Facts:

Appellants and private respondents applied for the post of Technical Assistant.

U.P. Reservation Act prescribed specific reservation percentages for different categories.

The State Government identified a wrongful calculation in category-wise vacancies and revised the requisition in August 2014.

UPPSC declared results based on the revised requisition, and an O.M. dated October 12, 2014, revised the vacancies for different categories.

Private respondents challenged the O.M. and the result in the High Court.

Issues:

Validity of the revised requisition and O.M.

Absorption of diploma holders.

Challenge to the selection process by private respondents who participated in the interview.

Filling of unfilled horizontal reservation vacancies.

Doctrine of res judicata.

Held:

Revised Requisition and O.M. Validity: The revised requisition and O.M. were valid as they rectified wrongful calculations and complied with the U.P. Reservation Act, 1994. The correction aimed to achieve the reservation quota without prejudicing the General category candidates. (Para 32)

Absorption of Diploma Holders: Diploma holders were wrongly counted against the OBC quota, and rectifying this mistake in the revised requisition was justified. The variation in vacancies against the "General quota" resulted from the absorption of diploma holders against the "General quota." (Paras 37, 38)

Challenge by Private Respondents: Candidates participating in the interview without objection cannot later challenge the modified vacancies; estopped by the principle of estoppel. (Para 50)

Filling of Unfilled Horizontal Reservation Vacancies: Filling unfilled horizontal reservation vacancies by candidates of vertical reservation is in accordance with the government's policy. (Para 56)

Doctrine of Res Judicata: The decision of the Supreme Court is binding on all writ petitioners before the High Court, even if they were not parties in the appeal before the Supreme Court. (Para 63)

Appointment Issues and Article 142: Selected candidates do not have an indefeasible right to be appointed. Power under Article 142 cannot be exercised to direct the State to issue appointment orders to 906 candidates. (Para 76)

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over the interpretation of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, specifically regarding the definition of "commercial site."

The appellant, K.H. Nazar, sought exemption for his quarry under Section 81(1)(q), arguing that a quarry qualifies as a "commercial site."

Conflicting views from earlier judgments of the Kerala High Court on whether quarrying is a commercial operation added complexity to the case.

Issues:

Whether a rocky land used for quarrying purposes can be treated as a "commercial site" under Section 81(1)(q) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act.

The interpretation of the term "commercial site" in the context of the Act and its application to quarries.

Held:

The Court rejects the appellant's contention that quarrying constitutes a manufacturing activity, citing a previous judgment that breaking rocks into pieces does not amount to manufacturing (Paragraph 18).

The majority opinion emphasizes the restrictive meaning of the term "commercial site" in Section 81, stating that a commercial site involves land with a structure used for industrial or commercial purposes (Paragraph 15).

The Court dismisses the dissenting view that sought support from Section 81(1)(k), emphasizing that it deals with a different type of land belonging to an industrial or commercial undertaking (Paragraph 17).

The wider construction of the words "commercial site" would defeat the laudable object of the Act, which aims to restrict concentration of large swathes of land in favor of a few individuals (Paragraph 19).

The Appeals are dismissed, affirming the majority opinion of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court (Paragraph 20).

Facts:

The case involves appellants Sagar Sharma and another against respondents Phoenix ARC Private Limited and another. The impugned judgment erroneously stated that the I&B Code's coming into force on 1st December 2016 triggered the right to apply under Section 7, and the application was not barred by limitation.

Issues:

The misapplication of the limitation period concerning applications under Section 7 of the IBC, particularly in reference to the I&B Code's enforcement date.

Held:

It is clarified that the I&B Code's enforcement on 01.12.2016 is irrelevant to triggering any limitation period for the Code. The court sets aside the impugned judgment and directs a fresh determination, emphasizing that Article 137 of the Limitation Act alone applies to applications under Section 7. The NCLT order dated 29.01.2019 remains stayed until further orders from the NCLAT. Senior Counsel Rakesh Dwivedi expresses intent to raise a plea based on Section 22 of the Limitation Act before the NCLAT.

FACTS:

Source information on June 20, 2006, alerted authorities about a Tavera vehicle carrying contraband material (poppy straw) from Madhya Pradesh to Jodhpur.

A team intercepted the vehicle, driven by the respondent Sahi Ram, and found 223 kgs of poppy straw behind the driver's seat.

Samples were taken, sealed, and the material was subject to forensic examination.

The trial court convicted Sahi Ram for possession and transportation of illegal poppy straw.

ISSUES:

The non-production of the entire contraband material before the court.

The High Court acquitted the respondent based on this non-exhibition of material.

HELD:

The seizure of the material was not in doubt, and the court emphasized that the entire contraband material need not be produced if the seizure is otherwise proved.

The court recognized that the material could be too bulky to present entirely before the court, especially when the bags weighed 223 kgs.

The key requirement was proving the integrity of samples taken for forensic examination, ensuring seals were intact.

The High Court's decision to discard the evidence due to non-exhibition of the entire material was deemed unsustainable.

The appeal was allowed, the High Court's decision was set aside, and the order of conviction by the trial court was restored.

A minimum sentence of 10 years' imprisonment was imposed under Section 8 read with 15 of the NDPS Act.

Facts:

The case involves a family dispute, leading to a violent incident during a Panchayat. Accused No. 1 (Guru @ Gurubaran) was convicted of causing fatal injuries to the deceased with a sickle, while Accused No. 2 (Durai @ Durairajan) was alleged to have caused non-lethal injuries with an iron pipe. Armed confrontation occurred during the Panchayat, and the victims suffered injuries from various weapons.

Issues:

Whether the accused can claim the benefit of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC (culpable homicide not amounting to murder) based on the sudden quarrel and heat of passion.

Assessment of the applicability of Section 34 or Section 149 IPC, determining individual liability for injuries.

Held:

The court held that Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC was not applicable since the accused came armed, indicating a lack of intention for a peaceful resolution. The manner of the attack, using weapons, did not support the claim of a sudden quarrel in the heat of passion.

Accused No. 1's conviction under Section 302 IPC was upheld, given the dangerous nature of the act resulting in the victim's death. The sentence of imprisonment for life was maintained.

Accused No. 2's conviction was altered from Section 302 IPC to Section 324 IPC, considering the non-lethal nature of the injuries caused by the iron pipe. The sentence was reduced to the period already undergone, approximately 11 years.

Accused Nos. 3, 5, and 9 were found guilty of the offenses attributed to them, and their convictions under relevant sections were upheld.

Facts:

IndusInd Media and Communications Ltd. (Appellant) imported goods and declared them as multiplex or satellite receivers, test and measurement equipment.

Show Cause Notice was issued on the suspicion of mis-declaration of value and classification.

Investigation revealed that the imported goods constituted a 'Head End' for cable TV operations.

The Department contended that apart from the supply of equipment, necessary software was embedded in the equipment before the supply was effected.

Out of 19 items in the Bill of Entry, only 8 items were physically presented; the rest were already embedded in the main unit.

Issues:

Classification of the imported goods - Whether under heading 8543 as ordered by the adjudicating authority or under heading 8525 as claimed by the appellant.

Valuation - Whether the value of software already embedded in the equipment and service charges should be included in the assessable value.

Held:

The Tribunal found that the goods, though ordered separately, were intended to contribute together to perform a common clearly defined function ('Head End' for cable TV operations), classifying them under heading 8525. The embedded software and services were rightly included in the valuation. The Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, dismissing the appeal.

Facts:

Appellant's father, brother of the original tenant, was inducted as a tenant on the respondent's land due to the ill health of the original tenant.

The original tenant executed a will bequeathing his properties, including land rights, to the appellant's father.

Legal disputes arose, including objections by the original tenant's wife and subsequent litigation.

A suit filed by the appellant's father for possessory title and injunction was decreed in his favor and attained finality.

Issues:

Validity of the will executed by the original tenant in favor of the appellant's father.

Rejection of an application under Section 48-A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, for the grant of occupancy rights.

Held:

The High Court erred in holding that the will is hit by statutory prohibition. The applicable statutory provisions are under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, since the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, was not in force when the will was executed. The provisions in the Acts are similar, and the High Court's decision cannot be sustained.

In the scheme of the Acts, heritable rights exist for a tenant with certain restrictions. The findings of a civil suit, which conclusively determined the heirship and validity of the will, were not given due consideration by the High Court. The wife of the tenant was found not to be the heir, and the will is valid.

The Land Tribunal's rejection of the claim was cursory and failed to appreciate contextual statements made by the appellant. The appellate authority's dismissal and refusal to restore the appeal were hyper-technical. The High Court erred in rejecting the claim based on irrelevant considerations and without proper examination of the civil suit findings.

The impugned judgments and orders are set aside. The application for the grant of occupancy rights is allowed, and the Land Tribunal is directed to pass necessary formal orders in favor of the appellants.

Facts:

The first respondent, an LIC employee, opted for Plot No.2 in a Cooperative Housing Society for employees. Despite her alleged seniority, the plot was unlawfully allotted to the appellant. An interim order was issued, but the society executed a sale deed in favor of the appellant.

Issues:

The disputant's status as a member/deemed member of the society and entitlement to Plot No.2.

Held:

The disputant, being an LIC employee who deposited Rs.4,750, was conclusively a depositor of the society. Her attendance at the meeting on December 18, 1988, was in her own right, as her husband did not claim depositor status or entitlement to an additional plot.

The appellant neither contributed to the society nor attended the crucial meeting. The disputant's claim to Plot No.2, exercised on December 18, 1988, had no competing claims. Her contribution, along with other depositors, facilitated the society's land purchase, unlike the appellant.

The appellant did not pay any amount towards the society's shares or admission fee before December 18, 1988. The resolution passed in 1984 did not restrict depositor choices for Plots 1 and 2. The disputant's superior claim is highlighted by her timely application and fee payment.

The High Court's conclusions, deeming the appellant's allotment illegal, and quashing the society's resolution and sale deed, were justified. The disputant's entitlement, membership, and plot selection as of December 18, 1988, must guide future allotments.

Facts:

Pramod Kumar Sahoo was appointed as a Primary School Teacher under the Rehabilitation Assistance Scheme in 1988.

Dispute arose regarding the appropriate pay scale for Sahoo, who had an intermediate qualification when appointed.

The Orissa Revised Scales of Pay (Amendment) Rules, 1990, introduced separate pay scales for Trained Matric Teachers and non-Trained Matric Teachers.

Counsel for the appellant conceded before the Tribunal that teachers with intermediate qualifications are entitled to the pay scale available to Trained Matric Teachers.

Issues:

Validity of the concession made by the counsel.

Correct classification based on educational qualifications for determining pay scales.

Held:

The concession given by the learned State Counsel before the Tribunal was a concession in law and contrary to the statutory rules. Such concession is not binding on the State for the reason that there cannot be any estoppel against law. The rules provide for a specific Grade of Pay; therefore, the concession given by the learned State Counsel before the Tribunal is not binding on the appellant.( Paragraph 11)

The Trained Matric Teacher is the one who has been trained for the purposes of teaching. In the absence of such training, the respondent cannot be said to be a Trained Matric Teacher entitled to the pay scale meant for such teachers. The classification based upon educational qualification for grant of a higher pay scale to a trained person or a person possessing higher qualification is a valid classification.( Paragraph 12)

Therefore, we find that the order passed by the Tribunal as affirmed by the High Court is not sustainable in law. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The Original Application filed by the respondent is dismissed.( Paragraph 14)