POCSO Courts Cannot Bypass Accused's Right To Seek Discharge In The Name Of Expeditious Trial; Right To Hearing Is Substantive Safeguard: Andhra Pradesh HC

"The requirement of a meaningful hearing at the stage of discharge or framing of charge cannot be reduced to a mere ritualistic formality; it necessarily presupposes that the accused and his counsel are afforded sufficient opportunity to acquaint themselves with the materials on record before the Court proceeds to determine whether a prima facie case exists." High Court of Andhra Pradesh, in a significant ruling, has held that Special Courts established under the POCSO Act must balance the mandate for an expeditious trial with the accused’s substantive right to seek discharge under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS).

A single bench of Dr. Justice Y. Lakshmana Rao observed that the procedural safeguards provided under Section 250 of the BNSS are not mere formalities but are indispensable facets of the right to a fair trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

The petitioners, arraigned as Accused Nos. 2 and 3 in a POCSO case, moved the High Court challenging an order of the Special Court for Speedy Trial of Offences under the POCSO Act, Prakasam. The trial court had framed charges against them for offences under the POCSO Act and the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) within 17 days of their first appearance. The petitioners contended that they were deprived of their statutory right to file a discharge application within the 60-day period prescribed under the new criminal code.

The primary question before the court was whether the 30-day timeline for recording child victim evidence under Section 35 of the POCSO Act overrides the 60-day window for filing a discharge application under Section 250 of the BNSS. The court was also called upon to determine the starting point for calculating this 60-day period in cases where Special Courts take direct cognizance of offences without committal proceedings.

Right To Seek Discharge Is A Valuable Procedural Safeguard

The High Court observed that Section 250 of the BNSS confers a valuable procedural safeguard upon an accused before the commencement of a trial. The bench noted that the legislature consciously provided an opportunity for the accused to seek discharge before charges are framed. The court emphasized that these provisions are intended to prevent an accused from being subjected to an unwarranted trial based on groundless or frivolous accusations.

The bench further noted that the powers conferred under Sections 250 and 251 of the BNSS, which correspond to Sections 227 and 228 of the erstwhile CrPC, are substantive judicial safeguards. It held that the trial court is duty-bound to independently evaluate the record to decide whether sufficient grounds exist to proceed against the accused, rather than acting as a mere conduit for the prosecution.

"The underlying object of these provisions is to safeguard the accused's valuable right to seek discharge before being subjected to trial, thereby reinforcing the guarantee of a fair trial embodied in Article 21 of the Constitution."

Harmonious Construction Between POCSO Act And BNSS Mandates

While addressing the apparent inconsistency between the timelines in the POCSO Act and the BNSS, the court applied the doctrine of harmonious construction. It noted that Section 35(1) of the POCSO Act directs the recording of child victim evidence within 30 days of cognizance, whereas Section 250 of the BNSS provides a 60-day window for discharge applications. The court ruled that these provisions must be read together to preserve the accused's rights without undermining the objective of speedy disposal.

The bench clarified that since the POCSO Act is a special enactment, its provisions prevail in case of an irreconcilable conflict. However, it held that the two statutes are capable of operating simultaneously. The court observed that the stage of recording evidence arises only after charges are framed, and therefore, the court must first follow the statutory procedure governing the consideration of discharge.

Calculating The 60-Day Period In Cases Of Direct Cognizance

A significant legal point addressed by the court was the "interpretative difficulty" regarding the starting point of the 60-day limitation for discharge applications in Special Courts. Under Section 250(1) of the BNSS, the period is reckoned from the "date of committal." However, Section 33 of the POCSO Act empowers Special Courts to take direct cognizance without the necessity of a committal order from a Magistrate.

To bridge this legislative gap, the High Court adopted a purposive interpretation. It ruled that in prosecutions before Special Courts taking direct cognizance, the 60-day period for filing a discharge application should be reckoned from the date on which the accused first appears before the Court after cognizance is taken. This ensures that the statutory right to seek discharge remains a reality and not an illusory promise.

"In the context of trials before a Special Court, the expression 'date of committal' should be understood to mean the date on which the accused first appears before the Special Court after cognizance has been taken under Section 33(1) of the POCSO Act."

Meaningful Hearing Is Mandatory Before Framing Charges

The High Court expressed concern that the docket proceedings of the trial court did not disclose whether the petitioners were afforded an effective opportunity of hearing before the charges were framed. The bench held that even if the accused does not file a formal discharge petition, the court must still hear both sides to determine if a prima facie case exists. The requirement of a hearing cannot be reduced to a "ritualistic formality."

The bench further directed that if an accused does not intend to seek discharge, such intention must be expressly recorded through a written memorandum signed by the accused. This ensures procedural certainty and protects the accused from a premature framing of charges. The court noted that in the present case, the trial court had not even inquired whether the petitioners intended to file for discharge.

The High Court set aside the order framing charges, concluding that the procedure adopted by the trial court resulted in a denial of valuable procedural safeguards. While acknowledging the importance of expeditious trials in cases involving grave offences against children, the court held that speed cannot override the fundamental requirements of due process.

The petitioners were granted 15 days to file a discharge application. The trial court was directed to dispose of the application within two weeks after hearing both sides. If the application is dismissed, the court must hear the parties again before framing charges and subsequently fix an expedited trial schedule to comply with the POCSO Act's mandate.

Date of Decision: 06 July 2026