Facts:

The case involves the appellant, Bharatbhai Bhimabhai Bharwad, challenging the grant of bail to respondents No.2 and 3.

The respondents were accused of serious offenses related to causing hurt and attempted murder.

The trial court granted bail to respondents No.2 and 3 based on certain considerations, including the recovery of weapons and the health status of the injured parties.

The appellant challenged the bail order in the High Court, alleging an arbitrary exercise of discretion by the trial court.

Issues:

Whether there was an arbitrary exercise of discretion in granting bail to the respondents.

Whether the High Court properly understood the nature of the challenge raised by the appellant.

Held:

The Supreme Court emphasized the difference between considerations for cancellation of bail and challenging the grant of bail on the grounds of an arbitrary exercise of discretion. It clarified that the appellant had challenged the very grant of bail on the ground of arbitrary exercise of discretion, not merely seeking cancellation.( Para 10)

As the High Court proceeded as if the appellant had filed the application only for cancellation of bail, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's orders and remitted the matter to the High Court for reconsideration. The High Court is directed to treat the application as challenging the order of grant of bail and proceed accordingly.( Para 11)

Facts:

The case involves a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, where the appellant's cheques were dishonored due to insufficient funds. Section 143A, introduced in 2018, allows the court to order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant. The appellant challenged the order of the Trial Court, which directed the payment of interim compensation.

Issues:

The prospective or retrospective applicability of Section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, concerning the payment of interim compensation.

Held:

The court held that Section 143A is prospective and applies only to cases where offenses under Section 138 were committed after its introduction. It emphasized that Section 143A creates a new liability and exposes the accused to coercive recovery methods. The court set aside the orders of the Trial Court and the High Court, directing the return of the money deposited as interim compensation along with interest. The court allowed the appeal.

Facts:

The appellant, Rupa Roy, filed a claim petition seeking compensation for injuries sustained by her minor son in a motor vehicle accident.

The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal awarded Rs. 2,00,000/- as compensation.

The High Court dismissed the appeal without providing reasons.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in dismissing the appeal without appreciating the evidence.

Whether the compensation awarded for the injuries sustained by the minor son was justified.

Held:

The High Court committed a jurisdictional error by not appreciating the evidence and failing to provide reasons for dismissal.

An appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act is akin to Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, and courts must provide reasons for their decisions.

The victim, the minor son, suffered a 70% permanent disability, as established by medical evidence.

Considering the victim's age, extent of disability, medical treatment, mental pain, suffering, and loss, the Supreme Court enhanced the compensation to Rs. 10,00,000/-.

The awarded sum carries 6% interest from the date of the High Court's order.

Respondent No. 1 is directed to pay the awarded sum within 3 months, adjusting the amount already paid with interest awarded by the Tribunal.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over possession of a property following a court decree. The decree-holders were given possession, leading to the respondent's (Lt. Col. Nahar Singh) dispossession. Lt. Col. Nahar Singh filed an application claiming adverse possession, which was rejected by the Executing Court.

Issues:

The interpretation and application of Order XXI, Rule 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, specifically post the 1976 amendment. The central question was whether an applicant, in possession before dispossession, needed to prove not only bona fide possession but also right, title, and interest in the property to be put back in possession.

Held:

The Court clarified the amended scope of Rule 101, emphasizing that the applicant must establish not only bona fide possession but also right, title, or interest in the property. Prior possession alone does not warrant being put back in possession.( Para 14, 16, and 17)

All issues between the parties under Order XXI Rules 99, 100, and 101 were to be examined by the Executing Court. The amendment in Rule 103 eliminated the need for a separate suit and allowed adjudication under Rule 101, with the determination having the same force as a decree.( Para 25, 26, and 27)

The High Court erroneously asserted that questions regarding adverse possession need not be decided under Order XXI Rules 99, 100, and 101. The Court emphasized that the determination of right, title, or interest in the property is integral to these proceedings.( Para 28 and 29)

The Court noted the dismissal of respondent No.1's suit seeking a declaration of title by adverse possession. No steps were taken for its restoration.( Para 28)

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, overturning the High Court's decision. It affirmed the correctness of the Executing Court's order, emphasizing that the respondent must prove right, title, or interest in the property to be put back in possession.

Facts:

Rathin Ghosh, the appellant, held the position of Superintending Engineer in the respondent-Company. The Company issued a tender for the procurement of 10 lakh meters, and Ghosh received a personal invitation to attend a presentation in New Delhi. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him based on allegations related to attending the seminar without permission and availing hospitality from the successful bidder.

Issues:

The charges against Rathin Ghosh included attending the seminar without permission and accepting the successful bidder's hospitality. The court was tasked with determining the validity of these charges and assessing the proportionality of the imposed punishment.

Held:

The casual leave application for 17.04.2008, sanctioned ex post facto by the Additional Chief Engineering, negates the sting of the first charge. Ghosh had informed his superior officer in advance about attending the presentation in New Delhi. The charge of misconduct for attending without permission is not sustained, given the prior information provided to the superior officer.(Paras 14-16)

Ghosh's role in providing technical specifications for the tender and selection of the successful bidder did not involve any impropriety. He was not part of the committee making decisions on the tender, and no evidence indicated any benefit received from the successful bidder. (Paras 17, 18)

The punishment imposed, including permanent withholding of pension and forfeiture of gratuity, was disproportionate to the charges. The disciplinary authority's decision was found to shock the conscience of the court. The judgment emphasized the need for proportionality in imposing punishments in disciplinary matters.(Para 20)

Regulation 62 does not authorize permanent withholding of pension or forfeiture of gratuity. The imposition of such penalties in the absence of separate proceedings under the relevant regulations was deemed illegal and without jurisdiction. (Paras 23-27)

The court proposed treating Ghosh's resignation letter as voluntary retirement, entitling him to all benefits accruing on retirement as of the resignation date. The respondents were directed to compute and make the payment within two months, with non-compliance incurring interest at 6% per annum.(Paras 23-27)

Facts:

The respondents (Subhash, Kartar, Sohit, Amarjeet, Soran Bhati, Lilu@Mahendra, and Ashu @ Ashish) were facing trial for various offenses, including murder, in connection with Crime No. 608/2018.

The respondents applied for bail before the Sessions Court, but their applications were rejected.

The respondents appealed to the High Court, which granted bail without providing sufficient reasons for its decision.

The father of the deceased (appellant) challenged the High Court's decision in the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in granting bail to the respondents without assigning proper reasons.

Held:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court's orders and dismissing the bail applications of the respondents.

The High Court committed a jurisdictional error by not providing reasons for granting bail and not considering relevant factors, such as the antecedents of the accused and the nature of the offense.

Emphasized the need for assigning reasons while granting bail and referred to previous cases highlighting the same.

While not requiring categorical findings at the bail stage due to insufficient evidence, the court stressed that it must appear that the court applied its mind to the relevant facts.

Directed the respondents to surrender in the Sessions Court for custody as under trial.

Instructed the Sessions Judge to decide the trial strictly in accordance with the law and on its merits expeditiously, without being influenced by any observations made in the Supreme Court's order.

Facts:

Prestige Estates Project Ltd. applied for planning permission on March 22, 2011. The Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority issued a demand notice for charges, including I & A charges and premium FSI charges, on March 27, 2012. The respondent paid the charges on March 28, 2012. Subsequent amendments by the government on March 26, 2012, and March 28, 2012, revised the charges.

Issues:

The legality of the demand for revised I & A charges and premium FSI charges. The court examined whether the Rules, 2008, were formally amended and if the demand for revised charges was enforceable against Prestige Estates Project Ltd.

Held:

The court addressed the provisions of G.O.Ms No.86 and the contemplated amendment to the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning (Levy of Infrastructure and Amenities Charges) Rules, 2008. It was clarified that the Rules, 2008, were not formally amended, and the demand for revised I & A charges could not be enforced without such amendment.( Para 20)

The court considered an Internal Office Circular/Order dated April 16, 2012, specifying that revised I & A charges were leviable from March 28, 2012. The court agreed with the High Court's view that the revised charges were not lawfully demanded from Prestige Estates Project Ltd. for applications made prior to March 28, 2012.( Para 21)

The judgment scrutinized the levy of Premium FSI charges under Regulation 36. It emphasized that the demand for Premium FSI charges is incident to the grant of Premium FSI. The court affirmed that the demand for revised Premium FSI charges was lawful.( Para 22)

The court highlighted that planning permission was not yet granted, and the steps were outlined for the fulfillment of conditions before considering the application for planning permission.( Para 23)

Emphasizing that the grant of planning permission would only follow a meticulous scrutiny of the application, the court held that Prestige Estates Project Ltd. was bound to pay the revised charges once they came into force on April 1, 2012. The demand for revised Premium FSI charges on August 22, 2012, was deemed lawful.( Para 24)

Facts:

The appellants, prospective buyers, entered into an agreement to purchase land for Rs. 99,84,500. The appropriate authority issued a show cause notice under section 269UD(1A), challenging the disclosed sale consideration. After inquiries, the authority ordered the vesting of the suit land in the Central Government.

Issues:

Whether the appropriate authority's decision for pre-emptive purchase under Section 269UD(1) was valid.

The appellants challenged the apparent consideration and sought a refund.

The Division Bench also considered the disbursement of the amount, involving Section 269UG(4) of the Act.

Held:

The appropriate authority meticulously examined the location, area, and proximity of the suit land. After considering the condition and use of existing structures, the authority determined the market value at Rs. 1,79,21,532, surpassing the declared consideration. The authority rejected the appellants' objections regarding deduction percentages.( Paragraphs 26-29)

The writ court rightly limited its jurisdiction, acknowledging it couldn't act as an appellate court. The findings were consistently upheld by the writ court, appellate court, and review court, based on evidence and in conformity with Section 269UD of the Act.( Paragraphs 36-37)

The Division Bench dismissed the appellants' appeal but partially allowed the vendor's appeal. However, the Division Bench failed to consider Section 269UG(4) of the Act, which dictates the appropriate authority's role in determining the consideration.( Paragraphs 3, 12-13)

The court, in allowing the vendor's appeal, emphasized that the High Court should have left the disbursement matter to be decided by the appropriate authority under Section 269UG(4) of the Act.( Paragraph 6)

Facts:

The All India Chess Federation (second Respondent) disaffiliated the Maharashtra Chess Association (Appellant) on December 25, 2016.

The Appellant filed a writ petition before the Bombay High Court under Article 226 challenging the disaffiliation.

The second Respondent raised a preliminary objection, citing Clause 21 of its Constitution and Bye Laws, contending that the Bombay High Court lacked jurisdiction.

Issues:

Whether a private agreement (Clause 21) can oust the writ jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court under Article 226.

Whether the existence of an alternate remedy, as provided in the agreement, creates a legal bar on the Bombay High Court's writ jurisdiction.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that while parties can agree to submit disputes to a specific court, the existence of an alternate remedy does not create an absolute legal bar on the High Court's exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The judgment emphasized the discretionary nature of the writ jurisdiction and criticized the Bombay High Court's reliance solely on Clause 21 without examining the case holistically. The appeal was allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the writ petition was restored to the Bombay High Court for fresh consideration.