Facts:

The appellant purchased a Hydraulic Excavator in 2007 for Rs. 51,74,000 and insured it under a policy.

The Excavator was damaged in a fire in 2010, and the insurance claim was contested over the calculation of depreciation and sum insured.

Surveyors appointed by both the appellant and the insurance company assessed the loss differently.

Issues:

Calculation of depreciation for the damaged Excavator.

Discrepancy in the assessed sum insured between the appellant and the insurance company.

Held:

The court held that the parties are bound by the stipulated sum insured. The surveyor appointed by the insurance company was not justified in disregarding the agreed sum insured and calculating depreciation for a period prior to the policy date. The National Commission's decision was set aside, and the State Commission's judgment was restored.

Decision: The court allowed the appeal, setting aside the decision of the National Commission, and restored the judgment of the State Commission.

Facts:

Show cause notice issued on 01.05.1991 to respondent no.2 and its directors for FERA violations.

FERA repealed on 01.06.2000, replaced by FEMA.

Adjudication order on 05.12.2003 imposed penalty on respondent nos. 2 to 4.

Appeals filed before Special Director (Appeals) under Section 17 of FEMA dismissed as not maintainable.

Issues:

Appropriate appellate authority for appeals filed post-repeal against the order under Section 51 of FERA.

Jurisdiction conflict between Special Director (Appeals) and Appellate Tribunal under FEMA.

Held:

Section 49(5)(b) of FEMA transfers pending appeals from the dissolved Appellate Board under FERA to the Appellate Tribunal under FEMA. Dissolution of the Appellate Board necessitates a corresponding provision under FEMA for the disposal of pending appeals. Appeals, whether filed pre or post 01.06.2000 against orders under Section 51 of FERA, shall lie before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 19 of FEMA. Legislative intent is evident from the simultaneous statutory transfer of pending appeals to the Appellate Tribunal. No justifiable reason to distinguish appeals based on filing dates against similar FERA orders under FEMA. Section 49(5)(b) of FEMA and Section 81(c) of FERA both reflect the legislature's intention that such appeals be heard by the Appellate Tribunal. Purposive interpretation dictates uniformity in appellate forums for FERA adjudication orders, regardless of the filing date.

Decision: Appeals filed by respondent nos. 2 to 4 against the order dated 05.12.2003 transferred to the Appellate Tribunal under Section 19 of FEMA.

Facts:

Four officers requested Premature Separation from Service (PSS).

PSS request approved, and officers underwent pre-release course.

Application for withdrawal of PSS rejected.

Challenged rejection in Armed Forces Tribunal.

Three officers succeeded in Tribunal, one did not.

Two officers reinstated, one's reinstatement stayed pending appeal.

Issues:

Validity of rejecting PSS withdrawal.

Applicability of Air Force Act, 1950, and Human Resource Policy.

Tribunal's decision on operational requirements and withdrawal restrictions.

Held:

The Air Force Act 1950 governs individuals subject to it, defining their categories and tenure during the President's pleasure. Retirement, release, or discharge follows Rules.

Provisions of the Air Force Act 1950 ensure discipline in the Armed Forces. Article 33 allows Parliament to restrict Part III of the Constitution for Armed Forces members.

Entry and exit from the Air Force follow legal provisions, not individual preference. Human Resource Policy, delegated by Ministry of Defence, aims to balance individual aspirations and service interests.

Human Resource Policy outlines guidelines for premature separation, considering officers' years of service. The process involves a Board of Officers and strict adherence to a time schedule.

The policy limits the right to seek extension of PSS, emphasizing maintaining efficiency and discipline. Officers undergoing pre-release courses impact operational requirements.

The right to withdraw a PSS request is not absolute; it depends on "extreme compassionate grounds." The withdrawal is subject to permission, not a unilateral decision.

The determination of PSS applications considers the Air Force's manpower requirements. Approved PSS has consequences for both service and officers until the eventual severance.

Officers in this case applied under the Human Resource Policy, which restricts the right to withdraw. Officers can't rely on the policy and repudiate withdrawal conditions.

The Tribunal erred in not appreciating the operational requirements of the Armed Forces. Paragraph 18's restrictions on withdrawal are founded on the principle of fair assessment.

The right to withdraw from approved PSS is neither absolute nor unqualified. Rejections were bona fide, considering "extreme compassionate grounds" and service exigencies.

Two officers due to superannuate on specific dates; their services until remaining tenure won't be affected by the judgment, subject to applicable norms.

In one officer's case, the Tribunal's decision is set aside, and the application is dismissed. In another officer's case, the Tribunal's decision is affirmed.

Facts:

Dasarath Yadav lost his life in a railway accident when his head collided with a post while peeping out of a compartment door.

Railway Claims Tribunal denied compensation, deeming the deceased a victim of his own act.

High Court applied the Principle of Strict Liability, awarding compensation of Rs. 8,00,000/- with interest.

Issues:

Whether the deceased is entitled to compensation under the Principle of Strict Liability.

Applicability of the Railway Accidents and Untoward Incidents (Compensation) Rules, 1990.

Calculation of interest on the compensation amount.

Held:

The Tribunal found the deceased to be a bona fide passenger but denied compensation. High Court applied the Principle of Strict Liability, awarding Rs. 8,00,000/- with interest.( Paragraph 2-5)

Referring to Union of India v. Rina Devi, the court clarified the principles:

Liability accrues on the date of the accident.

Compensation as on the date of the accident with reasonable interest.

If revised compensation with interest is less than the prescribed amount as on the award date, higher of the two amounts is awarded. (Paragraph 6)

The court emphasized that interest on Rs. 8 lakhs was an error, and the calculation should align with Rina Devi's principles. The High Court's decision on interest was set aside, but the respondent's entitlement to the awarded sum was maintained.( Paragraph 10)

The court adjourned for eight weeks to address safety concerns highlighted in reports regarding Indian Railways, suggesting the Railways must address safety issues urgently.( Paragraph 12-13)

Facts:

The respondent-bank filed a winding-up petition against the debtor companies after securing a decree from the Debts Recovery Tribunal and obtaining a recovery certificate. The debtor companies raised several pleas, including the argument that the petition was barred by provisions in Section 17 read with Section 18 of the Recovery of Debts Act.

Issues:

Whether the winding-up petition is barred by the provisions of Section 17 read with Section 18 of the Recovery of Debts Act?

Should the creditor relinquish its security and stand in line in winding-up proceedings, or can it realize its security outside the winding-up proceeding?

Applicability of Section 434(1)(b) versus Section 434(1)(a).

The timing of the winding-up petition concerning the application of Section 441(2) and Section 439 of the Companies Act.

Held:

A winding-up proceeding is not a means for the realization of debts under the Recovery of Debts Act. Therefore, the bar contained in Section 18 read with Section 34 of the Recovery of Debts Act does not apply to winding-up proceedings under the Companies Act (Paragraph 13).

Under Section 439 of the Companies Act, a secured creditor's petition for winding up is maintainable without relinquishing its security, unlike Section 9(2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act (Paragraph 17).

Section 529(1)(c) of the Companies Act refers to the right of a secured creditor under the law of insolvency, and it is Section 47 of the Provincial Insolvency Act that is applicable, not Section 9(2) (Paragraph 17).

Section 441(2) does not mean that a secured creditor must give up its security at the time of filing the winding-up petition. Section 441(2) must be read in conjunction with Section 441(1) (Paragraph 17).

Section 434(1)(b) was not applicable in this case as the company petition was filed before the issuance of the recovery certificate (Paragraph 19).

Decision: The winding-up petition filed by the respondent-bank is held to be maintainable.

Facts:

The Additional District Magistrate, Gwalior, issued an order externing the respondent for one year.

The respondent challenged the order, contending that the Additional District Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to pass such orders under the Madhya Pradesh Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990.

Issues:

Whether the Additional District Magistrate had the jurisdiction to pass orders under the Madhya Pradesh Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990?

Held:

The statutory scheme of the Adhiniyam, 1990 allows orders under Sections 3, 4, 5, and 6 to be passed by an Additional District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate.

The Constitution Bench Judgment in Ajaib Singh Vs. Gurbachan Singh (AIR 1965 SC 1619) is not applicable to the present case as it dealt with a different statutory scheme.

The High Court erred in relying on Ajaib Singh's judgment, and the impugned judgment is unsustainable.

The Notification dated 05.03.2003, empowering the Additional District Magistrate, was not challenged in the writ petition.

The period of externment being one year has already expired, making consideration of other grounds unnecessary.

The appeals are allowed, and the impugned judgments of the High Court are set aside.

Facts:

The appellant claimed rights to agricultural land after the death of Mangalram and Rukma Devi.

Allegations of collusion were made against respondent Nos. 2 and 3 for recording the land in the name of respondent No. 3.

A gift deed was executed, leading the appellant to file a civil suit challenging its validity.

Issues:

Whether the relief sought falls under the jurisdiction of a revenue court, as per the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955.

Whether a civil court has jurisdiction when khatedari rights are pending adjudication in a revenue court.

Held:

The Trial court dismissed objections to its jurisdiction, stating a conclusive decision can only be made after framing preliminary issues and recording evidence.

The High Court allowed revision, citing that the suit fell under the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, and was, therefore, barred under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The relief sought, involving khatedari rights, was held to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of revenue courts.

The civil court cannot grant the relief until khatedari rights are decreed by the revenue court.

The High Court's decision was upheld, dismissing the appeals.

Facts:

The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of title and possession, relying on a rent note from 1967.

A fire incident in 1967 was alleged as the cause for the land being vacant, leading to a claim of dispossession in 1972.

The defendant asserted possession based on sale deeds, and the dispute revolved around the ownership and possession of the property.

Issues:

Whether the plaintiff had better title over the property?

Whether the plaintiff was in settled possession of the property, justifying dispossession?

Held:

The plaintiff lacked documentary proof of possession and title.

The Court emphasized settled possession as a prerequisite for possessory title and found the evidence of the plaintiff insufficient.

The sale deeds presented by the defendants indicated ownership and possession over the disputed property.

The High Court's interference with the First Appellate Court's findings was deemed unjustified.

The appeal succeeded, and the judgment of the First Appellate Court was restored, leading to the dismissal of the suit.

Facts:

An advertisement was issued for direct recruitment to the Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service (UPHJS). The petitioners applied but were debarred on grounds of age, not complying with the age limit prescribed in Rule 12 of the 1975 Rules.

Issues:

The constitutional validity of Rules 8(1) and 12 of the 1975 Rules was challenged. The contention included the impact of these rules on candidates who exceeded the age limit between the last recruitment and the present recruitment.

Held:

The directions in Malik Mazhar Sultan, which aim to fill vacancies in the district judiciary, do not override the prevailing rules governing selections to the HJS. These directions do not create an enforceable right in any candidate for selection or the right to assert age relaxation in violation of the rules.

The validity of both Rules 8 and 12 has been upheld by Division Benches of the Allahabad High Court in separate judgments.

The power to fix a cut-off date or age limit is incidental to the regulatory control over the selection process. A cut-off is not arbitrary if it has a rational basis and is not manifestly unreasonable, violating Article 14 of the Constitution.

Rolling back the date for the upper age limit is impermissible. The determination of cut-off dates lies in the realm of policy, and it is the rule-making authority's function, not the court's, to discharge that duty.

No merit in the grievance of discrimination as the cut-off dates for distinct requirements, such as practice years and age criteria, serve different purposes.

No case of discrimination or arbitrariness is established by comparing the Higher Judicial Service Rules with the Rules governing Nyayik Sewa, as they cater to different cadres.

Decision: The writ petitions and the appeal challenging the constitutional validity of Rules 8(1) and 12 of the 1975 Rules are dismissed.