Facts:

The respondent, Krishna Narayan Tewari, was employed with the appellant-bank, Allahabad Bank, and was posted as Officer in-charge at the Sultanpur branch in Uttar Pradesh.

He was suspended pending a disciplinary enquiry initiated against him with the service of a charge-sheet.

The Enquiry Officer concluded the proceedings quickly, finding the respondent guilty on most counts.

The Disciplinary Authority accepted the findings and imposed the penalty of removal from service.

The respondent's departmental appeal was dismissed, following which he approached the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the disciplinary proceedings and the orders passed by the authorities suffered from deficiencies.

Whether the High Court was justified in not remanding the matter back to the competent authority.

Whether the respondent is entitled to salary and retiral benefits for the period between removal from service and superannuation.

Held:

The Supreme Court acknowledged the general principle of remanding cases for a fresh enquiry or order when deficiencies are found in disciplinary proceedings.

Considering the prolonged legal process and the respondent's circumstances, the Court deemed a remand too harsh and upheld the High Court's decision not to remand the matter.

Regarding entitlement to salary during the period of removal until superannuation, the Court partially allowed the appeal. It granted the respondent continuity of service till superannuation with all service benefits but awarded only 50% of the salary for the period of removal till superannuation, along with retiral benefits.

Facts:

The BCCI failed to comply with the recommendations of the Lodha Committee, as affirmed by the final judgment and order dated 18.06.2016. Despite ample time provided, the BCCI did not adhere to the court's directives. The President of BCCI, Mr. Anurag Thakur, sought a letter from the President of the International Cricket Council (ICC), requesting that the appointment of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) nominee be deemed governmental interference, potentially leading to ICC suspension.

Issues:

Whether the actions of the President of BCCI constituted contempt of court?

What measures should be taken regarding the officials of BCCI and its affiliated State Associations who failed to meet the norms recommended by the Lodha Committee?

Held:

The conduct of the President of BCCI in soliciting a letter from the ICC President after the final judgment of this Court was an attempt to evade compliance with the court's order. Mr. Thakur's actions rendered him unfit to continue as President of BCCI and obstructed the court's order dated 18.07.2016.

The President of BCCI and Secretary of BCCI are to cease and desist from their roles within the organization. The senior-most Vice-President of BCCI is to assume the duties of President, and the Joint Secretary is to assume the duties of Secretary.

A committee of administrators will oversee the administration of BCCI through its Chief Executive Officer. Proceedings will be listed for the pronouncement of directions regarding the appointment of administrators.

Facts:

Pushparani Jain appointed her brother Jinendra Jain as her attorney to handle formalities regarding her plot allotted by the Bhopal Development Authority (BDA).

Harjas Rai Makhija (the appellant) entered into an agreement with Jinendra Jain regarding the sale of Pushparani's plot.

Legal proceedings ensued, including suits filed by Pushparani and Makhija, which were decided in favor of Pushparani and against Makhija.

Makhija's subsequent appeals were dismissed by the High Court and the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Allegations of fraud in obtaining the decree in favor of Pushparani.

Collateral attack on a final decree.

Specific performance of the agreement and the necessity of proving fraud with evidence.

Held:

The court held that Makhija's appeal lacked merit, emphasizing the importance of proving fraud with evidence and intent to deceive. The court noted that Makhija had failed to prove fraud and that mere allegations without evidence are insufficient. It was deemed impermissible for Makhija to reopen the case for specific performance as the decree had become final. Accordingly, the court dismissed Makhija's appeal and ordered him to pay costs. This decision was in line with earlier precedents emphasizing the necessity of proving fraud with evidence.

Facts:

The cases in question were pending before the High Courts, where proceedings had been stayed at various stages such as registration of FIR, investigation, framing of charges, or during trial, through the exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution or Sections 397/482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

The court noted the prolonged pendency of serious criminal cases due to the issuance of stay orders by the High Courts. The Law Commission had been tasked with studying the issue and recommending measures for setting up additional courts and providing necessary infrastructure to ensure speedy disposal of cases. Subsequently, the Chairperson of the National Court Management Systems Committee (NCMSC) proposed an interim approach, which supplemented the disposal rate method with the prevailing unit system of the High Courts to determine judge strength based on the nature and complexity of cases.

Issues:

The efficacy of the rate of disposal method in assessing judge efficiency and its implications.

The need for due importance to be given to the disposal of old cases and complex cases within the framework of the unit system.

Determining judge strength to address backlog and prevent its recurrence.

Acceptance and implementation of the interim approach proposed by the NCMSC.

Role of State Governments and High Courts in addressing infrastructure and manpower needs of the judiciary.

Held:

The Court addressed criticisms of the rate of disposal method, emphasizing that lower disposal rates may not necessarily reflect inefficiency but could be due to various external factors such as inadequate infrastructure, absentee witnesses, and delays in service of summons. Ground realities must be considered alongside statistics. (Para 16)

The Court emphasized the need for the High Courts to revise the unit-based norms to incentivize the disposal of complex and old cases, consulting with the district judiciary to ensure a balanced approach. (Para 17)

It was highlighted that judge strength should anticipate future case filings and aim to clear backlogs within a specified timeframe. (Para 18)

The Court accepted the interim approach proposed by the NCMSC for determining judge strength, rejecting the stipulation by the Union government to create new posts only after 90% of the sanctioned strength is filled. It emphasized the necessity of providing adequate judge strength to facilitate infrastructure development. (Para 20)

The Court noted the endorsement of proposals by the Fourteenth Finance Commission and urged State Governments to utilize additional fiscal allocations for meeting judiciary requirements. (Para 21)

Specific directions were formulated, including the utilization of the interim approach until a scientific method for determining judge strength is formulated by NCMSC, cooperation between State Governments and High Courts, and the creation of additional infrastructure as per recommendations.(Para 22)

List the proceedings for disposal of the criminal appeals before the appropriate bench in the third week of July 2017. (Para 23)

Facts:

The application filed on behalf of Shri R.R. Nair sought the recall of an order dated October 21, 2016, citing incomplete hearing and the filing of another writ petition challenging the same sections of the Advocates Act in the High Court of Delhi.

Issues:

The adequacy of hearing, the challenge to the constitutional validity of Sections 16 and 23(5) of the Advocates Act, and the related writ petition filed in the High Court of Delhi.

Held:

The Court recalls the earlier order and decides to set down the matter for fuller arguments afresh, along with the transferred Writ Petition (C) No. 6331 of 2016. This decision is based on the need for a comprehensive hearing, considering the dissatisfaction among certain sections of the bar and the challenges to the designation process of lawyers as senior advocates.

Facts:

The case, Krishna Kumar Singh vs. State of Bihar, Civil Appeal No. 5875 of 1994, concerned the re-promulgation of an ordinance by the State of Bihar.

Issues:

Whether re-promulgation of an ordinance violates constitutional principles.

Whether the satisfaction of the President under Article 123 and of the Governor under Article 213 is immune from judicial review.

The standard of review applicable to the satisfaction of the President and Governor in issuing ordinances.

Held:

The Court held that re-promulgation of an ordinance is impermissible as it violates constitutional principles, particularly because it cannot create an enduring or irreversible right in a citizen.

The Court reiterated that the failure to comply with the requirement of laying an ordinance before the legislature constitutes a serious constitutional infraction and an abuse of the constitutional process.

It emphasized that the satisfaction of the President under Article 123 and of the Governor under Article 213 is not immune from judicial review, especially after the amendment brought about by the forty-fourth amendment to the Constitution.

The Court outlined the test for judicial review of such satisfaction, stating that it would examine whether the satisfaction is based on relevant material and whether it constitutes a fraud on power or is actuated by an oblique motive.

Decision: The Court declared that the re-promulgation of the ordinance in question was unconstitutional and violative of the principles laid down under Articles 123 and 213.

Facts:

The case involved the murder of a mother and her unmarried daughter.

The prosecution's case relied heavily on the testimony of Guddi (PW-9), who was a close relative and neighbor of the deceased. Guddi provided a detailed account of the incident, including threats made by the accused prior to the murder and the events leading up to the crime.

Issues:

The reliability of Guddi's testimony, the sufficiency of evidence for conviction, and the validity of the recovery of articles based on the accused's disclosure statements.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction based on the following reasons:

Guddi's testimony was considered credible, natural, and consistent, corroborated by other witnesses .

The recovery of articles, including bones and ashes, from the canal based on the accused's disclosure statements was deemed sufficient evidence.

The absence of independent witnesses from the village was not deemed significant, considering the circumstances of the incident.

Minor discrepancies in the evidence were considered inconsequential, as long as there was sufficient independent evidence to sustain the conviction.

The appeals were found to be devoid of merit and were accordingly dismissed. Any appellants on bail were directed to be taken into custody to serve their remaining sentences.

Facts:The case involved a dispute between the State of Uttar Pradesh and Jai Bir Singh regarding the interpretation of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Issues:

The correct interpretation of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Held:The decision to refer the matter to a larger bench was made after careful consideration of the arguments presented and the implications of the issue.

The bench recognized the serious doubts raised about the correctness of a previous case and deemed it necessary for a larger bench to address the matter. As a result, the appeals were ordered to be placed before a Bench comprising Nine-Judges, to be constituted by the Chief Justice.

Facts:

The appellants, associated with the Mid Day newspaper, published articles alleging impropriety by Justice Y.K. Sabharwal and his family members.

The High Court of Delhi initiated contempt proceedings suo motu based on these articles, alleging that they lowered the image of the judiciary.

Issues:

Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to initiate contempt proceedings for alleged contempt of the Supreme Court.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to initiate contempt proceedings for contempt of the Supreme Court. Article 129 of the Constitution explicitly grants the Supreme Court the power to punish for its own contempt. This power, coupled with the principle that a court of record possesses inherent jurisdiction to punish for contempt, reinforces the exclusive authority of the Supreme Court in matters of its own contempt.

Therefore, the order passed by the High Court was deemed to be without jurisdiction and was set aside.