Facts:

The appellant (Union of India - Income Tax Department) vs. Respondent (Yes Bank Ltd.).

Assessment Year 2007-2008 - Question of the respondent's entitlement to claim deduction under Section 35-D of the Income Tax Act.

Dispute arose on whether the respondent-Bank qualifies as an industrial undertaking for Section 35-D benefits.

Commissioner's adverse order prompted the appeal to ITAT, which ruled in favor of the respondent.

Revenue appealed to the High Court under Section 260-A of the Act.

High Court dismissed the appeal without framing substantial questions of law and without deciding the main issue of Section 35-D applicability.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's dismissal of the appeal without framing substantial questions of law was justified.

The applicability of Section 35-D to the respondent-Bank.

Held:

The High Court's dismissal was not legally sustainable.

High Court should have framed substantial questions of law, especially concerning Section 35-D, and decided them on merits.

The case is remanded to the High Court for a fresh decision along with another appeal on the same issue, if pending.

No expression of opinion on the merits; the High Court should decide the appeal uninfluenced by previous observations.

Facts:

The appellant, S. Sreesanth, faced allegations of spot-fixing in an IPL match, leading to a one-man Commission's investigation. The Disciplinary Committee of the BCCI imposed a life ban after considering evidence, including telephone conversations.

Issues:

Violation of principles of natural justice by the Disciplinary Committee.

Burden of proof and standard of proof under Article 3.1 of the Anti-Corruption Code.

Effect of the appellant's discharge from the criminal case on the disciplinary proceedings.

Propriety of imposing a life-time ban under Article 6 of the Anti-Corruption Code.

Constitution of the Disciplinary Committee and its alleged vitiating factors.

Held:

Violation of Natural Justice: The appellant received transcripts of telephone conversations before the show-cause notice, and there was no violation of natural justice by the Disciplinary Committee. The Commissioner's initial report without the appellant's statement was justified due to the appellant being in police custody.(Para 23, 25)

Burden of Proof and Standard: Article 3.1 places the initial burden on the Disciplinary Committee, and the appellant must explain allegations. The Committee's conclusion, based on evidence and telephone conversations, is not subject to judicial review unless perverse or baseless.(Para 30, 34, 35)

Effect of Criminal Case Discharge: The scope of inquiry in criminal and disciplinary proceedings differs. The discharge order in the criminal case doesn't affect the BCCI's disciplinary proceedings under the Anti-Corruption Code.(Para 38, 39, 40)

Imposition of Life-time Ban: While zero tolerance to corruption is upheld, relevant factors must be considered in imposing sanctions under Article 6. The Disciplinary Committee failed to consider aggravating and mitigating factors, leading to an unjust life-time ban.(Para 52, 57)

Constitution of Disciplinary Committee: No legal impediment in the participation of Shri Srinivasan in the Disciplinary Committee, and the appellant cannot challenge the constitution at this stage.(Para 41)

Decision: Partly allowing the appeal, the Court sets aside the life-time ban. The Disciplinary Committee must reconsider the quantum of punishment, allowing the appellant to present his stance on the sanction.(Para 58, 59, 61)

Facts:

The appellant challenged the order of the Trial Court seeking to summon certain individuals in a murder case.

The High Court upheld the Trial Court's order.

The Supreme Court is considering the appeal, focusing on the discretionary power under Section 319 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Issues:

Interpretation and application of Section 319 Cr.P.C.

Whether the individuals in question are the main perpetrators of the crime.

Held:

The provisions of Section 319 Cr.P.C. are to ensure that the real culprit does not go unpunished. The power is discretionary and requires stronger evidence than mere probability of complicity.

The Trial Court and the High Court failed to consider certain facts, emphasizing the need for re-examination with reference to applicable principles.

The Court allows the appeal in part, setting aside the impugned orders, and restores the applications under Section 319 Cr.P.C. for reconsideration by the Trial Court.

The Court clarifies that it has not pronounced on the merits of the case, and the Trial Court should reconsider the prosecution's prayer uninfluenced by any observation in the judgment.

Facts:

The respondent, a Constable since 1987, faced charges of being inebriated and misbehaving with the public in 2006.

A medical report confirmed intoxication, leading to a charge sheet in 2007.

After a disciplinary inquiry, the officer found the misconduct charge substantiated.

The Superintendent of Police issued an order of dismissal in May 2007.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in converting the dismissal into compulsory retirement based on the respondent's past conduct and years of service?

Held:

The charge against the respondent involved serious misconduct of drunkenness and misbehavior with the public.

The fact of intoxication was duly proved in the medical report.

Considering the gravity of the charges and the respondent's position in the police service, the High Court had no justification to interfere with the dismissal order.

The Division Bench erred in allowing the Special Appeal and converting the dismissal to compulsory retirement.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's decision and maintaining the order of dismissal.

Facts:

Respondent No. 1 was engaged as a Gramin Dak Sewak (Extra-Departmental Agent) on a part-time basis in the Postal Department.

Respondent No. 1 voluntarily resigned in 2014, and the resignation was accepted by the Department.

The claim for gratuity was made by Respondent No. 1 under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.

The Department contended that Gramin Dak Sewaks are not entitled to ex-gratia gratuity as per the Gramin Dak Sewak (Conduct & Engagement) Rules, 2011.

Issues:

Whether a Gramin Dak Sewak is considered an 'employee' under Section 2(e) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, and is entitled to gratuity.

Whether a Gramin Dak Sewak is eligible for gratuity under the Gramin Dak Sewak (Conduct & Engagement) Rules, 2011, upon voluntary resignation.

Held and Decision:

The Gramin Dak Sewaks are not considered 'employees' under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, as per Section 2(e), and are not entitled to gratuity under this Act.

The Gramin Dak Sewak (Conduct & Engagement) Rules, 2011, provide a separate code for the engagement, conduct, and gratuity of Gramin Dak Sewaks.

Rule 6(13) of the 2011 Rules states that no gratuity is payable if a Gramin Dak Sewak quits the agency on their own.

The Order accepting Respondent No. 1's resignation was issued under Rule 6(13), making him disentitled from gratuity under the 2011 Rules.

The High Court's orders were set aside, and the appeals were allowed.

Facts:

The respondent tendered a resignation letter on July 14, 1990, and it was accepted by LIC. Subsequently, the Pension Rules, 1995, came into force more than five years later, affecting the respondent's eligibility for pension benefits. Similar scenarios are presented in cases involving the General Insurance Scheme and Andhra Bank Pension Regulations.

Issues:

The applicability of pension rules, the distinction between resignation and voluntary retirement, and the retrospective application of amended schemes to employees who resigned before the introduction of such schemes.

Held:

Resignation and Pension Rules: The court held that when an employee resigns and the Pension Rules are applicable, the consequence is the forfeiture of service. Applying the Pension Rules retrospectively to the respondent would be contradictory, and the resignation would entail the forfeiture of service, making him ineligible for pensionary benefits (Para 17-19).

General Insurance Scheme: The appellant, having resigned before the conditions for availing benefits were met, was deemed ineligible for the pension scheme introduced in 1996. The court emphasized the importance of fulfilling prerequisites and highlighted the appellant's failure to meet age requirements and other conditions (Para 28-35).

Andhra Bank Pension Regulations: The court observed that the Pension Regulations, 1995, did not consider resignation as a qualifying condition for pensionary benefits. The distinction between resignation and retirement was crucial, and the Regulations did not encompass the concept of resignation for availing benefits (Para 42).

Facts:

The appellant issued seven cheques of Rs. 3 lakhs each in favor of the complainant, which were subsequently dishonored. The Trial Court dismissed the complaints, but the High Court reversed this decision, convicting the appellant under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Issues:

The dishonor of the cheques, the presumption under sections 118 and 139, and the appellant's attempt to rebut this presumption.

Held:

The appellate court, while recognizing the general restrictions on upsetting a judgment of acquittal, noted that a different approach is warranted in matters related to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The accused has the burden to establish a probable defense to rebut the presumption, and the appellate court is entitled to examine the evidence to determine if the preponderance favors the accused.

The appellant could not deny his signature on the cheques, and all basic elements of Section 138 and related sections were evident. The Trial Court had drawn the requisite presumption. The onus shifted to the appellant to establish a probable defense.

Despite drawing the presumption under Section 139, the Trial Court questioned the lack of evidence regarding the source of funds for the loan and the examination of relevant witnesses. This approach was inconsistent with legal principles.

The appellant's defense that he had a monetary transaction with another party was not substantiated with adequate evidence. The suggestion that his signatures were on a blank stamp paper was deemed remote and uncertain.

The Trial Court's decision suffered from perversity and a fundamental error of approach. The observations made by the Trial Court were not in conformity with the presumption existing in favor of the complainant under Sections 118 and 139.

The findings of the High Court convicting the appellant under Section 138 were confirmed. Monetary penalties were maintained, but the sentence of imprisonment was modified. The appellant was directed to pay a fine of double the amount of each cheque within two months, with imprisonment for one year in case of default.

Facts:

The High Court allowed the petition filed by respondent Nos. 2 to 17, quashing FIR I-CR No. 67 of 2017 in part, specifically in relation to offences under Sections 392, 395, and 397 IPC. The appellant challenged this decision.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the FIR at a preliminary stage.

Whether the FIR disclosed prima facie allegations of the concerned offences.

Held:

The Division Bench, after hearing both parties, concluded that the High Court erred in allowing the petition and quashing the FIR partly. Instead, the court should have directed the Investigating Officer (IO) to conduct a proper investigation based on the FIR and file a charge sheet accordingly. The FIR had prima facie allegations of the concerned offences, and quashing it prematurely was not justified.

The High Court's order quashing the FIR was based on the belief that even if the prosecution's case was true, the essential elements for offences under Sections 392, 395, and 397 IPC were not established. The High Court should have allowed the investigation to proceed.( Paragraph 7)

The Division Bench found that the High Court erred in entertaining the petition and allowing it in part. No proper investigation by the IO had concluded, and the impugned order intervened prematurely, resulting in quashing the FIR concerning serious offences.( Paragraph 8-9)

The court criticized the High Court's approach, emphasizing that quashing the FIR for more serious offences without allowing proper investigation was improper.( Paragraph 10-11)

The court set aside the impugned order and directed the IO to conduct a full and proper investigation into the allegations made in the original FIR. The IO was to file an additional charge sheet for any other offences found during the investigation within three months.( Paragraph 14)