Facts:

On 21st April, 2007, during a marriage ceremony, the appellant fired celebratory gunshots that resulted in injuries to five individuals, leading to the deaths of two. The appellant's defense was accidental firing caused by a ball hitting the gun. The appellant was convicted under Sections 302 and 307 of the IPC.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's act constituted 'culpable homicide' or 'murder'?

Whether celebratory firing with unintended consequences falls under Section 304 Part-2 of the IPC?

Held:

The appellant's act of firing towards the roof during the marriage ceremony, although unintentional, was found to be an act of 'culpable homicide' under Section 299 of the IPC, punishable under Section 304 Part-2. The appellant carried a loaded gun in a crowded event, aiming towards the roof, which resulted in injuries and fatalities. While he may not have intended to kill, his actions invited risk and likely consequences. The sentence of life imprisonment under Section 302 IPC was reduced to 10 years' rigorous imprisonment, and the conviction under Section 307 IPC was altered to Section 308 IPC. The fine remained unchanged.

The Court referred to the case of Kunwar Pal vs. State of Uttarakhand, (2014) 12 SCC 434, wherein the intention to kill was not proven, and the accused was given the benefit of doubt, resulting in a lesser conviction.

Facts:

A notice inviting tender was issued by the appellant, Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (BCCL), for hiring Heavy Earth Moving Machinery (HEMM) for coal extraction and transportation. The bidding was conducted online, and technical issues led to connectivity problems during the auction. The last bid by respondent No. 1 went unresponded for thirty minutes, resulting in the auction's automatic closure. The auction was later restarted due to technical issues and communicated to all bidders. Respondent No. 6 was ultimately declared the successful bidder.

Issues:

The scope of judicial review in tender matters.

Allegations of illegality, irrationality, and procedural impropriety.

Whether larger public interest was affected by the auction process.

The existence of technical problems and connectivity issues during the auction.

Interpretation of contractual terms and authority's decision-making process.

Held:

The scope of judicial review in tenders has been extensively discussed. Courts are concerned with lawfulness, not soundness, of decisions. Allegations of illegality and procedural impropriety warrant judicial intervention. The decision-making process is subject to scrutiny, but not the end result.

Writs are appropriate remedies when a constitutional right is infringed, such as treating all equally or challenging actions in contravention to trade and commerce freedom. Writs are impermissible when allegations concern contractual rights or duties.

The Division Bench of the High Court failed to evaluate whether larger public interest was affected. Respondent No. 1's interest was private and monetary, not a public law right.

After an inquiry report by the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC), it was clear that BCCL and others acted bona fide. Technical issues and connectivity problems were established, and no fraudulent decisions were proven .

The Division Bench erred in holding no technical difficulties existed, contrary to the findings of various entities. Multiple bids were received after the resumption of the auction process, indicating technical issues

The uniform communication about the extension of the auction time placed all bidders on equal footing. Respondent No. 1's interpretation was moot since they did not object to the email's wording during the resumed auction .

Courts must defer to the authority's interpretation of contractual terms unless it is patently perverse or mala fide. BCCL's interpretation was plausible, and mere differences in interpretation are not grounds for finding illegality.

Facts:

The appellant, Ex-Gunner Virender Prasad, was found guilty of murdering Gunner-Sushil Kumar while posted in a sensitive area during a time of heightened terrorist threats. The appellant claimed he had shot the deceased under the belief of a militant attack.

Issues:

Whether Section 433-A of the CrPC applies to a case tried under Section 69 of the Army Act, regarding the minimum imprisonment term before release for a life convict.

To determine an appropriate sentence for the appellant considering factors such as the nature of the offence, circumstances, prior criminal record, age of the offender, rehabilitation prospects, and community needs.

Held:

The Court confirmed the appellant's guilt but focused on the sentence.

The Court referred to previous cases, such as Santa Singh v. The State of Punjab (1976) 4 SCC 190, which established that a proper sentence involves considering multiple factors.

The Court acknowledged that Section 433-A of the CrPC, which mandates a minimum imprisonment term before release for life convicts, applies to cases under Section 69 of the Army Act. However, the appellant had already served over 16 years and 6 months in prison, exceeding the 14-year requirement.

Taking into account the appellant's conduct, the circumstances, and the time served, the Court found that the sentence served was proportionate to the offence. As a result, the Court ordered the appellant's immediate release.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant's release was directed.

FACTS:

The appellant, Jeetendra, had been in custody since January 5, 2019, under charges related to Sections 420, 177, 181, 193, 200, and 120-B of the IPC.

An earlier case was filed by the appellant's wife, which led to his arrest. He was released on bail after the matrimonial dispute was resolved.

A new complaint was filed alleging forgery of documents submitted as personal bond for the appellant's release in the previous case.

A closure report was filed, but further investigation was ordered by a Judicial Magistrate after five years.

ISSUES:

The appellant's bail application was rejected by the High Court based on the pending acceptance of the closure report.

The appellant contended that bail should be granted as per the principles of "Bail is rule and jail is exception."

HELD:

The Supreme Court emphasized that the grant or rejection of bail should not be mechanical as it concerns an individual's liberty. In this specific case, where a closure report had been filed twice and the examination of witnesses was linked to the fate of the report, the High Court's denial of bail was not appropriate. (Paragraph 7)

The Court reiterated the principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception, and, considering the nature of the allegations and the time spent in custody, the appellant deserved to be released on bail. (Paragraph 7)

The High Court's order was set aside, and the interim bail granted earlier was made absolute. The appellant was to be released on regular bail, based on the bail bonds already furnished. The appeal is allowed. (Paragraph 8)

FACTS:

Respondent No. 1, a judicial officer, was appointed as Civil Judge (Junior Division)-cum-Judicial Magistrate. During the probationary period, allegations of misdemeanour and corruption in discharge of judicial functions were received. The Registrar (Vigilance) of the Rajasthan High Court submitted a report detailing these allegations. The Full Court evaluated probationary judges' suitability, based on integrity, knowledge, conduct, and behaviour. Respondent No. 1's services were not confirmed based on overall assessment.

ISSUES:

• Whether the termination during the probationary period was punitive or due to unsatisfactory performance?

• Whether specific allegations or overall performance were the basis for the termination?

• Whether principles of natural justice apply in this case of non-confirmation?

HELD:

The purpose of probation is to evaluate suitability for a position, and probationers do not have an indefeasible right to continue in employment.

The High Court's role in judicial review of administrative decisions is cautious and should not substitute for an appellate role.

Termination based on overall performance during probation, rather than specific misconduct, may not be treated as punitive.

In this case, the termination was based on an overall assessment of performance, not specific misconduct.

The Court can consider overall suitability and relevant factors when assessing probationers' performance.

DECISION:

The appeals are allowed. The High Court's judgment is set aside, and the order of discharge of Respondent No. 1's services during probation is approved.

Facts:

The case involves appeals by Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (Appellant) and Anil Padegaonkar (Respondent) against a common order in a writ appeal. The Corporation is aggrieved by the order setting aside the punishment due to issues related to the issuance of the charge-sheet. The employee is aggrieved by the grant of liberty for a fresh charge-sheet and denial of back wages upon reinstatement, especially since the employee had reached the age of superannuation.

Issues:

Whether the charge-sheet was issued by the appropriate disciplinary authority.

Whether the term "Competent Authority" includes a disciplinary authority authorized by the delegation of authority manual.

Whether the punishment of the employee was dismissal or discharge.

Held:

The court examined the definitions of various terms within the rules, such as "Functional Manager," "Disciplinary Authority," and "Competent Authority." The court concluded that the term "Competent Authority" could include a disciplinary authority authorized by the delegation of authority manual. The court held that the charge-sheet had been issued by an authority competent to do so, upholding the order of discharge. The direction to issue a fresh charge-sheet was set aside, rendering the question of reinstatement and back wages under the second charge-sheet academic and irrelevant.

The Corporation's appeal was allowed, while the employee's appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute concerning the interpretation of Section 37 of the Architects Act, 1972. The primary issue was whether individuals not registered with the Council of Architecture were prohibited from practicing architectural activities or merely from using the title "Architect." The case also examined whether government posts titled as "Architect" or similar titles could be held by individuals not registered as architects.

Issues:

The scope and extent of the prohibition imposed by Section 37 of the Architects Act on unregistered individuals regarding the use of the title "Architect" and their engagement in architectural activities.

Involved assessing whether individuals not registered as architects could occupy government posts with titles that incorporate the term "Architect" or similar styles.

Held:

Issue 1: The Court observed that Section 37 of the Architects Act prohibits individuals from using the title and style of "Architect." However, a distinction was drawn between the use of the title and actual architectural practice. The legislative intent was to protect the title "Architect" while allowing non-registered individuals to undertake architectural activities without using the title. The Court referred to the legislative history, including the Statement of Objects and Reasons, to support this interpretation. (Para 26-30)

Issue 2: The Court ruled that if an individual holds a government post with a title such as "Associate Architect" or "Architect," it implies the use of the title "Architect." Such a person would likely be assumed to be registered under the Architects Act and possessing a recognized architectural degree. Promoting individuals without the required qualifications to such posts using the title "Architect" would violate the prohibition outlined in Section 37. (Para 36-37)

Delegated Legislation and Primary Legislation: The Court highlighted the principle that when there is a conflict between primary legislation (Architects Act) and delegated legislation (Promotion Policy 2005), the provisions of the primary legislation prevail. (Para 38)

Facts:

M/s. Abhilasha Construction (R-3) obtained a loan but failed to repay, leading to a decree in favor of Shree Mahalaxmi Mercantile Co-op Bank Ltd. (R-2). A subsequent sale of property took place during the execution proceedings, leading to objections from Mukul Thakorebhai Amin (R-1) and R-3. The primary contention was whether these objections were filed within the prescribed time limits.

Issues:

Whether the objections filed by R-1 and R-3 were within the statutory time limits as per Order XXI Rule 90, Section 5, and Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

Held:

The court found that the objections filed by R-1 and R-3 were not within the prescribed time limits. The court examined the provisions of Order XXI Rule 90 and Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act. The court held that the objections, even if filed in good faith, did not meet the time-bar requirements. The court noted that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which allows for the condonation of delay, does not apply to proceedings under Order XXI Rule 90. Additionally, the court found that Section 14 of the Limitation Act, which deals with the exclusion of time due to certain circumstances, could not be applied as the proceedings were not diligently pursued by the respondents. The appeals were allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the executing court's order was upheld.

Facts:

Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. was involved in the execution of a foreign decree from a reciprocating country in India. The question before the court was related to the period of limitation for executing such a foreign decree and the interpretation of Section 44A of the CPC.

Issues:

Does Section 44A of the CPC only provide for the manner of execution of foreign decrees or does it also indicate the period of limitation for filing execution proceedings?

What is the period of limitation for executing a foreign decree passed by a court from a reciprocating country in India?

From which date does the period of limitation start running for executing a foreign decree passed in a reciprocating country and sought to be executed in India?

Held:

Issue 1 - Section 44A of the CPC: The court concluded that Section 44A of the CPC is only an enabling provision empowering the District Court to execute a foreign decree as if it were an Indian decree. It does not deal with the period of limitation. Section 44A empowers the District Court to execute the foreign decree and provides that Section 47 of the CPC applies from the date of filing the certified copy of the decree. The section sets the procedure for execution but does not indicate the period of limitation for filing an execution petition. [Para 19, 20, 21]

Issue 2 - Limitation for Executing Foreign Decree: The court held that the limitation period for executing a foreign decree passed by a court from a reciprocating country in India would be as prescribed in the reciprocating foreign country. This is subject to the decree being executable under Section 13 of the CPC. The court emphasized that the law of limitation is substantive and not merely procedural, and the foreign decree's limitation law should apply. [Para 31, 33, 34, 35]

Issue 3 - Starting Date of Limitation: The court explained two situations: if the decree-holder doesn't take steps to execute the decree in the cause country within the prescribed limitation period there, they cannot execute the decree in India later. The period of limitation starts from the date the decree was passed in the cause country. However, if the decree-holder initiates execution proceedings in the cause country, the right to apply under Section 44A accrues only after those proceedings are finalized. In such cases, the decree-holder can file a petition for execution in India within three years from the completion of execution proceedings in the cause country. [Para 40, 41, 42, 43]