Facts:

Plaintiff claimed to have married the deceased Hanumanthappa.

Defendants denied the marriage, asserting it was a fabricated story for property acquisition.

Plaintiff provided an agreement of marriage and a photograph as evidence.

Issues:

Validity of the alleged marriage between the plaintiff and Hanumanthappa.

Burden of proof on the plaintiff regarding the age and customary ceremonies.

Held:

The agreement of marriage was not recognized as a valid certificate of registration under the Special Marriage Act, 1954.

No evidence of customary ceremonies or rites to validate the marriage.

Burden of proof on the plaintiff, who failed to prove the marriage.

The marriage considered void ab initio under Section 24 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954.

Plaintiff not entitled to claim a share in the property based on the alleged marriage.

The appeal was allowed, restoring the trial court's judgment.

Facts:

The appellant sought release of premises under Section 21(1)(a) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972.

Dispute arose over ownership, with the Prescribed Authority denying the appellant's claim.

Appellate Authority later recognized appellant's lawful ownership through family settlement.

High Court, under Article 227, reversed Appellate Authority's decision.

Issues:

Dispute over ownership based on family settlement and the right of the appellant to claim the premises.

Consideration of the appellant's bonafide need for the property under the relevant Acts.

Held:

The Court found the detailed examination of the property's nature unnecessary in a summary proceeding. The Court highlighted that the tenant cannot dispute the appellant's ownership when the landlord (Shri Dwarka Prasad) has settled the property in favor of the appellant.( Paragraph 16)

The Court accepted the bonafide need of the appellant for the property, considering the lack of evidence for alternate premises and the greater hardship the appellant would face if the property is not released.( Paragraph 17)

The judgments of the Prescribed Authority and the High Court were set aside, and the Appellate Court's decision was restored. The respondents were granted three months to vacate, and release of the premises was ordered irrespective of opting for the alternate premises.( Paragraph 18)

Facts:

The Selection Committee, under the IAS (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1955, assessed officers for promotion to the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) of the Tamil Nadu Cadre for the year 2004. The first respondent's name was considered but couldn't be included in the Select List due to a lower overall grading. The first respondent challenged this in the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), which rejected the plea. The High Court later set aside the Tribunal's order.

Issues:

The fairness and objectivity of the Selection Committee's assessment for the promotion of the first respondent and the subsequent legal challenges.

Held:

The All India Services Act, 1951, empowers the Central Government to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service for the Indian Administrative Services. The IAS (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1955 govern the promotion process. The Selection Committee, following a consistent practice, assesses officers based on service records and other criteria.

In this case, the first respondent's name couldn't be included in the Select List for the year 2004 due to a lower overall grading by the Selection Committee. Promotion to the IAS is strictly based on merit, ability, and suitability. The first respondent's seniority, refixed post the Selection Committee meeting, doesn't influence the merit-based gradation.

The court dismisses the first respondent's claim that seniority should enable inclusion in the Select List. The Selection Committee holds the power to classify based on relative assessment, and seniority becomes relevant only in case of equal merit, which is not the situation here.

The court emphasizes that it cannot sit in appeal over the Selection Committee's classification. The first respondent's exclusion from the Select List was based on a fair assessment, not suffering from arbitrariness. The High Court's view that the Committee failed to assess properly is rejected.

Conclusion: The High Court's judgment is set aside. The first respondent's challenge to G.O. Ms. No.1125 dated 26.11.2011 will be considered independently.

Facts:

The petitioner sought enforcement of an arbitral award in the Delhi High Court, leading to a series of orders restraining the respondents from encumbering their assets. Alleged violations of these orders, particularly related to share transactions, form the crux of the contempt proceedings.

Issues:

The primary issues include the encumbrance of shares, disobedience of court orders, and the validity of transactions conducted by the respondents post the specified dates.

Held:

The court found Contemnor Nos. 1 to 8 guilty of knowingly and wilfully disobeying court orders related to shareholding. They were given an opportunity to purge the contempt by depositing the value of shares within a specified timeframe.

Contemnor Nos. 9 & 10, 12 & 13 were held to have lost control of the company willfully, violating court orders and undertakings. They were given a chance to purge the contempt by depositing a specified amount.

A suo moto notice of contempt was issued for a violation of a subsequent order, with directions to register a fresh contempt petition against relevant parties.

Decision: The court directed the contemnors to deposit specified amounts within a given timeframe to potentially mitigate the contempt charges. Further decisions on disbursement were left pending.

Facts:

The appellant, Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM), owns the lands in question. SevenHills Healthcare Limited (SHCL) agreed to develop the lands and construct a 1500-bed hospital through a contract dated December 20, 2005. The construction was to be completed within 60 months, but SHCL failed to meet the deadline. MCGM alleged defaults in payments, issued a show cause notice for contract termination, and insolvency proceedings were initiated by Axis Bank. The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) admitted the petition, and the first respondent was appointed as the Resolution Professional (RP).

Issues:

Validity of the resolution plan concerning the appellant's properties.

The authority of NCLT to approve the resolution plan without the corporation's consent.

Applicability of Section 238 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.

Held:

The resolution plan did not involve disposal of MCGM's land; it pertained to a change in shareholding. The moratorium under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code applied to prevent any asset transfer during insolvency proceedings.

Section 238 does not override MCGM's right to control its properties, as specified in Sections 92 and 92A of the MMC Act. The adjudicating authority cannot override MCGM's objections without approval under these sections.

The resolution plan would impede MCGM's independent plans for public health amenities, and without approval under the MMC Act, the authorities under the Code cannot preclude MCGM's control over its properties.

Decision: The impugned order and NCLT's decision are set aside.

Facts:

The case involves the Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited and Satish Kumar Gupta and Others. The central issue revolves around the time-limit for the completion of the insolvency resolution process as per the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Issues:

The court is the mandatory nature of the 330-day time limit for the insolvency resolution process. The court is tasked with determining the constitutionality and reasonableness of this time frame.

Held:

In a decision rendered on 15th November 2019, the Full Bench addressed the constitutional aspects of the insolvency resolution process time limit. The court struck down the term "mandatorily" from the provision, declaring it manifestly arbitrary under Article 14 of the Constitution and an excessive restriction on the right to carry on business under Article 19(1)(g). The ruling clarifies that the 330-day limit is not mandatory, providing flexibility for extension based on case-specific factors.

The court held that, while the general rule is that the insolvency resolution process should be completed within 330 days, extensions can be granted in exceptional cases. Factors such as a short period left for completion, the interest of stakeholders, and delays attributed to the Adjudicating Authority and/or Appellate Tribunal can warrant extensions.

The decision emphasizes that the extension of time is only applicable in exceptional cases, with the overarching rule being the completion of the resolution process within 330 days. This ensures that the corporate debtor is not unnecessarily pushed into liquidation.

Facts:

Appellants (TC Healthcare P. Ltd. and Modi Mundipharma Pvt. Ltd.) were small-scale units exempted from price fixation under the DPCO based on a notification dated 2nd March, 1995.

Notifications dated 11th July, 2006, and 30th April, 2009, imposed ceiling prices on drug formulations (Frusemide and Potassium), leading to a legal challenge.

Issues:

The appellants contested the arbitrary nature of price fixation, alleging non-application of mind.

The argument was made that sustained release technology used in their products was not covered by price fixation norms.

Held:

The High Court rejected the challenge, finding that the price fixation exercise was not arbitrary and considered data from pharmaceutical producers.

The court ruled that sustained release and continuous release technologies were covered by the pricing norms unless specifically sought for a particular drug.

Failure to approach NPPA for specific price approvals or demonstrate uniqueness in their drug delivery systems did not exempt appellants from pricing norms.

The appeals were dismissed, and no costs were awarded. The court upheld the pricing norms under the DPCO, emphasizing that sustained release and continuous release technologies were covered unless specifically sought otherwise.

Facts:

The respondent, M/S. Krishna Wax (P) Ltd., faced a search at its registered office and factory premises. Allegations included manufacturing activities without proper procedures and clearing excise duty. A writ petition was filed, contesting the department's authority, claiming no manufacturing activity.

Issues:

The jurisdiction of the Department to proceed with the matter. The respondent contended that the notice was invalid as the preliminary objection was not decided.

Held:

The High Court directed the Department to decide the preliminary objection before addressing other issues. An Internal Order dated 15.03.2006 was issued, stating the jurisdiction to proceed. However, the Act doesn't mandate such prima facie determinations. The Department's decision not to communicate the Internal Order independently was justified.

Decision: The appellate order and the Tribunal's decision were set aside. Proceedings based on the show cause notice were directed to a logical conclusion. The respondent was given three weeks to respond, presenting materials supporting its case. The matter would proceed in accordance with the law.

FACTS:

The Appellant trust had acquired flats from the Respondent for the purpose of providing hostel facilities to nurses employed by the trust's hospital. Due to alleged poor building quality, the structure became dilapidated, and the trust vacated the flats in 2002. The trust filed a complaint seeking compensation for annual loss of rent, cost of reconstruction, and future loss of rent.

ISSUES:

Whether the Appellant trust qualifies as a 'consumer' under Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986?

Whether the complaint is barred by limitation?

HELD:

The court held that the Appellant trust is a 'consumer' under Section 2(1)(d) for the specific transaction. The purchase of flats for providing accommodation to nurses does not qualify as a 'commercial purpose.' The court rejected the argument that the hostel facilities were indirectly connected to the commercial purpose of the hospital's operation. The court remanded the matter to the National Commission for further consideration.

REFERRED CASES:

Cheema Engineering Services vs. Rajan Singh, (1997) 1 SCC 131

Kalpavruksha Charitable Trust vs. Toshniwal Brothers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd., (2000) 1 SCC 512

Laxmi Engineering Works vs. P.S.G. Industrial Institute, (1995) 3 SCC 583

Paramount Digital Colour Lab vs. Agfa India Private Limited, (2018) 14 SCC 81

Spring Meadows Hospital vs. Harjol Ahluwalia through K.S. Ahluwalia, I (1998) CPJ 1

Synco Textiles Pvt. Ltd. vs. Greaves Cotton and Company Limited, (1991) 1 CPJ 499