Facts:

The deceased spouse of the respondent took a life insurance policy from Reliance Life Insurance Co Ltd. Subsequently, two months later, he submitted a proposal for another life insurance policy to the same company. In the proposal, he denied having any current insurance or pending applications. The insurer issued the policy. About a year later, the insured passed away, and the insurer repudiated the claim, citing the suppression of material facts regarding previous insurance.

Issues:

The validity of the insurer's repudiation based on the non-disclosure of a previous life insurance policy by the insured.

Held:

Section 45 of the Insurance Act stipulates restrictions on insurers challenging a policy after two years. Beyond two years, the insurer must establish inaccuracies, suppression of material facts, and fraudulent intent by the policyholder.( Para 12, 13)

Insurance operates under the doctrine of uberrima fidei, demanding complete good faith. Mutual obligations of trust and good faith are fundamental in the insurer-insured relationship.( Para 15)

Regulation 2(d) defines the "proposal form" and emphasizes the proposer's duty to provide all material information. Regulation 4(3) guides proposers to adhere to Section 45 during form filling, placing the onus on the insurer to prove any suppression.( Paras 23, 24)

"Material" in the context of insurance refers to any information impacting the insurer's risk assessment. It includes vital details influencing the insurer's decision to assume the risk and determine policy terms.( Para 25)

Proposal forms serve to gather essential information for risk assessment and premium fixation. The duty of utmost good faith requires accurate disclosure, as any misrepresentation renders the policy voidable.( Para 26)

The insurer sought information about previous policies, crucial for assessing the risk. The failure to disclose the earlier cover within a short timeframe justified the insurer's inquiry and repudiation.( Paras 27, 28)

The proposer's claim of ignorance about the form's contents was rejected. The insurer relied on the statements in the proposal form for coverage, and the failure to disclose the earlier policy entitled the insurer to repudiate the claim.( Paras 29, 31)

Facts:

The respondents, plaintiffs in this case, asserted that the appellants approached them for the sale of the suit property and franchisee rights in relation to the running business of an automobile company ('T'). An agreement for the sale was allegedly concluded, with the respondents having paid Rs. 5 crores as part of the consideration. The appellants disputed the validity of the agreement, alleging forgery and fabrication.

Issues:

The alleged fabrication of the agreement, the dispute over the receipt of Rs. 3 crores, and the respondents' claim for specific performance.

Held:

The Court held that the admissions made by the appellants did not amount to categorical and unconditional admissions, especially considering their contention that certain pages of the agreement were tampered with. Mere admission of entering into an arrangement or contract could not be isolated from the appellants' objections regarding the fabrication of specific pages.( Para 33)

Given that the suit was filed in 2006, and the trial had commenced by 2010, the Court found no justification to decree the suit at the current stage. The Court emphasized the presence of serious factual disputes and the appellants' defense, making it inappropriate for a roving inquiry at this juncture.( Para 37)

The Court highlighted the equitable and discretionary nature of the relief sought (specific performance) and the necessity for the plaintiffs to prove readiness and willingness. The lack of an initial averment in the plaint and subsequent amendments raised concerns about the plaintiffs' conduct. A judgment in a referenced case supported the appellants' plea.( Para 38)

Concluding, the Court found the High Court's decision to be in error, decreeing the suit based on an application under Order XII, Rule 6 of CPC. The impugned judgment was set aside.( Para 40)

Facts:

The prosecution alleged that the accused were involved in selling fake foreign currency notes, and the appellant, accused no.4, was implicated based on statements made by co-accused during the investigation.

Issues:

The appellant's plea for discharge, arguing the lack of material evidence against him, primarily relying on the statements of co-accused. The legality of these statements in light of Section 25 of the Evidence Act and Sections 161 and 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was a central issue.

Held:

The Court emphasized that at the stage of framing charges, it must ensure that a case is made out for the accused to stand trial. The absence of material evidence, coupled with the co-accused being absconding, led the Court to conclude that the order framing charges against the appellant should be set aside, and he is entitled to discharge (Para 21, 47, 48, 50).

Section 25 of the Evidence Act renders confessions made to a police officer inadmissible. The Court clarified that even if a statement contains an admission, if made during the investigation to a police officer, it would not be admissible under Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Paras 25, 40, 41, 44, 46).

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order framing charges against the appellant and granting him the right to discharge.

Facts:

The respondent, a public limited company, was allotted a commercial plot by the appellant, Delhi Development Authority (DDA). A perpetual lease deed was executed, and subsequently, a demerger scheme was approved by the Company Judge, transferring assets to another company (respondent no.2). DDA demanded payment for UEI and misuse charges, leading to a legal challenge.

Issues:

Validity of DDA's demand for UEI and misuse charges.

Whether the transfer falls under the stipulations of the Lease Deed.

Applicability of DDA's policy and instructions in the case of a demerger.

Held:

The Company Judge's order clearly stated the transfer of property, assets, rights, and powers to respondent no.2. Compliance with clause 6(a) of the Lease Deed, including obtaining prior written consent and paying UEI, is mandatory for such transfers. The High Court misinterpreted clause 2(d) of DDA's policy in declaring it inapplicable to a demerger case.

The central clause is 6(a) of the Lease Deed, emphasizing the necessity of complying with the lessor's terms. Commonality of directors/shareholders does not exempt the transferor from UEI obligations. Clause 2(d) of the policy reinforces the charge of UEI irrespective of commonality in directorship and the name continuity of the parent company.

The order of demerger establishes a case of transfer, and respondents, not falling under specified categories, are liable to pay UEI as per clause 6(a) of the Lease Deed. The High Court erred in setting aside the demand, which was valid as per the Lease Deed.

The transfer of the subject plot from respondent no.1 to respondent no.2 is evident. The involvement of the same set of directors/shareholders in both companies does not absolve respondent no.1 from the obligations outlined in clause 6(a) of the Lease Deed. The Single Judge's decision is reinstated.

Facts:

The Appellant filed a complaint about an unauthorized building used for rubber sheet production. The matter went to Lok Adalat, resulting in an award requiring the respondent to demolish the structure within three months. The Executing Court, based on the appellant's plea, directed the removal of the structure. The respondent contended that the temporary shed was already demolished, and he had permission for a new structure.

Issues:

The interpretation of the Lok Adalat award, the validity of the respondent's new structure, and the appellant's concerns about potential pollution from rubber sheet-making machinery.

Held:

The High Court held that the Lok Adalat award didn't prevent the respondent from constructing a new structure with due permission. It also rejected the appellant's claim of a permanent prohibition on construction. The High Court granted the appellant the liberty to address pollution concerns through appropriate legal channels.

Decision: The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, emphasizing that the Lok Adalat's scope was limited to removing the existing structure. No prohibition was imposed on legitimate activities, and any violations could be addressed through relevant authorities.

Facts:

The appellant's predecessor, Shri Bona Menezes, applied for occupancy rights over various parcels of land.

Landlord raised objections, specifically in relation to Survey No. 119/2A1, claiming it as 'Punja' land not leased to the applicant.

Issues:

Whether the land in Survey No. 119/2A1 qualifies as agricultural land under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961?

Whether the Land Tribunal's findings regarding possession and usage of the land were justified?

Held:

The High Court, on appeal, set aside the Land Tribunal's order, emphasizing that Punja land, if not brought under cultivation, cannot be classified as agricultural. The court also questioned the establishment of lawful tenancy and landlord-tenant relationship based on mere possession.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order. It remanded the case for reconsideration, noting that the High Court seemed to have overlooked relevant aspects and legal definitions. The Court directed the High Court to decide the writ petition afresh, emphasizing the broad definition of "land" under Section 2(18) of the Act of 1961.

Facts: The appellant, Globe Ground India Employees Union, raised an industrial dispute over the closure of their establishment and retrenchment by M/s Globe Ground India. The issue was referred to the Industrial Tribunal by the Central Government. The appellant claimed that the new company formed after closure, Bird Worldwide Flight Services Ltd., utilized the same equipment and retained most employees, alleging violation of labor laws.

Issues:

Whether the closure and retrenchment actions by M/s Globe Ground India were legal under the Industrial Disputes Act. The appellant sought reinstatement and benefits for the retrenched workers.

Held:

The court examined the corporate structure, noting that the first respondent, Lufthansa German Airlines, had a subsidiary (Globe Ground Deutschland GmbH) holding shares in the second respondent (Globe Ground India Pvt. Ltd.). The appellant argued the first respondent's involvement based on corporate relationships.

Decision: The court held that, considering the limited scope of adjudication under Section 10(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the first respondent was neither a necessary nor a proper party in answering the reference. The closure and retrenchment actions were found to be within legal bounds. The appeals were dismissed.

Facts:

The respondents allege that their father mortgaged the property for Rs. 2500 through a Deed (Ex.P-73) with a condition to repurchase within five years. The appellants argue that the transaction was a sale with a condition to repurchase. The trial court dismissed the suit, stating the debtor-creditor relationship wasn't established. The first Appellate Court reversed this decision, affirming that Ex.P-73 was a mortgage by conditional sale.

Issues:

Whether the document (Ex.P-73) should be classified as a "mortgage by conditional sale" or a "sale with a condition to repurchase."

Held:

By examining Ex.P-73, it's evident that the father of respondents borrowed Rs. 700 eight days before its execution, and this amount was adjusted from the total consideration of Rs. 2500. The intention of the parties was to terminate the debtor-creditor relationship, creating a vendor-vendee relationship. The document established a conditional sale with an option to repurchase within five years.

The mention of "borrowed a sum of Rs. 700" in the document is incidental. The recitals make it clear that the parties intended to end the debtor-creditor relationship and establish a vendor-vendee relationship. There is no mention of essential mortgage elements like interest rate or foreclosure in Ex.P-73.

The receipt Ex.P-69 cannot be relied upon as corroborative evidence of part payment. The burden of proving its genuineness was not discharged by the plaintiffs, and it cannot establish that Ex.P-73 is a "mortgage by conditional sale."

Despite the transaction and repurchase condition being in one document, Ex.P-73 does not fall within the proviso to Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act. It is a sale with a condition to repurchase, and the respondents lost their right to repurchase due to non-payment within the stipulated period.

The appeals are allowed.

Facts:

The Cantonment Board, Meerut, and others issued notices under Section 185 of the Cantonments Act, 1924, alleging unauthorized constructions by the respondents. The respondents filed writ petitions challenging these notices in the High Court.

Issues:

The authority of the appellants, and the validity of the notices. It also examined the failure to consider objections, the absence of reasons, and the stereo-typed orders by the appellate authority.

Held:

The High Court rejected jurisdictional challenges and the plea of not taking action within 12 months. However, it found procedural irregularities and lack of consideration for objections. The High Court quashed the notices but left it open for the appellants to initiate fresh proceedings.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed. The liberty granted by the High Court to initiate fresh proceedings was maintained. The appellants were directed to take fresh action in accordance with the Cantonment Act, 2006. The fresh show cause notice was to be in continuation of the earlier one, with a copy of the Inspection Report provided to the respondents.(Para 12)