Facts:

The appellant, VST Industries Limited, filed an appeal against an interim order dated 11.07.2018 by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court.

The High Court's interim order directed the deposit of 50% of the interest demanded by way of recovery within a week, with a stay on coercive measures until 18th July 2018.

Approximately 33 percent of the interest had already been realized from the appellant after the interim order.

Issues:

The pending writ petition (Writ-Tax No. 961 of 2018) of VST Industries Limited in the High Court needed a final decision.

The judgment in Civil Appeal Nos. 3257-3268 of 2019, involving Indian Oil Corporation Limited, addressed issues related to the liability of interest under the U.P. Act 2007.

Held:

The appeal was disposed of, and no further recovery was allowed against VST Industries Limited concerning the demand for interest on arrears of Entry Tax.

Any recovery of interest from the appellant would be subject to the final outcome of their writ petition (Writ-Tax No. 961 of 2018).

The appeal is disposed of.

Facts:

The respondents in the respective appeals were convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to life imprisonment. They filed writ petitions challenging the constitutional validity of Rule 8(2)(i) of the Rajasthan Prisons Rules, 2006, which imposed conditions for the consideration of premature release for those sentenced to life imprisonment.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 59 of the Prisons Act, 1894, and the constitutional validity of Rule 8(2)(i) in light of Section 433-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Held:

The High Court had struck down Rule 8(2)(i) on the grounds of non-compliance with the laying procedure before the legislature and its alleged inconsistency with Section 433-A. The Supreme Court, however, held that Section 59(2) did not require the rules to be laid before the legislature before promulgation. It also emphasized that remission is not a matter of right, and the state can impose restrictions as done by Rule 8(2)(i).

Decision: The Supreme Court set aside the impugned orders of the High Court and allowed the appeals, declaring Rule 8(2)(i) of the Rules, 2006, valid and consistent with the law.

Facts:

The dispute involves Bharat Broadband Network Limited (Appellant) and United Telecoms Limited (Respondent). The arbitration agreement provided for the appointment of an arbitrator by the Managing Director of the appellant-company. The Managing Director's appointment was challenged due to ineligibility as per the Seventh Schedule.

Issues:

Whether the proviso to Section 12(5) applies?

The eligibility of the arbitrator as per the Seventh Schedule.

Applicability of waiver by express agreement in writing.

Interpretation of Sections 12, 13, and 14 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

Held:

Section 12(1) mandates disclosure of circumstances affecting an arbitrator's independence. Challenge procedures are outlined in Sections 12(3) and 13(2), followed by an application under Section 34 post-award.

Section 12(5) deals with de jure inability, overriding prior agreements. Ineligibility can be waived post-dispute by an express agreement in writing, as per the proviso.

The Law Commission emphasizes minimum levels of independence. In Section 12(5) cases, Section 14(1)(a) applies, leading to automatic termination and substitution of the arbitrator.

The Managing Director's appointment, post the introduction of Section 12(5), was invalid under the TRF Ltd. judgment. The Amendment Act, 2015, applies retrospectively, rendering the appointment void.

The proviso to Section 12(5) applies only with a subsequent express agreement in writing. Analogies to other sections like Section 7 are rejected.

Decision: The appeals are allowed. The Managing Director's appointment as an arbitrator is held void, falling under Section 12(5). The proviso does not apply due to the absence of an express agreement in writing.

Facts:

The deceased husband of the Appellant obtained a personal loan from the Respondent-Finance Company, secured by a Group Insurance Policy.

The insurance premium was paid by the deceased through a Demand Draft.

The Appellant's husband passed away shortly after obtaining the loan.

The Respondent-Finance Company sought to recover the loan from the Appellant, leading to a dispute.

The District Forum ruled in favor of the Appellant, citing negligence in obtaining the insurance policy timely.

The State Commission upheld the decision, but the National Commission reversed it.

Issues:

Whether the Appellant's husband paid the insurance premium.

Whether the delay in obtaining the insurance policy constituted deficiency of service.

Held:

The National Commission erred in finding no evidence of premium payment; the Respondent-Finance Company admitted receiving a Demand Draft.

Deductions from the loan account were part of the composite transaction, not just processing fees.

The delay in obtaining the insurance policy was a deficiency of service by the Respondent-Finance Company.

Section 64VB(2) of the Insurance Act establishes the coverage from the date of premium payment.

Decision: The Order of the National Commission is set aside. The Civil Appeal is allowed. The Respondent-Finance Company is directed to pay Compensation of Rs. 50,000/- and Costs of Rs. 25,000/- to the Appellant.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute arising from a Will wherein the testator bequeathed his property to his son, with a life interest granted to his widowed daughter. The daughter had the right to reside in the property and use the rent income for herself, but was restricted from transferring, mortgaging, selling, or gifting the property. The question at hand is whether, upon the death of the widowed daughter, the tenant becomes a trespasser and is liable to be removed.

Issues:

Validity of a suit for possession after the death of the widowed daughter.

Interpretation of the life estate granted to the testator's daughter.

Applicability of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.

Held:

The definition of 'landlord' under Section 2(c) includes the daughter of the testator holding a life interest in the property. The life estate granted to the daughter enabled her to create a tenancy, making her a 'landlord' as per the 1949 Act.( Para 12)

The provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 are applicable to the tenant, granting the tenant a protected status. The status of a statutory tenant remains even after the death of the testator's daughter. The remedy for the appellants is to pursue eviction proceedings based on grounds specified in the enactment.( Para 14)

Statutory protection for tenants under specific tenancy laws aims to protect the interests of tenants. Restrictions on possession recovery have been imposed as a legislative policy for the benefit of tenants.( Para 15)

Facts:

The case involved an appeal against the order of the High Court confirming the Magistrate's decision for further investigation post the discharge of the accused. The FIR was filed against the appellant, and upon completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed. However, the Magistrate, while discharging the accused, directed further investigation, leading to the appeal.

Issues:

Whether the Magistrate, post-discharge of the accused, has the jurisdiction to order further investigation under Sections 173(8) and 227 of the CrPC?

What is the distinction between the powers available to the Magistrate at the pre-cognizance and post-cognizance stages?

Held:

The Magistrate lacks jurisdiction to suo moto direct further investigation after discharging the accused. The powers available to the Magistrate for further investigation at the pre-cognizance stage may not be exercised at the post-cognizance stage, particularly after discharging the accused. The court highlighted the availability of the investigating agency's option to apply for further investigation under Section 173(8) of the CrPC.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, and both the order of the Magistrate for further investigation and the High Court's confirmation were quashed. However, the investigating officer was given the liberty to file an application for further investigation under Section 173(8) of the CrPC.

FACTS:

Appellant filed a civil suit for declaration of right, title, and interest in the land, possession confirmation, and permanent injunction.

Trial Court dismissed the suit.

First Appellate Court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit.

Respondent filed a second appeal in the High Court, challenging the first Appellate Court's decision.

ISSUES:

High Court admitted the second appeal on six questions but did not answer them on merits.

High Court went into a discussion on other issues not related to the framed questions.

Failure of the High Court to confine its inquiry to the substantial questions of law.

HELD:

Section 100 (5) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 mandates that the second appeal shall be heard only on the substantial question(s) of law framed by the High Court. The High Court must confine its inquiry to the questions framed and not beyond.

The proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 100 allows the respondent to challenge the framing of questions. The High Court has the jurisdiction to frame additional questions, provided reasons are assigned.

DECISION: The appeal is allowed, setting aside the impugned order. The case is remanded to the High Court for rehearing the second appeal on its merits, in accordance with the law and uninfluenced by any observations made in the impugned order.

Facts:

The appellant, Revenue-Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai, filed an appeal against the High Court's dismissal of their appeal under Section 260A.

The dispute pertains to the assessment year 2008-09, involving the respondent, M/S A.A. Estate Pvt. Ltd., a company engaged in property development.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the appeal without framing substantial questions of law as required under Section 260A.

Held:

The High Court failed to formulate any substantial question of law as mandated by Section 260-A of the Act.

The questions urged by the appellant were not framed by the High Court, creating a distinction between proposed questions and those framed by the Court.

The High Court did not follow the mandatory procedure under Section 260-A, leading to a lack of proper decision on the appeal.

The Court remanded the case to the High Court for a fresh decision, emphasizing the need for framing substantial questions of law and addressing specific issues related to the notice under Section 148, escaped assessment, and the presumption based on seized documents.

Facts:

The appellant, a founder member of the Adarsh Colony Cooperative House Building Society Ltd, deposited amounts for a residential plot between 1975 and 1982. The Society faced challenges in land acquisition, leading to disputes over plot allotments. The Deputy Registrar canceled allotments made by the Administrator in 1984. Despite subsequent resolutions, the appellant's possession of the allotted plot was not realized.

Issues:

The possession of the plot, and whether the appellant, a founder member, was entitled to it. The legal process, from the initial allotment to cancellations and subsequent attempts to resolve the matter, formed the crux of the case.

Held:

The Court found that possession of the 250 sq. yards plot allotted to the appellant had not been handed over. Emphasizing the genuine grievance, the Court directed an inquiry by the Registrar to determine if the appellant was allotted a plot by the Administrator and if a fresh allotment was made after cancellations in 1984. The judgment invoked Article 142 to ensure complete justice.

Decision: The Court disposed of the appeals, directing the Registrar to conduct an inquiry, and if a valid allotment was found, grant possession to the appellant. In the absence of the allotted plot, necessary orders were to be passed, with the opportunity for affected parties to be heard.