Facts:

The case involved the execution of a share purchase agreement in 2009 between MCX, MCX–E, and a Financial Services Company. Subsequently, a 'Letter of Undertaking' was issued, leading to a dispute. A suit for specific performance was filed, and an injunction order was passed. In 2016, a winding-up petition was filed against LF under Section 433(e) of the Companies Act, 1956, which was later transferred to the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT).

Issues:

The application of the Limitation Act to winding-up petitions, the trigger point for limitation, and the relevance of commercial insolvency in such proceedings.

Held:

The court emphasized that a suit for recovery cannot impact the remedy of a winding-up proceeding. Time begins to run, and limitation can only be extended as provided in the Limitation Act. The Financial Services Company filed a suit in 2013 but filed the winding-up petition in 2016, making it time-barred due to the lapse of the three-year period.

The court clarified that the trigger point for limitation in a winding-up petition is the date of default in payment of the debt. Commercial solvency is considered at a later stage in the proceedings. The cause of action for limitation does not include commercial insolvency.

The court referred to Softsule (P) Ltd., Re, stating that a winding-up petition is not a legitimate means for enforcing a bona fide disputed debt. The ultimatum triggering the cause of action arose in January 2013, and the statutory notice in November 2015 did not mention commercial insolvency. The company's substratum disappearance or commercial insolvency was not pleaded.

The winding-up petition, filed in 2016, was beyond the three-year limitation period mentioned in Article 137 of the Limitation Act. As a result, it was deemed time-barred, and the judgments of the NCLT and NCLAT were set aside.

Facts:

Appellants were tenants of a shop in Delhi.

Respondents filed an eviction petition in November 2007, citing various grounds, including non-payment of rent.

Rent Controller, in an order dated 21st April 2008, directed appellants to pay arrears and future rent.

Respondents filed an application under Section 15(7) in April 2009, seeking to strike out the defense for non-compliance.

Appellants argued that they had paid arrears and additional rent, exceeding the required amount.

Issues:

Whether the Rent Controller's power under Section 15(7) is discretionary.

Whether the tenants were guilty of contumacious conduct in withholding rent.

Whether the striking out of the defense was justified.

Held:

The Court held that the power vested in the Rent Controller under Section 15(7) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, is discretionary and not mandatory. It emphasized that this discretion must be exercised judiciously, taking into account the facts and circumstances of each case. The Court found that the tenants had paid the arrears and additional rent, and any alleged default was not deliberate or contumacious.

The Court set aside the decision of the Rent Controller and the High Court, allowing the tenants to contest the eviction application. It directed the Rent Controller to proceed with the pending eviction application expeditiously, ensuring a decision within a specified timeframe, not exceeding one year.

Facts:

The case involved Nevada Properties Private Limited through its director versus the State of Maharashtra and another. The dispute centered around the interpretation of Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, specifically regarding the power of a police officer to seize immovable property.

Issues:

Whether the power conferred under Section 102 includes the authority to attach, seize, and seal immovable property.

The interpretation of the term 'any property' in Section 102.

The relationship between Section 102 and other relevant sections such as 451, 452, and 456.

Held:

The court held that the power under Section 102 does not extend to attaching, seizing, and sealing immovable property. Immovable property cannot be seized in its strict sense, and the language of Section 102 does not support the police officer's authority to dispossess a person of immovable property.

The expression 'any property' in Section 102 was interpreted, clarifying that it does not include immovable property. The court emphasized that Section 102 envisages the seizure of property, which, in the case of immovable property, would require dispossession, a power not expressly or impliedly conferred by the legislature.

The court explained that Sections 451, 452, and 456, dealing with the disposal of property, do not directly define the scope of Section 102. These sections provide specific and clear powers to the criminal court, and their parameters are distinct from Section 102.

The judgment highlighted the importance of applying the inversion test to ascertain the ratio decidendi of a case. It clarified that the decision in the Tapas D. Neogy case did not address the specific issue of whether immovable property falls under the expression 'any property' in Section 102.

The court reiterated that Section 102 is not a general provision enabling the police officer to seize immovable property for production in a criminal court during trial. Disputes related to immovable property must be adjudicated in civil courts.

Facts:

The respondent and family members applied for permission to convert agricultural land on 08.03.2013.

Amendments to the Goa, Daman & Diu Land Revenue Code were made on 22.05.2013, revising and increasing conversion rates.

Permission for conversion was granted on 19.11.2013.

The respondent later filed a writ petition seeking a refund of excess conversion charges, arguing for rates based on the application date.

Issues:

Whether conversion charges should be calculated based on rates at the time of application or the date when the conversion order was issued.

Held:

In the present case, the relevant date for fixing conversion charges is determined to be the date on which the decision to grant Sanad (permission) was made, which is 19.09.2013. The Court emphasized the importance of Section 32 of the Goa, Daman & Diu Land Revenue Code and stated that the respondent, by not filing an appeal within stipulated timelines, contributed to the delay. The Court held that the respondent's waiver of rights through an affidavit-cum-indemnity bond, along with their actions and conduct, precludes them from challenging the levy of conversion charges. The appeal was allowed, the High Court's judgment set aside, and the writ petition dismissed.

Facts:

The property in question was purchased by the grandfather of the appellants.

Through a Will, the grandfather bequeathed the property to the Donor (father of the appellants).

The appellants claimed that a family partition occurred in 1964 between the Donor and his two brothers.

Issues:

Whether the property is ancestral or self-acquired in the hands of the Donor.

Validity of the gift deed executed by the Donor in favor of the defendant-donee.

Held:

The appellants failed to prove that the property was ancestral, and the burden of proof rested on them. The grandfather purchased the property, making it self-acquired, and the Will did not indicate an intention to convey it as ancestral. (Para 10, 11, 21, and 24)

The appellants referred to a Will dated December 3, 2001, but failed to frame an issue or produce attesting witnesses, rendering the Will unproved. (Para 28)

While the Trial Court affirmed the property as ancestral, it did not address the issue of forgery related to the gift deed. The High Court, therefore, appropriately considered the evidence and ruled on Issue No.1 based on the evidence presented. (Paras 30, 31)

Order VI, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure mandates stating particulars in pleadings for allegations like misrepresentation and fraud. The appellants alleged forgery but failed to prove it, and no specific denial of the execution of the gift deed was made. (Paras 36, 38)

The case resembles Kannan Nambiar, and in the absence of evidence or specific denial of the execution of the gift deed, the Donee was not obligated to examine attesting witnesses. The Donee's care for the Donor was considered, and the appellants' failure to fulfill familial responsibilities was noted. (Paras 41, 42)

Facts:

Appellant, a financial institution, advanced a loan to respondent No.1, secured by a mortgage with deposit of title deeds and a demand promissory note.

Dispute referred to arbitration, and an arbitral award was passed in favor of the appellant.

Respondent No.1 filed an application under Section 34 of the Act to set aside the award.

Respondent Nos.1 and 2 sought permission to adduce evidence, which was denied by the District Judge.

Issues:

Whether the parties can adduce evidence in an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, to prove the specified grounds.

Whether the High Court erred in directing the District Judge to permit respondent Nos.1 and 2 to file affidavits and cross-examine witnesses.

Held:

The proceedings under Section 34 are summary in nature, and the scope is limited to specific grounds mentioned in Section 34(2).

Introduction of sub-sections (5) and (6) to Section 34 emphasizes expeditious disposal within one year and discourages delay.

The High Court erred in not considering the lack of grounds for respondent Nos.1 and 2 to adduce evidence.

The judgment clarifies that Section 34 applications ordinarily require evidence based on the record before the arbitrator.

Cross-examination should be allowed only if absolutely necessary.

The High Court's directions amounted to retrial on the merits decided by the arbitrator.

The order of the District Judge, dismissing the application, is affirmed, and the High Court's judgment is set aside.

Facts:

The case involved conflicting views among different High Courts on the competence of Chief Judicial Magistrates (CJMs) under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act. The High Courts of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttarakhand held that only Chief Metropolitan Magistrates (CMMs) in metropolitan areas and District Magistrates (DMs) in non-metropolitan areas were competent. Conversely, the High Courts of Kerala, Karnataka, Allahabad, and Andhra Pradesh took a contrary view, allowing CJMs in non-metropolitan areas to exercise powers under Section 14.

Issues:

The competency of CJMs to process secured creditor requests under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, given the conflicting interpretations by various High Courts.

Held:

The powers and functions of CMMs and CJMs are equivalent and similar, and the terms are interchangeable. Section 14 does not explicitly exclude CJMs from dealing with secured creditor requests. The nature of the power under Section 14 is non-judicial or the State's coercive power. Therefore, CJMs are competent to handle applications under Section 14.

The provisions of Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act do not override the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 37 of the SARFAESI Act indicates that its provisions are in addition to any other law for the time being in force. Thus, the SARFAESI Act is supplementary to, and not in derogation of, the Code.

Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act is a remedial measure, allowing the authorized officer to exercise administrative or executive functions to assist secured creditors in enforcing security interest. The authorized officer is not expected to adjudicate contentious issues but to verify compliance and facilitate the takeover of secured assets.

Applying the principle from Janardhan vs. State of Maharashtra, the substitution of functionaries (CMM as CJM) for administrative and executive functions is permissible and aligns with the legislative intent of Section 14.

Decision: The Court upheld the view that CJMs are equally competent to deal with applications moved by secured creditors under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act. The decisions of the High Courts of Kerala, Karnataka, Allahabad, and Andhra Pradesh were approved, and the decisions of the High Courts of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttarakhand were reversed. All these appeals are disposed of.

Facts:

Dharmbir Singh, an Army personnel, met with an accident during a two-day casual leave in 1999.

A Court of Inquiry (COI) was conducted to investigate the circumstances of the injury.

He was discharged in 1999 based on a Medical Board's report citing a 30% disability.

The claim for disability pension was rejected by the Medical Board.

Issues:

Whether the injury sustained during casual leave is attributable to military service.

The contradictory findings between the COI and the Medical Board.

The interpretation of relevant rules and regulations governing disability pension eligibility.

Held:

The court emphasized that Armed Forces personnel on casual leave or annual leave is deemed to be on duty as per Leave Rules. The 1982 Rules provide an expansive definition of 'duty,' including periods when returning from leave. The key criterion is a causal connection between the accident and military duties.( Para 11-14)

Regulation 423 of the Medical Regulations necessitates a causal connection between the injury and military service. Rule 12(f) of 1982 Rules, regarding injuries off-duty, presents a contradiction. The Medical Board's opinion is final in determining attributability at the initial claim stage.( Para 15-18)

Causal connection between the accident and military duties is crucial. The injury or death must be connected with military service, however remote. The court emphasized the distinction between an accident attributable to military service and a risk common to human existence.( Para 19-20)

The COI's purpose is to examine conduct, not the final determination of causation. The Brigade Commander's opinion lacks material support when compared to the Commanding Officer's findings. The court set aside the Tribunal's decision, dismissing the respondent's application for disability pension.( Para 22, 23, and 37)

Facts:

The appellant, Narain Singh, was enrolled in the Indian Army as a Driver on 15.10.1980.

Promoted to ALD and granted the rank of Lance Dafedar.

Suffered four red ink entries between 7.6.1993 and 3.5.1994.

Discharged from service under Rule 13(3)(III)(v) of the Army Rules solely based on the four red ink entries.

Challenged the order of discharge before the Armed Forces Tribunal.

Issues:

Whether the nature of the offenses leading to red ink entries justifies the discharge from service.

Whether the discharge was mechanically and solely based on the red ink entries.

Whether the relevant factors, including long service, were considered before the discharge.

Held:

The court held that the discharge based on four red ink entries, considering the nature of the offenses and the appellant's long service, was unjustified.

The court emphasized that the authority must consider all relevant factors before discharging an individual from service, as stated in Veerendra Kumar Dubey vs. Chief of Army Staff and Others (2016) 2 SCC 627.

The Commanding Officer failed to consider the appellant's long service, the nature of the offenses, and other relevant aspects while passing the order of discharge.

The order of discharge was set aside, and the appellant was entitled to all consequential benefits, including pension.

The court directed the release of monetary benefits expeditiously, not later than four months from the date of the order.