute arose when the appellant's salary payments were discontinued due to a management dispute.

Issues:

Validity of the appellant's ad hoc appointment.

Dispute over salary payments.

Alleged procedural irregularities in the appointment process.

Held:

The High Court dismissed the writ petition without proper consideration of the facts and pleadings. The appellant argued that certain paragraphs in the counter-affidavit and rejoinder-affidavit referred to by the High Court were not present in the actual documents.

Decision: The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and ordered a fresh consideration based on the pleadings in the record. No opinion was expressed on the merits of the appellant's claim.

FACTS:

The appellants, Digamber Vaishnav and Girdhari Vaishnav, challenged the judgment affirming their death sentence for murder and robbery.

The prosecution alleged that the appellants killed five individuals, including Shri Bai, Subhadra Bai, and Kondi, in a village house.

Chandni, a child witness, played a crucial role in the case, claiming to have seen the appellants with the deceased.

ISSUES:

Reliability of the child witness, Chandni (PW-8), and the sufficiency of her testimony.

Validity of the evidence related to recovery under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act.

Adequacy of forensic and expert evidence, including fingerprints and hair analysis.

Unexplained delay in reporting the crime and inconsistencies in witness testimonies.

Robbery as the motive, and the credibility of recovered articles, including cash and silver patti.

HELD:

The Court emphasized the cautious evaluation of evidence provided by a child witness (Para 22).

The recovery evidence under Section 27 was deemed unreliable due to lack of ownership confirmation of the recovered motorcycle (Para 29).

The forensic evidence, including fingerprints and hair analysis, was considered inconclusive and insufficient (Para 36-38).

Unexplained delays in reporting the crime and inconsistencies in witness testimonies raised doubts about the veracity of the case (Para 28, 34).

The motive of robbery was questioned based on the presence of valuable items left untouched at the crime scene (Para 39).

The prosecution failed to establish a strong case, and the circumstantial evidence did not conclusively point to the guilt of the appellants (Para 42).

Consequently, the appeals were allowed, the death sentence was set aside, and the appellants were acquitted (Para 44).

REFERRED CASES:

Alagupandi alias Alagupandian v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2012) 10 SCC 451

Arjun Marik & Ors. v. State of Bihar, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 372

Jaharlal Das v. State of Orissa, (1991) 3 SCC 27

Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1973) 2 SCC 808

Kanhaiya Lal v. State of Rajasthan, (2014) 4 SCC 715

Panchhi and others v. State of U.P, (1998) 7 SCC 177

State of Rajasthan v. Om Prakash, (2002) 5 SCC 745

State of U.P. v. Ashok Dixit and another, (2000) 3 SCC 70

Sujit Biswas v. State of Assam, (2013) 12 SCC 406

Varkey Joseph v. State of Kerala, 1993 Suppl (3) SCC 745

Facts:

Assessee is a Co-operative Society engaged in sugarcane production and sales.

Dispute arose over the excess sugarcane purchase price paid to members/non-members, violating Control Order, 1966.

Assessing Officer disallowed the excess as sharing profit; Assessee contended it's a legitimate business expense.

Issues:

Whether excess sugarcane purchase price is sharing of profit?

Applicability of Section 40A(2) on excessive payments.

Held:

Excess price determined under Clause 5A is profit-sharing; must be considered as income under Section 37.

Section 40A(2) applies to unreasonable payments beyond statutory rates.

Decision: The excess sugarcane purchase price over statutory rates shall be treated as profit distribution and included in the income of the assessee. Applicability of Section 40A(2) for unreasonable payments affirmed.

Facts:

An altercation ensued between the parties. Accused No. 1 and Accused No. 2 left the scene but returned after 10 minutes armed with a deadly weapon, a knife with a 15.5 cm blade. The victim was subsequently stabbed to death. Accused No. 1 stabbed the victim, while Accused No. 2 held the victim's neck.

Issues:

The appeal by Accused No. 2 challenges the High Court's conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34, arguing a lack of evidence for pre-planned murder.

Held:

The accused, after the initial incident, returned with a deadly weapon, demonstrating clear intention. The post-mortem confirmed that the inflicted injury was sufficient to cause death. Accused No. 1's conviction under Section 302 was upheld, and there was no reason to differ with the High Court's view that both accused were liable for conviction under Section 302.

The appellant contended that there could be no conviction under Section 34, citing a lack of evidence for pre-planned murder. However, all three eye-witnesses confirmed that Accused No. 2 held the neck of the victim, supporting the finding of common intention.

Examining the evidence, the common intention of Accused Nos. 1 and 2 was fully established. After an altercation, they returned armed, indicating a meeting of minds. Accused No. 2 held the victim's neck while Accused No. 1 stabbed him, confirming their common intention. The High Court's conviction of Accused No. 2 under Section 302 read with Section 34 was deemed appropriate.

Decision: The appeals by the accused were dismissed by the court.