Facts:

The case involves a dispute over a Gift Deed regarding ancestral immovable property, originally filed by the appellant seeking to declare the gift deed void. After disposal of the initial suit through compromise, the appellant filed a fresh suit for possession. The respondents contested, claiming the suit was barred by limitation.

Issues:

The interpretation of the limitation period under the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920 and the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in this context.

Held:

The Court interpreted the provisions of the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920, specifically Art.2(b) of the Schedule, which determines the limitation period for suits relating to ancestral immovable property.

The term "obtained" in Art.2(b) was defined to include the drawing up or preparation of the decree, not merely the passing of judgment.

It was established that the right to sue for possession arose only after certain conditions, such as the death of 'U', were met.

Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, was deemed applicable, allowing exclusion of time spent in execution proceedings.

The Court affirmed the lower courts' rulings, holding that the suit for possession was not barred by limitation.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, and the Court ruled in favor of the original appellant, rejecting the objection regarding the suit being barred by limitation.

Facts:

The appellant was the Municipal Corporation, Ujjain & Anr, while BVG India Limited and others were respondents.

After the pronouncement of the judgment, it was noticed that there was a typographical mistake regarding the dismissal of Civil Appeal No. 3332 of 2018 filed by BVG India Limited.

Issues:

The issue pertained to rectifying a typographical error in the operative portion of the judgment.

The error involved the omission of mentioning the dismissal of Civil Appeal No. 3332 of 2018 filed by BVG India Limited.

Held:

The bench, upon verification and considering the submission by the appellant's counsel, found the typographical error to be justified.

Paragraph 52 of the judgment (operative portion) was corrected to reflect the accurate decision.

As per the corrected paragraph, it was clarified that Civil Appeal Nos. 3330 of 2018 and 3331 of 2018 were allowed, while Civil Appeal No. 3332 of 2018 filed by BVG India Limited stood dismissed.

The clarification was instructed to be noted by the Registry in the main judgment, and necessary corrections were to be made accordingly.

Facts:

The appellant, P. Meenakshisundaram, entered into an agreement to sell a property to the respondent, P. Vijayakumar. However, issues arose during the transaction, including the revelation of encumbrances on the property.

Issues:

Whether the respondent proved continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract from the date of the agreement to the date of the hearing.

Whether the appellant was entitled to recovery of possession of the property.

Held:

The court held that the respondent failed to establish continuous readiness and willingness to perform his obligations under the contract, a requirement for specific performance suits. Additionally, discrepancies were found in the respondent's claims regarding possession of the property and his readiness to perform. Therefore, the respondent's suit for specific performance was dismissed.

The court upheld the appellant's counterclaim for recovery of possession of the property. The appellant was directed to refund the advance amount received from the respondent within three months, without any interest. The respondent was ordered to deliver vacant possession of the property to the appellant within one month. Neither party was awarded mesne profits for the period of wrongful possession by the respondent.

The decree passed by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court was modified accordingly. Each party was ordered to bear their own costs.

Facts:

The deceased was returning after unloading food grains on a tractor-trailer belonging to the respondent No. 2 and being driven by an employee of the respondent No. 2. The claimants filed a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, seeking compensation from the insurance company, the owner of the vehicle, and the driver. The Tribunal awarded compensation to the claimants, which was challenged by the insurance company before the High Court. The High Court set aside the Tribunal's award, absolving the insurance company of liability.

Issues:

Whether the insurance company could be held liable to pay compensation to the claimants.

Whether the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal was justified.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in absolving the insurance company of liability based on a selective reading of evidence. The Court reinstated the findings of the Tribunal, which had thoroughly analyzed the evidence and concluded that the deceased was indeed traveling with his goods at the time of the accident. Therefore, the insurance company was liable to pay the compensation amount awarded to the claimants.

Regarding the quantum of compensation, the Court noted that the claimants had not appealed for enhancement of the compensation amount and had not raised any objections during the proceedings. Therefore, the Court declined to consider this issue in the present appeal.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring the Tribunal's award of compensation to the claimants, with costs.

Facts:

Anilkumar Patel and Pravinchandra Patel, brothers, initiated arbitration proceedings to partition their assets.

An arbitral award was passed on 07.07.1996, which was signed by both parties.

Anilkumar Patel and his family members challenged the award, claiming they were not served with a copy and alleging fraud.

Anilkumar Patel, as head of the family, received the award on behalf of his family members.

Issues:

Whether service of the arbitral award on Anilkumar Patel constituted service on his family members.

Whether the challenge to the award was time-barred.

Held:

The Court held that the limitation period for challenging the arbitral award starts from the date of receipt of the award, and service on Anilkumar Patel amounted to service on all his family members involved in the proceedings. The Court noted various instances where Anilkumar Patel had acknowledged the award and used it in legal proceedings, indicating awareness of the award. Thus, the Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the High Court's decision that the challenge to the award was time-barred.

The Court found no reason to interfere with the High Court's judgment, concluding that service of the award on Anilkumar Patel was in compliance with the law, and the challenge to the award was indeed barred by limitation.

Facts:

B.N. Firos, proprietor of Comtech IT Solutions, challenged a notification declaring certain computer systems as "protected systems" under the Information Technology Act, 2000.

Firos developed software for the "FRIENDS" project initiated by the State of Kerala.

Disputes arose over the ownership of copyright for the software developed for the project.

Issues:

The ownership of copyright in the software developed for the government project.

The validity of the notification under the Information Technology Act, 2000, was also questioned.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that Firos did not have valid copyright ownership in the software developed for the government project.

The court held that Firos, by virtue of his agreement with Microsoft, did not own the copyright, as Microsoft was the first owner under Section 17(a) of the Copyright Act, having paid Firos for the software development.

Additionally, the Memorandum of Understanding stated that intellectual property rights in software developed for government projects vested in the government, further supporting the rejection of Firos's copyright claim.

The court dismissed Firos's appeal, directing each party to bear its own costs.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute arising from the marriage between Muthulakshmi (Accused No. 4) and Murugan. Due to strained relations between the families, the accused attacked Murugan, resulting in his death, and later attacked Poomari, leading to her death as well.

Issues:

The defense argued that the witnesses, who were family members of the deceased, were interested witnesses and their testimonies should not be given undue weight.

Additionally, the defense presented evidence to challenge the presence of one witness at the school during the time of the incident.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that being related to the deceased does not automatically make a witness interested. It emphasized that related witnesses cannot per se be discarded and that their evidence should be evaluated carefully. The court found that the testimonies of the family members provided consistent and credible evidence, which was corroborated by medical evidence (Paragraphs 9-15).

The court also considered the defense evidence but found it unconvincing, noting discrepancies in the attendance records presented. Therefore, the High Court's judgment was upheld, and the appeals were dismissed, thereby confirming the conviction and sentence of the appellants (Paragraphs 16-18).

Facts:

Mackintosh Burn Limited, a public company majority-owned by the Government of West Bengal, refused to register the transfer of 100 shares purchased by Sarkar and Chowdhury Enterprises Private Limited.

The dispute arose when the respondent sought registration of shares, which would increase its holding to 39.77%.

The appellant argued that the respondent was controlled by a competitor and thus refused registration.

Issues:

Whether the Company Law Board's decision to direct registration of shares was justified.

Whether the High Court properly addressed the legal questions raised in the appeal.

Whether the Supreme Court should uphold the decisions of the lower courts or remit the case for fresh consideration.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court and the Company Law Board erred in their interpretations of the law and application of principles. The Court set aside all previous orders and remitted the case to the Company Law Board (now the National Company Law Tribunal) for fresh consideration. The Court directed the Tribunal to decide the appeal without being influenced by previous findings and observations. Additionally, the Tribunal was instructed to expedite the process due to the case's age.

The Supreme Court emphasized that refusal of registration of shares on sufficient cause is a question of law, and the Company Law Board must consider all relevant factors, including potential competition issues. The Court highlighted that the appellant had raised various legal questions beyond the issue of limitation in the appeal, which the High Court failed to adequately address. Therefore, a fresh consideration by the Tribunal was deemed necessary.

This decision was made to ensure fair and impartial judgment in accordance with the Companies Act and relevant regulations.

Facts:

The case involved allegations of corruption against public servants, triggering a legal question regarding the requirement of prior sanction for prosecution under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (P.C. Act), before initiating an investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.).

Issues:

Whether the requirement of prior sanction for prosecution under Section 19(1) of the P.C. Act applies to the initiation of an investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., even before taking cognizance of the offense.

Whether the interplay between the P.C. Act offenses and the provisions of the Cr.P.C. necessitates a different interpretation regarding the initiation of investigations involving public servants.

Held:

The court acknowledged that a Magistrate must apply their mind even at the stage of directing an investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. Acting mechanically is not acceptable.( Para 33)

The court raised the question of whether the requirement of prior sanction under Section 19(1) of the P.C. Act should influence the initiation of an investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., especially considering the different provisions and purposes of the two statutes.( Para 34)

Referring to the case law, the court emphasized the Magistrate's authority to direct the registration of an FIR under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. based on the complaint's disclosure of a cognizable offense.( Para 35)

Given the complexity arising from the interplay between offenses under the P.C. Act and the provisions of the Cr.P.C., the court referred the matter to a larger Bench for resolution.( Para 36)

The court addressed the specific issue of one respondent seeking deletion from the array of parties, emphasizing that mere inclusion in a complaint does not automatically justify inclusion as an accused. The respondent was struck off unless further investigation revealed material warranting their inclusion.( Para 38-47)

It was clarified that if further investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. revealed material warranting the inclusion of the respondent as an accused, the order would not prevent such inclusion.( Para 48)