Facts:

Issac T.M., the appellant, served Idukki District Co-operative Bank in Kerala.

Kerala introduced a self-financing pension scheme for co-operative bank employees in 2005.

The appellant, eligible for pension, faced delays due to disciplinary proceedings.

A communication in 2006 initiated the pension scheme, but a show cause notice in 2007 led to a liability on the appellant.

Pension disbursal was hindered due to disciplinary proceedings, leading to a writ petition.

Issues:

Interpretation of para 5(2) of the Pension Scheme.

Delay in forwarding pension records by the bank.

Appellant's entitlement to pension from 1 February 2007.

Held:

The Court held that para 5(2) of the Pension Scheme was ultra vires based on a previous Kerala High Court judgment. The entitlement to pension from 1 February 2007 was affirmed. The Court directed the second respondent to pay arrears of pension between 1 February 2007 and 1 November 2013 within four weeks. Calculation and intimation of any interest due on delayed contributions were also ordered within four weeks. The first respondent was then required to remit the amount, and the arrears due to the appellant were to be paid within two months. The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs.

Facts:

The State of West Bengal invited tenders for a special repair program on National Highway-II. PAM Developments Private Ltd. (the appellant) won the bid, and an agreement was executed. After completing the work, the appellant raised claims, which went unpaid by the State. The appellant initiated arbitration under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act, resulting in the arbitrator allowing the claims. Subsequently, the State filed an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, and the appellant filed an execution application.

Issues:

Validity of the unconditional stay granted based on Order XXVII, Rule 8A of CPC.

Application of Section 36 of the Arbitration Act concerning the grant of stay of the arbitration award.

Equality of treatment between the government and other parties in arbitration proceedings.

Interpretation of the relationship between the provisions of CPC and the Arbitration Act.

Held:

The court, considering Sub-Section (3) of Section 36 of the Arbitration Act, emphasized that the grant of stay must be subject to conditions as deemed fit. The reference to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in Section 36 is for general guidance, and the phrase "having due regard to" implies a discretionary rather than a mandatory application. [Para 17]

The phrase "having regard to" in Section 36 implies a general guideline, and the provisions of CPC are to be followed as guidance, with the primary application of the Arbitration Act. The court clarified that the CPC should not make the main provisions of the Arbitration Act inapplicable. [Para 18]

Arbitration proceedings aim for quick dispute resolution, and automatic stays on money decrees against the government would defeat the purpose. The Arbitration Act treats all parties equally under Section 18, and there is no special treatment or differential application for the government in Section 36. [Para 24]

The court rejected the argument that Order XXVII, Rule 8A of CPC provides for special treatment for the government. Even if applied, it only exempts the government from furnishing security, and the court retains the power to direct deposit of the awarded amount. [Para 27]

Decision: The court allowed the appeals, declaring that the unconditional stay of the arbitration award was not sustainable. It restored the order of the Executing Court, enabling the appellant-award holder to pray for the release of the attached amount.

FACTS:

The first respondent, a constable in the CRPF, was charged with misconduct for carelessly handling his loaded 9 MM carbine, leading to the accidental firing of eight rounds, causing the death of a co-constable.

Disciplinary proceedings were initiated, and the first respondent was dismissed from service. He was also tried for an offense under Section 304 of the IPC but was acquitted.

The first respondent challenged his dismissal through a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

ISSUES:

Whether the charge of misconduct against the first respondent was duly proved in the disciplinary inquiry.

The impact of the acquittal in the criminal case on the disciplinary proceedings.

HELD:

The disciplinary authority found the charge of misconduct to be sustainable based on the evidence. The High Court erred in reappreciating the evidence during judicial review.

The acquittal in the criminal case did not automatically invalidate the finding of misconduct in the disciplinary proceedings.

The High Court's interference with the dismissal was deemed unsustainable, and the appeal was allowed. The judgment and order of the Single Judge, upholding the dismissal, were maintained.

REFERRED CASES:

Capt M Paul Anthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd, (1999) 3 SCC 679

Final Result : Allowed

Facts:

Respondent, an assistant typist, transferred but remained unauthorizedly absent from the Jaunpur Branch.

Disciplinary proceedings initiated, leading to guilt on the charge of unauthorized absence (14.05.2009).

Respondent superannuated on 20.06.2012, and services terminated on 26.06.2012.

Subsequent legal proceedings, including a writ petition, set aside the termination (29.05.2015).

Another writ petition sought salary from January 2007 to June 2012.

Issues:

Whether setting aside the termination automatically entitled the respondent to back wages.

Clarification on the High Court's direction regarding salary for the period 14.05.2009 to 20.06.2012.

Held:

The judgment (29.05.2015) set aside the termination but lacked an order for back wages or consequential benefits (Para 11).

Writ Petition No. 61102 of 2017 adjudicated the entitlement to salary from 02.02.2007 to 14.05.2009, but no clear decision on the period 14.05.2009 to 20.06.2012 (Para 13).

The Court held that the automatic entitlement to back wages is not correct, especially when the respondent was not dismissed and could have continued working until his retirement (Para 15).

The respondent was not kept away from work by any order; the termination occurred after his retirement (Para 17).

The Court partly allowed the appeal, setting aside the direction for automatic payment of salary after 14.05.2009 till 20.06.2012. The appellant is directed to consider the claim for back wages during that period (Para 23).

Facts:

Respondent carried out exports from 1988 to 1993.

Applied for an REP license, entitled to a premium, which was not paid due to the discontinuation of the scheme.

Appeals and unsuccessful attempts for premium release.

District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum allowed the claim.

Appellants challenged the jurisdiction of consumer fora, arguing that benefits under the Exim policy do not constitute a service.

Issues:

Whether a person claiming under an REP license is a consumer under the Consumer Protection Act.

Whether providing benefits under the Exim policy qualifies as a 'service' under the Act.

Held:

The court, after considering relevant sections of the Consumer Protection Act and the Exim policy for the period in question, held that the government, in formulating the Exim policy and providing incentives, does not perform a service. The person availing of incentives is not considered a consumer under the Act. The court referred to previous decisions, including Vikram Sales Corporation vs. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and Bihar School Examination Board vs. Suresh Prasad Sinha, to support this interpretation.

Facts:

The case originated from an application filed by the father seeking custody of the minor girl-child. The father alleged obstruction of court-granted visiting rights by the mother, leading to subsequent changes in claims and a request for admission to a reputed boarding school.

Issues:

The custody, well-being of the child, the father's financial responsibility for the child's education, and the mother's objections to sending the child to a boarding school.

Held:

The court emphasizes the negative impact of marital discord on a child's upbringing, emphasizing the paramount importance of the child's welfare.( Para 16)

The judgment reiterates that the welfare of the child is of paramount consideration in custody matters. Every child has the right to proper health and education. The court must exercise parens patriae jurisdiction, considering the welfare of the child as paramount.( Paras 18, 19, and 22)

The respondent-father, bearing all expenses for the child in the boarding school, demonstrates a commitment to the child's education. The appellant-mother's opposition to the boarding school is noted. The court emphasizes the need for caution to keep the child away from negative influences.( Paras 13, 14)

The order dated 26.04.2018, directing the child's admission to a residential school at Ooty, has been given effect to. The court sees no justification in interfering with this order at this stage.( Para 15)

The High Court, during the final decision, is directed to consider subsequent materials, including the progress report from the boarding school. The court suggests considering medical issues and obtaining necessary reports. The High Court's previous interactions with the child are highlighted.( Para 22)

Facts:

The Government of Manipur issued an office memorandum in 1999, revising pension percentages based on retirement dates. Those retiring on or after January 1, 1996, were entitled to higher percentages, while pre-1996 retirees received a lower percentage. The All Manipur Pensioners Association challenged this classification.

Issues:

The validity of the classification of pensioners into two groups based on retirement dates, and whether such classification violates constitutional principles of equality and non-discrimination.

Held:

Adoption of Pension Rules: The State of Manipur had adopted the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, making all government servants retiring in accordance with these rules and after completing qualifying service entitled to pension. The court emphasized that all pensioners formed a single homogeneous class.

Discrimination and Valid Classification: The court discussed the principles of valid discrimination and classification under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It held that a valid classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia and must have a rational relationship with the object sought to be achieved.

Financial Constraint: The classification based on retirement date had no valid justification, especially on the grounds of financial constraint. The court found that such a classification had no reasonable nexus to the objective of revising pensions due to an increase in the cost of living.

Violation of Article 14: The court concluded that the classification was unreasonable, arbitrary, and discriminatory, violating the equality clause (Article 14) of the Constitution.

Applicability of D.S. Nakara Case: The court emphasized that the issues in the present case were squarely covered by the Supreme Court's decision in the case of D.S. Nakara. The Division Bench of the High Court had erred in not following this precedent.

Decision and Relief: The court allowed the appeal, quashed the Division Bench's judgment, and restored the judgment and order passed by the Single Judge. All pensioners, regardless of their retirement date, were entitled to revision in pension at par with those who retired post-1996. The government was directed to pay the arrears to the respective pensioners within three months from the date of the judgment.

Facts: The appellants' appeals were rejected by the Appellate Authority under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957, or the 2005 VAT Acts of AP or Telangana. The rejection was based on the appellants' failure to produce proof of payment of admitted tax dues for the relevant assessment year.

Issues: The primary issue revolved around the interpretation of the provisos in Section 19 of the 1957 Act and Section 31 of the AP VAT Act, which imposed conditions related to the limitation period for filing appeals and the requirement to produce proof of tax payment.

Held: 3.1 The first proviso in Section 19 pertains to the limitation period for filing an appeal and the discretion of the Appellate Authority to condone the delay in filing. The second proviso is an independent condition mandating the appellant to produce proof of payment of tax dues, which can be fulfilled until the appeal is considered for the first time.

3.2 The second proviso does not specify a period for tax payment at the time of filing, allowing the appellant to file within the statutory period and deposit the specified tax dues later, but before the appeal is first considered.

3.3 The Appellate Authority has no power to extend the time for depositing specified tax dues. The proviso is not a provision of pre-deposit at the filing stage but requires payment as a prerequisite for considering the appeal on merits or condoning the delay.

3.4 To prevent misuse, the Appellate Authority must consider every appeal for admission or condonation of delay within 30 days from filing, institution, or presentation.

3.5 In cases where the appellant has deposited tax dues before the first consideration, the proviso does not apply as an institutional defect.

3.6 However, if the deposit is made after the rejection of the appeal, it does not fulfill the proviso's requirements, and the appeal stands dismissed.

Decision: The impugned High Court judgment is set aside, and the writ petitions are allowed. The concerned appeals are restored to the Appellate Authority for consideration in accordance with the law.

Facts:

A contract dated 07.02.2006 included an arbitration clause referring disputes to three arbitrators.

The contract specified a fee schedule for arbitrators based on a 2004 policy circular of NHAI.

Disputes arose, and arbitration was invoked by the appellant in 2017.

The respondent referred to a 2017 NHAI circular, seeking a change in arbitrators' fees.

Issues:

Dispute over the applicable fee schedule for arbitrators.

Application under Section 14 to terminate arbitrators' mandate based on alleged disregard of the agreement.

Held:

The fee schedule in the 2017 NHAI circular would operate, and arbitrators were entitled to charge fees accordingly, not as per the Fourth Schedule to the Arbitration Act.

The application to terminate the arbitrators' mandate was disingenuous; arbitrators did not become de jure unable to perform functions for following the law laid down by the Delhi High Court.

The change in language of Section 31(8) and Section 31A dealt with costs, not arbitrators' fees. The Fourth Schedule did not directly govern contracts with a pre-agreed fee structure.