Facts:

The case pertains to the misuse of residential premises for commercial purposes in Delhi, which was in violation of various laws including municipal laws, the master plan, and environmental laws. The Supreme Court had constituted a Monitoring Committee to seal such premises. Despite this, Delhi Development Authority (DDA) modified the master plan and enacted the Delhi Laws (Special Provisions) Act, 2006. Subsequently, a notification was issued by the Central Government, providing for the restoration of sealed premises under certain conditions.

Issues:

The court was the constitutional validity of the Delhi Laws (Special Provisions) Act, 2006, and the notification issued pursuant to it.

Additionally, the court needed to address the challenge posed by these legislative measures to the Supreme Court's orders and directions regarding the sealing of commercial premises.

Held:

The applicants expressed a clear intention to use the premises for residential purposes. Given this, formal appeals before the Appellate Tribunal would serve little purpose, especially considering the backlog of appeals already pending. Therefore, the court directed the premises to be de-sealed for residential purposes, subject to certain conditions. [Para 34]

The conditions imposed by the court aimed to ensure compliance with residential use and prevent further misuse for commercial purposes. These conditions included filing affidavits, payment of conversion charges, and compliance with directives from the Monitoring Committee. [Para 35]

The Monitoring Committee was entrusted with the responsibility to assess whether the premises should be de-sealed based on satisfaction with the conditions imposed. If unsatisfied, the applicants could approach the Supreme Court for appropriate orders. [Para 36]

The court clarified that its order applied only to premises misused for commercial (non-industrial) purposes and sealed at the instance of the Monitoring Committee. Any challenge to the Monitoring Committee's decision would lie before the Supreme Court. [Para 37]

Writ petitions transferred to the Delhi High Court for expeditious disposal were withdrawn and brought back to the Supreme Court due to significant delays in their resolution. [Para 39]

Decision: The Supreme Court directed the de-sealing of premises for residential purposes, subject to conditions, bypassing the need for formal appeals before the Appellate Tribunal. It clarified the procedure for compliance with the imposed conditions and reiterated the jurisdiction for challenges to the Monitoring Committee's decisions. Furthermore, it expedited the resolution of related writ petitions by withdrawing them from the Delhi High Court and bringing them back to the Supreme Court.

Facts:The petitioner, a visually disabled person, filed a writ petition seeking safe accessibility to roads and transport facilities, highlighting ten action points for providing proper access to public facilities for visually disabled persons. The petitioner's plea was based on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 and constitutional guarantees. The issue at hand was the enforcement of accessibility measures for visually impaired individuals in public spaces.

Issues:

The ensuring proper access to public facilities for visually disabled persons, as mandated by the Disabilities Act, 2016 and constitutional provisions.

The court needed to determine the obligations of the State and public authorities in this regard and the deadlines for implementing accessibility measures.

Held:

The rights of visually impaired persons to proper access to public facilities are constitutionally guaranteed under Article 19(1)(c) and are reinforced by international covenants and statutory recognition. It is the duty of the State and public authorities to establish norms for accessibility in public spaces, including roads, buildings, and transportation facilities. Failure to provide such accessibility constitutes an infringement of fundamental rights. The Disabilities Act, 1995 and its successor, the Disabilities Act, 2016, outline specific guidelines for creating a barrier-free environment, including provisions for transportation, buildings, and public places. It is the constitutional obligation of the State to safeguard the interests of disabled persons and provide non-discriminatory access by removing physical barriers.

The court issued directions for the effective implementation of accessibility measures, including deadlines for making government buildings, airports, railways, and public transport fully accessible. The central and state governments were directed to comply with these directives within specified time frames.

Decision: The court held that the prayers made by the petitioner were not adversarial but aimed at ensuring the rights of visually impaired persons. The court emphasized the commitment of the Central Government to addressing the needs of disabled persons and directed both central and state governments to take necessary measures for accessibility within prescribed deadlines.

Facts:

The appellant filed a suit for recovery of possession against the respondent concerning a property in New Delhi. The respondent sought an amendment to the plaint, which was allowed. Subsequently, the appellant sought to amend the written statement to introduce additional averments regarding the ancestral nature of the property and the existence of coparcenary rights.

Issues:

Whether the Trial Court was justified in allowing the amendment to the written statement, and whether the High Court's interference under Article 227 was appropriate.

Held:

The Court held that the proposed amendments in the written statement were merely an elaboration of existing defenses and did not amount to the withdrawal of admissions made earlier. The Court emphasized that the jurisdiction under Article 227 is limited to ensuring that inferior courts operate within their jurisdiction and does not entail a reassessment of evidence. Therefore, the High Court's interference was deemed unsustainable. The appeal was allowed, and the Trial Court's order permitting the amendment to the written statement was affirmed.

Facts:

The appellant was involved in a motorcycle accident with a mini lorry belonging to the Second and Third respondents.

The appellant suffered grievous injuries, including spinal injuries, and filed a compensation claim before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal.

The tribunal assessed the appellant's disability, income, and awarded compensation, deducting 40% for contributory negligence.

On appeal, the High Court enhanced the compensation but affirmed the finding of contributory negligence based on conjecture.

The appellant challenged the finding of contributory negligence.

Issues:

Whether the appellant was rightly held to be guilty of contributory negligence.

Whether the absence of a driving license automatically implies contributory negligence.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that:

The finding of contributory negligence was without basis and unjustified.

The absence of a driving license alone does not establish contributory negligence unless it is proven that it led to rash and negligent driving causing the accident.

The deduction of 40% for contributory negligence was set aside, and the appellant was entitled to additional compensation.

The respondent was ordered to pay an additional amount of Rs. 4,60,000 to the appellant, along with interest at 8% per annum from the date of the petition until realization.

The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs.

Facts:

The Court constituted a committee to examine various aspects related to consumer fora's functioning, including infrastructural requirements, vacancy positions, administrative powers, service conditions, and other relevant factors.

Various directions were issued to the Union Government regarding framing model rules, regulations by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, and addressing the vacancy in the post of Registrar.

The Union government was directed to file a comprehensive status report on compliance with the Court's directions.

Issues:

The infrastructural deficiencies in consumer fora, vacancy positions, administrative powers, service conditions, and the need for regulatory frameworks.

Held and Decision:

The Court held that proper infrastructure is essential for the effective functioning of consumer fora across the country. It directed the Union Government to frame model rules and regulations to address various aspects such as vacancy positions, administrative control, and service conditions.

The Court emphasized the importance of timely appointments and ensuring proper administrative control to streamline the functioning of consumer fora.

It directed the Union Government to file a comprehensive status report on compliance with the Court's directions within a specified period.

The Court's decision aimed to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of consumer dispute resolution mechanisms, ensuring access to justice for consumers.

The Committee's work was concluded, and the Court sought assistance from the Additional Solicitor General to formulate appropriate directions for ensuring proper infrastructure in consumer fora.

Facts:

TISCO, an industrial company operating in Jamshedpur, Bihar (now Jharkhand), received a demand notice from the State of Bihar for payment for water drawn from the Subarnrekha River, which was being used for industrial and domestic purposes.

TISCO filed a writ petition challenging the demand notice, arguing that it had riparian rights over the river and that the demand was illegal and unconstitutional.

The High Court declined to examine TISCO's claims of riparian rights and prescriptive rights, stating that such questions should be decided in a civil court and not in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Issues:

Whether the demand made by the State for payment for water drawn from the Subarnrekha River is legal and constitutional.

Whether TISCO has riparian rights over the river, and if so, whether such rights are enforceable against the State's demand.

Held:

The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and remitted the matter back to the High Court for further examination. The Court held that the demand made by the State could be construed as a fee, and therefore, it required legislative authorization under Article 265 of the Constitution. The Court refused to entertain arguments regarding the applicability of specific Acts, as they were not properly pleaded or argued before the High Court. Additionally, the Court noted ambiguity regarding the existence of a concluded agreement between TISCO and the State regarding the payment for water usage. Therefore, the matter was sent back to the High Court for further examination, allowing the parties to file proper pleadings and argue their case.

Facts:

The prosecution alleged that two trusts, including one run by the private appellants, collected funds under the guise of providing legal assistance to the victims of the 2002 Gujarat riots. However, these funds were not disbursed to the intended recipients. Substantial irregularities were found in the bank accounts and financial records of the appellants' trusts. The investigating agency seized the bank accounts under Section 102 of the CrPC.

Issues:

The legitimacy of the seizure of the bank accounts, adherence to procedural requirements, and the ongoing investigation into the alleged offenses.

Held:

The Court addressed the scope and applicability of Section 102 of the CrPC, emphasizing that the decision to seize bank accounts must be based on circumstances creating suspicion of the commission of an offense. The Court cited precedent to support the view that bank accounts are considered 'property' under Section 102, and seizure can be justified if there are direct links between the assets and the alleged offense.

Despite the appellant-CJP Trust not being named as an accused in the FIR, the Court acknowledged that investigations revealed active association of certain appellants with the trusts under scrutiny. The investigating officer had sufficient grounds to suspect offenses based on transactions associated with these bank accounts.

Regarding procedural matters, the Court affirmed that the procedure for freezing bank accounts under Section 102 of the CrPC had been correctly followed. Intimations were provided to the concerned magistrate as required by law, and there was no requirement for prior notice to account holders before seizure.

The Court reiterated that the investigating officer had exercised powers under Section 102 of the CrPC legitimately, having possessed materials indicating suspicious circumstances related to the alleged offenses. The officer had followed the prescribed procedure for seizure.

As the investigation was ongoing, the appellants were required to cooperate and explain their positions. Once the investigation concluded and a police report was submitted, the appellants could apply for the release of their bank accounts. The concerned court would consider such requests after hearing both sides and could impose conditions as necessary.

The Court clarified that at an appropriate stage or upon completion of the investigation, if the investigating officer was satisfied with the appellants' explanations, they could issue instructions to unfreeze the bank accounts.

Facts:

The case involved the interpretation and application of Section 26A of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, regarding the powers of the Central Government to regulate, restrict, or prohibit the manufacture, sale, or distribution of drugs or cosmetics in the interest of public health and safety.

Issues:

Whether consultation with the Drugs Technical Advisory Board (DTAB) under Section 5 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, is mandatory before exercising the powers under Section 26A.

The role and significance of the DTAB in the decision-making process under Section 26A.

Legislative intent and the scope of Section 26A in relation to other provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.

Held:

The Court held that Section 26A of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, is an additional power granted to the Central Government, which must be exercised based on its own terms .

Consultation with the DTAB under Section 5 is not explicitly mandated by Section 26A, and the absence of such requirement does not invalidate the exercise of power by the Central Government .

While consultation with the DTAB is desirable for technical advice, it is not mandatory for the exercise of power under Section 26A. The Central Government's satisfaction can be based on various factors, not solely on the advice of the DTAB .

The legislative history and intent behind Section 26A indicate that the omission of explicit consultation requirements with the DTAB was deliberate .

Section 26A must be interpreted on its own terms without importing requirements from other sections of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.

A DTAB/Sub-Committee should be established to review specific drug combinations based on the criteria outlined in Section 26A. The review process should consider risks, therapeutic value, and the necessity for regulatory action in the public interest.

The Court set aside certain notifications banning drugs manufactured before September 21, 1988, and directed further inquiry by the Central Government. The status quo of cases pending regulatory action was maintained until fresh notifications were issued. we accept the report, and accordingly dispose of these petitions in accordance therewith.

Facts:

The appellants claim the temple as their private place of worship, while the respondents argue it is a public shrine.

Various legal proceedings have ensued, including an application under Section 77 of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966.

Issues:

Whether the temple is a private or public institution.

The validity and significance of document Exh.B6, which suggests an endowment of the temple for public/charitable purposes by the father of the appellants.

Held:

The court granted both parties an opportunity to present all evidence to conclusively determine the temple's status. The appellants were directed to file a representation supporting their claim within four weeks. The adjudicating authority would then review the evidence, hear both sides, and make a determination within six months. The status quo of the temple property was to be maintained during this period. The decision did not express any final opinion on the merits of the case, leaving it to the adjudicating authority to decide impartially. The appeal is thus, allowed.