FACTS:

The incident occurred on 1st July 1987 in Village Prempara-Rampara, where the appellants caused injuries to Bhura Govind and Lakha Arjan, leading to their death.

The cause of the occurrence was a dispute over the right of way, as the appellants were not giving way to the deceased.

ISSUES:

Whether the appellants acted in self-defense.

Whether the injuries inflicted were in the right of private defense.

Whether the conviction under Section 302 of IPC is justified.

HELD:

The right of private defense is not available when the alleged assailants are unarmed. The appellants were armed with spears and other weapons, while the deceased were unarmed.

Multiple stab wounds on vital parts of the deceased indicate pre-meditation, ruling out the argument of a sudden fight.

The injuries on the deceased were not consistent with a right of private defense, justifying the conviction under Section 302 of IPC.

DECISION: The criminal appeal is dismissed, upholding the conviction under Sections 302 and 324 of IPC.

REFERRED CASES:

Decided on : 23-04-2019

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Sections 302, 304 and 324 - Murder - Appeal against conviction and sentence - Deceased had multiple stab wounds on the chest - Since there are multiple wounds, it cannot be said that the appellants have acted at the spur of the moment without pre-meditation and that the appellants are not taken any advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner - It is not a case of single injury which one can infer on account of sudden fight - Not find any merit in the alternate argument that the appellants are entitled to be convicted under Section 304 IPC as they have given multiple injuries on the vital parts of the deceased - Trial Court as well as the High Court was perfectly justified in law in convicting and sentencing the appellants for the offence under Section 302 IPC - Appeal dismissed.

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Sections 302, 304 and 324 - Murder - Right of Private defence - Appellants have lodged cross First Information Report - There is no evidence on the part of the appellants that the deceased were armed with any weapon in the first version, when they lodged report. The right of private defence is not available when the alleged assailants are unarmed. The right of private defence is to protect the person and the property. In such right, the person cannot cause more harm than what is necessary for the protection of the person and the property. What harm can be expected from the hands of the deceased when they were un-armed, whereas from the testimony of PW-3 and PW-4, the injured witnesses, the appellants were armed with spears and other weapons. The Post-Mortem report corroborates an oral testimony that both the deceased have received stab wounds. Therefore, the appellants cannot be said to have acted in the right of their private defence.

Counsel for Appearing Parties

Mr. Ravi Prakash Mehrotra, Advocate, Mr. Ankit Agarwal, Advocate and Ms. Deepti R. Mehrotra, Advocate, for the Appellant; Ms. Hemantika Wahi, Advocate and Ms. Puja Singh, Advocate, for the Respondent.

Facts:

The State of Karnataka appealed a decision quashing part of a Memo dated 7.4.2010 related to the transfer of teachers in Higher Primary Schools under the 'Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan' Scheme. The teachers appointed in 2004-2005 were affected by a clause on 'mutual transfer' in the Memo.

Issues:

The validity of Clause 13 of the Office Memorandum dated 07.04.2010, specifically concerning 'mutual transfers' of teachers under the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan Scheme, and whether it conflicted with the KCS (Regulation of Transfers of Teachers) Act, 2007.

Held:

The bench held that the SSA Scheme is an independent scheme, creating a hybrid category of higher primary schools. The provisions of the Act of 2007 and rules framed thereunder did not strictly govern these schools. The Office Memorandum, particularly Clause 13, dealing with mutual transfers, was deemed valid and not in violation of the Act and rules.

Decision: The Tribunal and the High Court's decisions were set aside, and the appeals were allowed. The bench found no violation of the Act and rules by Clause 13 of the Office Memorandum dated 07.04.2010.

Facts:

An oil tanker collided with a car, resulting in the death of 'RSJ' who was accompanied by his wife and children. The claimants, parents of the deceased and his wife and minor children, filed claims stating the deceased's age, occupation, salary, and prospects before the accident. The Tribunal awarded compensation, later enhanced by the High Court.

Issues:

The Tribunal's assessment errors, calculation of multiplicand, and failure to consider future prospects. Comparison with the principles established in the Pranay Sethi case.

The High Court's modification of the compensation and interest component. The deduction of an ex-gratia amount received by claimants.

Held:

The Tribunal's award suffered from fundamental errors, particularly in the assessment of multiplicand, deviating from the principles in the Pranay Sethi case.

The High Court's assessment, though slightly deviating in the enhancement of future prospects, remained in conformity with the principles in Pranay Sethi, and no modification was considered necessary.

The ex-gratia amount received by the claimants was not under any specific service rules, distinguishing it from the Shashi Sharma case. No deduction in the amount awarded by the High Court was deemed necessary.

The Tribunal's interest rate of 12% was deemed too high; the High Court's modification to 7.5% was considered reasonable.

The amount receivable by the claimants, as per the High Court's judgment, was upheld as just compensation, and no interference was warranted.

Accordingly, both these appeals fail, and are dismissed.

Facts:

The Respondent-State enacted the 2007 Act after the High Court declared the 2000 Act ultra vires. The challenge to the levy of Entry Tax was referred to a nine-Judge Bench by the Supreme Court. The High Court upheld the legislative competence in enacting the 2007 Act. The Supreme Court granted interim stay subject to the appellants depositing 50% of the accrued tax liability. The matter was referred to a Regular Bench after a nine-Judge Bench decision. The appellant was granted liberty to question the levy of Entry Tax under the 2007 Act, leading to Writ Petition No. 25730 of 17, challenging the validity of the 2007 Act.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in upholding the preliminary objection on the writ petition being a second petition on the same and consequential cause of action.

Whether Section 13 of the U.P. Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas Act, 2007, applies mutatis mutandis to Section 33 of the U.P. Value Added Tax Act, 2008.

Whether the 2007 Act contains substantive law for the levy of interest on Entry Tax.

Held:

Writ Petition No. 25730 of 2017 was filed in pursuance of the liberty granted, challenging the vires of the 2007 Act. The Division Bench, in its judgment, explicitly restricted the consideration to the questions framed by the Regular Bench, thereby excluding issues not expressly permitted for consideration. The plea regarding the leviability of interest was specifically raised but not permitted for consideration. The Division Bench's restriction cannot operate as res judicata in a subsequent writ petition where the challenge was to the leviability of interest.

Section 13 of the U.P. Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas Act, 2007, applies mutatis mutandis to Section 33 of the U.P. Value Added Tax Act, 2008. Even if Section 33 is treated as a machinery provision, it must be interpreted to make the liability effective and treated as substantive law for the levy of interest on Entry Tax.

The High Court erred in upholding the preliminary objection, and the matter is remitted to the High Court for determining the liability of interest under the 2007 Act. The questions regarding the nature and extent of liability to pay interest on Entry Tax need examination.

Facts:

The appellant, M/s. Diyas Mantra Lighting Private Limited, challenged the order of the Principal Commissioner of Customs (Preventive) and the Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT). The dispute involved the valuation of imported electric decorative lightings, with allegations of undervaluation and evasion of customs duty.

Issues:

Whether the sequential application of Customs Valuation Rules was followed in the determination of the value of imported goods?

Whether the appellant's plea regarding the non-significance of the brand 'Diyas' and 'mAntra' was justified?

Held:

The Court observed a fundamental mistake in the implementation of the statutory Rules, emphasizing the necessity of sequential application. It questioned the authority's choice to ignore Rules 3 to 5 and directed a fresh assessment following the correct sequence. The Court clarified that all available pleas could be raised and addressed on merits in the subsequent proceedings.

Decision: The orders of the Principal Commissioner of Customs (Preventive) and CESTAT were set aside, and the matter was remitted for a fresh assessment adhering to the sequential application of Customs Valuation Rules.

Facts:

The respondents in the respective appeals were convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to life imprisonment. They filed writ petitions challenging the constitutional validity of Rule 8(2)(i) of the Rajasthan Prisons Rules, 2006, which imposed conditions for the consideration of premature release for those sentenced to life imprisonment.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 59 of the Prisons Act, 1894, and the constitutional validity of Rule 8(2)(i) in light of Section 433-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Held:

The High Court had struck down Rule 8(2)(i) on the grounds of non-compliance with the laying procedure before the legislature and its alleged inconsistency with Section 433-A. The Supreme Court, however, held that Section 59(2) did not require the rules to be laid before the legislature before promulgation. It also emphasized that remission is not a matter of right, and the state can impose restrictions as done by Rule 8(2)(i).

Decision: The Supreme Court set aside the impugned orders of the High Court and allowed the appeals, declaring Rule 8(2)(i) of the Rules, 2006, valid and consistent with the law.

Facts:

The appellant, an elected Municipal Councillor, faced disqualification under Section 44(1)(e) due to unauthorized constructions by her husband.

The appellant argued that her husband had deemed permission under Section 45(5) of the Maharashtra Municipal Council Act.

The appellant contended that the construction's illegality should not result in disqualification as it attracts penal provisions.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's disqualification under Section 44(1)(e) is valid?

Does the deemed permission under Section 45(5) exempt the appellant from disqualification?

Does the criminal nature of unauthorized construction affect the applicability of Section 44(1)(e)?

Held:

The first limb of Section 44(1)(e) holds the Councillor accountable for constructions made by themselves, their spouse, or dependents, and it suffices for disqualification if illegal.

Deemed permission does not negate disqualification, and the court distinguishes between constructions by the Councillor, spouse, or dependents.

Section 44(1)(e) creates independent liability for disqualification, irrespective of criminal actions or convictions.

Temporary constructions also fall under the scope of Section 44(1)(e), and the appellant's disqualification is upheld.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed, and no costs are awarded.

Facts:

Appellant, Naresh Chandra Bhardwaj, a Scale II Officer at Bank of India, sanctioned loans later classified as Non-Performing Assets.

Procedural abnormalities in the loan process were identified, posing a potential loss of Rs. 70.32 lakh to the Bank.

Disciplinary proceedings ensued, leading to the appellant's removal from service.

Issues:

Whether the punishment of removal from service could be altered to compulsory retirement.

Parity in punishment concerning two other officers, Mr. R.K. Mishra and Mr. V.K. Srivastava, who faced compulsory retirement for similar losses.

Held:

The Court emphasized limited judicial review on the quantum of punishment, primarily within the domain of disciplinary authorities.

Parity in punishment must be based on identical charges and post-incident conduct, with absolute equality.

Financial implications, specifically the appellant's pension option, played a role in the decision.

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal, altering the appellant's punishment from "removal from service" to "compulsory retirement," citing the lack of financial difference and identical roles with other officers.

Facts:

The State of Bihar issued an advertisement on July 24, 1985, inviting applications for 40 posts of Assistant Conservator of Forests (ACF). The appellants participated in the selection but were unsuccessful. Representations were made to appoint them against vacant posts beyond the advertised 40. The State appointed them on April 13, 1988, purportedly with reference to the 1985 advertisement. Further appointments occurred in 1987, 1990, 1992, and 1995. The proposal to regularize the appellants' services was approved in 2005.

Issues:

Determination of the legality of the appellants' appointment.

Seniority calculation concerning substantive appointments.

The regularisation proposal's impact on seniority.

Held:

Rule 35 of the Bihar Forest Service Rules, 1953, dictates that seniority is determined with reference to the date of substantive appointment. The appellants secured their appointments through representations, rendering them illegal and fortuitous.

The recruitment initiated in 1985 culminated with the exhaustion of the Merit List in 1987. No further appointments could be made from it. The appellants' appointments were illegal and contrary to the statutory rules.

The appellants, through persistent lobbying, secured appointments against the 1985 Advertisement, which was illegal and in violation of the rules.

A proposal to regularize their services was made, considering their 17 years of service. The irregularity of their 1988 appointments was acknowledged in the proposal.

The High Court rightly dismissed writ petitions and Letters Patent Appeals, holding that seniority is reckoned from the date of regularization in 2005, not from the illegal appointment in 1988.