Facts:

The appellant, Suborno Bose, was involved in proceedings related to a complaint under Section 16(3) of the FEMA Act initiated by the Enforcement Directorate. A show-cause notice was issued to the appellant based on allegations of contravention of various provisions of the FEMA Act in relation to foreign exchange transactions.

Issues:

Whether the appellant, as the Managing Director of the company in question, was liable for the contraventions alleged against the company. Additionally, the court had to interpret the relevant provisions of the FEMA Act, FEMA Regulations, and guidelines to decide on the matter.

Held:

The court examined the provisions of Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the FEMA Act, along with related regulations and guidelines. Section 10(5) required authorized persons to ensure that transactions involving foreign exchange do not contravene provisions of the FEMA Act or related rules. Section 10(6) deemed certain circumstances to be contraventions, including failure to use foreign exchange for the intended purpose, not surrendering it within the specified period, or using it for unauthorized purposes.

The court concluded that the contravention under Section 10(6) was a continuing offense, and that even though the appellant became the Managing Director of the company after the alleged contravention took place, he was responsible for taking corrective actions upon assuming office.

The court emphasized that the requirement to surrender foreign exchange within a specified period was a civil obligation, and the appellant's awareness of the contravention meant he should have taken steps to rectify it.

Accordingly, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed

Facts:

The case involves a writ petition challenging the detention orders issued under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act. The detention orders were made by a specially empowered officer. The detenues, represented by their counsel, contended that their right to representation against the detention orders had been violated.

Issues:

Whether the detenues had the right to make representations against the detention orders made by a specially empowered officer under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act.

Whether the Detaining Authority had the obligation to consider the representation independently or wait for the Advisory Board's report.

Whether the delay in considering the representation by the Detaining Authority violated the detenues' constitutional rights.

Held:

Majority Opinion (Uday Umesh Lalit and Indu Malhotra, JJ.):

The detenues have the right to make representations against detention orders made by a specially empowered officer under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act. This right is in addition to the right to make representations to the State Government and the Central Government (Para 12).

The Detaining Authority is obliged to consider the representations without waiting for the opinion of the Central Advisory Board. The specially empowered officer has no statutory role to play at the stage when the Advisory Board's report is received. The report is meant for the appropriate Government's consumption, and confidentiality is mandated (Para 22-23).

In cases where the representation is received before or after the Advisory Board's reference, the Detaining Authority must consider the representation promptly. Inaction on the Detaining Authority's part to consider the representation causes prejudice to the detenues and violates their constitutional rights (Para 26-28).

Dissenting Opinion (Hemant Gupta, J.):

The Detaining Authority, whether the Central Government, State Government, or a specially empowered officer, has the jurisdiction to consider representations against detention orders independently of the Advisory Board's recommendation (Para 3).

The consideration for revocation of a detention order is distinct from the Advisory Board's assessment of sufficient cause for detention. The Detaining Authority should prudently defer the decision on the representation while the matter is being reviewed by the Advisory Board (Para 23).

Facts:

Respondent No. 2, not a party to certain court proceedings, filed an RTI application seeking information and certified copies of relevant documents. The Public Information Officer of the Gujarat High Court informed respondent No. 2 that, according to Rule 151 of the Gujarat High Court Rules, an affidavit stating the grounds for requiring the certified copies was necessary. The Appellate Authority upheld this decision.

In a second appeal, the Chief Information Commissioner directed the Public Information Officer to provide the requested information. Respondent No. 1 (High Court) challenged this order, leading to conflicting decisions between the Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench held that when valid rules govern a particular field, applying fresh rules under the RTI Act would create confusion.

Issues:

Can a third party seek information and certified copies of documents from the Gujarat High Court under the RTI Act?

Is Rule 151 of the Gujarat High Court Rules inconsistent with the provisions of the RTI Act?

Held:

The Court held that Rule 151 of the Gujarat High Court Rules does not obstruct a third party from obtaining copies of documents from court proceedings. The Rule simply provides a different procedure for obtaining information, requiring the third party to file an application/affidavit stating reasons for the request. This is to ensure that the information is sought for genuine reasons or public interest. (Para 27)

The Court emphasized that the RTI Act recognizes the need to protect institutional interests and confidentiality of sensitive information. It found that the procedure to obtain certified copies under the High Court Rules is not cumbersome and serves to prevent misuse of court processes and information. (Para 28)

The Court clarified that the High Court Rules' mechanism for obtaining information is not inconsistent with the provisions of the RTI Act. Instead, they complement each other. The information/certified copies on the judicial side should be obtained through the mechanism provided under the High Court Rules, rather than invoking the provisions of the RTI Act. (Para 38)

Facts:

The appellant challenged the grant of moderation/grace marks to certain candidates appointed on March 30, 2009, in the context of filling up six posts in the Higher Judicial Service through direct recruitment. The appellant sought his own appointment as a District Judge. The High Court set aside the moderation marks, leading to the recasting of the select list. The appellant was ultimately appointed as a District Judge.

Issues:

The appellant's claim for notional seniority and whether he should be granted seniority from the date of appointment of other candidates who were appointed through the same selection process.

Held:

The appellant was entitled to be appointed along with other candidates. The appellant was excluded from the original appointment due to certain circumstances. As the select list was revised, the appellant was deemed to be part of the appointment along with other candidates.The actual date of the appellant's appointment was recognized as February 24, 2011. Although the appellant couldn't be treated as appointed on March 30, 2009, he was entitled to notional appointment from that earlier date and consequential seniority.( Para 36)

The delay in deciding the seniority claim by the High Court could not defeat the appellant's right to claim seniority from the date other candidates in the same selection process were appointed.( Para 41)

The interpretation of rules and quotas for appointments and seniority was discussed. The Full Bench judgment clarified that there is a quota for in-service candidates, contrary to the High Court's erroneous interpretation.( Para 43)

The argument that some candidates were granted selection grades earlier than the appellant did not confer better legal or equitable rights. Appointments made beyond the prescribed quota meant for appointment by transfer were not protected.( Para 44)

The appeals are allowed

Facts:The case involves an appeal arising from a writ petition challenging the change of land use in the Indira Nagar development from commercial to residential. The Madhya Pradesh Housing and Infrastructure Development Board, the appellant, sought the modification based on town planning considerations. The modification was initially rejected by authorities but was subsequently approved by the Deputy Director, Town and Country Planning, and the State Government.

Issues:

Whether the modification of the layout plan from commercial to residential was legally valid and followed proper procedures under the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam.

Whether the High Court's application of the principle of promissory estoppel was appropriate in this case.

Whether the delay in filing the writ petition and the creation of third-party rights impacted the outcome of the case.

Held:

The Court discusses the legal framework and distinguishes between the development plan, zonal plan, and town planning scheme under the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam. It emphasizes the importance of adhering to these plans and the legality of modifications that conform to development norms.( Para 6)

The Court notes that the area earmarked for a shopping complex remained undeveloped for over 20 years and analyzes the arguments presented by both parties. It highlights the distinction between changing land use from commercial to residential (which is the case here) and the more common situation of changing land use to commercial or industrial.( Para 7)

The Court discusses the delay in filing the writ petition, the change in position, and the creation of third-party rights due to this delay. It cites relevant case law to emphasize that the courts usually do not assist tardy petitioners, especially when third-party rights are involved.( Para 8)

The Court observes that the Ujjain Municipal Corporation was not made a party to the case and that their stand was not considered. It notes that the State Government and authorities supported the modification. The Court underscores the need for reasonable grounds for opposing the modification.( Para 9)

The Court directs that the appellant-board and authorities should ensure that areas earmarked for a primary school and park/garden are not converted into residential plots. It also instructs that unsold residential plots should be used for public amenities, not allocated for sale.( Para 10)

Facts:

The appellant, a State Cooperative body, serves as the apex body of Cooperative Banks in Chhattisgarh. The first respondent is a District Central Cooperative Bank. The dispute centers around the appointment of the CEO of the first respondent. The Division Bench of the High Court held that the appellant had no role in CEO appointments, and such power lay with the Registrar only after the District Central Cooperative Bank's failure to make the appointment within a specified period.

Issues:

Whether the appellant had the authority to appoint the CEO of the first respondent?

Whether the amendments brought about by the 2016 Amending Act altered the provisions of CEO appointments for Cooperative Banks?

How should the conflict between the provisions of Section 49-E(2) and Section 54(3) be resolved?

Held:

Section 54 deals with the appointment of Managers, Secretaries, and officers of societies. Sub-section (1) empowers societies to make appointments based on qualifications. Sub-section (2) requires Apex and Central Societies to maintain a cadre of officers as directed by the State Government.

Section 49-E pertains to CEO appointments under specific circumstances. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 49-E override contrary provisions and apply when the State Government has contributed to share capital, given loans, etc. CEO appointments are covered under this provision.

Central Societies under Section 49-E(2) appoint CEOs from the cadre if created under Section 54.

Section 54(3) empowers the State Government to specify societies for cadre officers' appointment by Apex or Central Societies. The notified class must appoint cadre officers as deputed.

The 2016 Amending Act inserted clauses (a) and (b) into Section 54(3), specifying CEO eligibility and the Registrar's appointment authority. Clauses (a) and (b) apply solely to Cooperative Banks, and their introduction does not negate Section 49-E.

Section 49-E(2) stipulates CEO appointment from cadre officers of Section 54 if applicable.

Notification under Section 54(3) operates regulatory control over Central Societies under Section 49-E(2), specifying CEO appointment sources.

Courts must harmonize conflicting provisions; both Section 49-E(2) and Section 54(3) must be upheld. Section 54(3) notifications grant State Government regulatory power.

The State Government can specify Cooperative Banks' CEO appointments from Apex Society's cadre. Notified Apex Society provides a panel; RBI eligibility criteria apply. CEO appointment from cadre is mandatory under Section 49-E(2).

First respondent is a Central Society under Section 49-E(2). Notification obligates Cooperative Banks to appoint CEOs from cadre created by State Cooperative Bank. The appointment of CEO by the appellant was ratified by the Registrar and BoD, aligning with Section 54(3).

FACTS:

The appellants had been granted compassionate appointments, but their appointments were canceled upon the discovery that they were made in contravention of the Karnataka Civil Services (Appointment on Compassionate Grounds) Rules, 1996, as amended from 01.04.1999. The amendments introduced a stipulation that a minor dependent of a deceased government employee must apply within one year from the date of death and must have attained the age of eighteen on the day of application. Prior to the amendment, a minor could apply within one year of attaining majority.

ISSUES:

Whether the appellants' appointments were valid under the unamended provisions of Rule 5.

Whether the amended provisions of Rule 5 were applicable to the appellants' cases.

Whether the appellants' claims could be considered under the transitory provision of Rule 9(3).

Whether the norms prevailing on the date of consideration or on the date of the government employee's death should apply to compassionate appointments.

Whether the appellants were entitled to continuation of their appointments.

HELD:

The Court considered the contentions of the parties and the relevant legal principles in making its decision. The Court held:

The appellants' claims could not be considered under the unamended provisions of Rule 5 as they applied for compassionate appointments well beyond one year from the date of their respective parents' deaths, and the amended provisions had become operational.

The norms applicable on the date of consideration of the application should be the basis for compassionate appointment, and a dependent cannot demand consideration based on the norms prevailing on the date of the government employee's death.

The transitory provision of Rule 9(3) did not cover the appellants' cases as their applications were filed in contravention of Rule 5 as amended in 1999.

Compassionate appointment is a concession and not a right, and the criteria laid down in the rules must be satisfied by all aspirants.

The appellants were ineligible for compassionate appointment under the amended provisions of Rule 5, and their appointments were justifiably canceled.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over the classification of a specific parcel of land described as 'Shamlat Patti Dhera & Khubi'. The appellant, Patram, argued that the land, though described as 'shamilat' land, was actually a patti owned by his ancestors for over a century. The land was not being utilized for common village purposes, and thus, according to him, it should not be categorized as 'shamilat deh' under the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961.

Issues:

Whether the land in question qualifies as 'shamilat deh' under the definition provided in Section 2(g) of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961.

Held:

The court analyzed the definitions and provisions in the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, particularly focusing on Section 2(g) which defines 'shamilat deh'. The court noted that terms like 'taraf', 'patti', 'panna', and 'thola' represent different divisions within a village based on caste, religion, occupation, etc. The court discussed the absence of a comma after the word 'shamilat' in a specific section and concluded that this was likely a typographical error. The court interpreted that 'shamilat deh' should be read along with 'taraf', 'patti', 'panna', and 'thola'. A land could only be considered 'shamilat deh' if it met one of these conditions. If the term 'shamilat' was missing from any of these descriptions, the land could not be categorized as 'shamilat deh'.

Based on the evidence presented, including historical records and the fact that the land was not utilized for the common benefit of the village community, the court held that the land in question did not qualify as 'shamilat deh' under the Act. As a result, the court allowed the appeal, setting aside previous judgments, and ordered that the appellant's name be entered in the ownership column with the entry 'shamlat patti'.

Facts:

The appellant's husband owned a vehicle insured by the respondent. The vehicle was involved in an accident, leading to the death of the appellant's husband and daughter. The respondent rejected the claim, asserting that the driver did not possess a valid driving license. The appellant filed consumer complaints seeking compensation.

Issues:

Whether the insurance company's liability is absolved due to the driver's invalid/fake driving license.

What level of care/diligence is expected of the employer/insured when hiring a driver with a driving license.

Held:

The court referred to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, specifically Section 149(2)(a)(ii), which addresses the conditions of driving licenses. The court discussed the extent of care an employer should exercise when hiring a driver, and whether the insurance company can avoid liability due to the driver's invalid license.

The court cited the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Lehru & Ors., (2003) 3 SCC 338 and the case of Pepsu RTC vs. National Insurance Co., (2013) 10 SCC 217, emphasizing that the insurer cannot avoid liability merely on the ground of the driver's invalid license. The insurer must prove negligence or failure on the part of the insured to fulfill policy conditions regarding driver competence.

The court ruled that while hiring a driver, the employer must verify the driver's license and assess their competence. If the driver presents a seemingly genuine license, the employer need not further investigate its authenticity unless there's reason to doubt. The court deemed it unreasonable to place the onus on the insured to verify licenses with transport authorities across the country.

The court held that if the insurer proves that the insured was aware of the fake license but still allowed the person to drive, the insurer's liability ceases. In this case, the driver's license was purportedly issued by a licensing authority, but its authenticity couldn't be verified. The court found the insured had not been negligent and allowed the appeals, holding the insurer liable to indemnify the appellant.

REFERRED CASES:

National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Swaran Singh & Ors., (2004) 3 SCC 297 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 733

Pepsu RTC vs. National Insurance Co., (2013) 10 SCC 217

United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Lehru & Ors., (2003) 3 SCC 338 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 641