Facts:

Raman Aithan Ashari executed a deed of gift in favor of Chuzhali Bhagavathi Dharmadeva Bhandaram (donee). The appellant contested the acceptance of the gift, and subsequent events included a cancellation deed and a transfer of the property. The respondents filed a suit challenging the validity of these documents.

Issues:

Acceptance of the gift deed and the burden of proof.

Competency of the donor to execute the cancellation deed and transfer.

Applicability of Article 59 of the Limitation Act.

Substantial questions of law under Section 100 of the CPC.

Held:

The High Court rightly observed that the recital of possession in the deed of gift creates a presumption of acceptance, and the burden of proof lies on the party asserting non-acceptance.( Para 20)

The High Court declined to accept the findings of the lower courts regarding non-acceptance of the gift, emphasizing the wrong assumption of law made by those courts.( Para 26)

Article 59 of the Limitation Act was held inapplicable to the deed of gift, as the donor had no authority to revoke it, rendering subsequent documents null and void.( Para 31)

The Second Appeal was rightly allowed by the High Court, setting aside lower court decisions and declaring the suit property to belong to the Bhandaram. The deed of assignment was declared null and void, allowing the respondents to recover possession.( Para 34)

FACTS:

The property, admeasuring 1053.5 square meters, was acquired by the Union of India in 1994.

Multiple attempts were made to sell the property through auctions starting in 1994, but all efforts failed.

The appellant made an offer to purchase the property for Rs.32.11 crores, but it was not accepted by the CBDT.

Subsequent auctions were conducted, and a fresh valuation report was obtained.

The appellant was the highest bidder at Rs.30.21 crores in one auction, but the proceedings were kept in abeyance.

ISSUES:

Validity of the cancellation of the auction without providing a reason.

Applicability of the appellant's offer of Rs.32.11 crores.

Arbitrariness in the auction process.

HELD:

The reason for keeping the auction in abeyance was not found to be arbitrary.Public interest justified seeking the highest possible price for the property.( Paragraph 14)

Valuation reports were submitted at every stage, and there was no reason to doubt the Fair Market Value.( Paragraph 15)

The appellant had opportunities to bid in the fresh auction but chose not to participate.( Paragraph 16)

Dismissal of the appeal.Acceptance of the respondent's counsel's offer to pay Rs.35 crores within 12 weeks, with a deduction equivalent to 9% interest on the amount of Rs.7.78 crores.( Paragraph 20)

REFERRED CASES:

Formerly known as Financial Technologies India Ltd. & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors., (2019) 7 SCALE 50

Michigan Rubber India Ltd. vs. State of Karnataka & Ors., (2012) 8 SCC 216

Mohinder Singh Gill vs. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405

PRP Exports and Ors. vs. Chief Secretary, Government of Tamil Nadu and Ors., (2014) 13 SCC 692

Facts:

The prosecution alleged that Smt. Gargi, along with her brothers, was involved in the murder of her husband. The case rested on circumstantial evidence, highlighting strained family relations and a motive stemming from property disputes. Witnesses PW-7 and PW-8 testified in support of the prosecution's case.

Issues:

The reliability of witness testimonies, the significance of the property dispute, and the prosecution's failure to establish a direct link between the appellant and the crime. The last seen theory, gaps in the timeline, and subsequent conduct were also pivotal issues.

Held:

A combined look at the testimony of PW-7 and PW-8 highlights the significance of the property dispute and the strained family relations. The court observes that the Trial Court and the High Court overlooked crucial factors surrounding the sale of the ancestral house and subsequent financial failures.( Para 24)

The lack of direct and cogent evidence regarding the appellant's involvement in illicit relations or pressuring the deceased to transfer property is emphasized. Doubts about the reliability of statements made by PW-7 and PW-8 are raised. The court questions the validity of treating the alleged statement made to PW-7 as a 'dying declaration.'(Para 25)

The last seen theory is scrutinized, noting discrepancies in the timeline. The court emphasizes the gap between the last sighting and the discovery of the deceased's body, raising doubts about the probability of the appellant being the sole author of the crime.( Para 28)

The subsequent conduct of the appellant is considered, highlighting her attendance at the office and the lack of abnormal behavior during the relevant period. The court rejects unsubstantiated claims regarding the appellant's demeanor.( Para 29)

The acquittal of the appellant's brothers is deemed crucial. The court asserts that the prosecution's case against the appellant is weakened, and doubts surrounding the prosecution story intensify.( Para 31.1)

The court concludes that the prosecution failed to establish the case beyond reasonable doubt. Homicidal nature of death is acknowledged, but strained relations, illicit affairs, and imminent danger to the deceased's life are not conclusively proven.( Para 32)

Facts:

The case involves M/S Tecnimont Pvt. Ltd. (formerly known as Tecnimont ICB Private Limited) versus the State of Punjab and Others. The matter concerns the validity of Section 62(5) of the Punjab Value Added Tax Act, 2005, and the imposition of a 25% pre-deposit condition for hearing the first appeal.

Issues:

The validity of Section 62(5) of the Punjab Value Added Tax Act, 2005, and the reasonableness of the 25% pre-deposit condition.

The power of the first appellate authority to grant relief against the pre-deposit requirement.

Held:

Validity of Section 62(5) and Pre-deposit Condition: The High Court rightly held Section 62(5) to be legal and valid. It determined that the 25% pre-deposit condition is not onerous, harsh, unreasonable, or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Power of Appellate Authority Regarding Pre-deposit: The first appellate authority does not possess inherent powers to grant interim protection against the pre-deposit condition. It cannot waive the pre-deposit condition, as doing so would render the statutory intent nugatory and make the provision unworkable.

Interpretation of Statutory Powers: Implied powers of the appellate authority under a statute cannot be used to override the statutory requirement of pre-deposit. The High Court's view that implied powers allow the authority to grant interim protection is set aside.

Interim Protection/Injunction in Cases of Undue Hardship: While the first appellate authority cannot grant relief against the pre-deposit condition, in genuine cases of hardship, recourse is available to the concerned person. However, it is clarified that the appellate authority itself cannot grant such relief.

Decision: The appeals filed by the assessees are dismissed, and those filed by the State are allowed.

Facts:

The case involves the interpretation of Section 32-F(1)(a) of the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, as amended by Act 49 of 1969. The amendments introduced complications in the application of the provision, particularly concerning tenants' rights to purchase land from landlords who are minors, widows, or persons with mental or physical disabilities.

Issues:

The primary issues revolve around the interpretation of Section 32-F(1)(a), the applicability of the amendments made in 1969, and the potential discriminatory nature of the classification of tenants based on the status of their landlords.

Held:

The court highlights the agrarian reform legislation's scheme, emphasizing that the landlord is divested of title on Tillers' Day, except in specific cases involving minor landlords, widows, or persons with disabilities. The court clarifies that the tenant's right to purchase is postponed only when the landlord applies for possession within the prescribed period.( Para 13)

The court references Section 32-G, indicating the necessity of notifying tenants to determine the purchase price of land. It points out that tenants are aware of their rights and obligations within the statutory framework.( Para 14)

Introduction of Section 32-F in 1956 aimed at agrarian reform. The court underscores that the disability of a landlord in the mentioned categories leads to a one-year postponement in the tenant's right to purchase.( Para 15)

The court acknowledges the potential hardship caused by a literal interpretation of Section 32-F(1)(a) and the subsequent amendment in 1969.( Para 16 and 17)

The court explains the legislative intent behind the 1969 Amendment Act, emphasizing the need for landlords to inform tenants of the landlord attaining majority to enable meaningful exercise of the right to purchase.( Para 18 and 19)

An unintentional oversight in the drafting of the amendment is noted, which led to the exclusion of two other categories of landlords (widow or person with a disability) from the intimation requirement.( Para 20)

The court identifies the absurdity resulting from a literal reading of Section 32-F(1)(a), particularly in cases involving widows, where the tenant lacks knowledge of the landlord's death.( Para 21)

To eliminate discrimination, the court decides to strike down the words "of the fact that he has attained majority," making the provision applicable to tenants of all three categories of landlords.( Para 36)

The court justifies the elimination of discriminatory words to align Section 32-F(1)(a) with Article 14, ensuring equal treatment for tenants of all three categories of landlords.( Para 39, 40, 44)

The court dismisses submissions related to tenant's knowledge of landlord's death or the reverse situation, focusing on the specific facts of the case.( Para 49)

The High Court's judgment is set aside, allowing the tenant's intimation to be considered for determining the purchase price and fulfilling the postponed right to own the land.( Para 50)

Facts:

ITC Limited, a paper manufacturer, initially availed complete exemption from duty on paper cleared from its factory but later realized the mistake. They started paying duty on waste paper and filed a refund claim for the specified period.

Issues:

Validity of the refund claim by ITC Limited.

Interpretation of provisions in Sections 2(2), 17, and 27 of the Customs Act, pre and post-amendment.

Held:

The amended definition in Section 2(2) includes self-assessment as a form of assessment (Para 23).

Assessment procedures were discussed, both before and after the 2011 amendment, emphasizing the inclusion of self-assessment (Para 32).

The provisions of Section 17(1) allow for self-assessment, with verification powers granted to the proper officer (Para 33).

Section 18 deals with provisional assessment of duty (Para 34).

Section 27, both before and after the 2011 amendment, provides for the refund procedure (Para 35).

Various conditions and limitations for claiming a refund under Section 27 were explained (Para 36).

The nature of self-assessment and the limited scope of refund proceedings were clarified (Para 37, 38, 41).

The order of self-assessment is appealable under Section 128, and an appeal can be made by any person, whether the revenue or the assessee (Para 43).

Provisions under Section 27 cannot be invoked without modifying the order of assessment or self-assessment (Para 44).

The court emphasized that refund proceedings do not permit re-assessment and cannot adjudicate on exemption conditions (Para 44).

Decision: The court upheld the Tribunal's decision, stating that a claim for a refund cannot be entertained unless the order of assessment or self-assessment is modified through appropriate proceedings. Applications for a refund in this case were deemed not maintainable (Para 47, 48).

Facts:

The appellants are trustees of Shree Maruti Deo Trust Pimpli Limtek, registered as a public trust.

The respondents claim to be tenants of the land and filed a writ petition challenging the exemption certificate granted to the Trust under Section 88B of the 1948 Act.

The Trust, claiming to own the land for religious worship, was registered under the Public Trusts Act on 8.8.1984.

The respondents became deemed purchasers on Tillers' Day, i.e., 1.4.1957, as per Section 32 of the 1948 Act.

Issues:

Whether the subsequent registration of the Trust under the Public Trusts Act can divest the respondents of their deemed purchaser rights under Section 32 of the 1948 Act?

The validity of Section 32 of the Public Trusts Act.

Held:

The High Court's decision to quash the exemption certificate was affirmed. The registration of the Trust under the Public Trusts Act was deemed prospective, and the respondents' rights as deemed purchasers on Tillers' Day were not affected by the subsequent registration of the Trust. Section 32 of the Public Trusts Act was not questioned.

FACTS:

The respondents filed a suit seeking the framing of a scheme for the proper management of a Gurudwara.

Appellant claimed the Gurudwara as private property, denying public access.

Allegations of mismanagement after the death of the appellant's father, who was the Mohtmim of the Gurudwara.

The Committee proposed the framing of a scheme under Section 92 of the CPC for Gurudwara management.

ISSUES:

Whether the suit under Section 92 is maintainable.

Lack of orders on the application for leave under Section 92.

HELD:

The court emphasizes that leave of the court is a necessary prerequisite for filing a suit under Section 92 of the CPC. It cites legal precedents and notes that, normally, notice should be issued to the other side before granting leave. However, it acknowledges that in emergent situations, the court can grant leave without notice, but the respondent has the right to file an application for revocation of the leave granted.( Paragraph 6)

Despite acknowledging the legal requirement of obtaining leave, the court notes the unusual situation where the appellant did not raise the lack of leave during the trial. Both sides presented evidence, and the appellant submitted to the jurisdiction without objection. The court, considering the peculiar facts, decides to dismiss the appeal.( Paragraph 8)

The court specifies that the decision is based on the unique facts and circumstances of the case and should not be treated as a precedent. The dismissal of the appeal is stated, taking into account both the legal requirement of leave and the appellant's actions during the trial.( Paragraph 10,11)

REFERRED CASES:

R.M. Narayana Chettiar & Another v. L. Lakshmanan Chettiar & Others. (1991) 1 SCC 48

Vidyodaya Trust v. Mohan Prasad R. & Ors. (2008) 4 SCC 11

Facts:

Respondent No.2 declared NPA on 21.07.2011.

State Bank of India filed O.As in Debt Recovery Tribunal in 2012 to recover a debt of 50 Crores.

The debt was assigned to Respondent No.1 on 28.03.2014.

Debt Recovery Tribunal held O.As not maintainable on 10.06.2016.

Special Civil Application filed before Gujarat High Court resulted in remand.

Section 7 application under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code initiated on 03.10.2017 by Respondent No.1.

Issues:

Applicability of limitation periods to the Section 7 application.

Dispute over whether Article 62 or Article 137 of the Limitation Act is applicable.

Interpretation of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code and its interaction with limitation laws.

Held:

After hearing arguments, the Court held that Article 62 was not applicable as it pertains to suits, and the present case involves an application under Section 7, falling within the residuary Article 137. The Court concluded that time began to run from 21.07.2011, making the Section 7 application time-barred. The appeal was allowed, and the judgments of the NCLT and NCLAT were set aside.