Facts:

The respondent-University advertised a position for Assistant Professor in Physical Education (Yoga Therapy) with specific qualifications, including a requirement of a Post Graduate Diploma in Yoga or Yoga Therapy.

Dr. Sridip Chatterjee applied for the position and was selected by the Selection Committee despite possessing a Diploma in Yoga Education.

Respondent No. 1 challenged Dr. Chatterjee's eligibility, leading to legal proceedings.

Issues:

Whether Dr. Chatterjee's Diploma in Yoga Education satisfied the eligibility conditions advertised for the position.

The validity of the Equivalence Committee's findings regarding the equivalence of Dr. Chatterjee's qualification.

Held:

The Court emphasized that in the exercise of judicial review, it could not conclude that Dr. Chatterjee's Diploma did not meet the advertised eligibility conditions based solely on its nomenclature. The Selection Committee, comprised of experts, found him suitable.( Paragraph 16)

The Court rejected the argument that procedural irregularities in not recording Dr. Chatterjee's eligibility during the Selection Committee meeting were fatal. The Equivalence Committee, as directed by the Single Bench, found Dr. Chatterjee's Diploma satisfying the advertised requirements.( Paragraph 17)

The Court reinstated Dr. Chatterjee in service with all consequential benefits but without pay for the period he was out of service.( Paragraph 18)

Facts:

The case involves an application filed under Section 14(1)(e) seeking eviction of non-residential premises. The petitioner, a tenant, sought a reference to a larger bench for reconsideration of the *Satyawati Sharma case, which had declared Section 14(1)(e) as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

Issues:

The constitutionality of Section 14(1)(e) in relation to non-residential premises and the plea for a reference to a larger bench based on perceived conflicts with previous judgments.

Held:

The provision of Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, applies specifically to premises let for residential purposes. Part of Section 14(1)(e) was struck down in the *Satyawati Sharma case, deeming it violative of the doctrine of equality under Article 14. [Para 10, 11]

Prior to the *Satyawati Sharma case, landlords primarily used Section 14(1)(e) for seeking recovery of possession only for residential premises. Post the judgment, landlords began filing applications for eviction under Section 14(1)(e) for non-residential premises, which were processed through the summary trial procedure outlined in Chapter III-A of the Act. [Paras 11 and 12]

The principle of per incuriam, a legal doctrine developed by English courts, was discussed, emphasizing that the *Satyawati Sharma case was not per incuriam. The judgment did not ignore the ratio in **Gian Devi Anand case nor took a contrary view. [Paras 22 and 24]

The Court distinguished the #Gauri Shanker case, stating it was not applicable as it dealt with a different provision and premise, and it was not a binding precedent for the *Satyawati Sharma case. [Para 32]

The Court rejected the plea for reference, asserting that non-reference of Section 25-B in *Satyawati Sharma case did not render the judgment per incuriam. Section 25-B, being related to the procedure for considering applications under Section 14(1)(e), had no bearing on the issues addressed in *Satyawati Sharma. [Para 35]

The judgment clarified that *Satyawati Sharma case did not read down the provision of Section 14(1)(e) but struck down the discriminatory portion as violative of Article 14. [Paras 52, 53, and 54]

The Court addressed the non-reference of Section 25B, emphasizing that it did not render the judgment per incuriam. The issues related to the procedure under Section 25B were deemed matters for the legislature to consider, and any changes should be made by the legislature, not the judiciary. [Para 45]

The Court concluded that there was no good ground to refer the judgment in *Satyawati Sharma case to a larger bench, highlighting the acceptance of the suggestion in **Gian Devi Anand case by the legislature in enacting the Delhi Rent Act, 1995. [Paras 55 and 57]

Facts:

The case originated from a general election for a reserved seat in the Bombay Municipal Corporation. The successful candidate faced disqualification due to a complaint challenging her claim to belong to a backward class. The District Caste certificate scrutiny committee invalidated the candidate's caste certificate, resulting in disqualification by the Corporation and the creation of a casual vacancy in the ward.

Issues:

The primary issue revolved around the legality of the State Election Commission's notification, dated May 9, 2019, for a by-election to fill the aforementioned casual vacancy.

The appellant, Nitin Bandopant Salagre, contended that, as the candidate with the second-highest votes, he was entitled to be declared elected under Section 33 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act.

Held:

The Court held that the mere pendency of an election petition challenging the returned candidate's election does not automatically defer or postpone the filling of a casual vacancy. The State Election Commission is mandated to consider the statutory provisions under Section 34 and make a conscious decision, taking into account all relevant factors before proceeding with a by-election. The statutory scheme recognizes the candidate with the second-highest votes as deemed to be elected to avoid the necessity of conducting fresh elections.

The Court emphasized that the expression "as soon as it conveniently may be" in Section 9 grants discretion to the State Election Commission regarding the timing of holding byelections for casual vacancies. The Statute does not mandate an immediate election, providing the Commission flexibility for a purpose and object.( Para 26)

The Court clarified that the statutory scheme does not impose an automatic embargo on the State Election Commission's right to proceed with filling a casual vacancy merely because an election petition is pending. The Commission is obligated to determine whether there is no other candidate who can be deemed elected before holding fresh elections, ensuring a decision-making process that considers all relevant and necessary factors.( Para 27 )

Conclusions drawn regarding the statutory scheme under the Act, 1888 for filling up casual vacancies, highlighting the importance of Section 34 in cases involving the invalidation of a caste certificate.( Para 36 )

The Court directed the State Election Commission to take a fresh decision before issuing any notification fixing dates for holding a by-election in the relevant wards.( Para 38 )

Facts:

Appellant, Kathi David Raju, accused of obtaining a fake Scheduled Caste certificate.

FIR alleged that the appellant changed his name and parentage to secure the false caste certificate.

Police arrested the appellant, and during the incomplete investigation, requested a DNA test on the appellant, his mother, and two brothers.

Order for the DNA test was challenged under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in the High Court, which dismissed the application.

Appeal filed in the Supreme Court against the dismissal.

Issues:

Validity of the order for conducting a DNA test.

Prematurity of the DNA test request without a substantial investigation.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the order for a DNA test was premature as it was made without completing a substantial investigation. The Court emphasized the importance of not conducting such tests lightly without appropriate satisfaction of the need for testing. The order for the DNA test was declared unsustainable, and both the High Court and the Additional Junior Civil Judge were found to have erred in not setting aside the order. The Court allowed the appeal and noted that the court concerned could reconsider the request for a DNA test if there were sufficient materials on record to support such a decision.

Facts:

The respondents, as successors, sought conversion of land use for a commercial-cum-residential complex.

The Corporation directed the respondents to deposit a specific amount as conversion charges, which they did while reserving their rights.

The conversion of land use was initially allowed.

Issues:

The respondents later sought a refund of the deposited amount, leading to legal proceedings.

The High Court dismissed the writ petition, but the Division Bench allowed the special appeal, directing the appellants to refund the amount with interest.

Held:

Section 173-A was amended in 1999, introducing significant changes in the statutory provision. The amendment imposed restrictions on both categories of land, namely, land originally allotted or sold by the State Government/Municipality, and land not allotted or sold.

The amended Section 173-A prohibits the use of land for a purpose other than that permitted by the Master Plan. Even if the respondents used the land for commercial purposes before the amendment, the restriction now applies.

If the appellants claim that the land use in the Master Plan 2011 is residential, the amended Section 173-A restrictions shall apply, necessitating permission and payment of conversion charges.

The respondents' intention to construct a commercial-cum-residential complex and the Corporation's request for conversion charges are inconsequential. Compliance with statutory requirements is paramount.

In the event of conflicting claims regarding the land use in the Master Plan, the respondents are given liberty to submit a representation to the Corporation. This allows them to present materials and grounds indicating that, in the 2002 Master Plan, the land use was commercial rather than residential.

FACTS:

The case involved Col. Rajnish Bhandari, VSM, as the appellant, challenging charges under Section 497 of the Ranbir Penal Code and Section 63 of the Army Act, 1950.

ISSUES:

Constitutional validity of Section 497 of the Ranbir Penal Code.

Confirmation proceedings under Section 63 of the Army Act, 1950.

HELD:

The court declares Section 497 of the Ranbir Penal Code unconstitutional, following its judgment in Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 39.

The sentence "In such case the wife shall be punishable as an abettor" in Section 497 is deemed unconstitutional, rendering the entire section unconstitutional.

Nothing survives against the appellant on charges related to Section 497 of the Penal Code.

The appellant has been acquitted under Section 63 of the Army Act, 1950, subject to confirmation.

The Armed Forces Tribunal judgment dated 08.01.2019 is set aside.

The appeal is allowed.

Confirmation proceedings under Section 63 of the Army Act, 1950, are to continue and reach their logical conclusion.

REFERRED CASES:

Joseph Shine vs. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 39

Facts:

On December 7, 2009, an FIR was lodged alleging that Dhoom Singh, in association with the appellant Ritesh Sinha, was collecting money on the promise of providing jobs in the Police.

The Investigating Authority sought to verify recorded conversations by obtaining the voice sample of Ritesh Sinha.

The CJM issued summons to Ritesh Sinha to appear before the Investigating Officer and provide his voice sample.

Issues:

Whether Article 20(3) of the Constitution, protecting a person accused from self-incrimination, extends to protecting them from giving a voice sample during the investigation.

Whether, in the absence of a specific provision in the CrPC, a Magistrate can authorize the investigating agency to record the voice sample of the accused.

Held:

The first question was answered in the negative, following the precedent set in State of Bombay vs. Kathi Kalu Oghad.

The second question resulted in a split verdict among the judges. Justice Ranjana Prakash Desai held that the Magistrate had implied power under Section 53 CrPC to order a voice sample. Justice Aftab Alam disagreed, emphasizing the need for legislative action.

The Court, under Article 142 of the Constitution, concluded that a Magistrate should be conceded the power to order a person to give a voice sample for crime investigation until explicit provisions are enacted.

Facts:

A2-Yasmeen was accused of supporting terrorist activities of ISIS.

The prosecution alleged a criminal conspiracy involving A1 (husband of A2-Yasmeen) and A2-Yasmeen, leading to their association with ISIS.

Charges included offenses under Section 120B IPC, Section 125 IPC, and Sections 38, 39, 40 of the UAPA.

A2-Yasmeen was arrested at the airport while attempting to travel to Afghanistan.

Issues:

Whether the evidence supports the charges against A2-Yasmeen.

Whether A2-Yasmeen should be acquitted or convicted for the mentioned offenses.

Whether the sentence imposed by the trial court was appropriate.

Held:

The High Court set aside A2-Yasmeen's conviction for certain offenses but upheld it for others, reducing the sentence.

The Supreme Court dismissed A2-Yasmeen's appeal against her conviction and sentence under Section 120B IPC and Section 38 of the UAPA.

The Union's appeal against A2-Yasmeen's acquittal for offenses under Section 125 IPC, Sections 39, and 40 of the UAPA was also dismissed.

The Court allowed the Union's appeal regarding the reduction of A2-Yasmeen's sentence, restoring the sentence imposed by the trial court.

The judgment emphasized the importance of establishing mens rea for offenses under the UAPA.

The High Court's observation that "if a person is punishable under Section 38, Section 39 becomes superfluous" was deemed incorrect, clarifying the distinct scopes of these sections.

Facts:

The dispute involves the office of mutawalli at the Andrott Jumah mosque.

The respondents, claiming descent from Saint Ubaidulla, assert a customary right to the mutawalli office.

Appellants argue that the mosque's construction was by the island's inhabitants, and selection should be by local residents.

Issues:

Whether the Pattakal family has a customary right to the office of mutawalli.

Whether the local residents have the right to select the mutawalli.

Held:

Ordinarily, the High Court's revisional jurisdiction does not permit interference with findings of fact. However, correction is allowed if the lower court's findings are grossly erroneous. The High Court rightly noted historical facts, and the Tribunal failed to apply the appropriate standard of proof. No exceeding of revisional jurisdiction.

Partition deeds do not deal with the right of the mosque's management. The respondents claim a customary, not proprietary, right to the mutawalli office.

Historical materials, including the Gazette, support Ubaidulla as the first mutawalli. The Gazette is an official record, and its contents are relevant. The appellants failed to present contrary historical opinions.

The Muslim law does not inherently recognize succession to the mutawalli office, but exceptions, including custom, exist. Respondents demonstrated a customary right with clear evidence. The burden of proof is higher for a public waqf.

The committee's existence and the compromise decree are discussed. The compromise decree, being without court leave and violating Wakf Act provisions, is declared void. No breach in respondents' customary right.

The mutawalli has no property right, and the respondents' customary right is subject to the Waqf Act. The respondents established a reasonable customary right to the mutawalli office.