Facts:

Rajaiah and Nanjaiah, heirs of the late Nanjaiah Thavarekatte, filed suits against the University of Mysore claiming possession and enjoyment of certain land.

The University contested these claims, asserting its ownership of the land based on a lease agreement with the President of India.

Issues:

Whether Rajaiah and Nanjaiah had valid claims to the land.

Whether the Land Tribunal had jurisdiction to grant occupancy rights over land leased to the University.

Whether the documents presented by Rajaiah and Nanjaiah were fraudulent.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the disputed land belonged to the University of Mysore, as evidenced by a registered lease deed.

The Court found that the claims of Rajaiah and Nanjaiah's heirs were based on fraudulent documents, including a fabricated order from the Land Tribunal.

It was determined that the Land Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to grant occupancy rights over land leased to a university, as per Section 107 of the KLR Act.

Therefore, the High Court's judgment was set aside, the trial court's decision was reinstated, and the Land Tribunal's order was quashed.

The Court directed expedited legal proceedings in related criminal cases and affirmed that the University was in lawful possession of the land.

Facts:

The case arose from a dispute in the execution of a works contract, referred to an arbitrator by the High Court. The arbitrator issued an award in favor of the appellant. The respondent challenged the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The respondent sought to amend its objections after three years, initially rejected by the trial court but later allowed by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether objections to jurisdiction can be raised under Section 34 of the Act, even if not raised under Section 16, and the permissibility of amendments to objections beyond the period of limitation.

Held:

The Court held that objections to jurisdiction could be raised under Section 34 of the Act, even if not raised under Section 16. The court disagreed with certain observations made in M/s MSP Infrastructure Ltd. vs. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd., particularly regarding the interpretation of the phrase "public policy of India" and the jurisdiction of the tribunal. As the amendment application was not pressed, the appeal was rendered infructuous, and the impugned order was set aside. The matter was directed to be taken up by the trial court for consideration of objections under Section 34 of the Act.

The court left it open for the respondents to argue that their objection regarding the exclusion of the Act by the M.P. Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 could be raised even without formal pleading, as it was a legal plea. The appellant was also allowed to argue to the contrary.

Facts:

The State of Bihar appealed against the appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, contending that the Bihar Public Works Contracts Arbitration Tribunal Act, 2008, excluded the application of the Central Act. The arbitration agreement between the parties specified the applicability of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Issues:

Whether the Bihar Public Works Contracts Arbitration Tribunal Act, 2008, excludes the applicability of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Whether Section 4(3)(b) of the Bihar Public Works Contracts Arbitration Tribunal Act, 2008, is constitutionally valid.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that since the arbitration agreement between the parties specified the applicability of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the Bihar Public Works Contracts Arbitration Tribunal Act, 2008, would not apply. Therefore, there was no ground to interfere with the appointment of the arbitrator under the Central Act.

The Court declared Section 4(3)(b) of the Bihar Public Works Contracts Arbitration Tribunal Act, 2008, unconstitutional as it allowed the termination of the Chairman and other members of the Arbitration Tribunal at the pleasure of the Government, which was inconsistent with Article 14 of the Constitution.

Facts:

The respondent, a retired Train Examiner from the Indian Railways, faced difficulties in obtaining his rightful pension for over 27 years.

Various office memoranda and policy resolutions by the Government of India regarding pension calculations led to confusion and disputes.

The Central Administrative Tribunal initially ruled in favor of the respondent, but the Madras High Court overturned this decision.

Issues:

Whether subsequent office memoranda override or complement earlier ones regarding pension entitlements.

Whether the respondent's post was re-designated as Junior Engineer Grade-II.

Held:

The Supreme Court reiterated the principles laid down in the case of K.S. Krishnaswamy vs. Union of India, emphasizing that subsequent office memoranda clarified and complemented earlier ones, rather than overriding them.

The Court found no evidence to support the claim of the respondent's post being re-designated as Junior Engineer Grade-II.

Therefore, the Court set aside the judgment of the Madras High Court and allowed the appeal filed by the Union of India.

Any payments made to the respondent were to be retained, and a copy of the order was to be sent to the Department of Personnel and Training of the Government of India.

Facts:

The appellant challenged the election of respondent no.1 by filing an election petition before the High Court, alleging various violations of instructions issued by the Election Commission and provisions of the Representation of People Act. Respondent no.1 filed two applications seeking to strike out certain paragraphs of the election petition and to dismiss the petition in limine. The High Court allowed both applications.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's approach in considering the applications was correct.

Whether the election petition disclosed a cause of action.

Whether the paragraphs sought to be struck out contained material facts.

Whether the High Court erred in its analysis of the contents of certain paragraphs of the election petition.

Whether the applications filed by respondent no.1 should be rejected and the Election Petition restored for further proceedings.

Held:

The High Court's approach in considering the applications was erroneous as it ventured into analyzing the matter on its merits, which was prohibited at that stage.

The election petition should be read as a whole, and it cannot be dissected sentence-wise or paragraph-wise to rule out the disclosure of a cause of action.

The High Court misdirected itself in concluding that the election petition did not disclose any cause of action. The pleadings should contain all necessary details and particulars as required by law.

The averments made in the paragraphs of the election petition were not frivolous and vexatious, and the High Court erred in analyzing their tenability on merits.

The High Court's analysis of the contents of certain paragraphs of the election petition was incorrect. Those paragraphs disclosed material facts necessary for adjudicating the grounds for declaring the election void.

Both applications filed by respondent no.1 were to be rejected, and the Election Petition was to be restored to the file of the High Court for further proceedings. Similarly, the applications filed by the appellant were to be restored for decision by the High Court.

Facts:

The appellant participated in an auction held on 14th February 2013.

He deposited earnest money and part of the auction amount.

Eventually, he deposited the remaining 75% within 15 days of the confirmation of sale.

The auction was challenged, leading to litigation.

Issues:

Whether the 15-day period for depositing the remaining 75% started from the date of communication of confirmation of sale or from the date of the auction.

Held:

The court analyzed Rule 9 of the 2002 Rules and concluded that the 15-day period for depositing the remaining amount starts from the date of confirmation, not from the date of the auction. Various provisions of Rule 9 indicated that the deposit of the remaining amount is to be made after confirmation of sale by the secured creditor. Therefore, the auction purchaser had complied with the provisions of Rule 9 by depositing the remaining 75% within 15 days of the confirmation of sale.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned orders, and directed the delivery of possession in accordance with the law.

Facts:

The incident occurred on March 25, 1993, involving the shooting of the deceased by the respondents.

The prosecution's case relied primarily on the testimonies of three witnesses: Naresh Pal (PW1), Dharmendra (PW2), and Prakashee (PW3), the complainant, an eyewitness, and the deceased's wife, respectively.

The High Court acquitted the respondents, finding the prosecution witnesses not credible, leading to the appeal by the State of Uttar Pradesh.

Issues:

The credibility of prosecution witnesses.

Whether the prosecution proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Held:

The Court concurred with the High Court's assessment that the prosecution had failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

Various inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were noted, including contradictions, lack of plausible explanations for their presence at the scene, and suspicious conduct. The failure to present crucial witnesses further weakened the prosecution's case.

Therefore, the appeal filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh was dismissed, affirming the acquittal of the respondents.

Facts:

Respondent no. 2, a government employee belonging to the Scheduled Caste, filed an FIR in 2006 against two senior officers (non-Scheduled Caste) for making adverse entries in his Annual Confidential Report. The appellant, in 2011, refused sanction to proceed against the senior officers. Subsequently, in 2016, respondent no. 2 lodged another FIR against the appellant. The appellant sought quashing of the proceedings, which was rejected by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether there is an absolute bar against the grant of anticipatory bail in cases under the Atrocities Act.

Whether procedural safeguards are necessary to prevent false implications and arrests under the Act.

Whether the exclusion of anticipatory bail applies only to genuine cases and not to those where no prima facie case is made out or the allegations are patently false or mala fide.

Held:

The court affirmed its jurisdiction to issue appropriate orders or directions for the enforcement of fundamental rights, emphasizing the need to uphold constitutional values. It reiterated the importance of protecting rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution. Para (31, 32)

The court highlighted the objective of the Atrocities Act to prevent atrocities against marginalized communities and promote constitutional values of fraternity and integration. It emphasized the need to prevent perpetuating casteism and stressed the importance of interpreting the Act in a manner that promotes these values. Para (42, 49, 52)

The court ruled that exclusion of anticipatory bail under Section 18 of the Atrocities Act applies only to genuine cases and not to those where no prima facie case is made out or the allegations are patently false or mala fide. It advocated for a purposive interpretation of the law to achieve its objective and emphasized the principle of proportionality. Para (53, 56, 60)

The court underscored the importance of safeguards against false implications and arrests under the Atrocities Act. It directed that arrest of a public servant requires written permission from the appointing authority, and for non-public servants, permission from the Senior Superintendent of Police (S.S.P.) is necessary. Preliminary inquiries must also be conducted before registering an FIR to prevent frivolous or motivated cases. Para (64, 67, 75)

The court concluded that the proceedings against the appellant were liable to be quashed as they amounted to an abuse of the process of the court. Para (82)

Conclusion: The court quashed the proceedings against the appellant. It clarified that there is no absolute bar against anticipatory bail under the Atrocities Act. Procedural safeguards, including permissions for arrest and preliminary inquiries, are necessary to prevent false implications and arrests. The exclusion of anticipatory bail applies only to genuine cases under the Act. The directions provided by the court are prospective.

Facts:

The creditor issued a notice under Section 13(2) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, initiating recovery proceedings against the debtor.

The debtor made representations seeking rescheduling of the loan, which the creditor neither considered nor communicated reasons for non-acceptance.

Negotiations ensued between the creditor and debtor, with the debtor repeatedly seeking extensions and making promises to repay, but failing to fulfill obligations.

Despite various opportunities granted by the creditor, the debtor defaulted on payments, leading to the creditor taking symbolic possession of the secured assets.

Issues:

Whether the creditor's failure to reply to the debtor's representation breached Section 13(3A) of the Act.

Whether the inclusion of agricultural land as security interest in the recovery notice was valid under Section 31(i) of the Act.

Whether the creditor's transfer of symbolic possession affected their status as a secured creditor under Section 14 of the Act.

Whether allegations of fraud and collusion between the creditor and auction purchaser were substantiated.

Held:

The failure to furnish a written reply to the debtor's representation did not significantly impact the case, as the creditor had considered the representations during negotiations.

Consequently, the debtor was not entitled to discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution.

The inclusion of agricultural land as security interest was deemed valid, as the land in question was not agricultural land based on its use and purpose.

The creditor retained their status as a secured creditor despite transferring symbolic possession of the assets, as the transfer was not complete under the Transfer of Property Act.

Allegations of fraud and collusion between the creditor and auction purchaser were unfounded, as the mere existence of a dispute did not indicate collusion.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeals by ITC Limited, affirming the creditor's right to enforce security interest and rejecting the debtor's claims of impropriety.