Facts:

The plaintiff entered into an agreement to purchase land from the respondents.

Despite receiving full consideration and possession, the sale deed was not executed, and a gift deed was executed instead.

The plaintiff filed a suit seeking specific performance of the contract.

The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff, which was upheld by the First Appellate Court.

During the pendency of the second appeal, the land was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act.

Issues:

Whether specific performance of the contract was still feasible considering the acquisition of the land during the pendency of the appeal.

What relief should be granted to the plaintiff in lieu of specific performance.

Held:

The Court held that since the land was acquired during the appeal, specific performance of the contract was not feasible.

It invoked Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, which allows for the award of compensation in certain cases. The Court directed that Rs. 10 lakh be awarded to the plaintiff-appellants out of the compensation received for the acquired land, and the remainder be paid to the respondents, deducting the awarded amount.

If compensation had not yet been disbursed, it was to be disbursed according to the Court's directions. If already received by respondent No.1, they were to return Rs. 10 lakh to the appellants and the remainder to the other respondents.

Facts:

Kanhaiya Kumar, an Army personnel, was dismissed from service due to fraudulent enrollment based on a fake relationship certificate.

He challenged his dismissal under section 20(3) of the Army Act, 1950.

Issues:

Whether the dismissal under section 20(3) of the Army Act, 1950 was justified when there is a specific provision (section 122(4)) dealing with fraudulent enrollment cases.

Held:

The Court analyzed relevant sections of the Army Act, 1950, along with Rule 17 of the Army Rules, 1954, which outline procedures for dismissal or removal. It noted that Kanhaiya Kumar was given an opportunity to defend himself, and he admitted to using a fake relationship certificate.

The Court emphasized that employment obtained through fraud renders it voidable at the option of the employer, citing previous judgments supporting this principle.

Therefore, the Court concluded that the dismissal was valid, as the authorities were within their right to exercise power under section 20(3) of the Army Act, 1950. The appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Facts:

The petitioner, a public-spirited individual, approached the Supreme Court under Article 32 seeking various directives related to the National Anthem. This included mandamus or appropriate directions commanding the authorities to inculcate proper respect for the National Anthem, specifying actions to be taken when it is played or sung, and restraining its commercial exploitation.

Issues:

The court included determining the appropriate measures for respecting the National Anthem, considering the provisions of the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971, and the relevant constitutional provisions.

Held:

The court issued several directions regarding the playing and respect of the National Anthem. It clarified that while respect for the National Anthem is mandatory, the playing of it in cinema halls before feature films would be optional until a final decision was taken by a Committee appointed by the Union government.

The court emphasized the duty of citizens to show respect for the National Anthem as required by executive orders and prevailing laws. The exemption granted to disabled persons from standing during the National Anthem was affirmed until a final decision was made by the competent authority.

Facts:

The suit involved plaintiff No.1 filing on behalf of himself and his minor brother, plaintiff No.2, against their father, defendant No.1, seeking a declaration regarding property shares and the validity of a sale deed executed by defendant No.1 in favor of defendant No.2. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the first appellate court decreed it. However, the High Court dismissed the suit, stating that plaintiff No.1 could not act as the guardian of plaintiff No.2 without court permission during the lifetime of their father, who was the natural guardian of plaintiff No.2.

Issues:

Whether plaintiff No.1's representation of plaintiff No.2 without court permission was valid.

Whether the provisions of the Hindu Guardianship Act apply to the present case.

Whether the High Court's decision to dismiss the suit on grounds of lack of proper representation was justified.

Held:

The Court clarified that plaintiff No.1 did not fall under the definition of "Guardian" as specified in the Hindu Guardianship Act. The case, however, was governed by Order XXXII of the CPC.

It was established that every suit by a minor must be instituted by a "next friend" as per Order XXXII Rule 1 CPC, and the next friend need not necessarily be a guardian as defined under the Hindu Guardianship Act.

The distinction between a "next friend" representing a minor plaintiff and a "guardian ad litem" representing a minor defendant was emphasized under Order XXXII Rules 1 and 3 CPC.

The Court held that a decree cannot be set aside merely due to formalities not being observed in appointing a guardian ad litem, unless prejudice is caused to the minor defendant.

It was clarified that the concept of a "Guardian" under the Hindu Guardianship Act is different from that of a "next friend" or a "guardian ad litem" appointed under CPC.

The Court reiterated that the rights and restrictions of a natural guardian provided under the Hindu Guardianship Act do not conflict with the procedure for filing a suit by a next friend on behalf of the minor.

Order XXXII Rules 12, 13, and 14 CPC empower a minor plaintiff to decide whether to proceed with or abandon the suit upon attaining majority.

The Court concluded that the High Court's decision to non-suit plaintiff No.2 based on provisions of the Hindu Guardianship Act was not justified, and the matter was remitted to the High Court for a fresh decision on merits.

Facts:

The deceased, Meena Devi, was living with her son, daughter, and the accused Raj Kumar in a joint family house.

On 23.08.2007, the accused, in a drunken state, threatened Meena Devi and her children, and later, Meena Devi was last seen alive with the accused.

Meena Devi's body was found hanging from a tree on 25.08.2007.

The trial court convicted the accused based on circumstantial evidence, but the High Court acquitted him due to alleged improvements in witness testimony and lack of specific motive.

Issues:

Whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

Whether the High Court's acquittal was justified based on the alleged improvements in witness testimony and lack of a specific motive.

Held:

The circumstances must conclusively point towards the guilt of the accused, forming a complete chain without any gaps. The burden is on the accused to provide a reasonable explanation, and failure to do so can be considered a strong indication of guilt.

The court upheld the credibility of key prosecution witnesses, including the deceased's son, despite alleged improvements in his testimony. The witness's evidence was found to be consistent with the prosecution's case and inspired confidence.

The accused's motive, including previous disputes and assaults against the deceased, was considered along with his failure to report her disappearance. These factors formed significant circumstantial evidence against the accused.

The High Court's decision to acquit the accused was criticized for failing to properly appreciate the evidence and disregarding significant circumstantial factors. The acquittal caused a miscarriage of justice, leading to the Supreme Court setting aside the High Court's judgment and affirming the trial court's conviction.

Facts:

The respondents were denied employment as constables in the Chandigarh Police due to their involvement in criminal cases, despite subsequent acquittal.

The Screening Committee, after examining the cases, found the respondents unsuitable for the post of constable.

The respondents challenged this decision before the Tribunal and High Court, which directed the consideration of their candidature.

Issues:

Whether involvement in criminal cases, followed by acquittal, renders a candidate unsuitable for the post of constable.

Whether the decision of the Screening Committee to cancel the candidature of the respondents was justifiable.

Held:

The court held that acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle a person to a job, especially in the police force where impeccable integrity and track record are essential. The decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as final unless shown to be mala fide.

The court upheld the cancellation of the respondents' candidature based on the Screening Committee's assessment of their suitability. The judgments of the Tribunal and High Court directing the consideration of respondents for the post were set aside.

Facts:

The dispute involved a piece of land jointly owned by the Rathore family, who alleged fraud, cheating, and conspiracy against Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel and others. Several complaints were filed, leading to the registration of an FIR. The High Court partly quashed the FIR, leading to appeals by both the complainants and the accused.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's partial quashing of the FIR was appropriate.

Whether the FIR disclosed prima facie cognizable offenses.

Whether the High Court exceeded its powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Held:

The Court held that the High Court had exceeded its powers while exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The Court emphasized that the High Court should not act as an investigating agency or an appellate authority while considering the legality of an FIR. The FIR prima facie disclosed the commission of cognizable offenses, and the High Court should have allowed the investigating authorities to proceed with the investigation.

Therefore, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals filed by the complainants and dismissed the appeals filed by the accused persons. The Court directed the investigating authorities to complete the investigation without bias or prejudice and in accordance with the law. The judgment clarified that it did not decide any issue on merits, leaving the investigation to proceed independently.

Facts:

The purchase orders referred to standard terms and conditions containing an arbitration clause.

The Respondent accepted all terms except the delivery period.

A dispute arose over the quality of supplied cables.

The Appellant sought arbitration, but the Respondent resisted, claiming that the arbitration clause was not incorporated into the contract.

The High Court dismissed the Appellant's application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, stating there was no evidence of an arbitration agreement.

Issues:

Whether the arbitration clause from another document could be incorporated into the contract by reference.

Held:

The Supreme Court analyzed the interpretation of Section 7(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which deals with the incorporation of arbitration clauses from other documents. It referred to the case of M.R. Engineers and Contractors Private Limited v. Som Datt Builders Limited, establishing principles for incorporating arbitration clauses by reference.

The Court concluded that a general reference to a standard form of contract, even if not by a trade association or professional body, is sufficient for incorporation of the arbitration clause. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The National Kamgar Union challenged the closure of a manufacturing unit owned by Kran Rader Pvt. Ltd., alleging non-compliance with relevant labor laws.

Disagreement arose over the total number of workers employed, determining the applicability of Section 25-K of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

The Industrial Court found 115 workers employed, while the High Court determined the number to be 99.

Issues:

The main issue was to ascertain the total number of workers employed, impacting the application of Section 25-K of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Whether the High Court's re-evaluation of evidence and reversal of the Industrial Court's decision was justified.

Determination of compensation for workers affected by the closure.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming the finding that only 99 workers were employed. The Court found no jurisdictional error in the High Court's re-evaluation of evidence. Consequently, it ruled that Section 25-K did not apply to the respondent's unit.

The Supreme Court directed Kran Rader Pvt. Ltd. to pay a lump sum compensation of Rs. 2,50,000 to each worker who did not accept the earlier compensation offered. This amount was to be deposited with the Industrial Court, Pune, and distributed accordingly. The appeal was disposed of accordingly.