Facts:

The plaintiff and the defendant were acquainted, and the plaintiff had taken financial assistance from the defendant.

A sum of Rs.5,000/- was construed as consideration for the land, and a sale deed dated 10th December 1968 was executed.

Contemporaneously, an agreement dated 10th December 1968 and another agreement on 29th August 1969 were entered into, indicating reconveyance conditions.

The plaintiff filed a suit in 1980 seeking redemption of the mortgage.

Issues:

Whether the transaction is a mortgage by conditional sale or a sale.

The relevance of mutation proceedings in determining the character of the transaction.

The plaintiff's right of redemption based on the agreements and subsequent actions.

Held:

The court interprets Section 58(c) and the proviso, emphasizing that the sale deed must embody the condition to be deemed a mortgage. Contemporaneous agreements are considered but held insufficient to alter the nature indicated in the sale deed.( Paragraphs 5-7)

The court refers to a precedent emphasizing that a sale with a condition of retransfer is not a mortgage. The real character of the transaction is determined by the provisions of the deed viewed in light of surrounding circumstances and parties' intention.( Paragraph 8)

The court examines the documents (Exhibits 23, 24, and 14/1) and concludes that the sale deed does not indicate a mortgage. The defendant's acquisition of absolute right is supported by non-repayment and initiation of mutation proceedings.( Paragraphs 9-10)

The court dismisses the relevance of a cited case (Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar) regarding mutation's presumptive value on title. It asserts the importance of mutation in the present context, emphasizing its relevance in construing the nature of the transaction.( Paragraph 11)

The court finds the suit seeking redemption not sustainable and suggests that if the agreement of reconveyance is to be enforced, a suit for specific performance should have been filed. The suit is dismissed based on a misconception.( Paragraph 12)

Facts:

Mohammad Badruddin faced disciplinary proceedings, resulting in a punishment of compulsory retirement, later altered to reversion.

Five charges were leveled against Badruddin, with the Inquiry Officer finding charge No. 4 proved, while charges 1, 2, 3, and 5 were not proved.

The Disciplinary Authority disagreed with findings on charges 1 and 5.

Based on charges 1, 4, and 5, along with a previous punishment of reversion, Badruddin was removed from service.

The High Court set aside the removal punishment, citing reasons for disagreement not being supplied and non-disclosure of the previous punishment.

Issues:

Violation of natural justice due to non-furnishing of the Inquiry Report.

Validity of removal from service based on multiple charges, including a previous punishment.

Held:

Non-furnishing of Inquiry Report: The Division Bench set aside the punishment, citing a violation of natural justice. The Supreme Court clarified that the Ramzan Khan judgment had prospective effect and couldn't affect inquiries conducted before November 20, 1990. As the punishment order was before this date, the Court restored the punishment of reversion.( Paragraphs 4, 5, and 7)

Removal from Service - Multiple Charges: The Supreme Court clarified that, post the 42nd Constitutional amendment, there's no mandatory requirement to communicate the proposed punishment. Non-communication of previous punishments in the show cause notice does not invalidate the punishment. However, the Court couldn't maintain the removal punishment due to findings on charge No. 4. The matter was remanded to the Disciplinary Authority for reconsideration based on charge No. 4.( Paragraphs 23 and 24)

Conclusion: The order of reversion was restored, as the non-furnishing of the Inquiry Report did not affect the pre-November 20, 1990, punishment. The removal punishment was set aside, and the case was remanded to the Disciplinary Authority for reconsideration based on charge No. 4.

Facts:

The High Court dismissed appeals by the State of Madhya Pradesh and another on merits.

Despite the dismissal of the appeals, the landowners filed a cross objection seeking enhancement of compensation.

The High Court, without proper examination and reasons, rejected the cross objection.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was obligated to independently examine the issues raised by the landowners in the cross objection.

Whether there was a case for enhancement of compensation based on the evidence presented by the parties.

Held:

The Court observed that Order 41 Rule 22(4) of the CPC allows the cross objection to be heard and determined even if the original appeal is withdrawn or dismissed for default.

The High Court was obligated to independently examine the issues raised by the landowners in the cross objection and determine if there was a case for further enhancement in compensation.

The failure of the High Court to examine the question of whether there was a case for enhancement of compensation and the rejection of the cross objection without discussion and reasons were deemed legally unsustainable.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment, and restoring the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, confirming the dismissal of the landowners' suit.

Facts:

The appellant, Sulekha Rani, appealed against the judgment of the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) dismissing her Original Application for the grant of pension in respect of her deceased spouse's service in the Indian Army. The appellant's spouse was enrolled in the Army in 1994, posted at the Siachen Glacier, and discharged in 2001. The appellant contended that no Invalidation Medical Board was held prior to the discharge, and the absence of such a board was a violation of rules.

Issues:

Whether the absence of an Invalidation Medical Board prior to the discharge of the appellant's spouse is a violation of rules.

Whether the appellant is entitled to family pension.

Held:

The Court held that the discharge of the appellant's spouse without convening an Invalidation Medical Board was illegal. Rule 13(3)(III)(v) is a residuary provision and does not apply to cases of medical unfitness. The absence of an Invalidation Medical Board is a violation of the prescribed procedure for discharge in cases of medical unfitness. Consequently, the appellant is entitled to family pension, and the service of the deceased spouse is deemed to have continued until the date of death (30 September 2007). No arrears of wages are payable between the date of discharge and the date of death. The arrears of family pension are to be paid to the appellant within three months from the date of the order.

Facts:

Chaman Lal purchased land in 1949.

Gift deed executed in 1958 in favor of Gurdev Kaur.

Dispute arises in 1987 over the extent of gifted land.

Trial court decrees partition in 1998.

High Court interference in 2002, Supreme Court remits the case in 2003.

High Court decision in 2008 re-affirms the appeal.

Issues:

Whether the gift deed covered the entire land or only half.

Validity of the translation of the gift deed.

Jurisdiction of the High Court in a second appeal under Section 41 of the Punjab Court Act.

Held:

The High Court did not exceed its jurisdiction in examining the translation and considering the accuracy of the document. The accuracy of the translation was crucial in interpreting the gift deed, a document of title. The Court held that if the translation is inaccurate, it could result in a fundamental legal infirmity. The acknowledgment of both parties to the accuracy of the translation and transliteration was considered significant. The status of the property, after a prolonged period since 1958, is not liable to be disturbed. The Court dismissed the appeal, and parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Facts:

The case involves the sale of land by a common landowner to different parties on different dates.

Dispute centers around a passage, with the plaintiff claiming exclusive rights, while the defendant relies on a reserved right of access in an earlier sale deed.

Issues:

Whether the exclusive right granted to the plaintiff is valid in light of the reserved access rights in an earlier sale deed.

The impact of subsequent events, such as inheritance, on the rights created by the original sale deeds.

The applicability of Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

Held:

The court held that the easement rights reserved for defendant No. 2 in the earlier sale deed were not extinguished, rendering the exclusive right granted to the plaintiff illegal.

Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act was cited, emphasizing that later-created rights are subject to earlier-created rights unless a special contract or reservation binds the earlier transferees.

The court stressed that rights should be adjudicated based on the documents of title in 1976, and subsequent events should not affect these rights.

The appeals were allowed, and the 16 feet x 103 feet passage adjoining the property of the defendants leading to the property of the plaintiff was reserved for the common use of defendant No. 2 and the plaintiff.

Facts:

In February 2017, the Gujarat Maritime Board issued a tender for the auction of eight vacant plots at Alang-Sosiya Ship Recycling Yard. The allocation of these plots, especially the reservation for SC and ST categories, became a contentious issue. The S.C./S.T. Ship breakers Association challenged the allocation before the High Court, asserting that reservation should be based on the total number of plots available, not just those being auctioned.

Issues:

Interpretation of The Gujarat Maritime Board (Conditions & Procedures for granting permission for Utilizing Ship Recycling Plots) Ship Recycling Regulations, 2015.

Validity of the reservation policy for SC and ST categories concerning the total number of plots or only those being auctioned.

Applicability of the changed regulation from the 2006 Regulations.

Held:

The Supreme Court clarified that the expression "the plots" in the 2015 Regulations should be interpreted in the context of the plots to be auctioned, as mentioned in clauses 5.1 and 5.2. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment, confirming that reservation applies only to the plots being auctioned. However, the reservation made for the specific eight plots subject to the auction notice was maintained. The Court emphasized that the 2015 Regulations represented a departure from the earlier regulations, and the reservation policy should be implemented in a non-arbitrary manner by the Gujarat Maritime Board.

The appeal was allowed, and the protection granted by the previous order continued for four weeks. The appellant was granted the freedom to pursue further legal proceedings.

Facts:

The appeal arises from a dispute between a landlord (appellant) and a tenant (respondent) over eviction from a property under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.

The tenant, after compromising in a civil suit, failed to vacate the property as per the agreed terms, leading to an execution petition by the landlord.

The High Court set aside the Executing Court's order, stating that the execution petition was not maintainable without a formal decree.

Issues:

Whether the execution petition filed by the appellant is maintainable without a formal decree.

Whether the order dated 01.06.2012, passed under Order 23 Rule 3, can be treated as a decree for execution purposes.

The propriety of directing the appellant to apply under Section 152 of the Code.

Held:

The High Court was not right in holding that the execution petition is not maintainable without a formal decree. The order had the effect of a decree during the interim period.

The appellant is granted two weeks to apply under Section 151 read with Order 20 Rule 6(A) of the Code to the concerned Court for drawing up a formal decree.

The High Court was not right in directing the appellant to apply under Section 152 of the Code.

The Executing Court's order is modified to impose a compensatory cost of Rs. 50,000 on the respondent.

The respondent is granted one month to vacate the property after completing procedural formalities and making payment of all arrears of rent.

Facts:

The respondent filed a summary suit for the recovery of a specified amount under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appellant challenged the grant of conditional leave to defend, highlighting the absence of admissible dues and the withdrawal of a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Issues:

Whether the court properly exercised its discretion in granting conditional leave to defend?

Whether there was a prima facie fair and reasonable defense disclosed by the appellant?

The relevance of the withdrawal of the prosecution under the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Held:

The court emphasized the discretion vested in the court to grant conditional leave to defend in appropriate cases. It noted that in a summary suit, if the defendant discloses a prima facie fair and reasonable defense, unconditional leave to defend may be granted. The court, in this case, found that the appellant had raised substantial defenses and genuine triable issues. The lower courts misdirected themselves in applying the principles laid down in IDBI Trusteeship Services Limited vs. Hubtown Limited, resulting in the grant of conditional leave. Therefore, the impugned orders granting conditional leave were set aside, and unconditional leave to defend was granted to the appellant.