Facts:

Narsingh Yadav, the appellant, enrolled in the Indian Army on December 2, 2003.

Diagnosed with Schizophrenia, disability assessed at 20% for five years.

Invalidating Medical Board's opinion: Disability not attributable to or aggravated by military service.

Appellant discharged from army service on May 8, 2007.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's Schizophrenia can be considered attributable to or aggravated by military service.

Applicability of Rule 14 of the Entitlement Rules for Casualty Pensionary Awards, 1982.

Validity of the decision of the Armed Forces Tribunal rejecting the claim for disability pension.

Held:

The court applied Rule 14(d) and emphasized that entitlement to disability pension should be considered only if it is established that the cause of the disease was adversely affected due to factors related to conditions of military service.

Mental disorders, like Schizophrenia, are difficult to detect at the time of recruitment.

The appellant, posted in a peace station as a Vehicle Mechanic, did not face conditions causing stress and strain leading to disability attributed to military service.

The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decision of the Tribunal.

Facts:

The case revolves around the disappearance of a child, subsequent discovery of a freshly dug mound in the appellants' house, and their confession to murdering the child for a human sacrifice.

Issues:

The admissibility of the accused's confessions, the applicability of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, and the validity of the convictions under different sections of the IPC.

Held:

The court notes consistent testimonies by independent witnesses regarding the accused's confession to the murder for a sacrifice. The confessions were found to be voluntary, without any indication of inducement, threat, or promise.( Para 14)

The court upholds the trial court and High Court's reliance on the confessions, along with corroborating evidence, establishing the guilt of the main accused for the offense under Section 302 r/w Section 34 IPC.( Para 16)

Regarding charges of kidnapping and conspiracy, the court finds insufficient evidence. Lack of consistency in witnesses' statements and failure to prove common intention or conspiracy lead to acquittal of co-accused based on the benefit of doubt.( Para 17)

Applying Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the burden is placed on the accused to explain how the body of the missing boy came to be buried in their house, emphasizing the incriminating evidence against them.( Para 19)

The court deliberates on the sentencing, emphasizing that death sentences are reserved for the "rarest of rare cases." Factors considered include the brutality of the murder, lack of basic humanness in the accused, and their prior conviction for a similar offense.( Paras 22, 23)

Facts:

Air Commodore Naveen Jain, along with nine other officers, was being considered for promotion to the rank of Air Vice Marshal against five vacancies. Despite securing the top position in the merit list, he was not promoted due to his placement at serial number 3 in seniority.

Issues:

The interpretation and application of the Promotion Policy dated February 20, 2008. The appellant's contention was centered on lost promotion opportunities as he reached superannuation before vacancies arose.

Held:

The Promotion Policy does not explicitly state whether promotion is based on "merit-cum-seniority" or "seniority-cum-merit." However, clauses 17 and 22 clarify that the select list is prepared from the merit list and rearranged in order of seniority.( Para 10)

The Court emphasized that the Promotion Policy, as per clauses 17 and 22, ensures the determination of the final list based on merit first and then rearranging it in order of seniority. The policy, therefore, is not illegal, arbitrary, or discriminatory and does not violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.( Para 18)

The Court held that the lack of promotion due to non-availability of vacancies before superannuation is not a ground to strike down the Promotion Policy. The two-stage policy, involving shortlisting based on eligibility criteria and marks, does not make the applicability of seniority arbitrary or irrational.( Para 21)

Promotion to the post of Air Vice Marshal is governed by the Circular dated February 20, 2008, and can be claimed only in terms of eligibility and the norms fixed therein. The policy provides equal opportunities to officers within the zone of consideration, and the appellant is estopped from challenging the policy after participating in the selection process based on it.( Para 22)

The Court affirmed that the Promotion Policy, in line with the executive instructions, does not discriminate and provides equal opportunities to officers within the zone of consideration and subsequent promotion.( Para 23)

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, upholding the validity of the Promotion Policy and finding it legally sound, non-discriminatory, and in compliance with constitutional provisions.

Facts:

The petitioner, Sudam @ Rahul Kaniram Jadhav, filed Review Petition (Crl.) Nos.401-402 of 2012 challenging his conviction under Section 302 IPC based on circumstantial evidence.

Issues:

The scope of review jurisdiction in criminal proceedings, the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, the correctness of the death sentence, and the petitioner's conduct in prison.

Held:

The scope of review jurisdiction in criminal proceedings is limited to correcting miscarriages of justice caused by an error apparent on the face of the record, guided by Article 137 of the Constitution and Order XL Rule 10 of the Supreme Court Rules. The court cannot re-appreciate evidence in its entirety during the review (Para 1 to Para 6.5).

The petitioner's conviction under Section 302 IPC based on circumstantial evidence was upheld, and there were no grounds for interference with the findings on the "last seen" circumstance, extra-judicial confession, and motive. The chain of circumstances established the guilt beyond reasonable doubt (Para 10 to Para 17).

Though evidence being circumstantial may be a relevant consideration in sentencing, there is no bar on awarding the death sentence. The decision depends on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case, considering both aggravating and mitigating factors (Para 18.1 to Para 18.2).

The death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment due to a mitigating circumstance in the nature of circumstantial evidence. Incorrect observations regarding the deceased's facial injuries affected the decision. Life imprisonment alone would be inadequate, and the petitioner was ordered to remain in prison for life with restrictions on remission (Para 20 to Para 22.1).

Facts:

The case involves a criminal complaint against an MLA, Satish Ukey, alleging the non-disclosure of two criminal cases in Form 26, as required by the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

Issues:

The interpretation of Sections 33-A and 125-A of the 1951 Act, along with Rules 4A and Form 26 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961.

The central question is whether the information to be furnished by a candidate under Section 33-A includes cases where cognizance has been taken by the court, in addition to cases where charges have been framed.

Held:

The highlight that Section 33-A, as initially drafted, required information about convictions and cases where charges had been framed but excluded cases where cognizance had been taken. However, the court emphasizes that Form 26 mandates disclosure not only for cases where charges have been framed but also for cases where cognizance has been taken by the court.( Paragraph 8 and 9)

address the crucial question of whether the word 'information' in Section 125-A includes information beyond what is mentioned in clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 33-A(1). The court notes the requirement of providing information in Form 26 under Section 33-A(2).( Paragraphs 12 and 13)

Discuss the amendments made to Form 26 in 2012, explicitly mandating the disclosure of information about cases where cognizance has been taken. The court stresses that the new Form 26 requires information on both framed charges and cases where cognizance has been taken.( Paragraphs 15, 16, and 17 )

Refers to letters from the Election Commission emphasizing that candidates must furnish information on cases where a competent court has taken cognizance, along with cases where charges have been framed.( Paragraph 18)

Concludes that the information to be furnished under Section 33-A includes not only the information in clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 33-A(1) but also information required under the Act or the Rules, to be provided in Form 26.( Paragraph 19 )

Declares that the trial court's order, upheld by the High Court, is legally untenable. The complaint will be reconsidered afresh by the trial court.( Paragraph 20 )

Decision: The appeals are allowed, and the orders of the lower courts are set aside. The complaint will be reconsidered afresh by the trial court.

Facts:

The case revolves around the issuance and verification of caste certificates under the Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, De-notified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Classes, and Special Backward Category (Regulation of Issuance and Verification of) Caste Certificate Act, 2000. A notification dated July 30, 2011, established district-level committees for verification, subsequently quashed by the High Court. Challenges were raised against Caste Validity Certificates, alleging fraud in obtaining them during the interregnum period between the said notification and the Rules notified on August 31, 2012.

Issues:

The validity of the Caste Validity Certificates, the discretionary powers of the Scrutiny Committee, and the mandatory requirement of verification by the Vigilance Cell.

The challenge also questioned the conformity of the notification with directions given in the Kumari Madhuri Patil case.

Held:

Composition of Scrutiny Committee:

The composition of the Scrutiny Committee was a point of contention, with the court emphasizing that, as long as the procedure adheres to legal requirements, strict adherence to previous directions is not necessary (Para 26).

The court rejected the challenge against the notification on the grounds of non-conformity with Kumari Madhuri Patil case, as such a challenge would not be sustainable (Para 26).

Requirement of Vigilance Cell Verification:

The court affirmed the mandatory requirement of verification by the Vigilance Cell, as established in the Kumari Madhuri Patil case (Para 27).

During the interregnum period, the input from the Vigilance Cell was obtained selectively, leading to a flawed exercise. The court directed a fresh exercise to be undertaken by the Caste Scrutiny Committee (Para 27).

Fresh Exercise and Timeline:

The court quashed the exercise conducted during the interregnum period, directing a fresh exercise to be completed within six months, i.e., on or before March 31, 2020 (Para 29, 31).

Existing certificates issued for the interregnum period would remain valid until the completion of the fresh exercise (Para 31).

Appeals and Vigilance Inquiry:

Individuals whose caste certificates were rejected without vigilance inquiry were granted the right to appeal as per Rule 7 of the 2012 Rules (Para 31).

Cases where an adverse report existed, yet a caste validity certificate was issued, were to be re-examined in the fresh exercise. The appeals are accordingly allowed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. (Para 31).

Facts:

Dispute over ownership of land in Survey No. 493 of Patwari Halka No.76 at Village-Purani Chhabani, Guna.

Original landowners sold land to Urmila Devi, who later sold a portion to the appellants.

Plaintiff, Matadin, claimed adverse possession based on Khasra entries for 1960-1961.

Trial court decreed in favor of the plaintiff, but the first appellate court allowed the appeal by the appellants.

High Court, in a second appeal, reversed the first appellate court's order and restored the trial court's decree in favor of the plaintiff.

Issues:

Validity of the plaintiff's claim of adverse possession.

Corrections in Khasra entries and their impact on the claim.

Whether the High Court erred in re-evaluating the evidence.

Held:

The court observed that the plaintiff's claim of possession originating in 1960-1961 was questionable, especially considering the suspicious corrections in the Khasra entries. The court noted that the son and nephew of the plaintiff were clerks in the collectorate, and they faced departmental proceedings and criminal prosecution for making false entries. The court highlighted that the entries in the name of Urmila Devi, the purchaser, were in blue ink, while the entries in the name of the plaintiff were in red ink.

The court concluded that the first appellate court's finding on possession being with Urmila Devi, supported by the court commissioner's report and the subsequent sale deed to the appellants, did not require interference. The High Court's finding that Urmila Devi never acquired possession, and the plaintiff established adverse possession, was considered perverse. The court emphasized that the plaintiff failed to establish peaceful, open, and continuous possession demonstrating a wrongful ouster of the rightful owner.

In light of these findings, the court set aside the High Court's order, restored the first appellate court's order, and dismissed the suit in favor of the appellants. The appeals were allowed.

Facts:

The case involves a review petition challenging the guidelines issued in the case of Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra. The guidelines pertained to arrests under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, specifically requiring approval for the arrest of public servants and a preliminary inquiry by a Dy.S.P for non-public servants.

Issues:

The validity of the guidelines issued in the Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan case.

The impact of the guidelines on the rights and protections afforded to members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes under the 1989 Act.

Held:

The court holds that Section 18 of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, is not violative of Article 21. The court emphasizes the historical discrimination faced by these communities and the need for protective discrimination. The existing provisions regarding arrests are analyzed, and the court concludes that the guidelines in question restrict the right to arrest.

The court discusses the right to live with dignity and the concomitant provision of compensation for human rights violations under Article 21. It emphasizes that the Act of 1989 is in essence aligned with various facets of Article 21, providing protections and compensation. The court rejects the notion of a presumption that members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes may misuse the law and argues against discrimination in procedures.

The court refutes the idea that the caste of a person is the cause for lodging false reports under the Act. It highlights the vulnerable position of these communities and the need for special protections. The court dismisses the argument that the high number of cases registered in 2016 indicates misuse of the Act and stresses that such misuse can be addressed through existing legal mechanisms.

The court addresses concerns related to the approval of arrests by the appointing authority for public servants. It argues that Section 197 of the Cr.PC already provides protection, and requiring appointing authority approval at the arrest stage would be discriminatory and encroach upon legislative territory.

The court rejects the idea that approval of the SSP is necessary for the arrest of non-public servants, emphasizing that it may cause delays and is not statutorily envisaged.

The court concludes that requiring the Magistrate to scrutinize reasons for further detention is unnecessary when approval from the appointing authority or SSP has not been granted. It emphasizes that this process may delay proceedings under the Act of 1989.

The court recalls guidelines (iii) and (iv) issued in the Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan case, stating that they encroach upon legislative territory and are against the concept of protective discrimination under Article 15(4). As a result, direction No.(v) also becomes irrelevant.

FACTS:

The case involved a dispute over the allotment of land, particularly Survey No. 129/45/D, to Andhra Prabha Publications under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976.

A learned Single Judge directed a survey to determine if the allotted land was indeed Survey No. 129/45/D.

The Division Bench initially set aside the Single Judge's judgment, but the Supreme Court disagreed in its judgment on 16.08.2017, restoring the Single Judge's direction for a survey.

Despite subsequent orders, the demarcation of Survey No. 129/45/D had not taken place as directed.

ISSUES:

Whether the land allotted to Andhra Prabha Publications was the same as Survey No. 129/45/D.

HELD:

In light of the extraordinary facts and the reluctance of authorities to part with the valuable land, the Court, using powers under Article 142, rejected the second Survey Report. The Court declared that the land marked as Survey No. 19/P, specifically 'PQRS' in the map, is actually Survey No. 129/45/D. The allotment to Andhra Prabha Publications was set aside, and they were directed to deliver the land to the government within eight weeks. The miscellaneous application is accordingly disposed of. ( Para 13)

All amounts paid by Andhra Prabha Publications to the Government were ordered to be refunded within twelve weeks, along with simple interest at 6 percent per annum.( Para 14)