Facts:

An FIR was lodged by Bhola Mohanta, the brother of the deceased, stating that his brother was murdered by the accused Ranjit Haldar along with his nephew and the wife of the deceased. The body was alleged to be concealed in a house, leading to an investigation.

Issues:

Validity of the FIR recorded in Bengali and later translated to Nepali.

Adequacy of evidence, including the absence of a DNA test on the dead body.

Ownership and possession of the house where the dead body was concealed.

Application of Section 106 of the Evidence Act regarding the burden of proof.

Held:

The Court held that the recovery of the dead body concealed under wooden planks, covered by mud and stones, was a strong incriminating circumstance. The absence of a DNA test was deemed irrelevant as the identity of the dead body was established beyond doubt. The prosecution successfully proved facts, invoking Section 106, making it difficult for the accused to provide an explanation. The appellants' failure to disprove the presumption under Section 106 led to the maintenance of their conviction.

Conclusion: Both appeals were dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentence of the appellants for causing the death of the deceased Netai Mohanta. The Courts below were found to have rightly recorded the conviction, and no error was identified in the judgment that warranted interference.

Facts:

The prosecution alleged the murder of the complainant's son after a ransom demand, leading to the arrest of the second respondent. The claim for juvenility was based on a matriculation certificate issued by CBSE.

Issues:

The conflicting evidence regarding the second respondent's date of birth. The Juvenile Justice Board (JJB) rejected the claim, while the High Court allowed it, emphasizing the precedence of the matriculation certificate.

Held:

Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice Act provides the procedure for determining juvenility. Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules establishes a hierarchical ordering for obtaining evidence in the enquiry. The matriculation certificate takes precedence, followed by the date of birth certificate from the first school attended and, if unavailable, the birth certificate from a corporation, municipal authority, or panchayat.( Para 10)

The matriculation certificate's date of birth lacked underlying support, making it unreliable. Contrarily, records from the first school attended, Aadhaar card, and driving license consistently indicated the second respondent's date of birth as 17.12.1995. The High Court's reliance on the matriculation certificate was deemed inappropriate, leading to the conclusion that the second respondent was not entitled to the claim of juvenility as of the date of the alleged incident.( Para 14, 15)

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal by the complainant, maintaining the order passed by the Sessions Judge. The Court concluded that the second respondent was not a juvenile at the time of the alleged incident.

Facts:

Dispute arose from an agreement for the sale of Iron Ore Pellets between the appellant and respondent.

Agreement contained an arbitration clause in Clause 18, specifying Bhubaneswar as the venue for arbitration.

Respondent invoked the arbitration clause, and the appellant contested, challenging the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court.

Issues:

Whether the Madras High Court could exercise jurisdiction under Section 11(6) despite the agreement specifying Bhubaneswar as the venue.

Interpretation of the agreement regarding the "venue" and its impact on jurisdiction.

Held:

The distinction between "Seat" and "Venue" is crucial, and the agreed "venue" has significance in determining jurisdiction.

The absence of words like "exclusive jurisdiction" does not alter the parties' intention to exclude other courts when a specific place is agreed upon.

When parties agree on the "venue" of arbitration, it becomes the "Seat," and the court at that location has exclusive jurisdiction.

The Madras High Court erred in assuming jurisdiction, as only the Orissa High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the petition under Section 11(6) due to the agreed "venue" being Bhubaneswar.

Facts:

Government of Madhya Pradesh issued a policy in 2012 for wind energy.

Tariff Order issued on March 26, 2013, applicable to projects commissioned till March 31, 2016.

Dispute arose on the commissioning date of a wind project between the appellant and respondent.

A new Tariff Order on March 17, 2016, with a different tariff rate for projects commissioned on or after April 1, 2016.

Dispute on the actual commissioning date of the project - appellant claimed April 1, 2016, while the respondent asserted March 31, 2016.

High Court directed the appellant to enter into a PPA based on the earlier tariff order.

Appellant revoked the commissioning certificate, leading to a second set of writ petitions.

Issues:

Determination of the actual commissioning date of the wind project.

Applicability of the tariff order and the subsequent guidelines.

Held:

The Court held that the project was commissioned on April 1, 2016, based on objective data from the State Load Dispatch Centre (SLDC). The respondent is entitled to the tariff under the Tariff Order dated March 17, 2016. The competitive bidding guidelines issued subsequently on December 8, 2017, do not apply to the project. The first respondent is directed to process the PPA application based on the March 17, 2016, Tariff Order from April 1, 2016.

Facts:

Prashanti Medical Services and Research Foundation, a charitable trust, established a Heart Hospital in Ahmedabad.

The foundation applied for approval under Section 35AC of the Income Tax Act for their hospital project, which was approved by the Committee along with 27 other projects.

A notification on December 7, 2015, listed the approved projects.

The foundation received donations in the financial years 2015-16, 2016-17, and 2017-18.

The Finance Act, 2016, introduced sub-section (7) in Section 35AC, disallowing deductions under this section for any assessment year commencing on or after April 1, 2018.

The foundation challenged the constitutional validity of sub-section (7), arguing for prospective application.

Issues:

Constitutional validity of sub-section (7) of Section 35AC.

Applicability of sub-section (7) to projects approved before its insertion.

Whether a plea of promissory estoppel is valid against legislative power in tax matters.

Held:

The Court upheld the High Court's decision, stating that sub-section (7) is prospective in its operation and does not apply retrospectively. The Court emphasized that a plea of promissory estoppel is not available to an assessee against the exercise of legislative power.( Paragraph 18)

The Court clarified that in tax matters, pleas based on equity or hardship are not legally sustainable. The constitutional validity of a taxing provision cannot be struck down on such grounds.( Paragraph 26)

The Court rejected the appellant's request to invoke powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, stating that such powers are not to be invoked once the action is in accordance with the law.( Paragraph 27)

Facts:

The case involves MSIL, a joint venture between Suzuki Motor Corporation and MSIL, initially known as SPIL.

SPIL filed its return in 2012, and later, a scheme for amalgamation with MSIL was approved.

Assessment proceedings continued in the name of the non-existent entity, SPIL.

Issues:

The validity of assessment proceedings conducted in the name of SPIL post-amalgamation.

Held:

The court emphasized that the income subjected to tax belonged to the erstwhile entity (SPIL) pre-amalgamation.

The approved scheme of amalgamation resulted in the cessation of SPIL, and it could not be considered a person against whom assessment proceedings could be initiated.

Despite the notice issued under section 143(2) and the communication of amalgamation to the assessing officer, proceedings were pursued in the name of SPIL, rendering them void ab initio.

The court referred to Spice Entertainment, where assessments in the name of amalgamated and dissolved companies were deemed null and void, emphasizing it as a substantive illegality.

The doctrine of merger was highlighted, affirming that the amalgamating entity ceases to exist upon amalgamation.

Consistency and certainty in tax litigation were stressed, adopting the principles established in prior cases for AY 2011-12 to the present appeal for AY 2012-13.

Decision: The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the void ab initio nature of assessment proceedings against the non-existent entity (SPIL) and upholding the principles of consistency and certainty in tax matters.

Facts:

Zorawar Singh owned certain immovable property in New Delhi.

Zorawar Singh executed a Will dated June 16, 1985, and a codicil dated October 21, 1995.

Two suits were filed: one by the respondents claiming declaration and permanent injunction in respect of the Will and codicil, and the other by the appellant claiming natural succession.

Issues:

The applicability of Clause (c) of Section 213(2) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925.

Whether it is necessary to seek probate or letters of administration in the National Capital Region of Delhi.

Held:

The Act is applicable to Wills and codicils made by Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, or Jains, subject to the jurisdiction of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal or within the local limits of the High Courts of Madras or Bombay - {clause (a) of Section 57 of the Act}.

It is also applicable to Wills and codicils made outside those territories and limits in relation to immovable property within those territories - Clause (b) of Section 57.

Clause (c) of Section 57 applies to Wills and codicils made by Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, or Jains on or after January 1, 1927, to which provisions are not applied by clauses (a) and (b).

Sub-section (2) of Section 213 of the Act applies only to Wills made by Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, or Jains falling under clauses (a) or (b) of Section 57, making clause (c) inapplicable.

The judgment cites several cases supporting the view that probate is not necessary for Wills made outside Bengal, Madras, or Bombay concerning properties and parties not located in those territories.

The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court's order, which accepted an intra-court appeal against the rejection of the plaint based on Section 213, was upheld.

The appeal was dismissed, finding no error in the judgment passed by the Delhi High Court.

Facts:

Lucknow Development Authority (LDA) acquired land for the Sitapur Road City Extension Scheme.

Respondents' land was part of the acquisition but sought release under Section 17.

LDA imposed development charges for the release of the respondents' land.

High Court quashed LDA's order, citing lack of evidence of development in the vicinity of the respondents' land.

Issues:

Whether development charges can be imposed under Section 17.

Interpretation of development activities in the context of land acquisition.

Applicability of the proviso to Section 17(1) of the Act.

Whether the High Court's findings on lack of development in the vicinity are correct.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's interpretation was not correct. It emphasized that development should be examined in respect of the entire acquired land, not just the specific area owned by the respondents. The Court accepted LDA's claims of extensive development activities, including road construction, provision of electricity and water, and sewer line installation. The respondents were deemed liable for development charges, and the High Court's decision was set aside.

Facts:

The Respondent Company, a subsidiary of the Marathwada Development Corporation, engaged women workers for stitching garments at their homes.

The Appellant, the Provident Fund Office, issued notices to the Respondent Company, claiming Provident Fund contributions for the women workers.

The Respondent challenged the order in the Bombay High Court, which ruled in their favor.

Issues:

Whether women workers engaged by the Respondent Company should be considered "employees" under Section 2(f) of the EPF Act.

Whether the women workers, despite working off-site and being paid on a piece-rate basis, fall within the definition of "employee."

Held:

The court held that the women workers were indeed covered by the definition of "employee" under Section 2(f) of the EPF Act. The inclusive definition encompassed both direct and indirect engagement in connection with the work of the establishment. The court emphasized that payment on a per-piece basis and working off-site did not negate the employment status. The Provident Fund Office's order was restored, and the Respondent Company was directed to deposit the assessed Provident Fund dues for the women workers within one month.

The Civil Appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms. All pending Applications, if any, are accordingly disposed of.