Facts:

The High Court concluded that road traffic offenses should be exclusively dealt with under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and prosecuting such cases under the Penal Code lacks legal sanction.

Issues:

The conflict arises over whether road traffic offenses should be prosecuted solely under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, or if the Penal Code, 1860, can also be invoked.

Held:

The Supreme Court clarified that there is no conflict between the Penal Code and the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Both statutes operate in distinct spheres, and their offenses, penal consequences, and ingredients are separate and independent.

The principle that the special law should prevail over the general law does not apply to the prosecution of offenders in road accidents under both the IPC and the MV Act.( Para No. 6)

Motor Vehicles Act lacks specific provisions for offenses causing death, grievous hurt, or hurt by a motor vehicle in motor vehicle accidents, unlike the IPC.( Para No. 7)

Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, allows an offender to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of the enactments when an act constitutes an offense under multiple laws.( Para No. 8)

Legislative intent of the Motor Vehicles Act was not to override or supersede the provisions of the IPC regarding convictions of offenders in motor vehicle accidents.( Para No. 9)

The principle of proportionality between the crime and punishment is highlighted, emphasizing that the punishment under the IPC for motor vehicle offenses is stricter and proportionate.( Para No. 12)

A prosecution, if maintainable, can lie under both the IPC and the MV Act, as both statutes operate independently in their respective spheres.( Para No. 13)

Facts:

The appeal challenged the validity of rules framed by Gujarat University providing for "Institutional Preference" in postgraduate medical courses.

The Gujarat High Court had upheld the vires of the rules related to admission to postgraduate medical courses.

Issues:

Whether the introduction of the NEET Scheme affects the validity of "Institutional Preference/Reservation" for postgraduate medical admissions.

The permissibility of "Institutional Preference" in light of Section 10D of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956.

Held:

The court held that "Institutional Preference" to the extent of 50% is approved and remains valid despite the introduction of the NEET Scheme.

The judgment emphasized that the NEET Scheme does not impact the established "Institutional Preference/Reservation" and that such regulation is not ultra vires to Section 10D of the MCI Act.

Admissions, even with "Institutional Preference," are to be based on merit and marks obtained in the NEET examination results.

The appeal/writ petitions were dismissed, and no costs were awarded.

Facts:

Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. filed a suit before the Commercial Court seeking registration of a mortgage deed related to an immovable property.

The High Court held that the immovable property was not used for trade or commerce, making the suit not maintainable before the Commercial Court.

Issues:

Whether the dispute arising from the agreement qualifies as a commercial dispute under Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of the Commercial Courts Act.

Whether the immovable property was used exclusively in trade or commerce.

Held:

The court examined Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of the Commercial Courts Act, which defines commercial disputes arising from agreements related to immovable property used exclusively in trade or commerce.

The plaintiff's suit sought specific performance of the MoU terms, but neither the agreement nor the plaint indicated exclusive use of the immovable property for trade or commerce.

Emphasized the need for basic pleadings and a purposive interpretation of the Commercial Courts Act to avoid burdening the system with non-commercial disputes.

Stressed the importance of entertaining only disputes that fit the definition of 'commercial disputes' and ensuring a strict procedure for such litigation.

Highlighted that a dispute involving immovable property becomes a commercial dispute only if the property is "used exclusively" in trade or commerce, and the term "used" means "actually used."

Described the facts of the case involving a Memorandum of Understanding executed in 2017 and the execution of a mortgage deed, emphasizing that the property's use was not exclusively for trade or commerce.

Pointed out that the trial court incorrectly assumed the property's use based on the plaintiff's business activities, and the property was not being exclusively used in trade or commerce in 2012.

Reiterated the purpose of Commercial Courts for speedy resolution of commercial disputes, and the need for meaningful interpretation to benefit litigants engaged in trade and commerce.

Conclusion: The court held that the suit did not qualify as a commercial dispute under Section 2(1)(c)(vii) due to the lack of pleadings indicating exclusive use of the property for trade or commerce. The Commercial Court was directed to return the plaint to the court with jurisdiction.

Facts:

The victim child went missing at approximately 4:00 p.m.

The appellant was observed distributing chocolates to children around the time of the child's disappearance.

The police apprehended the appellant, finding him with the victim child in a naked condition.

The victim had suffered brutal assault, including vaginal and unnatural intercourse, resulting in multiple injuries.

Issues:

The reliability of evidence, burden of proof, the severity of the crime, and the appropriateness of the death penalty.

Held:

The court held that the appellant, Ravi s/o Ashok Ghumare, was conclusively proven to be responsible for the heinous crimes against the two-year-old victim (Para 30).

The medical evidence, eyewitness accounts, circumstantial evidence, and DNA analysis collectively established the appellant's guilt (Para 35, 36).

The burden to prove that the injuries were not caused by the appellant rested on him, and he failed to discharge this burden (Para 30).

The court, by majority, upheld the death sentence for the appellant, emphasizing the gravity of the crime and the lack of remorse shown by the appellant (Para 61).

Dissenting Opinion on Sentencing:

One judge dissented on the death penalty, arguing for the modification to life imprisonment based on mitigating factors, including the appellant's intoxication at the time of the crime, age, and lack of evidence on rehabilitation possibilities (Para 34).

Facts:

The appellant was convicted for kidnapping, raping, and murdering a 13-year-old girl. The prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence, including DNA analysis, to establish guilt. The trial court and High Court imposed the death sentence.

Issues:

Whether a death sentence can be awarded in cases based on circumstantial evidence.

The impact of "residual doubt" in determining the standard of proof for capital sentencing.

Validity of the conviction under Section 376A based on certain findings not supported by medical evidence.

Held:

The court affirmed the guilt of the appellant based on strong circumstantial and medico-scientific evidence (Para 37).

Emphasized that there is no absolute bar on awarding death sentences in circumstantial evidence cases, considering the potential for abuse by seasoned criminals (Para 37).

Recognized the concept of "residual doubt" in recent cases but concluded that this case did not qualify as the "rarest of rare" deserving the death penalty (Paras 61, 62, 64, 65).

Noted some residual doubts in the case, including inconsistent witness statements and discrepancies in evidence (Para 61).

Acknowledged the erroneous finding related to bleeding due to sexual intercourse but clarified that it did not impact the conviction under Section 376A (Para 39, 60).

Decision: The death penalty was set aside, and life imprisonment was substituted due to the presence of residual doubts and the case not falling within the "rarest of rare" category.

FACTS:

Appellant issued a fire insurance policy to the respondent for plant and machinery.

Claim arose after a fire accident on 23.04.2000.

Appellant offered Rs. 7,98,019/-, which was refused.

A meeting was held on 20.09.2001, where the appellant revised the offer to Rs. 33,80,925/-.

Respondent, dissatisfied, approached the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, which dismissed the complaint.

Matter referred to arbitration, resulting in an award dated 28.06.2004.

ISSUES:

Validity of the proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

The jurisdiction of the Court for re-presentation of the petition.

HELD:

The Court observed that the delay of 8 days in re-presentation was the only issue. It was not justified to re-examine the entire period spent before the Jaipur court as malafide. The Court set aside the orders of the lower courts and allowed the appeal, restoring the proceedings to the file of the Additional District Judge S.No.3, Jodhpur.( Para 12)

The parties were directed to appear before the Jodhpur court on 15.10.2019 for further proceedings. The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs.( Para 14)

REFERRED CASES:

Consolidated Engineering Enterprises vs. The Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department & Ors. (2008) 7 SCC 169

Joginder Tuli vs. S.L. Bhatia and another (1997) 1 SCC 502

S. Ganesharaju (dead) through LRs. and Anr. vs. Narsamma (dead) through LRs. and Ors. (2013) 11 SCC 341

Shri Amar Chand Inami vs. Union of India (1973) 1 SCC 115

Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. vs. Union of India, (2019) 2 SCC 455

Union of India vs. Popular Construction Company, (2001) 8 SCC 470

Facts:

The Okhla Enclave Plot Holders' Welfare Association, in Writ Petition (C) No. 876 of 1996, alleged that the colonizer (respondent no.6) failed to adhere to the terms of the agreement in allotting plots. The matter was referred to arbitration, addressing four crucial questions.

Issues:

The portion of land claimed by the colonizer, the entity responsible for project development and allotments, relaxation of density norms, and the nature of the proceedings (arbitration or a Special Committee).

Held:

The plot holders are entitled to the entire extent of land as per the layout, irrespective of the portion claimed by the colonizer. The colonizer's claim is contingent upon payment of renewal fees and other charges.

The Town and Country Planning Department will undertake development after receiving 90% of the total amount payable by plot owners.

The arbitrator will determine development charges based on square meter cost, apportioning the total cost among eligible plot owners.

Failure to pay development charges within the specified time may result in the denial of amenities, with potential consequences such as forfeiture of plot rights.

The State of Haryana clarified that certain density norms cannot be reduced, and the arbitrator must adjust plots accordingly.

The proceedings are in the nature of a Special Committee constituted by the court, not under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Decision: The court's decision, dated October 3, 2019, establishes the entitlement of plot holders to the entire land as per the layout. The colonizer's claims are subject to specific conditions, and development responsibilities lie with the Town and Country Planning Department. The proceedings are considered a Special Committee, not arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Facts:

Narsingh Yadav, the appellant, enrolled in the Indian Army on December 2, 2003.

Diagnosed with Schizophrenia, disability assessed at 20% for five years.

Invalidating Medical Board's opinion: Disability not attributable to or aggravated by military service.

Appellant discharged from army service on May 8, 2007.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's Schizophrenia can be considered attributable to or aggravated by military service.

Applicability of Rule 14 of the Entitlement Rules for Casualty Pensionary Awards, 1982.

Validity of the decision of the Armed Forces Tribunal rejecting the claim for disability pension.

Held:

The court applied Rule 14(d) and emphasized that entitlement to disability pension should be considered only if it is established that the cause of the disease was adversely affected due to factors related to conditions of military service.

Mental disorders, like Schizophrenia, are difficult to detect at the time of recruitment.

The appellant, posted in a peace station as a Vehicle Mechanic, did not face conditions causing stress and strain leading to disability attributed to military service.

The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decision of the Tribunal.

Facts:

The case revolves around the disappearance of a child, subsequent discovery of a freshly dug mound in the appellants' house, and their confession to murdering the child for a human sacrifice.

Issues:

The admissibility of the accused's confessions, the applicability of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, and the validity of the convictions under different sections of the IPC.

Held:

The court notes consistent testimonies by independent witnesses regarding the accused's confession to the murder for a sacrifice. The confessions were found to be voluntary, without any indication of inducement, threat, or promise.( Para 14)

The court upholds the trial court and High Court's reliance on the confessions, along with corroborating evidence, establishing the guilt of the main accused for the offense under Section 302 r/w Section 34 IPC.( Para 16)

Regarding charges of kidnapping and conspiracy, the court finds insufficient evidence. Lack of consistency in witnesses' statements and failure to prove common intention or conspiracy lead to acquittal of co-accused based on the benefit of doubt.( Para 17)

Applying Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the burden is placed on the accused to explain how the body of the missing boy came to be buried in their house, emphasizing the incriminating evidence against them.( Para 19)

The court deliberates on the sentencing, emphasizing that death sentences are reserved for the "rarest of rare cases." Factors considered include the brutality of the murder, lack of basic humanness in the accused, and their prior conviction for a similar offense.( Paras 22, 23)