Facts:

Multiple accused, including Postman Vengaisamy (A-l), Thalaiyaripandi (A-ll), and others, were tried for offenses under Sections 148, 302, and 506 (Part II) IPC.

Incidents occurred on April 8, 2003, and April 26, 2003, involving alleged attacks on the deceased, Chinnaperiaiyah, and others.

Issues:

Credibility of prosecution witnesses, especially Irulandi (PW-1) and Ramar (PW-2).

Allegations of the accused being armed with weapons and forming an unlawful assembly.

Held:

The court hears arguments from both sides and finds no merit in the appeal.( Paragraph 8)

Irulandi (PW-1) and Ramar (PW-2) testified to being surrounded by accused, led by Thalaiyaripandi (A-ll), armed with swords. Accused attacked the deceased and injured Irulandi (PW-1) and Ramar (PW-2). Defense claims these witnesses are introduced, but the court finds no such inference from cross-examination.( Paragraph 9)

Medical evidence supports the oral testimony. Dr. Jayakumar (PW-13) examined Irulandi (PW-1) and Ramar (PW-2) on the same day. Deceased's postmortem report (Ex.P-28) and medical reports (Ex.P-29, Ex.P-30) of the injured witnesses corroborate events.( Paragraph 10)

Statements of Baskaran (PW-4) and Rathi (PW-5) confirm the incident on April 8, 2003, adding to the credibility of the prosecution's case.( Paragraph 11)

Court rejects the applicability of precedents cited by the defense (Ram Laxman, Najabhai Desurbhai Wagh, and Mahendran) as they are distinguishable from the facts of the present case.( Paragraph 13)

Reiterates the principle that "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus" has no application in India. Even if part of a witness's statement is unproved, the entire testimony cannot be rejected.( Paragraph 14)

Conclusion: The court dismisses the appeal, affirming the judgment of conviction and sentence by the High Court. Appellants are granted three months to surrender before the competent court.

Facts:

The appellant sought specific performance of an agreement to sell land.

The trial court decreed the suit, but the decree for specific performance was declined in the second appeal.

The High Court granted a decree for recovery of the earnest money with interest.

Issues:

The scope of second appeal as per Section 100 of the CPC and Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act.

The validity of the power of attorney to purchase land.

The plaintiff's readiness and willingness to perform the contract.

Held:

The court emphasized the limited scope of second appeals, clarifying that interference is only allowed in case of an error in law or procedure, not on findings of fact.

The High Court's interference based on the absence of a specific power of attorney was found unjustified.

The judgment highlighted the findings of the first appellate court that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform the agreement.

Financial capacity, evidenced by the execution of sale deeds, was considered.

The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the decree for specific performance was restored.

The appellant was granted two months to pay the balance sale consideration, and if not received, the plaintiff could deposit the amount with the executing court.

The appeal was allowed, and no costs were imposed. The court reinstated the decree for specific performance, emphasizing the limitations on the High Court's jurisdiction in second appeals.

FACTS:

The appellant, an ex-Havildar in the Indian Army, completed 24 years of service with a two-year extension granted.

During the extended tenure, the appellant suffered a stroke and was discharged after being re-categorized with an 80% disability.

The appellant sought disability pension and ex-gratia compensation.

ISSUES:

Eligibility for ex-gratia compensation based on the conditions stipulated in the policy circular dated December 26, 2011.

Interpretation of Regulations 173 and 173-A of the Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961.

HELD:

The court emphasized the specific conditions for ex-gratia compensation outlined in the policy circular.

The appellant, having been discharged due to a permanent low medical category during the extended service, was entitled to disability pension under Regulation 173-A but did not meet the criteria for ex-gratia compensation.

The deeming fiction under Regulation 173-A was held not to extend to the policy document dated December 26, 2011.

The appeal was dismissed on the grounds that the claim for ex-gratia compensation could not be entertained.

Facts:

Zorawar Singh owned certain immovable property in New Delhi.

Zorawar Singh executed a Will dated June 16, 1985, and a codicil dated October 21, 1995.

Two suits were filed: one by the respondents claiming declaration and permanent injunction in respect of the Will and codicil, and the other by the appellant claiming natural succession.

Issues:

The applicability of Clause (c) of Section 213(2) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925.

Whether it is necessary to seek probate or letters of administration in the National Capital Region of Delhi.

Held:

The Act is applicable to Wills and codicils made by Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, or Jains, subject to the jurisdiction of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal or within the local limits of the High Courts of Madras or Bombay - {clause (a) of Section 57 of the Act}.

It is also applicable to Wills and codicils made outside those territories and limits in relation to immovable property within those territories - Clause (b) of Section 57.

Clause (c) of Section 57 applies to Wills and codicils made by Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, or Jains on or after January 1, 1927, to which provisions are not applied by clauses (a) and (b).

Sub-section (2) of Section 213 of the Act applies only to Wills made by Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, or Jains falling under clauses (a) or (b) of Section 57, making clause (c) inapplicable.

The judgment cites several cases supporting the view that probate is not necessary for Wills made outside Bengal, Madras, or Bombay concerning properties and parties not located in those territories.

The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court's order, which accepted an intra-court appeal against the rejection of the plaint based on Section 213, was upheld.

The appeal was dismissed, finding no error in the judgment passed by the Delhi High Court.

Facts:

Dispute arose between the appellants and the respondent over alleged damage to goods stored in the respondent's cold storage.

Appellants disputed the existence of the arbitration clause and objected to the appointment of Sri S.T. Madnani as an arbitrator due to his prior representation of the respondent in another case.

Despite objections, Madnani proceeded with the arbitration, awarding the respondent the claim amount.

Issues:

Validity of the arbitration clause.

Arbitrator's conduct in failing to disclose prior representation of one party in another case.

Held:

The Court addressed the validity of the arbitration clause, noting that the appellants had previously sought the appointment of an independent arbitrator, rejecting the contention of no consensus ad idem.

The crucial issue was the conduct of the arbitrator, Sri S.T. Madnani, who failed to disclose his prior representation of the respondent in another case, violating Section 12(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Citing the V.K. Dewan and Co. case, the Court held that Madnani should not have acted as an arbitrator in fairness.

The Court emphasized the need for justice to be done and seen to be done. Madnani's failure to recuse himself rendered the award unsustainable. The Court set aside the High Court's order, reinstating the District Judge's decision to set aside the award.

The parties were given the liberty to pursue arbitration according to the law, and all contentions on the merits of the claim were left open.

Facts:

Respondent No.1, Abdul Halim, educated outside West Bengal, applied for the position of Assistant Teacher.

He lacked Bengali as a subject at various educational levels but completed a Certificate Course in Bengali from the University of Delhi.

Despite eligibility criteria requiring proficiency in Bengali, Halim was empanelled but later had his selection canceled due to opting for a Bengali medium school.

Issues:

Interpretation of eligibility criteria concerning the language of instruction.

Validity of the Certificate Course in Bengali from the University of Delhi.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the interpretation of eligibility criteria by the authorities, requiring proficiency in Bengali at a level equivalent to post Higher Secondary education, was plausible. The Court noted the lack of evidence certifying the Certificate Course's standard equivalence to Bengali at the post Higher Secondary level. The High Court's decision was set aside, allowing the appeal with no costs.

Facts:

The appellants, father and son, were accused of dowry death concerning the suicide of the wife of accused no.1. Allegations included cruelty due to dowry demands. The trial court acquitted both appellants, finding the prosecution failed to prove the case. The High Court overturned this decision, relying on witness depositions and misplaced letters.

Issues:

The reliability of witness testimonies.

Misplacement of crucial letters.

Applicability of Sections 304B and 306 r/w Section 34 of the IPC.

Held:

Section 304B and Presumption: Section 304B applies if a woman's death within 7 years of marriage results from cruelty or harassment for dowry. The presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act is rebuttable, allowing the accused to show the absence of elements of Section 304B. (Paras 33, 34)

Contradictions in Evidence: The testimony of the sister of the deceased, PW-1, and contradictions in the evidence of the deceased's father, PW4, were highlighted. The prosecution's case, as presented through PW4, was deemed unacceptable, and contradictions went to the root of the matter. (Paras 36, 37, 38, 39)

Missing Letters: The two letters allegedly written by the deceased were not produced. Even if misplaced, the absence of harassment allegations in letters sent by PW4 was crucial. The High Court's reliance on the allegedly missing letters in an appeal against acquittal was deemed unacceptable. (Paras 42, 43, 46)

Scope of Trial and Relevant Evidence: The High Court's consideration of evidence related to harassment by the second accused (son) was found irrelevant and foreign to the trial for the offense under Section 304B. The Court emphasized that the evidence must be directly related to the demand for dowry. (Paras 51-53)

Appellate Court's Role: The Appellate Court has the power and duty to reappraise evidence. The Court stressed that truth in a criminal trial is discovered by analyzing chief examination, cross-examination, and re-examination. (Para 50)

Decision: The Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the conviction under Section 304B.

Facts:

The complainant, Shiv Prakash Mishra, filed a complaint against several accused, including Subhash Chandra Shukla.

Subsequent investigations led to the exclusion of Subhash Chandra Shukla from the charge sheet, as evidence indicated his absence at the place of the incident.

During the trial, the appellant sought to summon Subhash Chandra Shukla under Section 319 CrPC.

Issues:

Whether the evidence presented justifies summoning Subhash Chandra Shukla as an additional accused under Section 319 CrPC.

Held:

The court emphasized the discretionary nature of the power under Section 319 CrPC, to be exercised sparingly and based on strong and cogent evidence. The court found contradictions in witness statements and highlighted the absence of Subhash Chandra Shukla at the place of the incident during the investigation. The trial court's decision to dismiss the application under Section 319 CrPC was upheld. The appellant failed to file a protest petition during the investigation, and the court concluded that the power under Section 319 CrPC should not be exercised in a casual or cavalier manner.

Facts:

Respondent No.1 was found tampering with the meter, leading to a loss assessed at Rs. 6,28,383.

The appellant argued that this was respondent No.1's second offense, with a prior case compounded in 2009.

The complaint was filed under Section 135 of the Electricity Act, 2003.

Issues:

Delay in filing the complaint within 24 hours as required under Section 135(1A) of the Electricity Act, 2003.

Jurisdiction of the Special Court under Section 193 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Held:

The Special Court is empowered by the proviso to Section 151 of the Electricity Act, 2003, to take cognizance directly, negating the need for an order of committal under Section 193 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Dismissing the claim of delay, the Supreme Court accepts the appellant's submission that the disconnection occurred within the specified time.

The government notification (G.O.Ms. No.118) designates the 1st Additional District Judge's Court as a Special Court, establishing jurisdiction.

The High Court's order quashing proceedings is set aside. The Supreme Court does not delve into the merits, leaving it to the trial court.