Facts:

Provide a concise summary of the factual background leading to the legal dispute.

Issues:

Identify and outline the key legal issues addressed in the judgment.

Held:

Section 273 Cr.P.C. exceptions - Violation in the present case. No dispensation for the absence of the accused during evidence recording. High Court's conclusion upheld. [Para 18]

Chapter XXXV of Cr.P.C. - Irregular Proceedings. Section 461 - Irregularities that vitiate proceedings. No vitiation unless great prejudice to accused. Accused's right to watch prosecution witnesses is valuable. Infringement acknowledged but remedied by High Court's direction for de novo examination. [Paras 19 and 20]

Chapters XXVIII and XXIX of Cr.P.C. - Powers of High Court. Proceedings under Chapter XXVIII a continuation of the trial. High Court's wide powers, including ordering further inquiry or taking additional evidence. No jurisdictional error in the present case. [Para 22]

Retrial of criminal cases - Not to be taken lightly. High Court's order not to rectify defects but to remedy the absence of accused during evidence recording. [Paras 23 and 24]

Balancing interests of accused and society. High Court's directions ensure a fair procedure. Accused's right to watch and cross-examine witnesses preserved. Ensuring justice without a great miscarriage. [Para 25]

Facts:

The petitioners, producers of the Bengali film "Bhobishyoter Bhoot," received a letter from the Joint Commissioner of Police (Intelligence), Special Branch, requesting a prior screening due to concerns about potential public sentiment issues. Despite being certified by the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC), the film faced disruptions after its release, with exhibitors abruptly removing it from screens.

Issues:

The police's interference in the lawful release of a CBFC-certified film, the abrupt removal of the film from theaters, and the subsequent violation of the petitioners' fundamental rights.

Held:

The police, as uniformed authority, cannot assume the role of self-appointed guardians of public morality. The statutory authority to certify a film for public exhibition lies with the CBFC, and any order under statutory provisions is subject to legal control and judicial oversight. The wielding of extra-constitutional authority is deemed destructive of legitimate expectations.

The freedoms guaranteed by Article 19 are universal and impose both negative and positive mandates on the State. The State has a duty to ensure conditions for the flourishing of these freedoms, especially in the realm of speech and expression. The State cannot ignore organized interests threatening freedom, and in this case, there was an unconstitutional attempt to invade fundamental rights.

Due to the film's removal, the petitioners suffered a violation of their fundamental rights. A remedy in public law, in the form of remedial compensation, was deemed necessary. The respondents were directed to pay compensation of Rs 20 lakhs and costs of Rs 1 lakh to the petitioners.

Decision: The State was restrained from resorting to any extra-constitutional means to prevent the lawful screening of the film. The State must ensure the protection of theater owners' properties and viewers' safety. Compensation of Rs 20 lakhs and costs of Rs 1 lakh were awarded to the petitioners.

Facts:

Memorandum of Settlement in 1978 set the superannuation age at 60 years for existing workers and 58 years for those recruited post-settlement.

Central Government directed all PSUs to increase the age to 60 in 1998, followed by financial difficulties for the PSU.

The Central Government, in 2003, directed a reduction in retirement age to 58 for pre-1978 employees due to financial challenges.

Issues:

Legality and correctness of the order reducing the retirement age.

Jurisdiction of the State to make references to the Labour Court under Section 10 of the ID Act after earlier judicial decisions on the matter.

Held:

The issue of reducing the retirement age had been conclusively decided in earlier rounds of litigation, and the principle of res judicata applied.

The State had no jurisdiction to make references to the Labour Court on the same issue after its final adjudication.

The Labour Court's awards upholding res judicata were restored.

The appeals succeed and are accordingly allowed.

Facts:

The case involves an application under Sections 11(4) to 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, concerning an arbitration clause in an unstamped sub-contract. The arbitration clause's existence is in question due to its unstamped nature.

Issues:

Whether an unstamped arbitration clause in a sub-contract can be recognized as "existing" as a matter of law?

How does the introduction of Section 11(6A) affect the applicability of mandatory provisions under the Stamp Act?

What is the procedure to be followed when an arbitration clause is unstamped, and an application under Section 11 is filed?

Held:

The court holds that the arbitration clause in an unstamped agreement or conveyance does not have an independent existence. Section 11(6A) does not negate the applicability of mandatory provisions under the Stamp Act, as established in SMS Tea Estates case.( Para 15, 16)

An arbitration clause in an agreement is not considered to exist if the agreement is not enforceable by law, emphasizing that the SMS Tea Estates case remains unaffected by the amendment of Section 11(6A).( Para 19)

The arbitration clause in the sub-contract does not "exist" as a matter of law until the document is duly stamped, dismissing the argument related to Section 11(6A) dealing with "existence."( Para 24)

Harmonious construction between the Maharashtra Stamp Act and Section 11(13) of the 1996 Act is necessary, ensuring expeditious disposal of both stamp duty issues and arbitration applications.( Para 26)

Suggests a procedure: The High Court must impound unstamped instruments, hand them to stamp authorities for prompt resolution, and upon payment of stamp duty and penalty, parties can proceed with the arbitration application.( Para 27, 28)

The judgment of the High Court is set aside, remitting the matter to be decided in light of this judgment.( Para 29)

Facts:

The prosecution alleged that the appellant-accused, husband of the deceased victim, committed the offenses of pouring kerosene on the victim, setting her on fire, and fleeing the scene. The victim succumbed to severe burn injuries, and a dying declaration was recorded by the Metropolitan Magistrate. The trial court initially acquitted all accused, but the High Court reversed the acquittal of the appellant-accused.

Issues:

The trial court's dismissal of the dying declaration and other evidence, leading to the acquittal of the accused. The High Court's interference in the appeal against acquittal was also questioned.

Held:

The dying declaration was established and supported by medical evidence and the testimony of the metropolitan magistrate. Despite minor contradictions, the trial court erred in discarding the dying declaration. The appellant's defense of accidental burns was debunked, and the trial court's conclusions were deemed untenable.( Para 9)

Considering various Supreme Court decisions, the Court evaluated whether the High Court's interference with the acquittal was justified. The Court could maintain the conviction if satisfied that the trial court's approach was patently illegal or its conclusions demonstrably unsustainable.( Para 10)

The High Court's entitlement to re-appreciate evidence independently was acknowledged. However, interference with acquittal should not solely be based on two possible views but on the absence of a reasonable view. The trial court's errors in discarding evidence were reiterated.( Para 12)

Upon re-evaluating the entire evidence and trial court findings, the Court affirmed the High Court's interference. The trial court's patent errors in discarding the dying declaration justified the appellant's conviction under Section 302 of the IPC. No interference with the judgment under appeal was warranted.( Para 13)

Facts:

The case stems from an incident where the accused, Kanhaiya Lal, allegedly caused a single fatal blow to the deceased, Raju, using an axe.

The High Court altered the conviction from Section 302 to Section 304 Part I, citing the single nature of the injury and an altercation that occurred earlier in the day.

Issues:

Whether a single fatal blow, even with a deadly weapon, should lead to a conviction under Section 302 or a lesser offense like Section 304 Part I.

Another issue is the consideration of an altercation that happened earlier in the day as a factor in determining the accused's intention.

Held:

The High Court's reasoning for converting the conviction based on a single blow is deemed insufficient. The nature of the weapon and the vital part of the body where the blow was struck are crucial factors.

The absence of repeated injuries is not a valid ground for altering the conviction. The severity of a single blow to a vital part can still constitute murder.

The High Court's reliance on an earlier altercation is rejected. The absence of a recent altercation does not negate the intention to cause death during the incident.

Facts:

The respondent filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 36896 of 1992, which was disposed of in terms of the judgment of the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court reported as State of U.P. and Others vs. Putti Lal, (1998)1 UPLBEC 313.

The respondent filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 43443 of 2004 after the above order was passed. The Writ Petition was disposed of on 23.10.2008 with directions for consideration of regularization under the Uttar Pradesh Regularisation of Daily Wages Appointments on Group 'D' Posts Rules, 2001.

The Divisional Director, Social Forestry Division Agra, passed an order on 19.11.2008, denying regularization to the respondent.

The respondent filed Contempt Application (C) No. 1632 of 2009, alleging violation of the order dated 23.10.2008.

Issues:

Whether the respondent is entitled to regularization and minimum pay scale as a daily wager under the Uttar Pradesh Regularisation of Daily Wages Appointments on Group 'D' Posts Rules, 2001?

Whether the contempt proceedings were justified?

Held:

The Court considered the history of the case and previous orders, emphasizing the need for accurate eligibility and seniority lists for regularization under the Rules.

The Court found that the contempt proceedings were not justified and that officers should not be summoned to court unless the order is proved illegal.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, and the Contempt Application is dismissed.

Facts:

The respondents challenge the maintainability of the review petition, arguing that the documents in question were unauthorizedly removed from the Ministry of Defence.

Issues:

Whether the review petition is maintainable, considering the alleged violation of the Official Secrets Act. Another issue involves the claim of privilege under Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act.

Held:

The Official Secrets Act does not provide for executive power to restrain the publication of documents marked as secret.

Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act applies to unpublished public records, but in this case, the documents are in the public domain. The claim of immunity against disclosure must be judged on public interest.

Section 8(2) of the Right to Information Act allows access to information even in matters concerning security, provided public interest outweighs harm.

Decision: The preliminary objections challenging the maintainability of the review petitions are dismissed. The review petitions will be adjudicated on their own merit, taking into account the relevance of the documents appended.

Facts:

The prosecutrix was familiar with the accused since 2009, and they were involved in a love affair. The appellant established a physical relationship with her under the pretext of marriage. However, after keeping the prosecutrix and her family members in the dark for about two months, the appellant refused to marry her and performed marriage with another girl. The Sessions Court convicted the appellant under Section 376 of the IPC, and the High Court confirmed the judgment.

Issues:

Whether the prosecutrix's consent, given under the belief of a false promise of marriage, could excuse the accused from the charge of rape under Section 375 of the IPC.

Held:

The court held that if it is established that the accused had no intention to marry from the inception and induced consent based on false promises, such consent would be a consent on a misconception of fact under Section 90 of the IPC. This would not excuse the accused, and he could be convicted for rape under Section 375 and 376 of the IPC (Para 12).

The prosecution successfully proved that the accused never intended to marry the prosecutrix, and her consent was based on a false promise. The court rejected the argument that the prosecutrix, being educated, should have known about the accused's impending marriage. Both courts rightly convicted the accused under Section 376 of the IPC, maintaining the seriousness of rape as a morally reprehensible crime (Para 14, 15).

Despite the accused's subsequent marriage and any actions of the prosecutrix, the court, considering the circumstances and a request by the appellant's counsel, reduced the sentence from 10 years' rigorous imprisonment to seven years, the minimum prescribed at the relevant time (Para 16).