Facts:

The appellant, M/s. Diyas Mantra Lighting Private Limited, challenged the order of the Principal Commissioner of Customs (Preventive) and the Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT). The dispute involved the valuation of imported electric decorative lightings, with allegations of undervaluation and evasion of customs duty.

Issues:

Whether the sequential application of Customs Valuation Rules was followed in the determination of the value of imported goods?

Whether the appellant's plea regarding the non-significance of the brand 'Diyas' and 'mAntra' was justified?

Held:

The Court observed a fundamental mistake in the implementation of the statutory Rules, emphasizing the necessity of sequential application. It questioned the authority's choice to ignore Rules 3 to 5 and directed a fresh assessment following the correct sequence. The Court clarified that all available pleas could be raised and addressed on merits in the subsequent proceedings.

Decision: The orders of the Principal Commissioner of Customs (Preventive) and CESTAT were set aside, and the matter was remitted for a fresh assessment adhering to the sequential application of Customs Valuation Rules.

Facts:

The National Green Tribunal (NGT) passed an order on 5 December 2018 regarding a proposal for the exchange of land with forest land.

The order was challenged before the Supreme Court.

On 8 February 2019, the Supreme Court observed that the proceedings were still pending before the NGT and disposed of the appeal, stating that the earlier orders were interlocutory.

The NGT, on 11 February 2019, disposed of the Original Application (OA) and directed further steps to be taken.

Issues:

Whether the NGT's order on 11 February 2019 aligns with the Supreme Court's observations on 8 February 2019.

Whether the NGT allowed the appellant to address objections to the proposed land exchange.

Held:

The NGT's action of effectively shutting out the appellant from addressing objections is indefensible.

The NGT should have allowed the process initiated before the State and MOEF&CC to continue and permitted the appellant to address its objections in the pending proceedings.

Decision: The Supreme Court allows the appeal, sets aside the NGT's order of 11 February 2019, and restores OA 124 of 2017 to the file of the NGT. The NGT is expected to abide by the Supreme Court's order on 8 February 2019. The appeal is disposed of with no costs.

FACTS:

Appellant filed a civil suit for declaration of right, title, and interest in the land, possession confirmation, and permanent injunction.

Trial Court dismissed the suit.

First Appellate Court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit.

Respondent filed a second appeal in the High Court, challenging the first Appellate Court's decision.

ISSUES:

High Court admitted the second appeal on six questions but did not answer them on merits.

High Court went into a discussion on other issues not related to the framed questions.

Failure of the High Court to confine its inquiry to the substantial questions of law.

HELD:

Section 100 (5) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 mandates that the second appeal shall be heard only on the substantial question(s) of law framed by the High Court. The High Court must confine its inquiry to the questions framed and not beyond.

The proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 100 allows the respondent to challenge the framing of questions. The High Court has the jurisdiction to frame additional questions, provided reasons are assigned.

DECISION: The appeal is allowed, setting aside the impugned order. The case is remanded to the High Court for rehearing the second appeal on its merits, in accordance with the law and uninfluenced by any observations made in the impugned order.

Facts:

The appellant, Revenue-Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai, filed an appeal against the High Court's dismissal of their appeal under Section 260A.

The dispute pertains to the assessment year 2008-09, involving the respondent, M/S A.A. Estate Pvt. Ltd., a company engaged in property development.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the appeal without framing substantial questions of law as required under Section 260A.

Held:

The High Court failed to formulate any substantial question of law as mandated by Section 260-A of the Act.

The questions urged by the appellant were not framed by the High Court, creating a distinction between proposed questions and those framed by the Court.

The High Court did not follow the mandatory procedure under Section 260-A, leading to a lack of proper decision on the appeal.

The Court remanded the case to the High Court for a fresh decision, emphasizing the need for framing substantial questions of law and addressing specific issues related to the notice under Section 148, escaped assessment, and the presumption based on seized documents.

Facts:

The appellant, a founder member of the Adarsh Colony Cooperative House Building Society Ltd, deposited amounts for a residential plot between 1975 and 1982. The Society faced challenges in land acquisition, leading to disputes over plot allotments. The Deputy Registrar canceled allotments made by the Administrator in 1984. Despite subsequent resolutions, the appellant's possession of the allotted plot was not realized.

Issues:

The possession of the plot, and whether the appellant, a founder member, was entitled to it. The legal process, from the initial allotment to cancellations and subsequent attempts to resolve the matter, formed the crux of the case.

Held:

The Court found that possession of the 250 sq. yards plot allotted to the appellant had not been handed over. Emphasizing the genuine grievance, the Court directed an inquiry by the Registrar to determine if the appellant was allotted a plot by the Administrator and if a fresh allotment was made after cancellations in 1984. The judgment invoked Article 142 to ensure complete justice.

Decision: The Court disposed of the appeals, directing the Registrar to conduct an inquiry, and if a valid allotment was found, grant possession to the appellant. In the absence of the allotted plot, necessary orders were to be passed, with the opportunity for affected parties to be heard.

Facts:

The accused (respondent No. 2) was facing trial for offenses under Sections 302, 304-B, and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code due to the death of his wife in Nigeria under unnatural circumstances. The appellant, mother of the deceased, moved an application under Section 311 CrPC to summon Dr. I. Yusuf, the witness who conducted the first post-mortem in Nigeria.

Issues:

Whether the Trial Court erred in rejecting the application under Section 311 CrPC, considering the age of the case and the availability of a copy of the post-mortem report.

Held:

The court held that the Trial Court and the High Court failed to appreciate the relevance of Dr. I. Yusuf's evidence and the necessity to summon him. It emphasized that the age of the case alone cannot be decisive when a material witness needs examination. The court opined that the Trial Court should ensure material evidence comes on record for a just conclusion.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, setting aside the previous orders. The application under Section 311 CrPC was allowed, and the Trial Court was directed to take necessary measures for the examination of Dr. I. Yusuf, either by issuing a commission or recording his statement through video-conferencing, ensuring expeditious proceedings.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute arising from a Will wherein the testator bequeathed his property to his son, with a life interest granted to his widowed daughter. The daughter had the right to reside in the property and use the rent income for herself, but was restricted from transferring, mortgaging, selling, or gifting the property. The question at hand is whether, upon the death of the widowed daughter, the tenant becomes a trespasser and is liable to be removed.

Issues:

Validity of a suit for possession after the death of the widowed daughter.

Interpretation of the life estate granted to the testator's daughter.

Applicability of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.

Held:

The definition of 'landlord' under Section 2(c) includes the daughter of the testator holding a life interest in the property. The life estate granted to the daughter enabled her to create a tenancy, making her a 'landlord' as per the 1949 Act.( Para 12)

The provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 are applicable to the tenant, granting the tenant a protected status. The status of a statutory tenant remains even after the death of the testator's daughter. The remedy for the appellants is to pursue eviction proceedings based on grounds specified in the enactment.( Para 14)

Statutory protection for tenants under specific tenancy laws aims to protect the interests of tenants. Restrictions on possession recovery have been imposed as a legislative policy for the benefit of tenants.( Para 15)

Facts:

The case involved an appeal against the order of the High Court confirming the Magistrate's decision for further investigation post the discharge of the accused. The FIR was filed against the appellant, and upon completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed. However, the Magistrate, while discharging the accused, directed further investigation, leading to the appeal.

Issues:

Whether the Magistrate, post-discharge of the accused, has the jurisdiction to order further investigation under Sections 173(8) and 227 of the CrPC?

What is the distinction between the powers available to the Magistrate at the pre-cognizance and post-cognizance stages?

Held:

The Magistrate lacks jurisdiction to suo moto direct further investigation after discharging the accused. The powers available to the Magistrate for further investigation at the pre-cognizance stage may not be exercised at the post-cognizance stage, particularly after discharging the accused. The court highlighted the availability of the investigating agency's option to apply for further investigation under Section 173(8) of the CrPC.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, and both the order of the Magistrate for further investigation and the High Court's confirmation were quashed. However, the investigating officer was given the liberty to file an application for further investigation under Section 173(8) of the CrPC.

Facts:

The dispute involves Bharat Broadband Network Limited (Appellant) and United Telecoms Limited (Respondent). The arbitration agreement provided for the appointment of an arbitrator by the Managing Director of the appellant-company. The Managing Director's appointment was challenged due to ineligibility as per the Seventh Schedule.

Issues:

Whether the proviso to Section 12(5) applies?

The eligibility of the arbitrator as per the Seventh Schedule.

Applicability of waiver by express agreement in writing.

Interpretation of Sections 12, 13, and 14 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

Held:

Section 12(1) mandates disclosure of circumstances affecting an arbitrator's independence. Challenge procedures are outlined in Sections 12(3) and 13(2), followed by an application under Section 34 post-award.

Section 12(5) deals with de jure inability, overriding prior agreements. Ineligibility can be waived post-dispute by an express agreement in writing, as per the proviso.

The Law Commission emphasizes minimum levels of independence. In Section 12(5) cases, Section 14(1)(a) applies, leading to automatic termination and substitution of the arbitrator.

The Managing Director's appointment, post the introduction of Section 12(5), was invalid under the TRF Ltd. judgment. The Amendment Act, 2015, applies retrospectively, rendering the appointment void.

The proviso to Section 12(5) applies only with a subsequent express agreement in writing. Analogies to other sections like Section 7 are rejected.

Decision: The appeals are allowed. The Managing Director's appointment as an arbitrator is held void, falling under Section 12(5). The proviso does not apply due to the absence of an express agreement in writing.