Facts:

The Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited (the appellant) allotted industrial plots to various entrepreneurs (the respondents) with the condition that they must establish their units within two years from the date of taking possession of the plots.

The respondents failed to meet this condition within the stipulated time frame, leading to show-cause notices for cancellation of the plots by the Corporation.

The respondents argued that once the sale deeds were executed, transferring absolute ownership of the plots to them, the Corporation had no authority to cancel the allotments or demand payment of 50% of the prevailing market value.

Issues:

Whether the Corporation had the authority to cancel allotments and demand payment based on the conditions mentioned in the allotment letters after the execution of sale deeds.

Held and Decision:

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, emphasizing that once the sale deeds were executed, transferring absolute ownership to the respondents, the Corporation could not insist on the conditions mentioned in the allotment letters. The Court also rejected the Corporation's argument that the doctrine of proportionality did not apply in this case, noting that the Corporation had withdrawn the cancellation action and instead demanded payment of 50% of the prevailing market value, which had no legal basis after the registration of the sale deeds.

In view of the above, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Corporation and upheld the High Court's decision, ordering the Corporation to pay costs.

Facts:

The appellants filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction regarding joint ownership and possession of ancestral property. They alleged fraud in the execution of a registered sale deed by the respondents.

Issues:

Whether the suit was barred by limitation, as contended by the respondents under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the CPC.

Held:

The Supreme Court reinstated the decision of the Trial Court, holding that the issue of limitation was a triable issue and should not lead to the rejection of the plaint at the threshold. The Court emphasized that only the averments in the plaint should be considered at this stage and criticized the High Court for basing its decision on assumptions rather than analyzing the content of the plaint. Therefore, the Court allowed the appeal and restored the order of the Trial Court.

Facts:

The appellant, Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu Public (Law and Order) Revenue Department, issued an order of detention under Section 3(1)(ii) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA Act) against the respondent, Kamala.

The High Court quashed the detention order on the ground that the period of detention was not specified in the order.

Issues:

Whether the absence of specifying the period of detention in the detention order renders it invalid under the COFEPOSA Act.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the detention order is not rendered invalid or illegal merely because it does not specify the period of detention.

The Court emphasized that the COFEPOSA Act does not require the specifying of the period for which a detenu is to be detained, and the implication of not specifying a period is that the detention is for the maximum period prescribed under the Act.

The Court referred to previous judgments, including T. Devaki v. Government of Tamil Nadu, which overruled Commissioner of Police v. Gurbux Anandram Bhiryani, establishing the legal position that non-specification of the period of detention does not invalidate the detention order.

Consequently, the High Court's judgment quashing the detention order was set aside, and the detention order was revived. However, since the period of detention had already concluded, no further action was required except for clarifying the legal position.

Facts:

The petitioner, Bharatiya Janata Party West Bengal, filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of mandamus.

They requested the West Bengal State Election Commission to issue nomination forms for their candidates for the upcoming panchayat elections and to provide police protection to them.

Instances of violence hindering their candidates from obtaining and filing nomination forms were cited, as reported in various newspapers.

Issues:

Whether the court should intervene in the conduct of the panchayat elections in West Bengal due to reported violence hindering the nomination process.

Whether the writ petition is maintainable in light of the precedents cited by the respondents.

Held:

The court acknowledged the initiation of the election process but expressed concern over reports of violence impeding the nomination process. It emphasized the responsibility of the State Election Commissioner to address grievances related to the election process.

The court disposed of the petition, granting liberty to political parties and candidates, including independents, to approach the State Election Commissioner with their grievances. It instructed the Commissioner to address these grievances promptly and in accordance with the law. The court expressed hope that steps would be taken to ensure fair and free elections, addressing the concerns raised by the petitioner and other candidates.

Facts:

Brijesh Singh, the deceased son of the appellant Munshiram, was married to Khushboo.

Allegations of harassment and false complaints were made by both parties against each other.

Brijesh Singh committed suicide on July 8, 2013, allegedly due to continuous humiliation and suffering inflicted by his wife and her family.

Two suicide notes were found, implicating the wife and her family in the harassment and threats against the deceased.

An FIR was lodged by Munshiram against Khushboo and her family under Section 306 IPC for abetting the suicide of his son.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's decision to quash the FIR was justified?

Whether Section 482 of CrPC was used appropriately in quashing the FIR?

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in prematurely quashing the FIR without allowing proper investigation by the police. The Court emphasized the cautious use of Section 482 of CrPC in quashing FIRs and noted that it should only be done when continuing the investigation would amount to an abuse of process. The investigation was still pending, and certain factual assertions made in the FIR required thorough examination. The findings of the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report, which indicated similarities between the handwriting in the suicide notes and that of the deceased, were significant. Additionally, the status report filed by the police implicated the respondents in the alleged offense under Section 306 of the IPC.

Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and directed the investigative authorities to complete the investigation promptly and reach a logical conclusion.

The observations made by the Court should not be construed as findings on the merits of the case, and the investigative authority and the court were instructed to evaluate the matter impartially.

Facts:

The case involves a habeas corpus petition filed by the father, Asokan K.M., expressing apprehension that his 26-year-old daughter, respondent no. 9, was being transported out of the country against her will. During the proceedings, respondent no. 9 appeared before the court and expressed her desire to stay with respondent no. 7, declining to go with her parents. Subsequently, she married the appellant, Shafin Jahan. The High Court, in its impugned order, declared the marriage null and void and directed respondent no. 9's custody to her father.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in annulling the marriage and determining respondent no. 9's custody while entertaining a habeas corpus petition.

Whether the invocation of the parens patriae doctrine by the High Court was justified in this case.

Whether the expression of choice and autonomy in matters of marriage is protected under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

Held:

The Supreme Court criticized the High Court's decision to annul the marriage and determine respondent no. 9's custody while entertaining a habeas corpus petition. It emphasized that the expression of choice is a fundamental right under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution, and once an individual asserts their choice freely, the court's inquiry should cease.

The Court held that the invocation of the parens patriae doctrine by the High Court was unjustified in this case. It stated that this doctrine should only be invoked in exceptional cases where individuals are incapable of asserting their own rights, such as minors or those with mental incapacity, which was not the case with respondent no. 9.

Emphasizing the importance of individual autonomy in marriage, the Supreme Court reiterated that neither the state nor society can intrude into matters of personal choice and marital decisions. It held that the High Court's interference in annulling the marriage exceeded its jurisdiction.

Facts:

Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA) granted permission in 1997 to allot land to a proposed Cooperative Housing Society of its employees.

The initial allotment lapsed due to non-compliance with regulations regarding payment of premiums.

In 2003, a fresh allotment was made by MMRDA based on a new proposal submitted by the housing society.

Appellants contested their exclusion from the list of eligible members for the new allotment, arguing that their eligibility should be determined based on the original resolution from 1997.

The housing society requested a fresh consideration of the allotment based on the Government of Maharashtra Resolution dated 09.07.1999.

Issues:

Whether the 2003 allotment constituted a fresh allotment or was a continuation of the 1997 resolution.

Whether the eligibility criteria set forth in the new resolution applied to determine eligibility.

Held:

The court held that the 2003 allotment was a fresh one based on a new proposal and a subsequent resolution. The eligibility criteria set forth in the new resolution, which included being in service on the date of the allotment letter, applied to determine eligibility. The court also noted that the housing society itself had acknowledged this eligibility criterion. Furthermore, the court observed that the area of land allotted to the society had been reduced due to the inclusion of non-eligible members in the initial list. Consequently, the court upheld the High Court's decision to dismiss the writ petition, finding no grounds for granting relief to the appellants.

Facts:

The appellants, Uma Pandey, filed a civil suit against the respondents, Munna Pandey, seeking partition and separate possession of agricultural lands.

The appellants claimed their share in the ancestral lands owned by the family.

The trial court decreed in favor of the appellants, but the first appellate court ruled in favor of the respondents, which the High Court affirmed.

This appeal was filed in the Supreme Court challenging the High Court's decision.

Issues:

Whether the second appeal involved substantial questions of law under Section 100 of the CPC.

Whether the High Court erred in dismissing the second appeal in limine.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in dismissing the second appeal in limine, as there were substantial questions of law involved. The Court framed specific questions for consideration in the second appeal, including the nature of the document (whether it could be termed a partition deed), its binding effect on the plaintiffs, and whether any objection about its admissibility could be raised at this stage.

Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and remanded the case back to the High Court for a decision on the merits of the substantial questions of law framed by the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court directed the High Court to decide the appeal within six months, emphasizing that the High Court should decide the case strictly in accordance with the law and uninfluenced by the observations made by the Supreme Court.

Facts:

The appellant, Raghunath Prasad Pande, challenged a decision made by both a learned Single Judge and a Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka. The case centered around the interpretation of Sections 14(1) and 14(5) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, formerly known as the Mysore Land Reforms Act, 1961. The appellant had entered into a compromise deed with the respondents on 02.03.1970, permitting the appellant to resume possession of 4 acres of land. The compromise deed was submitted before the Munsiff/Tribunal, and possession of the land was handed over to the appellant as per the order dated 2.3.1970 passed by the Munsiff/Tribunal.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's possession of the land, as per the compromise deed, complied with the procedural requirements of Section 14(5) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961.

Held:

The Court held that despite the procedural aspect not strictly adhering to Section 14(5) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, the compromise deed, acted upon by handing over possession, fulfilled the substantive requirements of the law. The Court criticized the hyper-technical approach taken by the High Court and concluded that the appellant's possession of the land since 02.03.1970 was legal. The Court further noted that the land in question had already been acquired by the State Government, and the possession of 4 acres of land had been taken from the appellant for public purposes. Therefore, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned judgments, and disposed of any pending applications. No costs were awarded in the case.