Facts:

The appellant, DUNCANS INDUSTRIES LTD., manages 14 tea gardens, and the Central Government, under the Tea Act, took control of 7 gardens. The appellant defaulted on payments to the respondent-operational creditor for pesticides.

Issues:

The maintainability of insolvency proceedings under the IBC without the prior consent of the Central Government as mandated by Section 16G(1)(c) of the Tea Act.

The applicability of Section 16G of the Tea Act considering the continued management and control of the appellant over the tea gardens.

Held:

In effect, the appellant continues to be in management and control of the tea estates, despite the Central Government's control over 7 gardens. The Court noted that Section 16G(1)(c) of the Tea Act is not applicable as the appellant remains in control. The provisions of the IBC override the Tea Act, and no prior consent of the Central Government is required for insolvency proceedings under Section 7 or Section 9 of the IBC.

Section 16G(1)(c) refers to winding up proceedings. The Court clarified that proceedings under Section 9 of the IBC are not limited to winding up and are focused on corporate insolvency resolution. The IBC's objective is to ensure the revival of the corporate debtor. Section 238 of the IBC, being a subsequent Act to the Tea Act, takes precedence, and the IBC's provisions override the Tea Act.

Conclusion: The Court upheld the NCLAT decision, stating that the insolvency petition under Section 9 of the IBC initiated by the respondent-operational creditor is maintainable.

Facts:

Incident occurred on 01-11-1983 at about 06:30 PM.

Appellants and others were members of an unlawful assembly armed with spears and lathis.

Deceased was surrounded to prevent escape; initial assault on the head with a lathi.

Witnesses (PW7 and PW8) were also assaulted; appellants convicted under Section 302/149 IPC.

Issues:

Defective charge under Section 147 against four persons.

Prejudice in defense due to inadequate Section 313 CrPC questioning.

Inconsistencies in prosecution evidence and challenges to witness credibility.

Absence of injury reports for PW7 and PW8.

False implication due to previous enmity.

Held:

Omission in framing charge under Section 147 deemed inadvertent and non-prejudicial.

Absence of injury reports considered a case of defective investigation, not discrediting witness credibility.

Challenges to convictions based on procedural irregularities require demonstration of actual and material prejudice.

Despite objections to Section 313 CrPC questioning, no prejudice found; upheld convictions.

Bail canceled; appellants directed to surrender for remaining sentence.

Facts:

Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. filed a suit before the Commercial Court seeking registration of a mortgage deed related to an immovable property.

The High Court held that the immovable property was not used for trade or commerce, making the suit not maintainable before the Commercial Court.

Issues:

Whether the dispute arising from the agreement qualifies as a commercial dispute under Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of the Commercial Courts Act.

Whether the immovable property was used exclusively in trade or commerce.

Held:

The court examined Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of the Commercial Courts Act, which defines commercial disputes arising from agreements related to immovable property used exclusively in trade or commerce.

The plaintiff's suit sought specific performance of the MoU terms, but neither the agreement nor the plaint indicated exclusive use of the immovable property for trade or commerce.

Emphasized the need for basic pleadings and a purposive interpretation of the Commercial Courts Act to avoid burdening the system with non-commercial disputes.

Stressed the importance of entertaining only disputes that fit the definition of 'commercial disputes' and ensuring a strict procedure for such litigation.

Highlighted that a dispute involving immovable property becomes a commercial dispute only if the property is "used exclusively" in trade or commerce, and the term "used" means "actually used."

Described the facts of the case involving a Memorandum of Understanding executed in 2017 and the execution of a mortgage deed, emphasizing that the property's use was not exclusively for trade or commerce.

Pointed out that the trial court incorrectly assumed the property's use based on the plaintiff's business activities, and the property was not being exclusively used in trade or commerce in 2012.

Reiterated the purpose of Commercial Courts for speedy resolution of commercial disputes, and the need for meaningful interpretation to benefit litigants engaged in trade and commerce.

Conclusion: The court held that the suit did not qualify as a commercial dispute under Section 2(1)(c)(vii) due to the lack of pleadings indicating exclusive use of the property for trade or commerce. The Commercial Court was directed to return the plaint to the court with jurisdiction.

Facts:

The High Court concluded that road traffic offenses should be exclusively dealt with under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and prosecuting such cases under the Penal Code lacks legal sanction.

Issues:

The conflict arises over whether road traffic offenses should be prosecuted solely under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, or if the Penal Code, 1860, can also be invoked.

Held:

The Supreme Court clarified that there is no conflict between the Penal Code and the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Both statutes operate in distinct spheres, and their offenses, penal consequences, and ingredients are separate and independent.

The principle that the special law should prevail over the general law does not apply to the prosecution of offenders in road accidents under both the IPC and the MV Act.( Para No. 6)

Motor Vehicles Act lacks specific provisions for offenses causing death, grievous hurt, or hurt by a motor vehicle in motor vehicle accidents, unlike the IPC.( Para No. 7)

Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, allows an offender to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of the enactments when an act constitutes an offense under multiple laws.( Para No. 8)

Legislative intent of the Motor Vehicles Act was not to override or supersede the provisions of the IPC regarding convictions of offenders in motor vehicle accidents.( Para No. 9)

The principle of proportionality between the crime and punishment is highlighted, emphasizing that the punishment under the IPC for motor vehicle offenses is stricter and proportionate.( Para No. 12)

A prosecution, if maintainable, can lie under both the IPC and the MV Act, as both statutes operate independently in their respective spheres.( Para No. 13)

Facts:

The government decided to provide employment to displaced abkari workers by reserving 25% of daily wage vacancies in the Corporation.

A subsequent change in policy favored dependent sons of deceased abkari workers who lost employment after 1996.

The affected abkari workers filed a writ petition seeking the implementation of the initial government order.

Issues:

Whether there was a legitimate expectation for re-employment for all displaced abkari workers.

Whether the change in policy was arbitrary or in the public interest.

Whether the altered assurance to consider dependent sons of deceased abkari workers was justified.

Held:

The Court held that no assurance was given to provide re-employment to all displaced abkari workers. The government promised to reserve 25% of future daily wage vacancies, and no vested right accrued to all abkari workers.

The change in policy was deemed justifiable due to administrative difficulties in implementing the initial order, considering the insufficient number of vacancies.

The Court recognized the principle of substantive legitimate expectation but emphasized that administrative policies may change with evolving circumstances.

The decision makers' freedom to change policy in the public interest cannot be fettered by applying the principle of substantive legitimate expectation.

The expectation of the respondents for consideration against future vacancies was deemed not legitimate, considering the change in policy. The decision to alter the policy was made to balance the interests of displaced abkari workers and unemployed youth.

The requirement of giving an opportunity before altering the policy was discussed, noting that displaced abkari workers were consulted through their representatives.

The Court acknowledged that a claim of legitimate expectation can be raised if an administrative authority reneges from a promise without giving an opportunity, especially if past practice dictates so.

The principle of procedural legitimate expectation was discussed, emphasizing exceptions in cases where the government announces a policy but subsequently withdraws it due to overriding public interest.

The Court differentiated between primary and secondary review, stating that the Court can ask the State to justify the policy during primary review, but secondary review shows deference to the executive's decision.

The Court explained the test of proportionality involving a 'balancing test' and 'necessity test.'

The change in policy was held not disproportionate, considering the balancing act between the interests of displaced workers and unemployed youth.

The Court applied the test of proportionality to review the impugned decision of the Government, given the challenge was on the ground of violation of Articles 14, 19, and 21.

The Court rejected the argument that the order dated 07.08.2004 was a continuation of the earlier order dated 20.02.2002.

The findings recorded by the High Court regarding a right of appointment accruing to the respondents were disapproved. The Order dated 07.08.2004 was issued in modification of the Order dated 20.02.2002.

FACTS:

The appellant, Madhoor Buildwell Private Limited, filed a writ petition seeking direction for the disbursement of approved funds under the Urban Infrastructure Development Scheme.

The Scheme involved funding from the Central Government (80%), State Government (10%), and the Municipal Council (10%).

The Municipal Council issued a public tender for an underground sewer Scheme without the Central Government's fund sanction.

The State Level Sanctioning Committee and Ministry of Urban Development approved the Sewage Scheme for Yeola Municipal Council, but funds were not released due to lack of approval from the Finance Department.

ISSUES:

Whether there is a commitment from the Central Government to release funds for Yeola Municipal Council.

The legality of the Municipal Council awarding the contract without the Central Government's fund sanction.

HELD:

The High Court's order dismissing the writ petition was upheld.

The Supreme Court emphasized the necessity of a sewage system in urban areas.

Directed the State Government to consider and approve the sewer Scheme for Yeola Municipal Council within three months.

If the State Government cannot provide funds, it should seek funds from the Central Government under the AMRUT Scheme.

The Central Government is expected to consider and decide within three months based on the State Government's recommendation. The appeal stands disposed of.

Facts:

The case, Nusli Neville Wadia v. Ivory Properties & Ors., pertains to the interpretation of Section 9A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The proceedings were heard by a bench consisting of Justice Arun Mishra, Justice M. R. Shah, and Justice B. R. Gavai. The judgment was delivered on October 4, 2019.

Issues:

The narrow interpretation of "jurisdiction to entertain" under Section 9A, the relationship between jurisdiction and the preliminary issue of limitation, and the distinction between the existence and exercise of jurisdiction.

Held:

The court clarified the meaning of "jurisdiction," emphasizing that it is the authority to decide and not solely the power to decide correctly. Jurisdiction encompasses the power to decide justiciable controversies, including questions of law and facts on merits. (Para 16, 17)

The interpretation of Section 9A was discussed, highlighting that "jurisdiction to entertain" is a narrower concept relating to the court's competence to receive a suit for adjudication, especially in the context of maintainability. (Para 28, 45)

The distinction between the existence and exercise of jurisdiction was emphasized. While a court may have jurisdiction, a mistake in its exercise can be a jurisdictional error, but it does not negate the existence of jurisdiction.

(Para 33, 36)

The court addressed the scope of Order XIV Rule 2 and Section 9A, noting that a mixed question of law and fact cannot be decided as a preliminary issue under these provisions. The court also discussed the rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) concerning issues of limitation.(Para 46, 65)

The literal interpretation of "jurisdiction to entertain" in Section 9A was emphasized, suggesting that it denotes the power to receive a case for consideration.(Para 76)

Decision: The court concluded that the word "jurisdiction" in Section 9A should be interpreted in the context of the power to entertain, and the court must have the competence to receive a suit for adjudication. While the court may have jurisdiction to decide issues of limitation, it may not be able to grant relief if the claim is time-barred.

Facts:

A sample of milk collected from the appellant was found to deviate from the prescribed standards under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The appellant was prosecuted and convicted by the trial court, with the conviction upheld by the Sessions Court and the High Court.

Issues:

Compliance with prescribed standards under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.

The significance of marginal variations in food standards.

Invocation of powers under Article 142 and Section 433 of CrPC.

Held:

The Court emphasized that adherence to prescribed standards is crucial in food cases, especially for primary foods like milk. It highlighted that the Act is consumer protection legislation, and even marginal deviations from standards are matters of serious concern for public health. The Court rejected arguments regarding delay in testing, non-compliance with Section 13(2), and the illiteracy of the appellant.

The Court clarified that powers under Section 433 of CrPC can only be exercised by the appropriate government and cannot be usurped by the courts. Article 142 powers cannot be used to pass orders contrary to the minimum sentence prescribed by law.

The appeal was dismissed, and the Court directed the appellant to surrender within four weeks to undergo the remaining sentence.

Facts:

Antoinette Bendre Bhagwat passed away in California, leaving a will dated 24.6.1977.

The will bequeathed properties to her husband, Balaji Bhagwat, and in case of his predecease, to be vested in an inter-vivos trust.

Probate was granted in California on 26.2.1981.

Letters of administration were sought in India by Dinkar Sambhaji Patole, as constituted attorney, and granted on 24.11.1994.

Ramesh Nivrutti Bhagwat, claiming to be a relative, filed for revocation of letters of administration in 1999, alleging non-compliance and fraud.

Issues:

Whether the application for revocation is time-barred under Article 137.

Whether the delay of 31 years in approaching the court for revocation is justified.

Whether the grant of probate in California is conclusive.

Held:

The Court held that the application for revocation is time-barred under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, which runs from the date of the appellant attaining majority. The delay of 31 years was considered unjustified, and no acceptable explanation for the delay was provided. The grant of probate in California is conclusive, and the ancillary letters of administration granted in India cannot be revoked. The application for revocation was dismissed.