Facts:

The case involved a challenge to the amended Recruitment Rules equating the post of Principal, Grade ‘A’ (Senior Scale) with that of JCIF.

Issues:

The dissimilarity in the nature of duties, responsibilities, and powers exercised by officers holding the posts.

Held:

The High Court, relying on previous decisions, dismissed the writ petition, upholding the tribunal's decision to quash the amended rules.

The tribunal and the High Court failed to consider relevant factors that led to the amendment, including the concurrence of the UPSC and government deliberations.

The UPSC's conscious decision, considering pros and cons, amounted to a policy decision, rendering the tribunal's decision unjustified.

Duties of JCIF and Principal, Grade ‘A’ (Senior Scale) were found to be identical or similar, further justifying the amendment.

The impugned judgment of the High Court was quashed, and the order of the tribunal was set aside.

Facts:

The case involves a suit for title and permanent injunction based on a sale deed. The defendants claimed that the suit property had been part of a partition and fell into the share of the husband of defendant no.1 and father of defendant no.2 and 3. The trial court dismissed the suit, asserting collusion in executing a sham document. The first appellate authority upheld this decision.

Issues:

The admissibility of the partition deed and the authenticity of the sale deed. The trial court and the first appellate court found the sale deed to be nominal, while the High Court, in appeal, held that the partition deed required registration and, therefore, was inadmissible.

Held:

The jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 100 of the CPC, post the 1976 amendment, is confined to second appeals involving a substantial question of law. The substantial question framed by the High Court was not substantial at all. Both lower courts had given reasoned decisions based on evidence, and the High Court erred in re-appreciating evidence, which was impermissible under Section 100 of the CPC.

The father of defendants was not a signatory to the sale deed, making it not binding on him or his heirs. The sale deed was not acted upon, and even if it were registered, a defendant could challenge its validity. The High Court's interference with the findings of the lower courts on this matter was unwarranted.

The partition deed relied upon by the defendants was deemed a family arrangement and did not require registration. The execution of this document was established and proved by witnesses, including the plaintiff's admission of the oral partition. The High Court's finding on its inadmissibility was not justified.

The sale deed executed in favor of the plaintiff had discrepancies in the stated consideration, and both lower courts had found it to be sham. The High Court should not have interfered with these findings.

Facts:

The case revolves around the award of bonus marks to candidates seeking appointment as Primary School Teachers in Zila Parishads in Rajasthan in 1998-99. The Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court declared the award of bonus marks unconstitutional, leading to a series of litigations.

Issues:

The primary issue was the validity of awarding bonus marks in the appointment process, specifically whether such preferential treatment based on place of birth, residence, or urban/rural background was constitutionally permissible.

Held:

The Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court declared the award of bonus marks unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court, invoking the doctrine of prospective overruling, protected appointments made before November 18, 1999.

Candidates who had not filed writ petitions on or before November 17, 1999, were not entitled to appointment upon recalculation of marks by excluding bonus marks.

The Court clarified that its directions did not apply to cases where the principle of res judicata would be applicable, i.e., decisions that became final without further challenge.

Facts:

The appellant, registered as an NBFC, filed its return of income for AY 2008-2009, engaging in trading in shares. The assessing officer treated the loss from share trading as speculation loss, leading to a dispute.

Issues:

The nature of the appellant's principal business (granting loans and advances or trading in shares), the applicability of Section 73, and the retrospective effect of the amendments to the Explanation to Section 73.

Held:

The appellant's admission that share trading was its sole business during the assessment year was crucial. The High Court was justified in rejecting the submission that the principal business was granting loans and advances. The amendment to the Explanation to Section 73 was not retrospective, and its effect applied from 1 April 2015. Consequently, the loss from share trading in AY 2008-2009 couldn't be set off against profits from futures and options.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed, and there shall be no order as to costs.

Facts:

The appellant, a Manager in Bank of Baroda, was accused of criminal breach of trust, cheating, forgery, and conspiracy. The charges were related to the alleged opening of a fictitious savings bank account and misappropriation of funds.

Issues:

Whether the appellant, being a manager of a nationalized bank, can claim the benefit of Section 197 Cr.P.C.?

Was the sanction for prosecution under Section 197 Cr.P.C. applicable to the appellant?

Held:

The appellant, not being removable from his office with the sanction of the Government, cannot claim the protection of Section 197 Cr.P.C.

The court upheld the rejection of the appellant's application for discharge on the grounds of lack of sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. The court also deleted certain observations regarding forgery made by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, emphasizing that such conclusive opinions should be avoided at the pre-trial stage.

Decision: The appeal was partly allowed to the extent of deleting specific observations regarding forgery made by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. The court upheld the order of the High Court and the order of the CMM rejecting the appellant's application under Section 197 Cr.P.C.

Facts:

The case involves the transfer of granted lands in violation of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978. The grant included a condition of non-alienation for a duration of 15 years. The appellants acquired the land from the beneficiaries after the expiration of the 15-year period. The Assistant Commissioner nullified the sale deeds, a decision subsequently upheld by the Deputy Commissioner and the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the granted land's transfer, executed by the beneficiaries without prior permission, is illegal under the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Act, even after the lapse of the 15-year period.

Held:

Full Disclosure: The lower courts based their decisions on the absence of actual permission granted by the competent authority, with documents submitted by the appellants found to be forged. However, criminal proceedings are pending on this matter. The lack of full disclosure does not warrant non-suiting the appellant.

Shifting Plea: The appellant consistently argued for prior permission throughout the proceedings. Shifting to a new plea, asserting that no permission is required, is not permissible at this stage. The court emphasizes that such a plea cannot be entertained, especially without proper pleadings.

Legislative Intent: The Karnataka Land Grant Rules, 1969, and the Act were enacted to protect the interests of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes from exploitation. The objective is to prevent misuse, and therefore, permission for transfer is mandated, irrespective of the time elapsed.

Rule 9 Conditions: Rule 9 of the Karnataka Land Grant Rules, 1969, outlines more rigorous conditions for transfers within the window of 5 to 15 years. The Deputy Commissioner's satisfaction is a prerequisite, including a credit to the government of 50% of the land's market value.

Post 15 Years Permission: Even after 15 years, the competent authority may consider granting permission, ensuring the interests of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Section 4(2) of the Act is explicit in requiring permission for any transfer, and the court upholds this interpretation.

Absolute Ban on Transfer: Section 4 of the Act, dealing with the prohibition of transfer, is absolute in its terms. It overrides any agreement, contract, or law. The court highlights the clarity of Section 4(2), mandating permission for transfer even after the lapse of 15 years.

Court's Validation: The lower courts and the competent authority acted within their jurisdiction to nullify transactions contrary to Section 4(2) of the Act. The court acknowledges the validity of their actions, given the statutory provisions and the dubious manner of execution.

Facts:

The case involves an appeal to the Supreme Court arising from a dismissal of an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The appellants sought to quash the complaint and criminal proceedings related to offenses under Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506 IPC, and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

Issues:

Differentiation between two sets of allegations in the complaint.

Validity of summoning orders for specific offenses against the appellants.

Timing and motive behind the filing of the complaint, especially in relation to divorce proceedings.

Held:

In taking cognizance of an offense, a Magistrate is not required to pass a detailed order. However, when a Magistrate issues process against a person not charged with the offense for which summoned, the summoning order can be challenged.

Two sets of allegations were present: one for offenses under Sections 323, 504, and 506 IPC and another for offenses under Sections 498A IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The appellants not implicated in the first set of allegations could not be summoned for those offenses .

Specific allegations supported by evidence justified summoning the appellant in Crl. Appeal No. 595 of 2019 under Sections 323, 504, and 506 IPC. The court refrained from pronouncing on the veracity of the incident at this stage.

Criminal prosecution can proceed only when a prima facie offense is disclosed. The judicial process should not be a tool for oppression or harassment. The High Court has the authority to quash proceedings if they meet the parameters set by the Supreme Court .

Complaint under Section 498A IPC and Sections 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act filed by the father of the victim during divorce proceedings indicated a motive to harass the accused. The High Court erred in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings.

The divorce decree does not negate examination of criminal offenses committed within the jurisdiction despite divorce being granted. The complaint under Section 498A IPC and Sections 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act was considered retaliatory to the divorce petition.

The High Court's impugned judgment lacked a reference to the allegations, necessitating a detailed factual analysis before applying legal principles. Failure to do so constituted an error.

Facts:

Appellant joined Syndicate Bank in 1979 as a Law Officer.

Went on deputation to Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad, and Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad.

Applied for the post of Presiding Officer at Debt Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow, during the deputation.

Received appointment letter but faced delays and lack of response from Syndicate Bank.

Respondent Bank sought retirement, alleging unauthorized absence due to failure to join immediately after deputation.

Appellant's resignation accepted by the Bank, but pension benefits denied.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's failure to immediately join the bank after deputation constitutes unauthorized absence.

Validity of denying pensionary benefits based on the interpretation of Pension Regulations.

Held:

The court found the Bank's stance unjustified and unsustainable, considering the technicality of the appellant's immediate return after deputation.

Emphasized that there was no interruption in service, and the appellant had obtained a 'No Objection Certificate' for the new position.

Criticized the Bank for an unjustified ego issue and laxity in responding to the appellant's request for permission to take over the new post.

Quashed the impugned orders and allowed the Writ Petition, directing the Bank to remit the appellant's dues with interest within two months.

Imposed costs of Rs.25,000 on the respondent No.1 Bank.

Final Result : Allowed

Facts:

The appellant, Kalabai, threw a burning stove on the deceased during a quarrel between the deceased and her husband.

The incident resulted in serious burn injuries to the deceased, leading to her death.

Issues:

The offense committed by the appellant—whether it constituted murder under Section 302 IPC or a lesser offense under Section 304 Part II IPC.

Held:

The appellant argued for a reduction in the offense based on a precedent, Hari Shanker vs. State of Rajasthan (1998) 8 SCC 355, where a similar act was downgraded from murder to Section 304 Part II IPC.

The Court considered the dying declaration of the deceased, stating that the appellant threw a burning stove on her during a quarrel.

The Court noted the absence of evidence indicating any intention or motive to kill on the part of the appellant.

Relying on the precedent, the Court concluded that the facts and circumstances warranted reducing the offense from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC.

The Court partially allowed the appeal, altering the appellant's conviction and reducing the sentence from life imprisonment to rigorous imprisonment for five years.