Facts:

The appellant, Director, Prasar Bharati, regularly telecasts advertisements on their TV channel "Doordarshan" and entered into agreements with advertising agencies for better regulation of advertising practices.

The agreements stipulated that the agencies would receive a 15% commission on advertisements sold to them by the appellant.

The Income Tax Department raised questions regarding the applicability of Section 194H and Section 201 of the Income Tax Act to the payments made by the appellant to the agencies.

The matter went through assessment proceedings, appeals, and eventually reached the High Court, which ruled in favor of the Income Tax Department.

Issues:

Whether the payments made by the appellant to advertising agencies constitute commission as defined under Section 194H of the Income Tax Act.

Whether the appellant is liable for not deducting tax at source as required by Section 194H.

Held:

The court examined the terms of the agreement, which explicitly used the term "commission" in relevant clauses, indicating the nature of the transactions.

It was established that the appellant was paying 15% commission to the agencies for securing advertisements, and the relationship between the parties was that of principal and agent.

The court affirmed that the payments indeed constituted commission payments, making the appellant liable for not deducting tax at source as required by Section 194H.

The judgment dismissed the appeals, upholding the decision of the High Court.

Facts:

The case involved two sets of references before the Industrial Tribunal regarding the regularization of contract laborers at ONGC Ltd. The first set of reference (Civil Appeal No. SLP(c) No.23494/2012) questioned the entitlement of certain contract laborers to regular employment and benefits similar to those of regular employees. The second set of reference (Civil Appeal No. SLP(c) No.23495/2012) addressed the regularization of services of contractual workers at ONGC Ltd.

Issues:

Whether the contract laborers were entitled to regularization and benefits akin to those of regular employees.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after hearing arguments from both sides, concluded that the Industrial Tribunal had thoroughly considered all relevant aspects in its award, and there was no need for further adjudication.

The Court noted that the Division Bench primarily needed to consider the correctness of the Single Judge's judgment rather than remitting the matter to the Tribunal. Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Division Bench and remitted the matters back to the High Court for disposal on merits.

The Court requested the Division Bench to expedite the disposal of the writ appeals, preferably within six months. The Court disposed of the appeals, with no order as to costs.

Facts:

The case involves the consideration of the use of videography in crime scene investigations.

The Court refers to submissions and notes provided by the Additional Solicitor General, Committee reports, and suggestions from legal experts.

Issues:

The main issue is the admissibility and use of videography in criminal investigations, particularly at crime scenes.

The Court also addresses concerns regarding the implementation of videography, such as funding, storage, and admissibility of electronic evidence.

Held and Decision:

The use of videography in crime scene investigations is of immense value in improving the administration of criminal justice.

New techniques and devices, including videography, have evidentiary advantages, subject to appropriate safeguards.

The Court approves the proposed implementation plan and sets deadlines for its execution, directing the establishment of a Central Oversight Body (COB) to oversee the process.

Compliance with the directions provided is mandated, and progress is to be reported to the Court by a specified date.

Additionally, the Court directs the creation of an oversight mechanism in every state to monitor CCTV camera footage in police stations and prisons.

Facts:

The respondent, Kanwal Nain Singh, applied for voluntary retirement under the bank's VRS on 01.03.2001 but later tried to withdraw the application.

His request was denied, and he was retired as per the provisions of the VRS.

Subsequent legal battles ensued regarding the validity of his retirement and the ex-gratia payment made to him post-retirement.

Issues:

The legality of the respondent's retirement under the VRS and the subsequent ex-gratia payment made to him.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the respondent was bound by the previous judgment which declared his retirement under the VRS as irrevocable. The Court criticized the High Court's decision to reopen the case based on subsequent judgments, stating that the respondent's fate was sealed by the earlier judgment.

Regarding the ex-gratia payment made to the respondent, the Court acknowledged that the payment was credited to his account in 2004, even though the calculation was based on his service until 30.03.2001. The Court directed the bank to pay Rs. 1,00,000 as compensation to settle any disputes regarding the belated payment.

The Court emphasized that no recovery would be made of the benefits already paid to the respondent during his service period. It aimed to prevent further litigation on the matter and provided a final settlement.

Facts:

The case involved the interpretation of Section 19(3)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act), concerning the jurisdiction of High Courts and the power to grant stays in criminal matters. The appellants challenged the framing of charges against them under the PC Act.

Issues:

Whether an order framing charges under the provisions of the PC Act constitutes an interlocutory order, thereby invoking Section 19(3)(c) and barring the revisional power of the High Court under Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).

Whether the bar on revision under Section 19(3)(c) also extends to the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC or Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

Held:

The order framing charges may not be purely interlocutory but can, in certain circumstances, be interfered with under Section 397(2) of the CrPC, Section 482 of the CrPC, or Article 227 of the Constitution. Such interference, however, should be limited to exceptional situations. [(Para 26, 27)]

The intention of the legislature in cases under the PC Act is the expeditious conclusion of trials without impediment through stays of proceedings. The High Court's jurisdiction to entertain challenges against orders framing charges and to grant stays should be exercised sparingly and only in rare and extreme circumstances, considering the societal interest and the accused's rights. [(Para 28, 29)]

Challenges to orders framing charges should be entertained only to correct a patent error of jurisdiction, and decisions on such challenges should be expedited. Stays, if granted, should be conditional and not of indefinite duration. Matters should be decided on a day-to-day basis, and the duration of stay should not exceed two to three months. If proceedings remain pending longer, the stay should automatically lapse after six months, unless extended by a speaking order. [(Para 30-32)]

The law declares that the order framing charges is neither purely interlocutory nor final. The jurisdiction of the High Court is not barred, but its exercise should align with the legislative policy for expeditious trial disposal. Stays should not operate for an unduly long period, and the mandate of speedy justice applies to cases under the PC Act and other civil or criminal cases. [(Para 36, 37)]

Facts:

Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated on January 30, 1948, and several individuals were tried for the conspiracy and murder. Nathuram Godse and Narayan Apte were convicted, among others. The petitioner, Dr. Pankaj Kumudchandra Phadnis, sought to reopen the investigation into Gandhi's assassination, raising concerns about the circumstances of the assassination and the findings of the Kapur Commission Report.

Issues:

Whether the Supreme Court should entertain the petition to reopen the investigation into Gandhi's assassination after such a significant delay.

Whether the findings of the Kapur Commission Report should be reviewed.

Held:

The court emphasized the gross delay in raising the issue by the petitioner and stated that new research into a concluded matter does not justify reopening criminal investigations.

It further highlighted the substantial evidence presented during the trial, including eyewitness testimonies, the recovery of the murder weapon, and the findings of the investigation reports, all pointing to the involvement of Nathuram Godse as the sole assailant. The court refused to engage in reviewing the findings of the Kapur Commission Report, emphasizing the limited authority of such commissions and the need to avoid contentious issues.

It dismissed the petitioner's attempt to reopen the controversy surrounding Gandhi's assassination, considering it an exercise in futility. Therefore, the Special Leave Petition (SLP) was dismissed.

Facts:

Harita Sunil Parab filed Transfer Petition (Crl.) Nos. 254-255 of 2017 seeking the transfer of two FIRs filed against respondents nos. 2 to 4.

The FIRs were registered at Tilak Marg Police Station, New Delhi, and Indirapuram Police Station, District Ghaziabad (Uttar Pradesh).

The petitioner, a resident of Mumbai and a practicing Advocate before the Mumbai High Court, expressed concerns about the fairness of the investigation and her safety.

The respondent opposed the transfer petitions, emphasizing that the accused and prosecution witnesses were situated in Delhi, and the respondent, also an advocate practicing at Delhi, would face similar hindrances in professional engagements if the cases were transferred to Mumbai.

Issues:

Whether the petitioner's concerns regarding the fairness of the investigation and her safety warrant the transfer of the cases to Mumbai.

Whether the inconvenience faced by the petitioner in pursuing her professional engagements in Mumbai outweighs other considerations such as the availability of witnesses and the progress of the trial.

Held:

The Supreme Court rejected the transfer petitions. It was reasoned that the petitioner's apprehensions regarding possible harm to her in Delhi were too nebulous a ground for transfer. The court noted that the petitioner had been traveling between Mumbai and Delhi for professional reasons and emphasized that convenience alone could not override other considerations such as the availability of witnesses and the progress of the trial. The court referred to precedents emphasizing that the comparative inconvenience of the litigant parties was not the sole criterion for transferring cases between states but also included the inconvenience and hardships likely to be caused to the witnesses and the burden on the state exchequer.

Facts:

Between 2002 and 2007, vacancies were not determined, leading to neither promotees nor direct recruits being appointed despite vacancies being available.

After the amendment of the Rules in 2007, recruitment processes were initiated, and vacancies were determined. Both promotees and direct recruits were appointed.

A dispute arose regarding seniority, with direct recruits claiming seniority as per the Rota system laid down under the Rules, and promotees claiming seniority from the date of vacancy accrual without having passed the suitability test, which was retrospectively prescribed after the 2007 Rules amendment.

Issues:

Whether the promotees recruited in the year 2008/2009 are entitled to seniority prior to their selection on the ground that no suitability test was required prior to 9th January 2007 and retrospective effect to such requirement was illegal.

Whether the Quota-Rota rule can be applied in the absence of determination of vacancies and the impracticality of enforcing it due to continuous litigation over determining vacancies.

Held:

The High Court was correct in holding that the suitability test was required as per the judgment of this Court in All India Judges’ case and under the retrospectively amended Rules. Thus, the promotees couldn't be given promotion or claim seniority without passing this test (Para 29).

The Quota-Rota rule, although mandatory, cannot be applied in the absence of determination of vacancies and in situations where enforcing it becomes impractical due to continuous litigation over determining vacancies. Therefore, a pragmatic interpretation of the Rules is necessary (Para 30).

Decision: The Court affirmed that promotees were rightly given seniority from their appointments and rejected the direct recruits' claim based on the Rota system due to the impracticality of applying it in the given circumstances.

Facts:

The appellant-accused was sentenced to life imprisonment by the trial court. During the pendency of his appeal before the High Court, he was denied bail, despite being in custody for more than 10 years.

Issues:

Whether the denial of bail during the pendency of the appeal violated the appellant's fundamental right to speedy justice under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that access to speedy justice is an integral part of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

The Court observed the significant challenge posed by long-pending cases, especially those older than five years, in the High Courts.

It emphasized the need to explore alternative fora for handling criminal appeals to ensure timely disposal and enforcement of the right to speedy justice.

The Court recommended the timely filling of judicial vacancies and the establishment of a central selection mechanism for expediting appointments based on merit.

It highlighted the importance of improving the functioning of the collegium system for judicial appointments.

The judgment addressed the issue of strikes by legal professionals, stating that frequent strikes obstruct access to justice and contribute to the pendency of cases.

The Court called for mechanisms to enforce laws against strikes that disrupt judicial proceedings, including potential sanctions against office bearers of bar associations involved in organizing strikes.