Facts:

The respondent initially filed a writ petition challenging the 2016 Rules, which was disposed of with the liberty to make a representation. The subsequent representation was rejected. A second writ petition was filed by the respondent, challenging only the 2016 Rules. An amendment application sought the quashing of advertisements and the list of selected candidates, which was allowed by the court.

Issues:

The appeal included the High Court's interference with the select list despite the respondent being disallowed from challenging the advertisements, the absence of selected candidates in the writ petition, and the questionable categorization of the writ petition as a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) given its nature related to service jurisprudence.

Held:

The High Court erred in modifying the select list when the respondent was not allowed to challenge the advertisements. (Para 29-32)

The direction to modify the select list without impleading selected candidates was against the appellants' interests. (Para 33)

The High Court, in treating the writ petition as a PIL, erred, especially since the respondent was not allowed to challenge the advertisements. (Para 38)

The Court emphasized that the respondent, not participating in the selection process, should not have been allowed to challenge the validity of the Rules indirectly. (Para 40)

Decision: The appeals were allowed, the High Court's directions were set aside, and the writ petition was dismissed.

Facts:

The respondents sought compassionate appointment after the death of their parents who were teachers.

Appointments were made under Rule 10 of the Bihar Municipal Body Elementary Teachers (Employment and Service Conditions) Rules, 2006.

An instruction dated 17 October 2008 by the Government of Bihar affected the jurisdiction of the District Compassionate Committee.

Issues:

Validity of appointments under Rule 10.

Impact of the Government instruction dated 17 October 2008 on the appointments.

Held:

The High Court's direction to appoint the respondents in the regular service of the Government was deemed erroneous. The respondents were appointed in accordance with Rule 10 of the 2006 Rules. No executive instruction could supersede the rules. The respondents were granted the liberty to approach the State Government for suitable relief.

Facts:

The Union of India contended that the respondents were involved in smuggling a large volume of gold from the UAE to India, weighing over 3300 kgs. The respondents were arrested under Section 135 of the Customs Act, and detention orders were issued under Section 3 of COFEPOSA on May 17, 2019. The detention orders were served on the respondents on May 18, 2019, while the compilation of documents was served on May 21, 2019, and May 22, 2019.

Issues:

The High Court quashed the detention orders, citing a procedural violation concerning the non-simultaneous service of relied-upon documents with the detention orders. Additionally, the detaining authority's satisfaction regarding the respondents' likelihood of release on bail was questioned.

Held:

Section 3(3) of COFEPOSA allows a leeway of five days for the grounds of detention and documents to be served. The High Court erred in quashing the orders based on the timing of document service, as the statutory requirement was met within the stipulated timeframe.( Paragraph 19)

The relied-upon documents were served within the statutory period, and the time-consuming nature of compiling voluminous documents justified the delay in serving the compilation.( Paragraph 21)

The term "pari passu" must be read in conjunction with Section 3(3) of COFEPOSA, meaning that the grounds and documents must be served within five days. The High Court's decision to quash the orders on this ground was deemed incorrect.( Paragraph 24)

The "Hand Book on Compilation of Instructions on COFEPOSA matters" guidelines were fully complied with, but executive instructions cannot override statutory provisions.( Paragraph 26)

Detention orders can be validly passed against a person in custody, provided the grounds show awareness and the likelihood of release on bail leading to further prejudicial activities.( Paragraph 30)

The detaining authority's awareness of the respondents' custody was evident, even though it was not explicitly stated in the orders.( Paragraph 35)

The satisfaction of the detaining authority regarding the likelihood of release on bail was based on materials, and the High Court erred in quashing the orders solely on this ground.( Paragraph 37)

Decision: The appeals of the Union of India were allowed, and the appeals of the detenues were dismissed. The High Court's decision to quash the detention orders was set aside.

Facts:

Specific performance suit filed by the plaintiff against family members.

Only Defendant No. 5 (Respondent No. 1) filed a written statement but did not lead evidence.

Interim injunction in a partition suit related to the property.

Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between plaintiff and defendants.

High Court initially decreed specific performance but later recalled the judgment on a review petition.

Issues:

Validity of service on Respondent No. 1.

Absence of a written Vakalatnama for the advocate representing Respondent No. 1.

Family dispute and the effect of an interim injunction.

Held:

The court, after considering the facts and arguments, held that service on Respondent No. 1 was properly conducted through multiple attempts. The absence of a written Vakalatnama was deemed an irregularity, and the court rejected the argument that it could be a ground for review. The court found that the result of the appeal would have been the same even if Respondent No. 1 had not appeared. Consequently, the impugned judgment was set aside, and the appeal was allowed.

Facts:

Land owned by the petitioner acquired for Metro railway construction under the 1978 Act.

Petitioner filed for compensation under the 2013 Act, seeking an amendment.

Appellate Authority awarded compensation, including 12% per annum and 100% solatium.

High Court partially allowed revision, stating solatium calculated only on market value and assets.

Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether solatium under Section 30(1) should include the additional 12% per annum on market value.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after analyzing relevant sections, held that solatium under Section 30(1) should be calculated only on the market value plus the value of assets attached to the land. The total compensation amount determined under Sections 26, 27, and 28 should not include the additional 12% per annum on the market value specified in Section 30(3). The final award comprises three components: compensation amount, solatium, and the amount calculated at 12% per annum on the market value. The Court rejected the argument that Section 69 supports including the 12% per annum amount in the solatium, stating that Section 69 pertains to the determination of the final award, which includes separate components. The Special Leave Petitions were dismissed.

Facts:

Original plaintiffs filed a suit for specific performance against the original defendant.

Despite an injunction, the defendant executed a sale deed in favor of the appellant during the suit's pendency.

The appellant applied for impleadment as a defendant, claiming a direct interest in the suit property.

Trial court allowed impleadment, but the High Court set aside this order, stating the appellant was not a necessary party.

Issues:

Whether the appellant, not a party to the original agreement, can be impleaded in a specific performance suit.

Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the trial court's order allowing impleadment.

Held:

The Supreme Court, relying on the principles in Kasturi vs. Iyyamperumal, held that the plaintiff is the dominus litis and cannot be compelled to implead a person against whom no relief has been claimed. The Court emphasized that a third party or a stranger cannot be added to a suit for specific performance merely to find out who is in possession or to avoid multiplicity of suits.

The Court agreed with the High Court's view that the appellant cannot be impleaded as a defendant in the specific performance suit against the wish of the plaintiffs. The appeals were dismissed.

Facts:

The State of Maharashtra initiated land acquisition for the construction of Mukane Dam in 1994.

Landowners (appellants) challenged the compensation offered by the Land Acquisition Officer (LAO).

Civil Court partly enhanced the compensation rates for Jirayat, Bagayat, and Pot Kharab lands in 2006.

State appealed to the Bombay High Court against the Civil Court's award.

High Court partly allowed the State's appeals, reducing the compensation rates for Jirayat and Bagayat lands.

Issues:

Whether the rates determined by the Civil Court for Jirayat and Bagayat lands were justified.

The validity of the High Court's decision to reduce the compensation rates.

Held:

The High Court's reasoning and conclusion in reducing the compensation rates are just and proper. The reduction is based on the appreciation of evidence, including six sale deeds presented by both the State and the landowners.( Para 20)

The High Court correctly considered three sale deeds presented by the State and three by the landowners to determine the market value of the acquired land. The rates determined by the Civil Court were deemed on the higher side, justifying the reduction by the High Court.( Para 21)

The sale deed dated 14.02.1994 (Ex-141) was considered relevant for determining the market value, being close to the date of acquisition and involving a larger chunk of land.( Para 24)

Exclusive reliance on a single sale deed (Ex-P-42) from 1989 for a small piece of land was deemed unsafe. The High Court's consideration of multiple sale deeds was justified.( Para 26)

The marginal reduction in rates for Jirayat and Bagayat lands, based on the High Court's cogent reasoning, cannot be faulted with.( Para 29)

The appeals are accordingly dismissed. ( Para 30)

Facts:

The case involves the sale of land by a common landowner to different parties on different dates.

Dispute centers around a passage, with the plaintiff claiming exclusive rights, while the defendant relies on a reserved right of access in an earlier sale deed.

Issues:

Whether the exclusive right granted to the plaintiff is valid in light of the reserved access rights in an earlier sale deed.

The impact of subsequent events, such as inheritance, on the rights created by the original sale deeds.

The applicability of Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

Held:

The court held that the easement rights reserved for defendant No. 2 in the earlier sale deed were not extinguished, rendering the exclusive right granted to the plaintiff illegal.

Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act was cited, emphasizing that later-created rights are subject to earlier-created rights unless a special contract or reservation binds the earlier transferees.

The court stressed that rights should be adjudicated based on the documents of title in 1976, and subsequent events should not affect these rights.

The appeals were allowed, and the 16 feet x 103 feet passage adjoining the property of the defendants leading to the property of the plaintiff was reserved for the common use of defendant No. 2 and the plaintiff.

Facts:

In February 2017, the Gujarat Maritime Board issued a tender for the auction of eight vacant plots at Alang-Sosiya Ship Recycling Yard. The allocation of these plots, especially the reservation for SC and ST categories, became a contentious issue. The S.C./S.T. Ship breakers Association challenged the allocation before the High Court, asserting that reservation should be based on the total number of plots available, not just those being auctioned.

Issues:

Interpretation of The Gujarat Maritime Board (Conditions & Procedures for granting permission for Utilizing Ship Recycling Plots) Ship Recycling Regulations, 2015.

Validity of the reservation policy for SC and ST categories concerning the total number of plots or only those being auctioned.

Applicability of the changed regulation from the 2006 Regulations.

Held:

The Supreme Court clarified that the expression "the plots" in the 2015 Regulations should be interpreted in the context of the plots to be auctioned, as mentioned in clauses 5.1 and 5.2. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment, confirming that reservation applies only to the plots being auctioned. However, the reservation made for the specific eight plots subject to the auction notice was maintained. The Court emphasized that the 2015 Regulations represented a departure from the earlier regulations, and the reservation policy should be implemented in a non-arbitrary manner by the Gujarat Maritime Board.

The appeal was allowed, and the protection granted by the previous order continued for four weeks. The appellant was granted the freedom to pursue further legal proceedings.