Accused Cannot Be Punished For Both Simple & Grievous Hurt For Same Act: Himachal Pradesh High Court

"Section 326 is an aggravated form of Section 324 of the IPC because a grievous hurt by a sharp-edged weapon is required under Section 326... the accused could not have been sentenced of the lesser offence when he was convicted of the commission of the graver offence in view of Section 71 of the IPC," High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in a significant judgment, has ruled that an accused cannot be simultaneously punished for both simple hurt (Section 324 IPC) and grievous hurt (Section 326 IPC) when both offences arise from the same act of inflicting injury with a dangerous weapon.

A Single Bench of Justice Rakesh Kainthla observed that since Section 326 is an aggravated form of Section 324, sentencing an individual for both violates the mandate of Section 71 of the IPC.

The case reached the High Court through a criminal revision petition filed by one Negi Ram, who was convicted for attacking a woman with a sickle in 2009. While the High Court upheld the conviction for the graver offence of causing grievous hurt, it set aside the separate sentence imposed for simple hurt, noting that the trial court and the appellate court had erred in maintaining concurrent punishments for overlapping offences.

The petitioner, Negi Ram, was accused of attacking Shiv Dei (PW3) with a sickle while she was working in a threshing floor on October 21, 2009. The prosecution alleged that the accused inflicted multiple injuries on the victim's chest, arm, and back without any provocation. The Judicial Magistrate First Class, Rohru, convicted the accused under Sections 324 and 326 of the IPC, sentencing him to six months of simple imprisonment for each count. This conviction was subsequently upheld by the Additional Sessions Judge-2, Shimla, leading to the present revision.

The primary questions before the court were whether the concurrent conviction and sentencing under both Sections 324 and 326 IPC for the same act was legally sustainable under Section 71 IPC. The court was also called upon to determine if the testimonies of related witnesses could be discarded as "interested" and whether the non-recovery of certain items or non-showing of the weapon to the medical officer vitiated the prosecution’s case.

Scope Of Revisional Jurisdiction Is Narrow

The Court began by outlining the limitations of its revisional powers under Section 397 of the CrPC. Citing the Supreme Court’s ruling in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, the bench emphasized that a revisional court is not an appellate court and cannot re-appreciate evidence unless there is a patent defect, error of jurisdiction, or perversity in the lower court's findings.

The bench noted that when two courts have arrived at concurrent findings of conviction after detailed appreciation of material, the High Court’s scope of interference is extremely narrow. It held that the revisional jurisdiction is supervisory in nature, intended only to correct a miscarriage of justice or set right a well-founded error of law.

"Related" Witness Is Not Equivalent To "Interested" Witness

Addressing the petitioner’s argument that the eyewitnesses were the victim’s relatives and thus "interested," the Court clarified the long-standing legal distinction between the two terms. Justice Kainthla referred to Laltu Ghosh v. State of W.B. and Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, observing that a relative is a "natural witness" whose presence at the scene is expected and whose testimony cannot be discarded merely due to familial ties.

The Court held that an "interested" witness is one who derives some benefit from the result of the litigation or has a motive to falsely implicate the accused. In criminal cases, the bench observed, it is often the case that the offence is witnessed by close relatives, and they would normally be the last persons to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person.

"The law nowhere states that the evidence of the interested witness should be discarded altogether. The law only warrants that their evidence should be scrutinised with care and caution."

Evidentiary Value Of Injured Witness Testimony

The Court placed significant weight on the testimony of the victim, Shiv Dei, noting that her presence at the spot was established beyond doubt by the injuries she sustained. Relying on Neeraj Sharma v. State of Chhattisgarh, the bench held that the testimony of an injured witness is entitled to great weight and must be accepted as correct unless there are compelling circumstances to doubt it.

The bench observed that an injured witness would not normally allow the real culprits to escape while falsely implicating someone else. The court found the victim's version to be consistent, reliable, and duly corroborated by medical evidence, which recorded incised wounds caused by a sharp-edged weapon.

Enmity Is A Double-Edged Weapon

Regarding the defense’s plea that the case was a result of prior enmity, the Court remarked that enmity is a "double-edged weapon." While it may provide a motive for false implication, it equally furnishes a motive for the commission of the crime. In this instance, the Court found that the medical and oral evidence suggested that enmity acted as the catalyst for the assault rather than a reason for a fabricated charge.

Non-Showing Of Weapon To Doctor Is Inconsequential

The petitioner argued that the sickle was not shown to the Medical Officer (PW8) for an opinion, which allegedly made the case suspect. The Court rejected this, citing Sudha Renukaiah v. State of A.P., holding that the prosecution's case cannot be doubted merely because the weapon was not shown to the doctor, provided the injuries are consistent with the type of weapon described by eyewitnesses.

Double Punishment Prohibited Under Section 71 IPC

The most critical legal finding involved the interpretation of Section 71 of the IPC. The Court noted that Section 326 (grievous hurt by dangerous weapon) is an aggravated form of Section 324 (simple hurt by dangerous weapon). The bench held that when an accused is convicted for a graver offence, they cannot be separately sentenced for a lesser offence that is essentially a component of the graver one.

"Section 326 is an aggravated form of Section 324 of the IPC... the accused could not have been sentenced of the lesser offence when he was convicted of the commission of the graver offence in view of Section 71 of the IPC."

The Court concluded that the sentence of six months imposed for the commission of the offence under Section 324 IPC was liable to be set aside, while the six-month sentence for the graver offence under Section 326 IPC was appropriate and required no interference.

The High Court partly allowed the revision petition. While maintaining the conviction and the six-month sentence under Section 326 IPC, it set aside the sentence imposed under Section 324 IPC. The Court upheld the rest of the findings regarding the credibility of the witnesses and the nature of the assault, confirming that the petitioner must serve the remaining sentence for the grievous hurt caused.

Date of Decision: 01 July 2026